THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND

OF

PEARL HARBOR

VOLUME II

Storage

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

■inteiident of Dooumantg, XS.9. Oorenuntnit PAujiisf;OHle*'
gton, D.C 20102 (8-pajt set; sold to sets only)

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

APPENDIX II

PART A— HULL-NOMURA CONVERSATIOBS
(May 12, 1941 — August 6, 1941)

N«.l

PROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

Parti of 6.

The Government of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the ini-
tiation and concltision of a general agreement disposing the resumption of om tradititmal

friendly relations.

Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both
Governments that the incidents which led to, the deterioration of amicable sentiment among
our peoples should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and vxt'
fortunate consequences.

It is our present hope that, by a joint eSott, dtlT^lftions may i^|ft|^b «ieit^ .^t0t#' lte
Pacific; and by the rapid consummation of an entente cordiale, arrest, if not dispel, the tragic
confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.

For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would ^m ill-suited and weakenii^. Both
Governments, therefore, desire that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the
realization of a general agreement which would bind, meanwhile, both governments in honor
and in act.

It is our belief that such an understanding should compromise only the pivotal issues of
urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be deliberated at a conference and appro-
priately confirmed by oiur respective Gmmwem^i

Trans. 5-14-41

No. 2

PROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

Part 2 of 6.

Both Governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve hanaotdous relations if
certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved; to with;

1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting internaticsial reUtions and
character of nations.

2. The attitude of both Governments toward the European War.

3. The relations of both nations toward the China affair.

4. Commerce between both nations.

5. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area,

6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.
Accordingly, we hdve come to the fs^f^ti^Mt^lli^^^^iandiag^^

May 12. ^41
#295.

#295.

1. The concepts of the United States antj erf Japan respecting international relatitms and the
character of nations.

The Govejrnmenta of the United States and of Japan jointly acknowledge each other as
egwally swer^fft^tiS jwd contignoaa Pacjflepdw**?.

FROM: Washington (Nonsnra)
TO: Tokyo

Part 3 of 6.

Both Governments assert the unanimity of their tiaMcmal policies as directed toward the
feundatidn of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of Tespectfiil Mnfidenee and
cooperation among our peoples.

Both Governments declare that it is their traditional, and present, concept and conviction
that nations and races compose, as members of a family, one household; each equally enjoy-
ing rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interest regulated by peaceful
processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound
W isNteftd for themsel^-i^'they are bound not to destroy for others; they further admit their
responsibilities to oppose the oppression or exploitation of backward nations.

Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the
«ieSB^rtHS#^"Of wMfete and the underlying motA ipa^fidplea of social order in national Itfe will
continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas cwr ideok^es contrary to
those moral principles and concepts.

Trans. 5-14-41

No. 4

FROM: Washington (Npnmra)
ftofe4of6.

. 2. The attitude of both Governments toward the European war.

'['he Government of the United States and Japan make it their common aim to briuf
about the world peace; they shall therefore jointly endeavor not only to prevent further ext^-
sion of the European war but also speedily to restore peace in Europe.

The Governinent of Japan maintains that its alliance with the Axis powers was, and is,
defensive and designed to prevent the nations which are not at present directly affected by
the European war ftom engaging in it.

The Government of Japan maintains that its obligations of military assistance under the
Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy will be applied in accordance with the
stipulation of Article 3 of the said pact.

The Government of the United States maintain that its attitude toward the European war
is, and will continue to be, directed by no such aggressive measures as to ^sit any one nation

A-^

May 12, 1941
#295.

May 12, 1941

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

The United States maintaim that it is pledged to the hate of war, and accordingly, its atti-
tude toward the European war is, and will continue to be, determined solely and e;s:<^\}^ve^
by considerations of the protective defense of its own national welfare and security.

Trans. 5-14-41

No. 5

FROM: Washington {Nomura) May 12, 1941

TO: Tokyo

.fffflrt6^6.

:3i' Jt!be relations of both nations toward the China affair.

The Governments of the United States, acknowledging the three principles as enunciated
in the Konoye statement and the principles as enunciated in the Konoye statement" and the
principles set forth on the basis of the said three principles in the treaty with the Nanking Gov-
ernment as well as in the joint declaration of Japan, Manchukiio and China and rely in fi upon
the policy of the Japanese Government to establish a relationship of neighborly friendship
with China, shall fcarthwith request the CHIANG KAI-SHEK re^gime to negotiate peaef wiilli
Japan.

4. Commerce between both nations.

When official approbation to the present undetstanding has been given by both Govern-
ments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other to mutually supply such com-
modities as are, respectively, available or required by either of them. Both Governments
further consent to take necessary steps to the resumption of normal trade relations as former^^r
established under the treaty of commeyce a^4 flayjjgt^tiw fe&ta?^ United States and Japan.

'Tbm le^titinn in. the teft aerially occuned.

Trans. 5-14-41

No. 6

FROM: Washington (Nomws) May 12, 11^1

TO: Tokyo ^ #295.

Part 6 of 6.

5. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.

As Japanese activities in the Southwestern Pacific area shall be carried out by peaceful
means, American cooperation shall be given in the production -W^: im»GOteEC3i0^ j3f .astutal
resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which Japan needs.

6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.

a. The Governments of the United States and Japan jointly guarantee the independence
of the Philippine Islands on the condition that the Philippine Islands shall maintain a status
trf permanent neutrality. The Japanese subjects shall not be subject to any discriminatory
treatment.

b. Japanese immigration to the United States shall receive amicable consideration — on

'^^ ^

A-3

mBENDUM

The present understanding shall be iept as a confidentieil memca-andum between the
Governments of the United States and of Japan.

The scope, character and timing of the announcement of this understanding will be

iSmnM. 5-14-41

FROM: Wa3hii)ftmCH«m«iS) May 12, 1941

TO; Tokyo #294.

Re your #214".

The English text , complete, my #296' (six parts), is not in Ckivernment God®. TherefOTe,
please exercise great care.

"Msbsuoka si^ests revision of the text.

TYans. 5-14-41

FROM: Tokyo ' May 13, 1941

TO: Washington #219.

{In 3 parts — complete) .

Strictly secret. Separate message.

"The governments of Japan and the United States accept joint responsibility for the nego-
tiation and conclusion of a general agreetriMt coneeiwfag tlie Teitimption of our traditional
friendly relations.

"Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangeinent, it is the sincere desire of both
governments that the incidents which led' td'^i'5||^§^ii®NS0ii of amicable sentiment betweMi
our peoples should be pirevent^ flrom recuTrencg and arrested in their unforeseen and unfor-
tunate consequences.

'Tt is our earnest hope that, by a joint effort, the two nations will establish a just peace in
the Pacific, and by the rapid consummation of an amicable und^standing, arrest, if not
dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.

"For such decisive action, jwotracted negotiations would seem ill-suited and weakenijif .

We, therefore, suggest that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization
6f a general agreement which would bind, meanwhile, both governments in honor and in act.

"It is our belief that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of ur-
gency and not the accessory concerns which would be delibemted at a later conference and
appropriately confirmed by our respective governments.

"We presume to anticipate that our governments could relations if certain situations

itid attitudes were clarifis^ti^P'm^^

A-4

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARSOR

"1. The concepts of Japan and the United States r^pfic^g inteenatlanal relations and tiae
character of nations.
"2. The attitudes of both governments toward the European war.
"3. The relations of both nations toward the China Affair,
"4. Commerce between both nations.

"5. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.

Tiie gplici?s,Q| ]^oth vmtims affecting political stabilization in tbs Pacific

"1. The Concepts fif -Japan. mi the Umt&l Btates respecting IntermtiencU Relatuif^ and
Character of Nations.

The governments of Japan and the United States jointly acknowledge each other as equal-
}y sovereign states and contiguous Pacific powers.

B0th governments assert the unanimity of their national policies as directed toward the
i^l^tion of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of respectful confidence and
cooperation between our peoples.

Both gqvernments are firmly determined that theb respective traditional concepts on the
chafcicter ^ nations and underlying moral principles of social order and national life will con-
tinue to be preserved and never tr^isformed foreign ideas m i<^Ao0«» i^tB^s0 l^'^t^

THe^iUtii^'^'^oih Governments toward the European War.
It being the common aim of both governments to establish world peace, they will join
forces with a view to preventing the extension of the European War and restoring peace speedily.

The government of Japan maintains that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact was, and is, de-
lusive and d&^saedi^ fpgsemnt 1he participation of nations in t^ Enropean War not at |«^mt
involved in it.

The government of Japan declares that there is no question that the obligation of military
assistance under the Tripartite Pact c^es into force in the case stipulated in Article 3 of tbe
84id Pact.

The government of the United States declares that so far as its attitude toward the Euro-
pean War is concerned it does not and will not resort to aggressive measures aimed to assist
,any one nation against another. The United States maintains that it is pledged to the hate of
war, and accordingly, its attitude toward the European War is, and will continue to be, det6t»
mined solely and epSxudV^ ^^ meM^ittimB: <^ t}m^j^^ mm milliaiQSi

welfare and security.
"3. The Relations of both Nations toward the China Affair.

In appreciation of the three principles set forth in the Konoye Statement and the trea^
concluded with the Nanking government upon the basis of the said Statement and the joint
declaration of Japan, Manchukuo and China and also in reliance upon Japan's policy of
friendship and good neighbour toward China, the government of the Usl^^ iSltftiMl if^Ja^tdS?
diately request the Chiang Kai-Shek regime to negoimte pe^ice with Jap^
"4, Commerce betvjeen both Nations.

When official approbation to the present understanding has been given by both govern-
ments, Japan and the United States shall assure each other to supply mutually such commod-
ities as are, respectively, available or required by either of them. Both governments further
consent to take necessary steps to the resumption of normal trade relations as formerly estab-
lished under the Treaty of Navigation and Commerce between Japan and the United States.
If a new commercial treaty is desired by both governments, it could be elaborated as soon as
m ac@^^^ with usual jpiTDceduie.

'*6. Mcmom^cA'cidvity of both Nations in the Soiahwestem I^cific wea.
Noting that Japanese expansion in the direction of the southwestern Pacific is declared to
be of peaceful nature, American cooperation and support shall be given in the production and
procurement of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which Japan needs.

"6. The Policiefi of Both Nations affecting Political Stabilization in the Pacific.

(a) The governments of Japan and the United States jointly guarantee the independence
4i the Philippine Islands provided that the latter observes perpetual neutrality and accords to
the Japanese subjects a treatment equal to the Commonwealth citizens.

(b) Japanese immigration to the United States shall receive amicable consideration on a
baeis of equality with other nationals and freedom from discrimination.

The present tmderstanding shall be kept as a confidential memorandum between the
governments of Japan and the United States. The scope, character and timing of the aimQun^&'
ment of this understanding will be agreed upon by both governments."

Trans. 5-14-4X

No. 9

PROM:
TO:

Tokyo
Waslnngton

May 13, 1941
#218.

In writing up separate message #219" (Engl^h text) we have isatte t*8'«^ii«»itext in you*

message #256* as much as possible. However, it was necessary to revise certain parts, in order
conform more closely to the Japanese text (our revised proposal). When presenting the
^219) to the Sec

"See II, 8.
^Nfit available.

Trans. 5-14-41

No. 10

FROM: Tokyo May 9, 1941

TO: Washington #206.

(3 parts— complete) {Secret outside the department).

Regarding my message #204.

Main reason for the revision and other points to be noted:

(1) Clause 2 of the "Understanding Agreement" #2 was revised, despite the fact that no
farther provision should be required in view of the obvious nature of Japan's partnership in
the Tripartite Pact, because we felt that our position in relation to the aforesaid pact should be
made clear before adopting a provision of this nature.

(2) Each clause in "Understanding Agreement" #3 was struck out, because, to seek a U.S.-
Japanese understanding on the basis of such itemized provisions appears too much as though

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

'^tfr-elsuae relative to migration of xmt nationals to China was eliminated because it mfl^

give a mistaken impression to our countrymen who from the beginning resented emjgifatjon
to the United States, that the U.S. is directing even our immigration in China.

jiil4^6<i^h it might be sidd that ihwee should be no abjections to this so \on$ as it is kept
secret, matters such as this have a way of leaking out 0^^11^1*11^1 jPua^eitiie M
prepared for such an event.

We wish to obtain the United States' assurance, in a separate secret clause, to the effect
that she will stop aiding Chiang Kai-Shek in the event that Chiang accepts our peace sugges-
tion. However, if for any reason this is unacceptable to the United States^^ we are willing to have
merely the responsible parties adhere to this prwe^fiSna. ^ *

(3) "A" and "C" of #4 was eliminated because we consider it more realistic to wait and see
the effect of the "Understanding Agreement" on the strained U.S. -Japanese relations before
taking up this matter.

"B" should be considered as a separate item of understanding and a great deal of thou^t
should be given to determining the time, method and intentions regarding its fulfillment.
Ple^ bear SeTlii^'ilil'^li^^ of BUct^li^b'^»'Nteir>)ili!m

( 1 ) # 2 # 5 (Resised propoaal # 4) wts eUminated on the same ground, as ■ *A" and "C"

of #4.

{^•'*#* t^^^8'^ipopoaal #6). At present Japan has given assurance regarding the

Igtoiippines, however, we cannot commit oujselv^ to asaume the reBponeibiHties implied it» ■
tMs clause.

The phrase "and the southwest Pacific" in "C" of #7 was eliminated for the reason that,
when necessary, we will carry on negotiations in these parts independently of others.

(6) We have eliminated the entire reference to the hope of holding U.S.-Japanese conver-
sations. In its stead we wish to make an arrangement tTOSeby ^«faifi^ <o?i|&«#!*iides will be
expressed by exchange of notes, to hold a conference between the President and the Premier
or their respective rtI»W««at«tive^ when it is deemed necessary, after the present proposal has
been in effect.

(7) Please take note that the draft for #|ai^^ui@tt: 4#
-drawn up by us and sent to you.

Trans. 5-12-41

No. 11

FROM: Tokyo (Japw^eae Foreign Minister) May 10, 1941

TO: Washington ' #206.

ADDENDUM

Insert the addendum incorporated in this wu:e as paragraph 5 imm«S)iti^'i^&^'^^.|^^
graph 4. Please move paragraph 5 down in ite propet otder.
(5 and 6) (Revised draft of paragraph 5) .

The reason the statement "there shall be no recoti*9^% trmed force" has been deleted is
that in the Imperial peace plans, Premier KONOYE and this Minister have frequently found
it necessary in the past to use armed force. The Imperial Government's most ardent wish is
that the Southwestern Pacific question, as it applies to our expansion, be peacefully concludedt^
^ tbe light of the current international situation rampant with unprecedented confusion,
no one can say what changes will have to be brought about. In the future developments of thfi
inteinational situation, the Imperial Japanese Government, should it ever be provoked be^kltci

mdurance will not be able to a*^'%tfercismg military force and that she give a guarantee
to do so would be very difficult. However, regardless of the future developments of this situ-
ation, it is very clear that Japan alone could not det^mine such a course. 1 beUeve th^ jC}!)^^
point now is the time clarification should be taiul^iifl^l^^ l^^i^liel^'-SIS^^ h^LHiM

No. 12

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

Separate wire.

The three principles of Prince KONOYB ffis r^erredtO in this psragrsph are:

1. Neighborly friendship.

2. Joint defense against coaatffiiS^ii^

3. Economic cooperation — ?|j3f W^kfe J^ip^n does not intend to exercise ecom^ii^ )^§tSBgxsijff&)^,
in China nor to demand of China a imitation in the interest of Third Powers.

The fbllowmg are implied in the aforesaid principlisr

1. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories,

2. Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation cooperating as good neigh-
tasffs and forming a Far Eastern nucleus contributing to world peace.

3. Withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territeay in ^ctnqr^nce <wiiM an agreement
to be concluded between Japan and China.

4. No annexations no indemjiitiai.
M*. jBdependesce of Mahchxikufn*

May 12, 1941
#297.

No. m

PROM: Washii^jwilN'iB^ttii) May 12, 1941

TO: Tokyo #2^, '

Re your # 205°.

When I talked with Secretary of State HULL on the 12th, he demanded a formal explanation
of the three basic principles outlined in Premier KONOYE's statement contained in the third
paragraph (on the relationships of the two governments to the China incident), as well M tiie
Premier's statement regarding the proclamation of the treaty based upon these three princi-
ples. But there being the matter of instructions from you, I made presentation of the explana-
tion of my plan as outlined in my # 297 . I wonder, though, whether it might not be a bet^
plan to explain to him that there is virtually no difference between this and the various provi-
sions of paragraph 3 of the original proposals made in my # 256* (having to do with organized
immigration). Therefore, I would like to make formal explanation in any case along a line
which we feel to be mcst advantagews to us. Please wire me a&y «^j|nt$ats that jssfe ^
this subject.

'Contaming Matsuoka's leviaiqiu to the test of the proposal.

A-8

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 14

FBDM: Washington Mi^ 13, 1941

fO? Tokyo 4^>.

I met with Secretary Hull last night (the 12tli) and I sdMia^ ^
vised proposal contained in your message # 214".

He glanced through the papers. Then, while looking at the paragraphs regarding our south-
ward expansion and the China Affair on which the most importance is placed by Japan — he
implied that there was nothing further to be guaranteed in the case of the former and made
mquiries concerning the realistic values of the latter. This is as I reported to you in my earlier
message #296*.

I told the Secretary that Japan had absolutely no aggressive ambitions in the southern area.
However, it is natural, I explained, to avoid tying the hands of one's own country, and that
country only, in the event of unexpected misfortune in the future. For example, I said, in the
event that the United States puts a powerful navy in the Pacific, Japan does not want to be
placed in such a position which would prevent her &oin doing anything about It.

Translator's note: Following paragraph garbled, contsiim guesswork.

The Secretary replied that there would be no reason for the United States herself to do some-
thing which she can have Japan do for her. As a matter of fact, the United States would prefer
to have some other country do it for her, it said other country can do it to the same extent.

With regard to the matter of security, the Secretary said that every precaution was being
taken topse^mst^seetettsaad thai; tlwce wa%^^ttle)ly bo danger of any leiak^,

•Smb. 17.
*II.13.

Trans. 5-15-41

PROM: Tokyo May 13, 1941

im washingtMi #m.

Please transmit separate waesas^ 4 $LT to tbi Secretary of ^tat{» iljtt^>ti^4^^.

■NotftvaOable.

A-9

m-m

FROM: Tokyo May 13, 1941

TO: Washington #213,

Regarding my # 206'.

Pleaae have it understood that the attitude of the United States government towards the
European war, as stated in the provision "The Attitude of both countries towards the European
war" in Clause 2 of the "Understanding Agreement" represents merely the declaration of atti-
tude on the part of the United States government and is not to be taken to imply Japan's
proval of present acts and attitude of that government towards the European war.

"Seen, 10.

Traiia, 5-13-41

No. 17

FROM; Tokyo May 13, 1941

TO; Washington #214.

In presenting the revisions contained in my message # 205'' I assume that it was necessary
to reword some of the parts of the English text in your # 256*. While I feel certain that you have
abeady made appropriate rephrasing for instance, of Clause 6 where it relates to economic
activities of both countries in the southwest Pacific, I feel that the following might be accept-
able, "Having in view that the Japanese expanskm Gt W^^milSISm
is declared to be of peserful natui^".

t aia suggesting the ab«rt^ fegfelttMe of the importance of this point. (The original text's "with-
out resorting to arms", etc., al<me is unacceptable. If I thiai itf ©iiis^ cbfiU^gfe wM^
be made I will let you know.

In view of the importance of this negotiation please call on the Secretary of State this eve-
nwgtdJ^aiid obtain Iris derfaion a^to^«git

'Not yv.'i liable.
'Not availaljle.

Trans. S-13-41

No. 18

FROM: Tokyo May 13»,194Ji

Re my #214*.

In matters as important as this, it is necessary to inclutte-th0 <(li^^iMaI lltpa^ul^^^ wdll.
Will you please, therefore, gi^-l^li^v^^Bt^im «l «s^^t^^
revised by us immediately.

A-10

THE "MAGIG" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

" We are at present drawing up the English version of the above text and wk will probably cable
it to you sometime on this, the 13th. U|!ton its receipt, will yoti please deliver it to the Secretary
of State.

' ' ' ■ Trfins. S-13-41

No. 19

FROM: Tokyo May IS, 1941

TO; Waahinpaii Unnumhered.

Your "very urgent" diapajtch 0^ the 13fe (^^J, «aim£it fee 4eco#e4 the 15th letter. Pleaae
verify and repeat.

Trans. 5-14-41

No. 22

FROM: Washington May 15, mi

TQ: Tokyo sfeiiambered.

%e$ial.

Your message" of Igth ^iiSKiiliiftMliil

Trans. §-ia-41

FROM: Tokyo May 13, 19*1

TO: Washington #221,

Regarding your message # 302°.

Please add on to Clause 4 of my message #205,' which relates to "commerce between two
nations", the following paragraph which was accidentally left out in enciphering the message;

"If a new commercial treaty is desired by both IfEK^^ments, it eould hg; elfthp'^tfcl S€Km
as possible and concluded in accordance with usual procej^e."

"Not available.

TVaj^,i|-|,^:^

No. 24

FROM : Tokyo May 13, mi

TO: Washin^on #222.

In the fourth paragraph, which relates to trade between the two countries, of our revised
proposal, c<mtained in my message #205", will you please correct the words reading "(at
1 subsequent to ?) the Japanese-U.S. ctmferenc^" to read "(as soon as possiWe?)".

'Hct svatkble.

Trans. 5-14-41

No. 25

FROM: Washington May 13, 1&41

TO: Tokyo #302.

Re your #222". In the 4th paragraph of our revised proposal, contained in your message
#205', the paragraph headed "Trade between the two countries" ends with the phrase
"shall consider ways and means" . There is no such phrase as "at the Japan-U.S. conference"*

Please check and advise immediately.

"Not available.

Trans. 3-r^^^-4l

No. 26

FROM: WashingtJtaa- May 13, mi

TO: Tokyo #305.

Personal to the Minister.

All of ua are overwhelmed with gratitude at your giving us your support in the matters per-
taining to the "Understanding" pact.

As you are aware, only the President, Secretary of State, and the Postmaster- General are
concerned in this "Understanding" pact on the U.S. side. Not even the other Cabinet othcials
nor officials of the State Department are being consulted in this matter.

In view of this fact, I feel hesitant to handle this matter in a too business like manner as
yet. Moreover, I have already handed over the rough draft of the proposal to the U.S. aide and
have made all of the general explanations.

If we continue to submit minor revisions from time to time, I am afraid that the United
States may get the impression that we have entered into this business without being too well
prepared. This, naturally, reflects upon my integrity and may give rise to doubts in the i^eir
parties concerned as to my sincerity. This could lead the negotiations into a failure.

It is, therefore, my fondest hope that you will limit all further instructions and cautions to
me. Plea4eili^nte|@:«^^ifi^ 4^

A-i2

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 27

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

May 15, 1941/

(Badly garbled)

Re your extra (message).

This understanding is "bind both govrnimenl^ in honor and in act". (Please note that this
is to be carried in the English (text?).)

•fe your #305*.

I took careful note of the various items you set forth.

Please change the words "entente cordialc" in paragraph I of your message # 295*, to "ami-
cable understanding". Please use the wording as used by me (in my message #219') with
regard to part 2, paragraph 4, of your message # 295* (the proposal concerning the prevention
of the entrance into the war by those countries which are not already in it) .

I presume that the corrections I asked for in my message #221'' have already been made.

Since your English text and my English text are identical in so far as the gist is concerned,
I see no reason for making a special effort to revise them at this time. However, whenevaf the
opportunity arises while discussing the matter, please revise to approximate my text, (The
words "at a conference", as used at the end of paragraph 1 of your #295*, should be changed
to a simple "later" at the first opportunity. Also change that part of paragraph 5 of your
message # 295\ concerning the Konoye principles, etc.,

(Translator's note: garbled from here to end, guesswork used) so as to place emphasis on the
said principle and that all alliances and agreements will bai^ to he based thereon.

Please give these points your considerati^.

Trans. 5-19-41

No. 28

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Waahington

May 15, 1941
#229.

■See 11. 2fi.
'Seen, 1.

'^ot availfib]^

Trans. 5-16-41

A-13

No.2f

FROM: rdkyo
TO: Washington

May 13, 1941
#217.

Separate telegram.
;^^t0% confidential.

I feel it hardly necesKary but in order to leave no room whatever for any misapprtihension, I
wish to put the following on record at this juncture. It muat have been clear from what 1 have
often stated publicly or otherwise that my decision to follow the Pour Parler between Your
Excellenc\- and Ambassador Nomura and open the present negotiation was based on the
promises that the United States would not enter the European War and that the United States
government agree to advise Chiang Kai-shek to enter into a direct negotiation with Japan
with a view to bring about peace between Japan and China at the earliest possible date. Of
^Wse, it must have been plain trom the start that on no other promises would or could Japan
|[«^lb1^<»»ui iQuji^tiCideiB^ in view in the present negotiatioti.

The talks (as Secretary 'Hull has said, we are still in the stage erf: **e&the- record private
talkings" and have in no way entered into official negotiations as yet. As you are well aware
we are conducting the tallra along the general lines set forth in the "Understanding" s^ee-
ment.) are being carried on with the two points you mentioned in your message, i.e., preven-
tion of the U.S. entrance into the war, and the matter of urging Chiang to make peace, as the
focal points. I, myself, have constantly kept these points in mind in all the efforts I have been
making.

During the night of the 11th, 1 submitted our revised proposal and am, at present, awaiting
their reply. At a time like this, I fear that if we submitted such writings (setting forth our two
focal points) it would make further talks exce^dis^i^ ^aSSi&Mt WA may even inte^ere with the
establishment of the "Understanding" pact.

For this reason, I did not hand the papers over. I shall, at an opportune moment during our
tal^ bring up the subjects of prevention of U.S. entrance into the ^oA immediate U.S.
recommendation for (Japan-China) peace.

I shall appreciate your giving approval to my procedure.

Trans. 5-14-41

No. 30

FROM: Washington

May 13, 1941
#304.

'See 11,29.

A-14

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No, 31

FROM: Washingt^
TO; Tokyo

my 15, 1941

0ii 3 parts— Complete.) {Fmt 1 of S.)

- JLi^t night (the 14th) I called on Secretary Hull and explained to him — in accordance with
ydtOf menage — that all of the items listed in the section on the China Aifair in the first draft
were to be included with the exception of the matter pertaining to emigration.

Ill reply to this, the Secretary implied that there was a need to have some sort of a prelimi-
nary understanding with China and with England.

Followiiig thisj we discussed the various phases of the matter at hand. This was done in a
conversiitional tone throughout, and at no time did we assume what couI4 be texnted #^
argumentative attitude.

First of all, the subjeqt of American security was brought up. I stated that there wasn't
another country which was so fortunately situated as was the United States from the view-
point of safety of the nation. There is practically no possibility of an invasion from foreign
countries, I said. For t^s reason it was exceedingly difficult to see from the Japanese viewpoint,
I continued, why there was so much sentiment in the U.S. favoring U.S. entrance into the war.

In reply to this, the Secretary asked me if I had read the speech he made at the meeting of
the members of the American Society of International Law on the 24th of April. He followed
this up with the explanation that he was one who placed much importance in South America,
Should Hitler succeed in completely subjugating Europe, and should he extend his grasping
hands in the direction of South America, there is a grave danger that several of those countries
would be immediately conquered.

Of course, he continued, he realized that before he could do that, he would have to have the
control of the seas. But, he added, such an eventuality could be possible if an English Quisling
develops at the time that Germany succeeds in conquering England. Such a Quisling could
conceivably hand over the British navy to the Germans, the Secretary said, keeping a very
straight face while so saying.

I, therefore, countered by saying that I had understood that the British had promised not to
turn their navy over to the Germans under any circumstances. Furthermore, I said, wasn't
the Secretary just dreaming up possibilities.

The Secretary replied: "No, no. Rrnice, though promising many times that she would not
turn over her fleet to Germany .

(In 3 parts— comidete.) (Part 2 of 3.)

In spite of these French promises, Darlan and Laval are apparently about to transfer the
French fleet to Germany. Taking into consideration the possiblt; materialization of such a
move, the United States has no alternative than to aid the Churchill government. This step
would not be.«MasB iis^ely lb* the piwtectitm of d©iB«»«^^ lt ssfc^t lt ^ jfti ft sRatt^ijf isct,

(End Part 1.)

Trans. S-17-41

N«.32

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

May 15, tUX
#310.

A-15

imperatii* ife* iWi-- iMts4 States to d» m U potiset the Untted States, tte lk^i*iaE§r-i^ Si^

{I take this opportunity to report that Colonel Iwakuro" is making various indirect approa-
cbeis in. attempting to have the United States abandon its convoy project.)

Apparently it is Japan's policy to prevent the United States from aiding Britain. Minister
Matsuoka, it is said, {Secretary Hull continued), even went so far as to threaten war in his
convsarsations with Ambassador Grew. Not even Ambassador Grew ba^ been advised of the
conversations being carried on here, he said.

The Secretary seemed to be of the opinion that though there would be considerable dilhculty
in the attempt to invade England, he did not believe that the possibility could be discounted.

I asked him if Hess' flight to Scotland had any implication of peace overtures. The Secre-
tary rephed that he had been made aware of absolutely no such motives. He added that
. llfemgh he knew o£ nothing definite with regard to Hegs' teip to Engiaiid, he looked upon it as
toiieation thst apcrtion of the Gsman goverameat wa»aT*mbliag.

'Aide to the MUitaty AttiscM 141 WaMus^ton.

(In 3 parts— Complete.) (Part 3 of 3.)

I, therefore, pointed out that should the U.S. fleet come uito the Pacific, Japan's hands
W^Uld be tied against protecting herself because of the terms of the "Understanding Agree-
ment". You made reference to this possibihty in your conversations with Ambassador Grew
as I also did on one previous occasion.

However, due probably to the medicine's having reacted on the patient too vigorously, he
apparently was not thoroughly convinced regarding the possibility of an armed southward
espansion, I, th^refed^, *bM lil^ that Japan absolutely would not take the soldiers, upon being
telieved of their task in China upon the conclusion of the China Incident, and use them fat a
southward expansion program, thereby breaking her promise (to the United States) .

However, I apparently did not thoroughly ciS^ii^&(^ Mlat,^%» he said that Hitler; for exaraple,
has been signing treaties only to break them ever since 1933. The Munich agreement was one
of these, he said. Napoleon was likewise an tintPistworthy treaty signer, for he too merely
signed them to break them immediately. '

The way 1 look at it, the thing for us to do now is to strive to have the Secretary become
thoroughly convinced of the Japanese government's sincere intentions. Now that we have
submitted our proposat, Aetrfd fiSt IsacTt calmly and watch the next moves from the United
States.

I firmly believe that we should enter into this Understanding while the United States is

end, I am makii^mS^^ll^l^l^M-^^^ '^ the p0($0S& mmsiim^ ^'lS^M0^ are of the
same opinion.

said.

TVans. 5-19-41

No. 33

M&y 15, X941
#310.

Trans, 5-17-41

A-16

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND 0F PEARL HARBOR

FROM: Tokyo
TO; Wa$hip«tOBi

In 2 parts— complete.

Re your m«9|iafe #304°.

The other signatories of the Tripartite Pact, Germany and Italy, are affected by the proposed
Understanding Pact between Japan and the United States, Furthermore, it affects their do-
mestic policies as well as ours.

Therefore, I had the Chief of the Europe and Axis Section explain the proposal to the .Em-
bassadors from those two countries. The explanations touched only upon generalities, and no
details were divulged. He carefully pointed out that this proposal was originated by the
United States and went into some detail of how this came about. They were also told that the
United States was handling this matter with the utmost secrecy and that only the i^esident.
Secretary of State, and two or three of their colleagues were even aware of its existence. This
being the case, the Ambassadors were cautioned to divulge this information to Dictator Hit-
ler, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, Premier Mussolini, and Foreign Minister Ciano, They were
fiarther requested to exercise every precaution against its leaking out.

At the same time, it seemed unwise from various viewpoints to keep our Ambassadors in
Germany and Italy uniformed concerning this matter, as there is a possibility of mismider-
standings arising from such ignorance in the future. Moreover, I even had an uiquiry from our
Ambassador in Germany about this on the 10th, I dispatched a cable wordctl in the same
manner of my message #231*. (The serial number of this cable to Germany was my message
to Germany # 396',) The above are the circumstancsBS^ fljwi heeause «(ar rs^ASfflas
Germany and Italy ~— (Many groups missed here).

For these reasons, I believe that there is a necessity for us to put our request that the United
BtatM Stay out of war, and also that the IMifeSS Staf«* peaee between China mA

Japan, in a written form.

1 am aware of the great importance of this matter, and appreciate your standpoint. However,
^01 you please ms^ arrangements in accoi)iiP<i# ?|rith my mssspgi

May 15, 1941
#230,

"Seen, 30.
'Not available,
'NotavailaUe^.

Trans. 5-16-41

No. ,35

FROM: Tokyo May 17^1941

TO: Washingtoaa #234.

Re your #310'.

Of course, there is no way for me to know what was in the report received by the government
of the United States from Ambassador Grew. However, it is a fact that I had neither the in-
I^Uon or a cause to threaten or intimidate the Ambassador. I merely replied to his questions
ia#i[^versational tone.

The AmbasSifla* is one who easily becomes ««Sted!. Moreover, as you are well aware, he is
quite hard of hearing. Therefore, there is a possibility that he misunderstood my words.
Should an opportunity present itaelf , please explain this matter to the Secietajry^ Si^te.

'See II, 31-33.

Trans. 6-23-41

No. 36

FROM; Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

May 16, 1941
#314.

This morning's New York Herald Tribune carried m article written by NEWMAN from
Tokyo with a headline "Japan Asks United States to Mediate Sino- Japanese Conflict", a
summary of which 1 am sending in my #315". This being not in accordance with our past
policy, please see to it that special meMures are taken to prohibit articles of this type being
veprtntei in. J^iai;u.

The New York Herald Tribune of the 16th quoted a telephone conversation wfSi'NEWMAN
of the 16th which, though it was unofficial, quoted a responsible source as having disclosed the
authoritative toformation that, in order to sound out American opinion, a Japanese-American
understandings -|ff«^osil had 1^»n fs^eg^tei- to American authorities here. f^jeeMkiued.to the

following line:

The United States was to lend its assistance between Tokyo and Chungkmg toward the
settlement of the Sino- Japanese bicident.
The t'nitod States recognized Japanese position of leadership in China.
Japan guarantees not to use military force in the South Seas.

The United States recognizes Japan's rights in the South Seas of carrying on enterprise msM
economic endeavors (including loans),
Japan will revise her declaration to the effect that she would not deal with CHIANG KAI-

rlapan guarantees to revise her declaration that she will not brook the interference of third
powers in the China Incident,

Japan will clarify her intentions with regard to her place in the Far East.

Japan guarantees not to take hostile measures against the United States dictated by the
Axis Alliance.

'furthCTmoFe, NEWMAN added that mmf^^m expecWi^> of a settle-

3NNl.'<l»n«ii^«Ei^^ i8iitel><'linBm#'^<^ipiai»American negotiations, in

'Seen,37^

Trans. 5-20-41

No, 37

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

May 16, 1941

#318,

SHEK.

A-18

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND QF PEARL HARBOR

view of Ambassador PONDA's" return to Japan and the strong local military and n&val
authorities support of the WANG CHING WEI Regime, he thoi^ht thttt an undeirstanding
between Japan and the United States would be made impossible.
Relayed to New York.

*AmlMSstuJw to Japanese Pui>pet Government in Najikfog.

Trans. 5-20-41

TO: Washington
Re your #314°.

Although they do not cover all of the points contained, it is true to a considerable degree.
The leak seems to come from (New York) Japanese circles to local financial circles. These
have given rise to numerous rumors.

We are doing everything to check these leaks and would appreciate your doing likewise.

"Seen, 36.

Trans. 5-17-41

No. 39

FROM: Washington (Noraufa)
Tokyo (Gaimudftijift^'

(ht 2 parte— complete.)

Part 1. I am advised that requested a statement from (Your ExceUeney?) wStli'l^ard

to Hull's plans for the post war economic set-up.

The policy outlined by the Secretary deviates considerably from the economic policy which
the United States has actually pu^ued heretofore. Hiere have, no doubt, been various
reactions to the Hull statement of policy in Japan. Many opinions were expressed here.

I called on the Secretary of State last night, the 20th (Tuesday), He said at that time that
after the Understanding Agreement was entered into, there would be a need to explain
matters to business circles, so that trade between the two countries could be promoted. Japan
must consider the development of the Far Eastern economic bloc and at the same time must
constantly be striving for economic development of various areas. There is, therefore,
absolutely no reason why we should express any disapproval to the policy ou'Uined by the
Secretary. On the contrary I am of the opinion that it should be supported.

Part 2. Immediately following the incident, peace talks have cropped up in Paris saiff
in Vichy. In this country, too, there is a minority such as the Anti-war involvement aSn^f^^
the Hftsrst newspapers, Senator Wheeler, and others, who support a peace movement.

A-19

May 17, 1941
#535.

May 21, 1941

Wfa^ your good Mend aim said that he knew <rf nothing definite, he was aware that

there was some peaee talk in the air. Femiit me to expre^ xny humble opinion that this is a v«ty
critical time.

Ths Secretary of State alw satd It tfegp iii^idl^tt^^
tha fi^atep in the direction of a permiiiw|tt, JTsBge I^i.^fl^^/fe^ §gm mUch Will

have h^m done in behalf of general peace.

Trans. 5-23-41

TVo.40

FROM: Washington Ml^l9, 1941

TO: Tcftgw #320.

At present, while on the one hand we are trying to feel out the other pMty's intentions
through undercover channels, I am continuing my conversations with Secretary Hull. The
nucleus of the entire matter is British aid by the United States, our relations to our treaty
partners, the China Incident, and Japanese southward expansion. You are alreai^ awaxe of
this through my earlier reports.

There are as yet considerable differences of opinion between us, so there is no room for too
inuch optimism. In the meiWSitte^ I' ■Mft'%orking in close cooperation with the miUtary and
naval (attaches ?), in:^der to cati^ ont tlie i^ixit of your instructioiis to the maximum degree .

T^rans. 5-2i-41

No. 41

FROM: Tokyo May 24, 1941

TO: Washington #250.

Part 2 of 3".

the fact that made a that — - — presented to the Emperor would

probably a^ree. Although this was the strictest of secrets, I believe that in the meantime you
must have learned it. For this reason, although the intelligence has every indication of being
correct, I can hardly bring myself to believe it readily. What went awry, or through what
circumstances all this happened, is beyond my powers to surmise. But howsoever all this may
be, there are indications that Secretary HULL got the aforemuntioned impression also from
conversations with Your Honor. Will you, therefore, at the earliest possible opportunity, clear
Secretaiy HULL'a mind of this misconception. You, yourself. Ambassador NOMURA, know
that all through my life up to the present day 1 have been a zealous advocate of amity between
J^apan and the United States. You never could have had any doubt about that. In a wire which
I recently a^alI{OWARD^ I expressed great grief over the tragedy rife in the world today. I
tUOA that some method ought to be devised to stop this horrible war which threatens to lead
mu civilization downward into chaos, and that something ought to be done to stop the h^voe
of this conflict.

(Rest of message m^ing.)

'Parts 1 and3not available.

'Koy Howard, Piwident of Scripps- Howard ©6t

A-20

No. 42

FROM; Washington (Nomura) May 24, 1941

I have respectfully perused your message. It is absolutely baseless. My! My! To say the least
I was surprised. When the President and the Secretary of State have questioned me with regard
to Japan's procedure in establishing diplomatic policy, I have told them that Japan's diplo-
macy was in the hands of the Foreign Minister. However, when important questions having
great bearing on diplomatic pohcy which are within the scope of Army and Naval Ministers
arise, those ministers, as a matter of course, participate in these deliberations. Then, too, it
naturally follows that the Premier wields enormous influence. I have told them, too, that
as far as Japan's officialdom is concerned, they function in an advisory capacity to the
Foreign Minister; also, that Dr. MATSUNAMI and other men of incomptirable ability func-
tion in a similar capacity (the Becretaiy of State occupies a position which is virtually the
same). When I told the President thia, he said that in the United States practically the same
procedure was followed. The Secretary of State's position does not diti'er in the slightest degree.

Further, when the Secretary of State asked me the same question, I replied in the same
manner, and these replies are just as I have told you in each of my wires.

Now, should 1 have voiced erroneous statements which in themselves are incredible, then
hy that f&ct alone I deserve punishment. Had I, as a military man, made any such statement,
s&iefi it be proven, I believe that I should not be permitted to continue my existence. 1 am
ccmvinced that I have absolutely made no such statement. And as far as the Secretary of
State is concerned, I do not believe by any stretch the imagination that he labors under
any misunderstanding. However^ as you have requested in your wire, I shall eutdo mys^
in extending my best efforts.

Regardless of the impressions imparted by newspaper dispatdies from Japan, I am quite
cognizant of Your Excellency's fundamental feelings with regard to the J a pan -American
questions, and do not entertain a single doubt with regard to it. I have even told the Secretary
instate as much one or two times.

^ans,&-27-41

No. 43

FROM: Tokyo mm&^itUt
TO; Washington No number.

It is clear that what happened is as you guessed in your message of the 24th, 1 am very much
relieved, but there is no doubt whatever that the American officials entertain the misimpres-
^hms mentioned in my previous message, so please be sure to clear the matter up for them.

Either some Japanese or an American caused all this and created this impression in the
minds of the American officials. Will you please try to find out exactly what happened and
take the proper nieaaureSa

Trans. S-^^l

A-21

Hit. U

FROM: Washington (Nomyra) May 28, 1941

TOi Tokyo #3*5.

The newspapers are playing up the fact that the other day our army is said to have seized
some goods destined for CHIANG KAI SHEK, said to belong to Americans. It is widely held
that this is in connection with RAEDER'a recent statement, and that the Axis countries are
going to exert pressure in unison, and Secretary HULL, himself, in a press interview,
brought up this question. Therefore, for my information, please let me know the facts and
what steps you anticipate taking.

No. 45

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
T0t ' ^'Ml^ |6«imu4a^>

Regarding the President's speech:

1. The tone of the speech, insofar as Japan was concerned, was very mild. There was not a

single direct reference to Japan by name, and even that part concerning China was touched
upon very lightly. These are points in the speech which are worthy of noting.

Apparently there was considerable difference of opinion on these points among the leaders
of the Congress who were quietly advised of the contents of the speech before its delivery over the
radio. Their replies to questions by newspaper men have given rise to numerous rumors. The
©teef Executive's ofKce is letting it be known that it was done "designedly". Before the speech
was broadcast, the Secretary of State, through a certain foreigner, reported that special
attention was paid with regard to U.S. relations with Japan, in drafting this radio speech.

Prom all these indications, I come to the conclusion that the President wished to avoid
exciting this Ambassador unduly and was anxious to have the Japanese-U.S, negotiations
continued.

2. As I pointed out in my message # 350° the United States is bent on self defense. This
•Was made clear in the President's speech and his words were very flexible (insofar m the
la^ethods of carrying out this defense are concerned).

°Not available.

Trans. 6-2-41

No. 46

FROM: Washington
TO;

{Jn 3 peetB—mm0M}

Subsequently. I met and talked with Secretary of State Hull on the 16th (Friday), 20th
(Tuesday), 21st (Wednesday), and the 27th (Tuesday). However, we have not as yet reached

A-22

May 29, 1941

#356.

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

The Secretary said:

(1) That he would like to have the people in general coiae to recognize the meaning of main-
tenance of peace on the Pacific. As long aa there is a shadow of a doubt in the people's minds,
the plans cannot be sueeilMffl^% carried out. (He, on one occasisxt^ expressed himself in favor
of maintaining the status quo on the Pacific, including the southwest Pacific area. At that
time, I advised him that that would be unacceptable to us. It is our hope that we are to take
the (leadership ? ) in the econoinic dev^opment of the southwestern area with U.S. cooperation
and support. The Americans, on the other hand, wish to put this in a bilateral fowa, placing
both countries on an even basis and give each country equal opportunities.)

"I^ Secretary again asked me about Article 3 of the Tripartite Pact. I replied that I was sure
fttjUt even if I made inquiries on this point to {Tokyo ?), (Tokyo ?) would only reply that
Article 3 has no (hidden implications ?). I added that I was sure that there would be no need
for any clarification of the meaning contained therein. Apparently the Secretary's colleagues,
referring to various dispatches from (Tokyo ?), make numerous inquiries of the Secretary.

(2) With regard to China, the Secretary apparently does not want to put Chiang Kai-shek
in a tight spot. In this he is receiving th©,-|Wf|!jJ3rt of his coUeagnes. 'HiekSastetary furthirlte.*
sists that before the United States will assume the role of mediator, we must list the peace
terms. Moreover, it would be impossible, from the U.S. government's standpoint, to make
any reference to Japan's agreement with the Wang gov^nment or to the l^paitite (Japan,
Manchukuo, China (Wang) ??) Declaration. (Translatoif'a not«: Following sentence slightly
garbled; contains guesswork). Outside of these points, these are indications that the United
States is willing to make considerable concessions.

The Secretary seemed to be of the opinion that to cooperate in anti-communism and
were inconsistent and made several inquiries concerning them. I replied that the general aims
,0?tji^ — could cfeally' h&^mm in the agreement signed with thfi»^4^i0g goveimmeiit. Siich
matters as anti-communism and garrisoning of troops would be tfdceai up in the direct negO^
tiations between China and Japan thar would take place later.

Translator's note: One sentence here ga.rbied, impossible to read.

What we desire is to have some mediator such as Dunn and Denby in the Sino-Japanese
War and Theodore Roosevelt in the Russo-Japanese War. We must in this weir carry on a
direct negotiation with Chiang. Chiang at present is in a difficult spot and is depending en-
tirely on the United States for necessary aid. I told the Secretary that in 9iy opinion it would
1^^4^)^Gn^toC%1^#K]n)^ States suggest mediatifiii^^^d$%r

Translatar's Tmte: Next paragraph badly garbled, 0ai} 4Qn^ |tli^dt contents^

■is® ,^i^tftj»y. Said that he did not want to use the term ''ccpmmuniam" because of U.S.
■^ith the U.S.S.R. and China. Instead, he would prefer some such expression as
adding that an instrument such as the one being discussed now could not be
feqp* •a'lemt %t'%mi. He further told me that the Unh^l' itSates ^&v&e^^ilM <i^'m secret
agreement with any other country.

Since receiving your instructions, 1 have met with the Secretary seven times already aiBji
on each occasion, we discussed matters, off the record and informaO^ IsJP' ll^iSS i^& t©
hours. However, we seem to be repeating the same things over and over, and are unable to get
anywhere. Last night I asked if he had any other suggestions, and he said that he did have two
M three minor ones and added that he expects to have it done in two or three days. (Apparently
13ie United States is taking into consideration the effect that this "imderstanding" agreement
will have upon the other Cabinet members and btireau ofhcials.)

Is therefore, said that a&m ail^ the real motive of this "understanding" agreement is to
efeiffitge the war psychology ^^Mts t%ista in both countries, to one of peace. There is a danger
#lat while we are dickering about the use of a certain word, some untoward incident will break
«tat leading all of our efforts up in smoke. The Secretary seemed to be in agreentient with me
®tKis respect.

It is natural that the United States should take Japan into serious consideration in any of
her political or militaristic moves. That she is doing so, may be seen by th^ way tl^e fts^deot
handled tlm situation i»Ms^ech night before last. '

Trans. 6-4-4a

No. 47

FROM; Tokyo
TO: Washington

Ttmslator'&mte: message badly garbled.

Re your #3S6'.

You apparently are comparing Japan with some of the small countries which were barn as
a result of the war. It is true that Japan asked Minister Dunn to mediate in the Sino- Japanese
War and that Theodore Roosevelt's good offices were requested in the Russo-Japanese War.
However, Japan's position in the WOTld today is v«y different from that of the earlier times
mentioned above.

I wonder if it is wise to even compare Japan today with Japan of those days in discussing
the issues with the United States. The only thing that this Minister would have the United
States do with regard to mediating in the China affair, would be for her to tell Chiang Kai-
shek: "Negotiate with Japan. If you refuse, we shall stop all aid to you."

I aon sure that you are weU aware of my intentions in this matter through my previous
messages. However, because of the brevity of cables, ybu may hav© missed the point. Will
you carefully bear it in mind in the future.

•See 11.46.

fBOM: Tokyo

Washingto:

(Very urgent)

Secret outside the Q^px^^p^i^

A Domei wire of the 26th, quoting statements made in the Times and Herald Tribune of
that day, referred to the declarations of Senator GEORGE and others in the Senate to the
effect that the reason Japan was aot referred to in the Fireside Chat was that Japan's ardent
backing of the Tri-Partite Alliance was perceptibly cooling and the tendency in Japan to
anticipate her southern penetration by means of military force was definitely waning. Now,

May 31, 1941
#262.

May 30, 1941

THE "MAGie** SiSCKGROUND OF PEARL HAI^CSfe

as you know, the Imperial Government's and this Minister's policies have been minutely
innuraerated to Your Excellency. This dispatch has not been publicized here as there can be
no guarantee that this sort of news would not cause dissension within the country. Therefore,
as soon as you have immediately made an investigation as to how this got out, diouM iAiey
not , please arrange to file a "demand" lor ~ — .

Trans. 6-2-41

No. 49

FROM: Tokyo May 31, 1941

TO: Washington #260.

Re my #257'.

Rrobably through the channels mentioned in my message # 235*, there are many persons in

various circles in this country who seem to have proof {though they are vague) that a Japan-
ese-American negotiation is underway. They have given rise to numerous and varied un-
fcmnded rumors which has led to the need of taking some measures domestically. It was under
these conditions that the incident involving (HETATUGU? Henning ? — (garbled)) arose.

I, therefore, issued a statement for publication, a copy of which is being cabled to you as my
Separate eable #261".

Please do everythtog in your power to prevent the recuiTKice t£ bui^ mcident on the
U.S. side.

"Seen, 48.
'Seen, 38.
'Not available.

Trana. 6-2-41

New York Times

June 6, 1941
{Page 1, Column 4)

JAPAN ASKING U.S. FOR NO-WAR PACT

SHE mom ACCORD LIKE THAT BETWEEN TOKYQ MOSCOW

WASHINGTON COLD TO IDEA
By HaUett Abend

Washington, June 5.

For nearly 2 months Japan has been attempting to induce the U.S. Government to conclude
with her a neutrality and non-aggressive pact similar to that recently concluded between
Tokyo and Moscow. So far the reactions of the State Department have been unenthusiastic
and at present there appears little likelihood that Japans hopes will be fulfilled.

The Japanese overtures have been made through Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, Tokyo
Jmk^mBi/iqi here. The continuing talks between Sefpe*a^ of State Cordell HuU md Admiral

4^'

Nomuia have been entirely informal and off the record, so that if the preliminaries which
Japan hoped would result in formal negotiations, break down entirely, neith^ sid^ wiU
ofticialiy have to bear the blame for failuire.

Although it is learned that the first approach was made by the Japan^e ambassador, the
(Tdpanese Embassy does not acknowledge this. Spokesmen there say vaguely that the informal
talks seem to have sprung from a mutual desire to find some means of preventing a height-
ening of the concededly dangerous tension between Japan and the U.S.

To the chagrin and disappointment of the Japanese Government the response of the State
Department to the overtures has been — in what the Japanese term "an excessively formal and
stilted marnier**, iSiiit #6 iflf "Qie kind of treaty proposed #a4iM' ^ «£feefftely dubious for
two reasons:

1. The responsibUily of the leaders of the Japanese Government is subject to grave doubt
and their ability to carry out agreements questionable.

Time after time since the outbreak of the "China incident" almost 4 years ago, Japanese
leaders individually, and the Japanese government officially have reiterated promises to
respect Open Door in China and to ^ure "equal opportunity for all" but these promises
have never been kept.

This sensational Japanese attempt to etfect a formal reapproachment with the U.S. has
^mraed tike liTeliest speculation in the small circle here that is aware of Tokyo's proposals. Of
particular interest is the bearing that such a pact, were it ever concluded, would have upon
Japanese formal adherence to the European Axis agreement between Germany and Italy,

The Axis pact entered into by Japan late in September 1940 binds her to go to the assistance
of Germany or Italy if either is attacked by any three powers not engaged in hostilities with the
Axis at the date of signing. Seemmgly this pact would bind Japan to make war upon the U.S.
if this country became involved in hostilities with Germany or Italy.

But Japan, it has been long conjectured here, has sought a loophole of escape from the
obligation, and she thinks she has found it in the word ''attacked". If, for instance, Germany
wi»« to shell or bomb a U.S. patrol ship in the Atlantic and if war were to result, Japan might
legalistically plead that she would not ha^?» ftski lS^t^ sto«» GeTO^IMf i)!f®#J ihs

"attacked" the U.S.

Tfee Moscow-Tokyo Accord signed in Moscow on April 13 of this year or about the time
Admiral Nomura first approached Secretary Hull for a neutrality aji^M^*9SSf^l^V& .^cm*
ment — consisted of only four articles and a "frontier declaration".

The third article specifies that the life of the agreement shall be for 5 years, renewable auto-
matically for 5 years more if neither party denounces the agreement one year before the
expiration date. The fourth article provides for immediate ratification and the frontier
declaration relates to the "ihviolabil|p ©f Manchakuo and the Mong&Iftfli

People's Republic.

It is Articles I and H that Japan wotlld tfke to duplicate in a treaty with the U.S. These read
as follows:

Article I — Both contracting parties undertake to m&intain peaceful and friendly relations
between them and mutually respect the territorial ii^td^ty and invioiabiUty of the other
iKSftracting party.

Article II — Should one of the contracting parties become the object of hostilities on the part
of one or several third powers, the other contracting party will observe neutrality throughout
the duration of the conflict.

Proposals of this kind from Tokyo where Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka continues to
proclaim that loyalty committments to Germany and Italy is the "immutable basis" of

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

either that Mr. Matsuoka and the Cabinet of Prince Fumimaro Konoye are ready to scuttle
the Axis agreement, or that Japan is trying to lull the U.S. into a false sense of security by
concluding a pact that she does not mean to live up to.

Translated into working world politics in view of the present international situation, the
agreement that Admiral Nomura is seeking to negotiate would bind Japan not to attack the
U.S. if this country should become involved in war with Germany and Italy. The obligation
would be absolute and would not hinge on any inte^reta^on of the Words "attaclffid" or
"attacker".

Conversely, if the U.S. were to sign such a pact with Japan this country would be honor
bound not to fight Japan if she became involved in a war with Britain or the Netherlands. In
practical terminology this would leave Japan free to attack Singapore or to seize the Nether-
lands East Indies without fear of U.S. intervention either to protect those areas or to protect
this country's own vital sources of supply for rubfeffi* atei; it looks almost eiferftt-

sively to Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies,

As a problem in practical diplomacy the Japanese move Ifet & treaty with this country
raises several grave questions:

First, if the move is sincere, is the U.S. Government entitled to consider Foreign Minister
Matsuoka' s statements as a bluff to frighten this country into negotiations at the same time
that he deceives Reichfuerheaer Hitler and Premier Mussolini.

Secondly, if the move is insincere, is it perhaps an effort to lull the U.S. into a sense of
security under which it might transfer a greater part of its fleet from the Pacific to the Atlantic,

Thirdly, if the Japanese advances for an undertaking are made with the foreknowled^vdt
Berlin and Rome what kind of new betrayal are the Axis powers planning as a group.

Finally, if the advances are sint^ere would it mean that the Japanese Navy, doubtful of the
outcome of a war with this country, has finally persuaded the firebrfiilde of tl» Japanese^ ^loy
that conditions necessitate a policy ol appeasement toward the U.S.

The reaction of Berlin and Rome to the revelation of the Japanese attempt to reach a neu-
t3fality accord with the U.S. will be watched with keenest interest here as will Mr. Matsuoka'^
€esplanation to the Japanese Army and public of the reversal of his "immutable" policies of
loyalty to the Axis agreement. The Japanese Army, it is reported, is now convinced, that
Germany will be triumphantly victerio»pr,^|if« I^fe^!iil*v3^^ Navy is said to

be troubled by waivering and doubts.

When Mr. Matsuoka concluded his Moscow negotiations in Al»il, he exultantly declared that
he had no doubt that the new neutrality pact with the Soviet Union "laid a foundation for the
solution of all outstanding Soviet- Japanese problems" and would be followed soon by a new
trade treaty, a new fishery accordance and the settlement of other troublesome questions.

It is believed here that probably Mr. Matsuoka has had hopes that if he could obtain a
neutrality treaty with the U.S. such a pact might be followed by a new trade treaty, for the
abrogation of the old trade agreement by this country in the summer of 1939 was a terrific
blow at Japan's economic and financial stabilits;, tJi^iSKSStW^ bright hopes it

is believed would be another staggering blow.

FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 6, 1941

TO: Tokyo # 368.

On the 6th the New York Times, in an article by ABEND", states that Japan has been
considering a neutrahty pact with the United States similar to the one she has contracted
with the Soviet, and that I am conferring thereon with Secretary HULL.

Therefore, I have advised the Government of the United States to do the proper thing about
this.

'ABEND, in at) article iA the New York Times, states Jt^pan h coueidedng a nentiality pact with the U.S. The
1^ Qsiyi^maeiit Torn, been lecpested to the thiaf , about thk.

Trans. 6-X0-41

No. 52

FROM: Washington (Npmmra) June §,1941

f©r Tokyo • #371.

Strictly secret.

With regard to ABEND'S article in the New York Times on the 6th, I called A.P., U.P.,
Tribune", Domei and Asahi correspondents together and categorically denied that thei% was
any truth in this article- This is for your information alone.

f^fthermoie, this morning, the 6th, the President in his press conference in answer to
questions on this matter said that he knew nothing about it. And continuing he said, "Though
the Ambassador and the Secretary of State occasionally have int^riewB, these conversations
concern ordinary matters and have no connection with this matter."

statement in the N.Y. Times to the effect that Japs are consideriiig a neutrali^ pact witJi the VM- The PNildwfe
stated at his press conference on the 6th that he knew nothing about it.

FROM;

Washic^on (Nomura)

(Parti of 4)
11

June 3, 1941

At the risk of a certain amount of riepetition, I am repotting fin- you the substance d sub-
sequent developments:

Since I presented our final draft, I have held conversations several times a week. Finally,

an American plan was offered me unofficially in which two or three questions concerning the
China incident were left pending. I thought that if this were left up to a drafting committee of

A-26

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

both countries, it would be a good thing from the point of view of convenience in phrasing the
clauses, so after getting their approval, on the 4th it was discussed in a joint committee. But,
to my surprise, this was seized upon by various quarters in this country for demagogical and
estrangii^ propaganda. Every letter and every phrase was the object of suspicion and
speculation, so this only goes to show how delicate international relations are today. So
Saturday afternoon I went to see Secretary HULL and talked with him for an hour and a half.

Trans. 6-i0-41

No. 54

FROM: Washington (Nomutti) June 8, 1941

TO: Tokjro. #375,

CPart2<rf4)

He has always insisted on the following;

1. The maintenance of peace in the Pacific is the basis of this understanding and it is not
desired that this point be glossed over in such a manner as to deceive anyone. As soon as it is
put into effect, suitable negotiations can take place with industrial circles to provi^l^ Id*
Japanese and Ameisic^n

told me this.

2, In considering the Pacific question, the matter of Japan's and the United States' own
relations with the European war, and their relations to the Japanese- Chin esc incident have
to be considered. The United States is worried about the Chinese question and wishes to
improve Japanese-American relations, American-Chinese relations and Japanese-Chinese
relations. Consequently, the United States does not, by any means, wish to do anything
that will cause the Chinese to harbor ill-feelings toward them. That is what he always says.

During the course of our conversation I said, "Well, then, for the sake of peace in the Pacific
and for the sake of rehabilitation of the human race, could not the President, himself, go
ahead and advise China to make peace?" He replied, "Well, don't you think that depends,
after all, on whethei ot not we can see eye to eye on this agreemmt?"

No. 55

PROM; Washingt6a|Nl*fi4^«) jTO!&a,J^4,
TO: Tokyo #170,

In speeches and in newspaper articles, a number titeSS, he has repeated in e^Oe(^
Ibllowing statement with respect to the European war;

"HITLER is planning to conquer the world, and if &igland goes under, the A^^lantic will be
under his domination. South America will be his supply base for raw materials and the
Western Hemisphere will become an armed camp. It does not make sense to wait until he in-
vades OUT sphere before we take action. America does not want to repeat the mistake made
by so many other nations." (I know just how much danger there is of the United States
entering liie war. Along the lines you have pointed out, I have done my best to reason with the
jlii4i^^ .#Kdl l^ ^ li^l^ INit 0£iat all, it

A-29

is now not a question of correcting their way of thinking. Our future diplomatic relations with
the United States will center around the question of whether or not we are able to keep them
out of this war,) Furthermore, the time has not yet come to harp on peace. Many peace rumors
have been afloat lately with the i^sUpn of WINANT, but tiw ftjesident has mjwelehed all> as
you know.

Trans. 6-10-41

No. 56

FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 8, 1941

TO: Tokyo #375.

(Part 4 of 4)

He (the Secretary) said that the United States regards the principle of commercial non-
discrimination as important in the Pacific, and that the United States practices this princi-
ple toward the American States, if Japan is willing also to use this principle, the United States
intends to do nothing to hinder the progress of Japan. He said that if we will not accept these
prf)miaes, he has no interest in either of the proposals.

Well, I feel that it will be very difficult to get anywhere by outright dealings and feel the need
of conducting some other sort of activities which might be more direct. Well, I and my associ-
ates are certainly not optimistic, but on the other hand, we are not pessimistic. We will do
our very best to carry out your instructions. Unless something unforeseen happens within the
next ten days, I think that the points now pending will so crystallize that I will be able to let
you know something more or less definite. I do not doubt his zeal in the matter at all. I call
on him two or three times a week. We confer until late at night and when I leave he always
says, "Come back to see me anytime you wish."

It is evident that the President and the Secretary now vie^'^X^vill^^ifSBlly, so I ha,ve
asked him to let me know just exactly what the attitude of both is.

Trans. 6-10-41

No. 57

FROM: Tokyo June 7, 1941

TO: Washington #21%

Regarding yo\a # 356".

The United States' reply seems to be unreasonably delayed. Isn't quicker action possible? If
not, how long do they expect it will take? Please let me know by tel^Pil^» W# iffiMWel
t^^O^lJ^^^ gg,gle|^e. tal^e care not to convey the wrong impression.

Trans. 6-11-41

A-30

THE *^MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

N(i.58

FROM:
TO:

Tokyo

1* . ■ •

Reyour #375'.

Please telegram the entpe ^rt <^#^;f&BaU<e4 **UpoPeial
received on May 31st (?) .

FROM:

TO:

WaBhmgt(^
Tokyo

wlticb y^

Tran«.6-il^l

June 9, imi

Re your # 281"

This consists of th^ Aiaerican proposal, the Annex and the Explanation for the proposal,
each d^ignated as ^"^tteHSli^, Wi0miW^'ms& "mtimt (toitS^iiigtl;". I am seadiag yo« the
entire text (as follows).

(1) The American proposal — #378'.

(2) That portion of the Annet intended as a statemrait by Japan — # 379".

(3) That portion of the Annex intended as a statement by the United States— # 380''.
Excerpts from Hull's speech of the 24th relatijig to the "attitwd% flf both CQuntiies towards

the European wjHf''— #381'*. - • ' • - / » '

H) Explanation— #382".

'See n, 68.
'Seen, 60.

IPtans. 6-11-41

TQ: Tokyo #a78.
(Parti of 6)

Secret.
Strictly confidential.

Unofficial, exploratory and without commitment.

The governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the ini-
tiatkm and concJlu^ion of a genial agreement of understanding a& expressed in a joii|l

Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both
Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment between
their countries should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and
unfortunate consequences.

It is our present hope that, by a cooperative effort, the United States and Japan may con-
tribute effectively toward establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and,
by the rapid consummation of an amicable understaaiding, attest, if not dispel, th<9>1lS^
confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.

For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited and weakening.
Both Governments, therefore desire that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for
the realization of a general uadMstoBding whidi would bind, OMMI^wWit, both Go5lWWDft«|!te
in honor and in act.

It is the belief of the i^vemments that such an nnderstanding should CCM^fi^
the pivotal isaues of u^entgf md not the jigis^ffipty conc©Ti& which could be ddjb<^ated^ |fife*
conference.

Trans. 6-11-41

No. 61

fSOMt Washington
TO: Tokyo

l^il^ jl^^iSl^ents presume to anticipate that they could achieve haitacmiiOQs t^ations if
^eilti^ situations and attitudes were clarified or improved; to wit:

t. 'fhe concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and
the character of nations.

2. The attitudes of both governments toward the European war,

3. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan,

4. Commerce between both nations.

5. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.

6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.

7. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

Accta^lKJgly, the government of the United States and the government of Japan h&im coatee
t^r)Ml^toi#U]g mutual understanding and declaration of policy!

No. 62

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

(Part 3 of 6)

1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and
the character of nations.

Both governments affirm that their national policies are directed toward the foundation of
a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of reciprocal confidence and cooperation

A-32

June 9, 1941
#378.

June 9,
#378,

Tm "M4GIC" BACKGROUND OF PE4RL HAIiBQR

Both governments declare that it is iheit traditional, and fifeSfent, conception and con-
viction that nations and races compose, as members of a family, one household; each equally
enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by

they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others; th^
further admit their responsibilities to oppose the oppression or exploitation of other nations.

Both Grovernments are firmly determined that their respective traditional (ioneepts on the
character of nations and the underlying moral principles of social order and national life will
continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those
moral pnnciplES and concepts.

Iktea Secret.

2. The attitudes of both governments toward the European war.

The government of Japan maintains that the purpose of the Tripartite ^act was, and is,
i^ifeffltlvis! ani'feiiiftiigttfeii W p^mea^ i^ ^a0^pation of nations la ifei European war not at
present involved in it. ObvloiM^, pr©*M^ # |1# 4^ to im^mmmt.

tJhrough acts of self-defense.

The government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward the European
hostilities is and will continue to be determined solely and exclusively by cottsideratjons of
protection and seli-detense: its national security and the defense thereof.

3. Action toward a pmceful settlement between China and Japan.

The Japanese government having communicated to the government of the United States
the general terms within the framework of which the Japanese government will propose the
n^dHi^^l^^ pt^^'i^ltfeitfi^ ^iMi ^tef^ B%i»)^'8^<e«nliteMb, 'which terms are declared
by the Japanese government to be in harmony with the Konoye principles regarding neigh-
borly friendship and mutual respect of sovereignty and territories and with the practical
application of those prii^tes, the Resident of the United States will sugges* to -to goviiia*'
ment of China that the government of China and the government of Japan enter into a
negotiation which is mutually advantageous and acceptable for a termination of hostilities
and resumption of peaceful relations.

Txam. P-W^

N«,63

June 9, 1941

TO:

Tokyo

Trans. 6-12-41

No. 64

IROM: Washington June 9, 1941

TO: Tokyo #3^S.

(Part 5 of 6)

Note: The foregoing draft of section 3 is subject to further discussion of the question of
cooperative defense against communistic activities, including the stationing of Japanese
troops in Chinese territory.

4. Commerce between both nations.

When othcial approbation to the present understanding has been given by both governments,
H^ lfoiited States and Japan shall amam Mt(tiilil% to supply such comiabdftiee

as- IBpB, respectively, available and required by either of them. Both governments further
iiOdsint to take necessary steps to resume normal trade relations as formerly established
under the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan. H &
new commercial treaty is desired by both governments, it VVOul4 h% ^(^^iiated as soon as
possible and be concluded in accordance with usuai procedures.

T^arn. 6-13-41

No. 65

FROM: Washington June 9, 1941

TO: Tqrkyo

{Part 6 of 6)

5. Economic activity of both mttions in the Pacific area.

On the basis of mutual pledges hereby given that Japanese activity and American activity
in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle
of non-discrim ination in international commercial relations, the Japanese gov^nment and the
government of the United States agree to cooperate each with the other toward obtaining non-
discriminatory access by Japan and the United States to commercial supplies of natural
resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) country nee^ fi&ic tbit#yS^ritAc#Ml'll^

development of its own economy.

6. The policies of both nations affecting peace in the Pacific area.
— (several lines garbled that it is. Isfeeif

purpose, through cooperative effort, to contribute to the maintenance and the preservation
of peace in the Pacific area; and that neither has territorial designs on the — ™ in tile aarea
mentioned. ..' _j ♦ - -

7. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

The government of Japan declares its willingness to ^nter at such time as the government
of the United States may desire into negotiation with the fOV^etatian^t of th# Umtied States
with a view to the conclusion of a treaty for the neiitralizstlon of the PMlippu^ ^S^4Si
when Philippine independence shall have been achieved.

Trans. 6-13-41

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 66

FROM: Wasbiia^i^ June 9, 1941

TO: TolPiTO #af&t

Extra Secret.

Annex and Supplement on the part of the Japanese Government.
3. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.
The basic terms as referred to in the above section are as follow:
L Neighborly friendship.

2. (Cooperative defense against malicious communistic activities — including the station-
ing of Japanese troops in Chinese territoiry.) Subject to further discussion.

3. Economic cooperation— by which China and JapMi will |^©ef^' tMi Ibf^Jfegy^:. flf
discrimination in international commercial relations,

4. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories.

5. Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation cooperating a$, g<KJd neigh-
bors and forming a Far Eastern nucleus contributing to world peace.

6. Wit—.

(Message incQmplete)

TVana. 6-11-41

No. 67

FROM: Washingtctti June 9, 1941

TO: Tokyo ' #380,

( In 3 parts -complete)

Extra secret.

(Part 1)

Annex and supplement on the part of the United States.

1. The attitudes of both governments toward the European war.

The position of the government of the United States toward the military movement of con-
quest inaugurated by Mr. Hitler is set forth in a public address made by the Secretary of
Staie"4^: April 14, 1^1. Some extracts which are directly in point and which are basic in
relation to the entire si^iJui^diil^RB as follow:

(Part 2)

The forf'going statements make it clear that the attitude of the government of the United
States is one ol resolve to take measures of self-defense in resistance to a movement, which,
as has been madd unequivocally clear by the acts and utterances of Hitler, is directed to
world conquest by force from which no country and no area are excepted. This attitude is
based upon a most fundamental consideration — ^that of the inalienable right of self-defense.
The only other attitude this government could assume would be the suicidal attitude of some
fifteen countries in Europe which also were told, as our country is being told, that they would
not be molested"; but if they should undertake to resist beyond their own boundaries they
would be charged with being a^;ressora and with having assumed the offensive*

A similar course by this nation from the standiKjint of effective defense against the Hitler

movement of world conquest would be ik^oi^r IU|M«''^i j^pi^^' irm the stsnd^pieiG^^^
reasonable preQaiition for its safety.

(Pan 3)

In the l^ght of existing situation. Hitler is the one person who can promptly remove the
ijee^^ty fa^ effwts at eifective self-defense by this country and other countries simiUitly
situated, whereupon for any other nation to request that the United States desist from any
such resistance would in its actual effect range the country making such request on the aide
of Hitler and his movement of aggression by force. Hitler is therefore the person who should
be addressed in support of peace, rather than those whom he is attacking for the purpose of
bringing about their complete subjugation without color of law, or of right, or of humanity.

"Yes, it makes a difference who wins—the difference whether we stand with our backs to the
wall with the other four continents against us and the high seas lost, ft long ^li^^^flg: fesfe
free territories on earth— or whether we keep our place in an orderly world*"*

"In a later message, Washington to Tokyo, Gogai, dated June 9th, See II, 68, the following corrections were made:
"In the middle of Part 2, 'molested, but if should be corrected to read 'moles*6S'|^iytet|f<.
'Also, wiU you please add the following to the end of the same message:'
'Annex and supplement on the part of tlie govemntedit of tliei tltttted States.'
*4. Commerce between both nations. '

'It is understood that during; the present international emergency Japan and the United States ^hali each permit
export to the other of comnnHiities in amiiunts up tt.) the fifrures of usual or pte-wai -^ad^ tes^e^l$li'00)^^0tll^liSi.
commodities which it needs tor its own purposes of security and seit-detense.' "

Trans. 6-13^1

No. 68

FROM: Washington Jtoftte 9, 1941

TO: Tokyo No number.

Re my #380', part 2-

In the middle, "molested, but if should be corrected to read "moteste4
Also will you please add the following to the end of the same message;
"Annex and supplement on the part of the United States.

"4. Commerce between both nations.

"It is understood that during the present international emergency Japan and the United
States shall each permit export to the other of commodities in amounts up to the figures of
usual pre-war trade, except, in the t^g^^g^^ps^eaxaoditieis, wS^^ fteeda for its mm sWBf-
poses of security and self-defense,"

'Seen, e?.

Trans. 6-13-41

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Ho. 69

FROM: Washington
TO: Tok^

(1» 5 parts— coiBlietel

Extra secret.
(Pe^tl)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

May 31, 1941

NONOFFICIAL, EXPLORATORY AND WITHOUT COMMITMENT ORAL
EXPLANATIONS OE SUGGESTED AMENDIMTS TO THE JAPANESE

DRAFT

A few minor changes have been made in phraseology with a view to clariiying the meaning.

In the list of points enumerated on page two of the Japanese draft, the title of Section 3 has
been altered to conform more accurately to the subject matter; the word "southwestern" has
Ibe&ti ptiitli iiiltttibeced five and, in view of the new subject matter under point

six (for explanation see IHFEA), part of the subject matter under point six incorporated in an
additional Section, the title of which is therefore listed, and part of the subject matter in Section
^itf^llapanese draft has been omitted (for explanation see INFRA).

1. The concepts of the United State? and of Japan reapectmg international relations and
the character of nations.

The first par^aph has hem. tmitu4M;^^^B^^ii&^M^
(jWBBiiinder of Part 1' mfesuig) .

(Part 2)

2. The attitude of both governmenti tQwards the European war.

The first paragraph of the Japanese draft has been omitted in order to avoid any implica-
tion of inconsistency with statements made by the President to the effect that the present is
not an opportune time for the American government to endeavor to bring about peace in

To the second paragraph of tins iftipaiiie?© df aft a OSW^^t^ce km been added to empha-
size the aspect of self-defense.

The psa»0!Wj^^ i^e^^^ inasmuch fls fte lil^ fil^!^ ^partite Pact has
been published and no ptMifwase would appear to be swed by exisare^ te^mxx ta any of its
provisions.

The fourth parspoidt of the Japanese draft has been revised to emphasize the protectivf
and self-defense character of the attitude of the United States toward the European hostilities.

A statement in the annex and supplement on the part of the government of the United
States contains an elaboration of this government's viewpoint toward the military movement
of conquest inau|;urated by Chancellor Hitler.

(Part 3)

3. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.

As already stated, the title has been altered to describe more accurately the contents.
The statement in the Japanese draft has been rewritten to keep the underlying purport
and at the same lime to avert raising questions which do not seem fundamental to the basic

June 9. 1^1

A-37

subject and which are controversial in character and might present serious difficulties from the
point of view of the United States.

The statement in, th* Japanese annex and supplement in regard to this section has also
been revised in a partietilte itl Conformity with the considerations mentioned hi "iHie
preceding paragraph. In addition, point numbered three in regard to economic cooperation
has b^en ri^pll^tA'Sed so as to make it clear that China and Japan intend to follow in their
«eo«ffl^ifr*e!ftdeiig, tht principle to which it fe^ft^tra^teo^ ■^e iJi^iBilgte ^iifflsttent and the
Chinese government have long subscribed and which principle forms the foundation of the
commercial policy of the United States, As it is assumed that the term "troops" in point
<a^^^beml six is meant to include all armed forces, the language of this point has been sHght-
Vf^lirased to avoid possible ambiguity.

Jss already stated, the question relating to communistic activities, including the station-
it^'0i tfapanese troops in Chinese territory, is subject to further discussion.

(Part 4)

4. Commerce between both nations.

A statement is included in the annex and supplement on the part of the United States
clarifying the point that as a temporary measure during the present international emergency
it is understood that each country may restxiet etgcfft of ceai^podtties which it Re^d^ for it§
own purposes of security and self-defense.

5. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.

The language of this section has been rephrased to make the provisions thereof applicable
equally to the United States and to Japan,

6. T%e policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.

This section has been revised to make it consist of a clear-cut statement of the fundamen-
tal purpose of the understanding. The thought in mind is to give emphasis to this purpose so
tfeat the document may speak for itself on this all -important subject.

The statement of fundamental purpose has been assigned a section by itself in order
that it may gain added emphasis.

The statement in the Japanese draft ia r^afd itt #16 •SStf^puae iah^ife^feM been dealt
with in a new section bearing number 7.

The statement in regard to Japanese immigration has been omitted in view of the estab-
lished position of the United States that the question of immigration is a domestic matter. Fm
that reason, to attempt to include a statement on this subject would stand in the way of the
underlying purposes of the agreement.

(Parts)

7. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands,

The piiraseology of this section has been altered so as to bring it into conformity with the
language of the Ty dings- McDuffie Act, approved March 24, 1934,

ADDENDUM.

Jn view of the traditional policy of the United States and various practical considerations
in the United States, important difficulties would be presented should the government of the
United States endeavor to keep secret the understanding under reference together with its
annexes. This government could probably arrange to keep the understanding secret for a
period of a few weeks, during which time it believes that the two governments should wotrk out
procedure covering the scope, character and timing of the announcement of the understanding
and ef at least the definitive substance thereof.

A-38

THE "MAQiC" BAqKG^lW OF P&ABI« !l4E(BCm

N©.70

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

(Part 1 of 3)

There were many points unacceptable to me in the proposal of the United States which I am
transmitting to you this date (message #377°). At the same time, this proposal being un-
official, the American side expressed its desire to go over the objectionable parts with me before
submitting it to Japan. However, I am asking for a preliminary draft which will approximate
as much as possible the final pjcppoeAl,. which X intend to submit to you for your considera'
tion.

TVans. 6-11-41

No. 71

FKOM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

(Part 2 of 3)

1. Among the main points relating to the European War:

a. Eliminating the phrases regarding the right of self-preservation.

b. Eliminating Secretary Hull's speech in the Ann^. ' '

2. Regarding the China Incident:

a. In accordance with your telegraphic instructions, the suggestion to China to be made
by the President;

b. The working out of a mutually satisfactory phraseology regarding the desire for peace,

3. In place of a statement regarding justice and non-discrimination, the inclusion of 4
ckuser^ardingpeaeplli;!^#:^aSiQ«& . . _ •

Trans. 6-12-41

No. 72

FROM; Washington
TO: Tokyo

{Part 3 of 3)

In addition to the foregoing, the inclusion of stipulations relating to the prevention of the
spread of the European war, to efforts for future world peace, and peace in the Pacific.

Also, in an Annex, stipulations that Japan and the United States mutually recognize
Japan's national aspirations in the Far East, including the southwestern Pacific and those
of America in the Western Hemisphere; and that Japan plans no military bases in the West-
em Hemisphere and the United States none in the Far East.

A-39

June 9, 1941
#884i •

June 9. 1941

June 9, Wm
#384.

Your telegraphic instructions are requested regarding the admission ot manufactured goods.
TJie mediation proposal be acted upon in three dajre. Secretary Hull lias been indispoise^
aitteetbejiigbtlaefore last, ajadan wftd»&3«i4

Trans, 6-ia-41

No. 73

FROM: Washington June 9, 1941

tO: Tokyo #385.

The contents of the American proposal and the present condition of negotiations are as
reported in my # 377" and # 384*, but in the American proposal there are many points which
still require further deliberation and for this reason they are reluctant to report td
However, I expect that the report will be seait in a few days. In the meantime please accept the
preliminary proposal for your study.

'Seen, 70, ?1, 12.

IVans.l-Jl-i^t'

No. 74

FROM: Tokyo- (Japanese Foreign Minister) June 10, 1941

TO: Washington # 286.

To Counselor IGUCHI from Secretary TERAZAKl.

Officials, as well as outsiders returning to Japan from Washington, report that harmony is
lacking among the members in the Embassy there. I have been sensing this for quite a while
and lately it seems that the sneers are gradually getting more and more unbearable. I have
idaft heard that Ambassador NOMURA called the members of his staff togethlaf ^aitd begged
them to keep peace. I have just received a report that Consul General MIURA felt terribly
ashamed for an outsider like Ambassador NOMURA to find matters in such, a regrettable state.
Now, when the world situation is in such ae^^al state, will fOiiv «l GoSMi^^
the gt^ to please eoiiduct themselves in a mor«( seemly fashion .

Trans,

No. 75

FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister) June 10, 1941

TO: Washington #284.

Strictly Secret.

To Counselor IGUCHI from Secretary TERAZAKl.

In the telegrams concerning the adjustment of Japanese-American relations such as secret
message # 377* m the M% th«« tee atoas «ai^»«i*i *e€*t Iso niaMe gotHi senae

A-40

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

and I am at a loss at times to know just what is being said. It is not that I insist on your troubl-
ing yourself with a perfect job of drafting, but please wure me back just why it is that clearer
messages cannot be sent.

"Seen, 59.

Trans. 6-11-41

No.7e

FROM: Washington June 13, 1941

TO: Tokyo . — .. . -

Re your # 284".

Trans. 6-17-41

• • • •«

No. 77

FROM: Washii^^ June 11, 1941

TO: Tokyo ' #392.

To Bureau Chief Terasaki from Iguti.

Many of the messages connected with this subject have been drafted by the Ambassador
himself and although before they are sent they are submitted to Colonel Iwakuro, the Naval
and Military Attaches and to me and other officials for consideration, we have been sending
them whenever possible as nearly as originally drafted as possible in order to convey better
the feelings of the AmbaB8lia*il «iW& Wb iSlsfcuaisfeilMa matter with the Secretary ol State.

The tone of your message #285° is very disconcerting in view of our Ambassador's supreme
^topfe to promote adjustment of American- Japanese relations. Therefore, I trust that you will

Trans. 6-17-41

A-41

ium 24, 1941
#4M.

Re my #384*.

1. As I said in my caption message, I have repeatedly negotiated with them on their former
proposals for &n und^irstanding, on the basis of your instructions. On the 15th I talked with the
Secrtetafy *hfle Il&'*as gfeic in bed. (Since the 8th M has been up and atfi**, aiSS' T under-
stand that he iw i^win ;n!\nf to Hot Springs.) The Secretary said: "According to our reports, in
Japan there are intluentiai people who do not wish an understanding between Japan and the
United States, so I don't suppose that, after all, Japan considers the composure of the rela-
tions of our two countries as so important." "Could you not, he hopefully asked, "at your dis-
cretion, once more report all the details to the Imperial Government and find out whether the
Imperial Government is really in favor of composing relations between our two countries or
not?" I replied: "Well, such concessions as the American Government has made are really not
wgrth our^ consideration. I must repeat that I am negotiating entirely within the limits of the
itfcSti^^tiMi df -my fifeftttft ^QoveMiiaittt. Se'l'isng as yotf db ftct gfv# w a «n*S*'60^ JMll' ll^'f^ro^
posal, there is no sense in requesting instructions, at least on the basis of what y$(a^kBii^ t&^^
us so far." Since then I continued with my negotiations and on the 22nd(?) the SfeCtetaiy
haifided iSte tiie 69f al Statement in my # 426* preliminary to making the proposal in my # 425''.

The latest American proposal which contains the following excuse, "unofiicial, explore*
tory and without commitment", is far from being in accord with your instructions and I must
say that I am myself thoroughly dissatisfied but still, in view of the preceding facts, I am
sending it to you for wHat it may be worth. In connection with this American talk of self-
defense and peace terms relative to the Chinese Incident (commercial non-discrimination),
they stated that they would like for us to inscribe in official letters and documents our acccad
with what they have insisted on all along. However, the Imperial Government could not by
any means recognize some of these terms, so last night, the 23rd,{?) I sought an interview with
the Secretary and told him frankly that I c^uld not submit this to my Govarnnaent.

Tart 2 of 2 follows, {See II, 79).

'See II, 70„ .7i, 71 in 'Wiu^^M^'^'^i^S tta^te -to ie«pi»tf4 a I^Hs^ ^iikilSa^i0i^^

'Seen, 87, 8)1,*.
'Seen, 90.

2. I have told you in several mesaf^es tiiat there are three impi^taiit discrepancies in the
demands both^ides:

No. 79

FROM; Washington (Nomura)
*m: Tokyo

June 24, 1941

A-42

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

^Wben it comes to the European war, Anglo-American self*defefflse fil^his, md th&
Tripartite Pact, they will not yield to anything we advocate.

(2) When it comes to the question of our stationing of troops for protection against Commu-
nists, they strangeljr enough declare that they cannot interfere with Chinese-Japanese peace
terms, but in the same breath show censidfirable ire, declaring that this interferes with the
sovereignty of a third power.

(3) Secretary HULL's pet principle is that of commercial non-discrimination- He repeats
that the Pan-American policy of the United States consists in this. He often says that if we
applied the principle of non- discrimination to China and all the Pacific, we would have nothing
to lose and it would, as a matter of fact, be to our material interests.

These have all been very hard points but they took the attitude that if they were absolutely
certain that Japan actually and earnestly desired to compose relations between the two
countries, there was room for negotiations. However, when we talk peace with CHIANG KAI
SHEK, points two and three will be among the peace terms and we do not believe that the
United States would support us on those points. The United States, furthermore, strongly
insists that it is against her principles to ©aSBsl!^ CHIANG KAI SHEK to accept our demands
on these matters.

3, We were exempted from the order freezing foreign assets; the affair involving naval officers
has been settled amicably; and the Secretary of State, while in bed, interviewed me three
times. These things and others lead me to think that the President, his immediate associates,
and the Secretary of State have not cooled any in their zeal to adjust the relations of our two
countries but, judging from reports coming from the American Embassy in Tokyo and from
financial quarters in New York, I think that some American officials of the United States are
by some means endeavoring to cast suspicions on the sincerity of the Japanese Government.
There are, indeed, many indications that this is true.

4. Thus, though it can be seen that there are discrepancies between the views of our two
countries, I would not say that there is no room for negotiations. There are various reasons why
I think it would be to our advantage not to break off negotiations; however, if our high officials
in Tokyo think that the time has come to stop these talks, let them remember that the United.
States Government will freeze our credit, strengthen the embargo, and by every other sort 0
oppressive measure crowd us more than ever. If they decide to rupture these negotiations, let
them begin immediately to take every possible measure to prepare for the worst.

Translator's Note: Messages dictated by Ambassador NOMURA are extremely poorliy
phrased and difficult to translate.

SSeiieily Secret

Of the three secretaries in this embassy, as you know, one is worked to death on a special
assignment and has no time at all to devote to general work here. One or the other of the other
two is always sick or something, so I find it absolutely impossible to do things right with just
one secretary. True, I do have three or four aides, but they are either totally inexperienced, just
having graduated Ifom seh9oI< np to theit necks in telegiBphic wwk. Nwe of them can take

Trans. 6-27-41

No. 80

FROM: Washington
TOt Tokyo

June 10, 1941

the place of secretaries. I feel this shortage most keenly now that this country is gradually
turning toward war, because I have to send these men here and there both within and without
^i:^ iXfUti!lBcy Qn various missions and have very much work to do in connection with our business
M iiWitii>^liSii'iG6ntr America. You can well imagine my difficulty, I know that our whole
iii@ffiiil^l(l^;dit:$h<^t of men, for that matter, but I feel constrained to request that you send
*|i li|pi Ic^lid ^iasp secretaries immediately. If you do not have any suitable men in Tokyo
it ^lli Wbffi^ would prefer Secretary AOKI now at Vichy, be-

cause he knows general embassy work as well as commercial and economic conditions in
Central and South America^ or Business Official TAKAGI, who is mm .t^mring South m4:
Central ASHftrtfea eksag mtii Mfcteer YAMAGATA. We would lase ym to have GmM
INAGAKI, now in San Fraacisoo, sent h«e, Wi w^ll be very great^l if you will accouuoodate
tisin this matter.

(Parti of 3)
He your #37Sft

Needless to say, I am glad that you have without the loss of time submitted to our Government
a proposal, even though it be uno6Scial, on such an important matter as this. Furthermore,
this matter, in view of our relations with Germany and Italy which are the axis of our diplo-
macy and in view of world events, is very important. I also think that you fully reali^
delicate it is, A thing of this nature is first and foremost a matter to be handled primarily by
the Government. It is certainly lacking in propriety for you and the Secretary of State to get
together and submit the proposal to a drafting committee of both countries. As for the points
which the committee is to consider {superfluous or non-essential phrases are quite beside the
point), only after the Imperial Government and the Government of the United States have
reached an understanding between themselves, and after instructions have been r<eceived
flrom this Foreign Minister, is re-action to take place. That is the formula. You tejl me that
there were some important points on which both committees disagreed. But in any
time has not yet -fe-irtitoSrit ^ 1»at^ Any matters presented' to a

committee under the present circumstances should be distinctly understood as without
commitment but it would already seem that you have made some commitments which will
1b« d^jffii^ilt io ^IMe$

"Ambassador NOMUHA infmnis Foreign Minister MATSUOKA that he and Secretaiy HULL have submitted a
proposal for the adjusUneni of Japaiifise-Ameriean nsl^tigins tP a joint dsilSiig ^mto^i^lm which disagreed on impor-

No. 81

FROM; Tokyo
TO; Washtegtm

June 10, 1941
#285..

ts^ points.

Trans. 6-10-41

A-44

No. 82

FROM: Tokyo

As soon as I have received the full text of the unofficial American proposal, we will discuss it
jfi Government circles, and until you get some further instructions from me, please stop these
committee talks. Of course, I know that you will have to do so in a friendly and inoffensive
manner, but I will leave that up to your tact.

I do, as you know, and have always considered good relations between Japan and the
United States as important. However, no matter how urgent this adjustment might seem, it
is not so important as the Aiis Pact, and no bad effect must be brought to bear on that Pact.
Therefore, our first and foremost objective is to maintain the integrity of the Japanese, German,
Italian Alliance and to do everything we can to keep the United States from entering the war,
or at least to prevent her from taking any more direct anti-Axis measures than she has up to
the present day. I feel that our dauntless attitude has already achieved much in this direc-
tion. When you left Tokyo I told you this by word of mouth and you agreed with me, but un-
fcartunately there are many outsiders who afsem to tfajxilr #<Nuak
fi^ta, we Japanese will not necessarily do so.

Trans. 6-HMl

No. 83

FROM: Tokyo ,
TO: Washington

(Part 3 of 3)

As a matter of fact, the impression is imparted that the Japanese-Ammcan negotiations
are centering around that very impression. The President of the United States and the Secre-
tairy of State are scheming to include in this proposal for an understanding the basis for giving
to the American people and to the world at large such a false impression. From the point ql
view of our intention to cooperate with the three powers, we must therefore be ever on the alert.
1 %hmk that I have informed you on this matter through my various instructions. When we coAe
fo take this matter up, this is one point which we must carefully consider, and on which il«
must allow no error to be made. Summing all this up, if the United States fights Germany, tlO
mattejr what, sort of agreement exists, after all it will inevitably have to be broken. 'Dia^.J^
(flieare^'fefln the light of day. The important thing today is for us to maintain a reftSM^Isi
attitude. Even though it is beyond our power to make the United States feel friendly toward
Germany, we must keep her from making an outright attack. Compared with this, any
advice that the United Stat^ m^ht give CHIANG KAI SHEK to make peace with us is of
.secondary importance. I thinkweaUknOWthatbynoW.

I will wire you more later.

Trans.

June iO, 1941

June 10, 1941
#285.

FROM: Tokyo June 13, 1941

TO: Washington #289.

Regarding your #384".

Since reading your telegram I feel that I understand better the development of the dis-
cussions between you and the other party. If the "committee" is the type of which you speak,
we may authorize the instruction to .

We are now studying the unofficial American proposal (your # 378'} which you received from
the Secretary of State on April (?) 10th. Please bear in mind that our opinion regarding it will
be sent to you.

Although the proposal in question may be of the sort you mention, it nevertheless is useful
to this Minister when making translation of notes to be exchanged and for this reason it should
have been telegraphed to him without delay.

Please bear in mind in the future that a proposal of this nature is also very important in
finding out just how the President's and the Secretary of State's, minds work, which is useful
to our govemiuent^s deliberatiMi on tlus fflattcff.

'See II. 70. 71,72.
'See n, 60-65,

Trans. 6-17-41

No. 85

FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 14, 1941

TO: Tokyo #401.

On the ~ I called on the Assistant Secretary, WELLES (HULL is at present ill) and

requested thaL the TACHIBANA incident be dealt with from the standpoint of the general
political trend, WELLES agreed to do so.

Trans. 6-30-41

No. 86

FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 17, 1941

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #405.

It goes wi*hei«- M^f ^sfc JapaiWa*^43te«^B i«fert^t>fts -Beiftg very delicate, we mti^ lSe
ever nil I he alert. ' • ' .

There are a number of influential persosW-^S^ are advocatmg placing a general embargo on
t^h MijwcvMr, Aie to diplomatic wasoes, b*Jth the Seeretary of State and the State Depart-
ment are exercising restraint. They are also said to have advised the press to mdntatoil
attitude regarding questions affecting Japanese- American relations.

Trans, 6-19-41

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEAjii* .HApQ&

No. 87

FROM: Washington {Nomiira)
TO: Tokyo

Strictly sectiet {jutsid^ tbe Depart:meiit
(To be handled in Government Code)
ORAL STATEM^^-i^e 21, 1941.
Ckal Statement,

The Secretary of State appreciates the earnest efforts which have been made by the Japa-
jQ^se Ambassador and his associates to bring about a better understanding between our two
eeuntries and to establish peace in the Pacific area. The Secretary of State appreciates also
the frankness which has characterized their attitude throughout the conversations which have
been held. This Government is no less desirous than the Japanese Ambassador to bring about
better relations between our two countries and a situation of peace in the Pacific area, and in
timt spirit the Secretary trf State has given careful study to eveiy aspect of the Japfmese pro-
posal.

The Secretary of State has no reason to doubt that many Japanese leaders share the views
of the Japanese Ambassador and his associates as indicated above and would support action
toward achieving those high objectives. Unfortunately, accumulating evidence reaches this
Government from sources all over the world, including reports from sources which over many
years have demonstrated sincere good will toward Japan, that some Japanese leaders in
influential official positions are definitely committed to a course which calls for support of
Nazi Germany and its policies of conquest and that the only kind of understanding with the
United States which they would endorse is one that would envisage Japan's fighting on the
side of HITLER should the United States become involved in the European hostiliti^j tbioijgh
carrying out its present policy of self-defense.

Trans. 6-26-41

June 24^ mi

FROM: Washingtott'^JIfBSB'Wsil
TO; Tokyo

Strie%«eci«(6«f(*||J^ the Department.

• The tenor of recent public statements gratuitously made by spokesman (rf the Japanese
Government emphasizing Japan's commitments and intentions under the Tripartite Alli-
ance exemplify an attitude which cannot be ignored. So long as such leaders maintain this
attitude in their official positirais and apparently seek to influence public Opinion in Japan in
the direction indicated, it is not illusory to expect that adoption of a proposal such as t^i^-
under consideration offers a basis for achieving substantial results along the desired lines?

k^iSs^^^^^^^i^^l^^^ the proposal relates to the desire of the Japanese

i^sTfmmM Ift'lts terms a peaceful settte»il^% 4i#ired to the Chiitdse

JmeMf 1941
#426.

A-47

Government a provision which would permit the stationing of Japanese troops in certain
mmB m ton^ Mongolia and North China as a measure of cooperation with China in leaistin^

No. 89

FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 24, 1941

TO: Tokyo #426.

(Part 3 of 3)

(Strictly secret outside the Department)

While this government has given careful thought to the considerations which have prompted
the Japanese govemiOient to make such a proposal, and while this government does not
desire to enter into the merits of such a proposal, it feels that the liberal policies to which the
United States is committed, as explained on numerous occasions to the Japanese Ambassa-
dor and'Ml^-ilssociates, would not permit thi& government to ass{^^|ite>^itself with any course
which appears to be inconsistent with these policies. Furthermore, although in matters
affecting only this country, there might be some latitude of decision as to the qualifying of
rights, the matter under discussion affects the sovereign rights of a third country, and aeei^il^
ingly it is felt that this government must be most scrupulous in dealing with such a matter.

The Secretary of State has therefore reluctantly come to the conclusion that this govern-
ment must await some clearer iltiffisti^n than has yet been given that the Japanese govern-
ment as a whole desires to pursue a course of peace such as constitute the objectives of the
proposed understanding. This government sincerely hopes that the Japanese government
will manifest such an attitude.

Note: In order to bring the current discussions up to date as far as the American attitude
is concerned, there is being handed the Japanese Ambassador separately a revision, bearing
the date of June 21, of the document marked "Unofficial, exploratory and without commit-

'foaja8.7-7-41

FROM
TO;

No. 90

Washington
Tokyo

(Secret outside department).
(GM^of Office riM^a^*
Be lay #424'.

The U.S. text of the 21st consists of th# J
annex is being sent separately in # 427'-

#42S.

A-48

Add at the end of Paragraph 1 of the Preamble; "For the resumption of traditional friendly

relations".

Change "pjfeaent" to "earnest" in the first part of Paragraph 3 and inaert next to "under-
standingf * th'tPthree words "encourage world peace'*.

Insert "deliberated" next to "later" iti Clause 5.

In Clause 1 ^national r^hts) at the end of Para^aph I cba^^ge "among" to "between". In
PtoagtAph 21t!^ *'tivteg tmder tte Tde^it'Sf^^ dmtOlfd thirough justice and equity"

nest te) "one household". Al the end of the same paragraph change "nations" to "peoples".

In Clause 2 (European war), in Paragraph 1, substitute "to contribute to the prevention of an
unprovoked extension of the European "War" for the phrase between '*to preseat" and "self
defense".

In the May 31st text eliminate the entire phrase beginnuig with "obviously".
No revisions made in Paragraph 2.

In this Clause, the following paragraph, "There is appended a suggested draft of an exchange
of letters as a substitute for the annex and supplement on the part of the government of the
United StateiM^ lihis subject which constituted a part of the draft of May 31, 1941", has been
added as Note; please refer to my # 424° regarding this.

CkuLse 3 (China affair), no revisipuS; but note "The foregoing draft of section 3 is subject to

eluding the stationing of Japi^BlSfe troops in Chinese territory^, i^sS: the question of econoir^
cooperation between China attd S^^mn. With regard to suggestiott tlwit the language of Sectica?
^' wS ' dianged, it is believed that isdnsSd^tJdft of aiiy suggested change can most advanta-
•^Bously be given after all the points in the annex relating to this section have been satisfactorily
worked out, when the section and its annex can be viewed as a whole," has been added.

Clause 4 (trade relations), no revision.

Clause 5 (economic activities in the Pacific), no revision,
^^^^^^nnipij of the paragraph dealing with political activities in the Pacific has been

Clatise?, ho revision.

'Amb. Ncnnura wires Tokyo that in an interview with Secy. Hull he made the statement that there seem to be
influential people in Japan who do not desire an understanding with the U.S., so, after all, does Japan consider the
composure of relations between the two countT^»j^ |n^^t^|n^-;$l^ilK(^X|^ as U.S. has

so far oflisred are not wwthy of considera tion .

*S«»1I.91.

Trans. 7-1-41

FROM; Washington (Nomura)
(Part 1 of 2) Separate wire.

June 24, 1941
#427.

^Mc% secret outside the Department.

A-49

Annex and supplement on the part of the Japanese Government.

2 (or 3?). Action toward-aiteiii^^Uli^ti^isitltetweeii China and Japan.

The basic terms as referred to iafJ»«fei^«ectioB axe m foUowsi

1. Neighborly friendship.

2. Cooperative defense against injurious Ccanmunistic activities — inchjding the stationing
of Japanese troops in Chinese territory. Subject to further discussion.

3. Economic cooperation. Subject to agreement on an exchange of letters in regard to the
85>plication to this point &{ the princijjle of non-discriminaticm ia-'int^national commercial

j«lations.

4. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories.

Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation cooperating aa good
neighbors and forming an East Asian nucleus contributing to world peace.

6. Withdrawal of Japanese armed forces from Chinese territory as promptly as possible and
in accordance with an agreement to be concluded betwe^ Japan and China.

7. No annexation.

8. No indemnities.

9. Amicable negotiations in regard to Manchukuo.

(Part 2 of 2} Separate wire.

To be handled in Government Code.

Strictly Secret outside the Department.

Annex and supplements on the part of the Government of the United States.
4. Commerce between both nations.

It is understood that during the present international emergency Japan and the United
States each shall permit export to the other of commodities in amounts up to the figures of
usual or pre-war trade, except, in the case of each, commodities which it needs for its own
^EO^^es of security and self-defense. These limitations are mentioned to clarify the obliga-
tions of each Government. They are not intended as restrictions against either Government;
and, it is understood, both Governments will apply such regulations in the spirit dominating
f disitifaaa with friendly nations.

Trans. 6-26-41

No. 92

¥ROU: Washington (Nomtira)
TO: Tokyo

June 24, 1941
#427.

^lisa^. 6-26-41

THE "mGtW MmmmismoM peap^ ha^or

\o. 94

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

Regarding paragraph 1 of your message # 425".

It is not clear to us just how the 0£sm '■mm090':W'^ ^X^^ is to be fttSfeHi fau

Please send the revised text.

June 25, 1941
#309.

'Changes to be made in th« U.S. tfst^tibe "uodetstaiiding agreement."

Trans. 7-3-41

No- 95

FROM: Washington June 25, 1941

TO: Tokyo -pt^.

Re your #309".

Secret. . w. .

Before the third paragraph of the text reading as follows: "It is our earnest hope that, by a
cooperative effort, that the United States and Japan may contribute effectively toward the
establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific area and by the rapid consummation
of an amicable understanding, encourage world peace and arrest, if not dispel the tragic con-
fimion that now thre«te«si|i*^®ilf dvilization",|^^ insert a comma after "if not dii^"*

° "It is not clear to ue ju«t how the phrase "eneourage world peace" in (^^fc.^ I3f.fi)^tl4 ^^M* amd the revised
text."

Trans. 7-3-41

No. 96

FROM: Tokyo ' ' ' * ^' ' " June 26, 1941

TO: Washington #312.

Secsret outside the Department. >'

Concerning part 2 of your # 427" in your last sentence, repeat immediately all the words fol-
lowing, "it is understood."

"See II, 91 wMch gives the annex and supplement on the part of the Japanese and United States Governments to
the Oral Statement.

Trans. 7-1-41

A-51

FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 26, 1941

TO: Itel^ ^4m,

Re your #312", aaMltwsi

It is understood that both govemmeiits wiE apply mi^h reialaticina in the ^mt dasttumtrng
relaUpos with friendly nations.

°Se*H,96.

Trans. 6-30-41

No. 98

FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 25, 1941

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) ' Jid awnber,

F^t» tlMi jfif&m6|!d^ «^t%«l^oi6ipL Minister.

Believing that the question of tilisiteblishing better Japanese -American relations is one of
the important phases of our natiooal policy today, since my assumption of this post, 1 have
ditvoted all my time, putting aside All personal considerations, to its promotion. Howev^,
some time past Your Excellency saw fit to question my motive and I trust that it was made
clear at that time that any suspicion regarding my motive was unjustified. However, since
then I have been quietly making inquiries to locate the source of such suspicion.

On the other hand, in the "Oral Statement*' which was handed me together with the U.S.
{Sf!pQ||ll^ there are many indications that the United States government doubts the good faith
of-d(3r^i%i<maent. ThtnMng that there migl^ b&4$6te&>«teil»^$e&'««afljaii^ this att&

tvide I made inquiries and obtained from various reliable sources the 'iE#iWiag facts, in
general, regarding the true Static of the American proposals.

As I have already reported the proposal for American-Japanese wlidi^^et^SiSi'W^^ ^tsM^^
nally, being handled only by the President and a few heads of the government secre^^
Subsequently, it became necessary to disclose some phase of it to other members of tfc&
Cabinet and certain officials of the State Department. It appears that two or three members
of the Cabinet (probably Morgenthau, Ickes, and Jackson) are not in favor of Japanese-
Amsican understanding and some of the State Department officials oppose it as a matter of
cour^. Adhering to their traditional views they are trying to attach ulterior meaning to the
proposal. These officials also r^nt the leict n^EP^^'i^
their heads.

It IB also clear that both in America and Japan there are tb<eige-whd <l6-»6t View with sympa-
thy the idea of closer relationship between America and Japan. And these groups are sub-
mitting unfavorable reports to their respective Ambassadors, or Foreign Offices, with intent
i» wreck this plan. They are also wdrfeing throng ^ Kei^ '^tstk fkam^ clr^ieB fo'ilD#itS^
unfavorably a certain member of the Cabinet (presumably Morganthatt)^ (Old it appears that
Secretary Hull is at times confused by these reports submitted to hinj ^ <5olle agues and
BQbtirdfniitcia.

On several occasions I have been asked by the Secretary whether it is not true that certain
influential groups in Japan are opposed to the American-Japanese understanding. (It goes

A-52

THE "MAaiC" BACKWjUND Of ^mm* HARBOR

without saying that each time I have strongly denied this allegation.) In this manner, those
who wish to see otir plans wrecked are using all sorts of means to give the unfortunate impr^
sion that my views do not represent the true views of the Japanese government.

Although it is to be regretted that I have not always been able to carry out your instructions
fully, Your Excellency may be assured that I will not do anything that transcends the limits
of Your Excellency's instructions. I trust that my clear record of the past, our friendship
^tending to more than 26 years, and the circuS|jg^^mc«^ Qf my apiwinfctnent to the present
post, are sufficient evtdenee my ^m)A ita^i
Skmeipt them as such.

I^tibmit the above for Your Excellency's information.

2 parts — complete)

t am awaiting your instructions regafdiuf my menage # but m I asaume that the

German-Soviet war, which broke out since my message in question was dispatched) i& catts^
ing you a great deal of anxiety, I submit herewith my humble opinion.

-«1ferG^i!ed?'®tS^'d^-«et^^fei^ war, and it goes without saying that for tH*

reason she desires peace in the Pacific. T^^^^p^ei, as you already know, she is feverishly pre-
paring to meet any eventuality. Although ifeiffljjaited States is kying to assure greater freedom
of atiticiirti^giaii^bi^lie European war, throtii|ii4flte'pfO{!ii^^ American-Japanese "understanding",
actually it is unlikely that she will join the war for some time to come, and there is some
possibility that after the proposals for the Japanese-American "understanduig" have been
adopted, we can restrain America's war attitude tlmnigh diplomatic manipulations. The
United States is watching Japan's action very closely since the declaration of the German-
Soviet war and the opinion here is that although Japan's position is improved in the Far East
Ifj^ lessening of the Soviet pressure, Japan will not be able to conduct a large scale operation
in Siberia so long as the China Affair remains unsettled. Also, that her southward advance,
checked by the consorted air and submarine defense efforts of the Netherlands Indies, Britaiii,
and United Stsi^edfidijfi'lei^a^e^ determia»^affi' |i#ie&e cmt^^^^ protect these areas,
are driving Japan to an attitude of watchful waiting rath« than to idsk a lai^e scale wa* in^
volving herself with Britain and Australia.

It has already been repoHed to you that the United States intends to give aid to Hussis, '
but 1 douhit very much whether she is prepared to effectuate her intention.

Now then, if the United States government loses interest in the proposed Japanese- American
"understanding", it may be said that all efforts towards better American-Japanese relations
have come to a standstill. Thi.s means decisive economic action leading to our southward
expansion which, in turn, is replete with danger of collision with Netherlands (?) . In the event
of the above, not only will it be difiScult to maintain trade relations with the Americas and
the British Empire, but it will mean eventual severing of diplomatic ties with these countries.

It is my belief that our adherence to the Tripartite Pact should in no way affect the preser-
vation of peace in the ^t^e Ame^^miWj^S^e '^vadetstm^s^i^lMm^eat.

Trans. 6-30-41

No. 99

FROM: Washington
Tokyo

June 29, 1941
#452.

For reasons given above, I feel that broadly speaking, this "understanding" agreement will
prove advantageous to Japan and as I am of the opinion that the three proposals supplement-
ing my message can be made acceptable in some way, I await your instructions.

I wish to emphasize the importemce of proving to the United States government that the
Japanese gbvenunent is truly interested in the proposed Japanese- American "understzmding".

°Dod comment: Should be message number 4S4 (11, 98). AmbaMador Nomuia wires T^okyo that in an mterview with
Secy, HxiU, M tb# statement that tima mfms to be influHidal people in Japan wba do not desire an understanding
with tbt USi, titet wP^ does Japan msiS^ the compoaure oi lelatiom betwe^i the two «nmtrieB ao important.

No. 100

FROM I Tokyo June 30, 1941

TO: Washington #1367.

(f'ircular)

As present conditions indicate a critical period, it is necessary to bring to the attention of
all tH the administrative personnel the regulations concerning fiscal matters. Furthermore,
the previous conditions have already been , it is hoped.

1. All of the (confidential ?) reports and intelligence reports are to be dispatched as soon as
possible. In case of withdrawal, the reports in the process of preparation are expected to he
sent out.

2. The documents having relation to the (confidential ?) reports and intelligence reports
i^ottld a!iead<f Itt'd^ifteyed by fire.

3. Before withdrawing, the notice should be given as provided in leases for the disposal of the
rented property. You are to consult either this office or the nearest diplomatic post concerning
;(i»^'^si^iiftgpiii&idia^ which must b« ciuried out.

4. Japanese Government-own^ pi<operties shall be placed in the custody ef the proper
administrative representatives.

5. The ftimishings are to be seok (to Japan)* or if it is not practical to store them, they are to
be sold in such a manner as not to pve the appearance of closing the establishment.

6. The local personnel of the offices, in case of withdrawal, shall be discharged. Those of
Hiirtl countries shall be paid in the amount which has heretofore been the rale. Payments shall
be made to Japanese corresponding to the lowest amount of freight charges necessary for their
return. Enemy members of the personnel ^^all receive no payment whatsoever.

7. Although inevitift^ '« eeartiift. >IM^ for miscellaaeotas

expenditures will be lost • — — , and (differ^ttatim?) of private md

official documents will be — ?,

Trans. 7-9-41

A-64

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No, 101

FROM: WaefcingtOB July 1,1941

TO: Moscow #941,

(Washington Circulai # 143.)
•* — -■ ■ —

Acting Secretary of State Welles explained America's attitude toward the German -Soviet
war in his press conference on June 23rd. He said that America is equally opposed to a
Communistic dictatorship o* a Nmi didtatBreMpi but the problem at present is the destruc-
tion of Hitlerism throughout the world and to that end aid to Russia had been ordered. The
following day the President declared in his press conference that as far as possible America
would aid Russia but that as yet Russia had made no request for aid and therefore he did not
know what materials Russia stood in need of and inasmuch as aid to Britain would receive
preferential treatm^t, he did not know to what extent aid to Russia would be possible. As
fiaie step in t^« £^ |& Russia program, Russia was exempted from the order of the Secretary of
the Treasury of the June 14th freezing of all funds of European countries here, and thus the
$400,000,000 that Russia has in America was made available for the purchase of American
materials. On ihe 25tli, the President announced that the Neutrality Act would not be invoked
in the present conflict, (The excuse given for not applying the Neutrality .^ct in the present
German-Soviet war is that this act is not necessary for the preservation of American lives and
the pihlic peace.) The question of whether the Lend-Lease Act would be applied to Russia or
not is being given study. For the present all efforts are being concentrated on aid tO E^tain in
the hope that she wUl be able to deliver a knock-out blow to Germany.

America at this time is paying particular attention to Japan's attitude^ There are, no doubt,
arguments for a northern advance or for a southern advance. For the present the situation is
being kept under observation.

Hiat Japan will exercise a restraimnf Influence as to whether America enters a state of war
or not goes without saying. At any rate, public opinion is becoming more settled and decisive
action only awaits the completion of preparations. This may be only a matter of a few months.
1 have heard peiraona of influence discuss thelaMtSlMllty of war. Preparations are all in terms
of a long war. Plans are being laid for two years or moire in the future. Not a few influential
persons are saying that the European wai will result in anarchy and bankruptcy and plunge

No. 102

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 2, 1941

TO: Tokyo #467.

The New York Times and other papers on the 26th published the views of Pretaier KONOIfE

as expressed to U.P, reporters. The Postmaster Gexterai , so it

seems that he, too, was perturbed.

^5?e4t«rday in his p-ess conference the President made it clear that he hop^ Ishe United
§tatm epibt ^^i^ out of wat^ I fl^^ tl^t..^ J^p^e^ii^ ]Be«^;$ii8l^ neral

confened and decided, as an indirect reply to Prince KONOYE, to allay Japan's worries
ccmcerni^t ajft^ '^{^ilfle ^t«^^ A Mp«mm*A^^m^ imderstand^-^^

pact.

'ftans. 7-7-41

No. 103

FROM: Tokyo July2,194X
Besrlte .

Circular. (Part 1 of 2) (National Secret.)

At the conference held in the presence of the Emperor on July 2nd "The Principal Points in

the Imperial Policy for Coping with the Changing Situation" were decided. This Policy con-
sists of the following two parts. The first part "The Policy" and the second part "The Princi-
pal Poin4»" (I am wiring merely the gist of the matter.) Inasmuch as this has to do with
national defense secrets, keep the information only to yourself. Please also transmit the content
to both the Naval and Military Attaches, together with this precaution.
The Policy. ' . .

1. Imperial Japan shall adhere to the policy of contributing to world peace by establishing
the Great East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity, regardless of jbtow the world situation mny
change. — - ' - - "

2. The Imperial Government shall continue its endeavor to dispose of the China incM^^
and shall take measures with a view to advancing southward in order to establish fii^ii^ )|
bam fat her seif^'igsllSi^gnice ^d selfr-pfotection.

Trms. 8-8-41

No. 1»4

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Washingtiai

(Circular)

(Part 2 of 2.)

The Principal Points.

For the purpose of bringing the CHIANG Regime to submission, increasing pressure shall
be added from various points in the south, and by means ol both propaganda and fighting
plffiig fat the taking over of concessions shall be carried out. Diplomatic negotiations shall be
continued, and various other plans shall be speeded with regard to the vital points in the
south. Concomitantly, preparations for southward advance shall be reenforced and the policy
decided upon wiiSt Si^SMitce to French Indo China and Thailand shall be executed.
As regards the Russo- German war, although the spirit of the Three-Power Axis shall be main-
tained, every preparation shall be made at the present and the situation shall be dealt with
in our own way* Isai^ge^ meantime, diplomatic negotiations shall be carried on with extreme
em* Although -vsmmMWAUiMi sbaU h^'^S^f^m^ Ps^ m to prevent the United gtat^

#1390.

from joiniLng tlie war, if need be, Japan shall act in accordance with the Three- Power Pact
and shall decide when and how force will be employed-

Addresses to which this mes^^ i|.«fisat: UJS,, GeW^^-«!J4 %WtBWEB%.^ Germany
transmit to Italy.

Note: The system used in tl^ teessage is considered to be of the highest type of secret
dassiliciatioa.

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

(Parti of 2.)

At this time when the changes in international situation, brought on by the declaration of
the German-Soviet war, has placed Japan in an extremely delicate position, her stand against
Russia, whether it be by use of force or by collaboration with Germany, will tend to worsen
the relations between Japem and the United States and may drive the United States that
much closer to war.

However, if Japan took an independent action against Russia, on the pretext that the dislo-
cation of political situation arising out of the German-Russian war, necessitates her stand in
order to preserve peace in the Far East and to fulfill her obligation towards China, it might
help somewhat in alleviating this trend. I wonder how it would be, in the event that we decide
<Hi a definite stand against Russia, if we were to hasten the consummation of the proposed
^fepanese-American understanding ao that this traditional questiaia of sdf-pr^esrvation will
h^come a questicm eommon to both Japan ahd America.

Stents.

No. 106

FROM: Wa.shingto^
TO: Tokyo

(Part 2 of 2.)"

Now that Germany and the Soviet are at war, if we are definitely determined to make a
military stroke southward, there is absolutely no way to adjust our relations with the United
States.

My studied judgement concerning the status of Japanese-American relations being thus, I
consider it of the greatest urgency that whatever policy the Imperial Government takes, we
must play our hand immediately with the United States; therefore, I await your advice. I
have received your Circulars # 1366*, # 1367', and your # 321'' and we know full well that
they imply a serious decision on the part of the Japanese Empire. We are all tense and on our

July 3, 1941
#463.

July 3, 1941
#463,

toes, and doing our best to get everything in readiness for whatever may happen, so let your
mind be at test so far as that is <sm!^^^im$i>

'Part 1 of 2.

'MATSl'OKA directs that every precaution be taken in readiness for any emergency that might arise in order to
Assure th« safety of doetwttl^'itfARtelnedintbe^lefdbu^^
'See U, 100.
'Net available.

Tranf. 7-9-41

No. im

FROM: Washington (Nomura)

TO: Tokyo

(Part 2 of 3)" Very urgent.

I said: "Yes, I glanced over that newspaper. I have not received any reports on this, but
your country is assisting CHIANG, giving him economic help, sending him airplanes and
munitions, and lending him pilots. Under these circumstances it is absolutely necessary for
Japan to take measures to offset such acts. This has been going on already for a long time.
Some time ago your fleet cruised to Australia. You have placed attaches everywhere. It is
reported that you have conferred with the military officials of the Netherlands and British
Indies and the military preparations in those areas have increased. In addition, you are
strengthening the defenses in the Aleutians and it is even reported that you are going to work
out a reciprocal assistance agreement with Soviet Russia. I could go on enumerating such
things and they are all military steps aimed at Japan. Furthermore, there is a report that
you are going to extend the embargo to oil. As this tendency progresses it becomes more and
more difficult to maintain peace. That is why-f :Sffi'j^ll^:li^l^rd to establish an undmtan^
ing betw^n Japan and the Umted States."

"Parts 1 and 3 of 3 npt available.

Trans. 7-8-41

Ho Am

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

(In 3 parts — complete.)

Tokyo to Berlin as Circular # 1471 on 9 July.

Note: Italic words in the folhwii^ translation were omitted from Wifsfungton's message
when it was circularized by Tokyo.

1. About one month ago we learned from Source "A" that America was abeady putting
jtete liraetice the couvoy s^j^stem but the mfwmmkm mm WBt emi^b^ amt^i m mmtm M

July 6, 1941
#470,

July 7, 1941
#476.

A-58

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEAIU. HARBOR

reporf on it. Recently, tMs report has been indorsed indirectly ftom Source "B" and W6 have

the following to report :

The Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator George, said recently
that although the Lend-Leaae Act had been passed with the uiiderstanding that there would
be no convoys or at least that convoys would not be instituted without the consent of the
Senate, the President has been "misleading" us. Immediately following this Senator George
tai the 28th of last month, made his first speech atfeek^ Ifce ^^itoeiit; since his assump-
tion of the Chairmanship of the Foreign Relations Cotti|flitti«^,^^ !t|ttfe time the attitude
of his Committee toward the President has stiffened.

In answer to this opposition, President Roosevelt gave expression to his resolute determina-
tion through Knox's speech in Boston on the 30th of last month, in which Knox said that the
American Navy should take action in the Atlantic immediately. (As heretofore, Koosevelt
will leave it up to men like Stimson and Knox to impose his d^Snite decision on an indecisive
Congress.)

In the above-mentioned speech, because of the opposition of public opinion, a desire for a
Senate investigation to determine whether or not convoys were being used was expressed. In
his press conference on July 2, Knox denied the e«istance of CQnVoys. But a4 ,^jfeet«
Ihe government is employing convoys.

Momeoett's attitude tototttd iha Orient and Europe in general is summed up in the fact, that
<it^ hnve verified, that last fall the President instructed influential member x of the Senate
P&reign Relations Committee to seize upon one of the incidents that were occurring between
the U.S. and Japan and use it as a pretext for war. However, the members of the Committee
opposed this attitude and the President dropped the matter. Howeuer, since January of this
year, the President has entirely changed his attitude and is now earnestly desiring an adjust-
ment of U.S.-Japanese relations.

The PreKident's attitude toward Germany has also undergone revision. At first he had hoped
through aid to Britain to be able to lead Britain to victory without entering the war, but Ger-
mmiy's astraiishing victories in the Balkans and Crete have caused him to change hia policy
«nd ^ yet he has not formulated a new policy and due to the probtem of regulation of
rek^Asm with Japan his fireside chat was postponed two weeks.

Cfei tite-^d^ Ittumi' ®0dBe*«elt?8 aid to Russia which he declared upon the outbreak of the
Russo-German hostilities got off to a bad start. The American First Committee, which claims
10,000,000 members made a direct frontal attack on the government, and this was not the
only obstacle placed in the path of his desire for war, (Roosevelt's calling Lindberg a "copper-
head" turned out to be a great failure,) In addition to the American First Committee, the
following religious organizations also adopted resolutions opposed to war: Methodists, 8,000,000;
B^pl&te^ 7,000*000; Presbyterians, 7,000,000; Congregationalists, 2,500,000; Disciples, 1,500,
000. In considering the attitude that should be adopted toward Germany and Japan it was
necessary to take into account the above arguments for peace.

'^31049^ tiil0Ai'W£iK-&0t a background of united public opinion Roosevelt was perplexed as to how
to dispose of his dagger. Influential Senators were divided in opinions and the government is at
present in a dilemma. Roosevelt will decide his policy in the next two or three weeks. He desires
to advance toward some definite action and finds it very difficult to support the present
ambiguity. (Thi.s is similar to Japan's position.) The thing that concerns America most at
the present time is Japan. One way of breaking the present dilemma is regarding the Japanese-
Ametieun understanding. Even though Roosevelt's and Hull's fervor may not change they
still doubt Japan's sincerity. If Japan expands toward the .south (even though the army isn't
prepared) America will use the navy which is prepared to open war on Japan and thus popular

opinion will be unified. (America does not wish to fight on two fronts but in viem of the German'
Soviet war she can neglect the Atlantic} and thus the presmt dUemma would Uimottt asArmrim
desires.

Trans. 7-15-41

No, 109

fl^Mt Washington {Nomura)
1?^ Tokyo

(Foreign Office Seoret.)

Although we are unable to definitely ascertain it, a certain person who is very prominent in
political circles in this area, told a person connected to this othce that Germany has dispatched
an agent in secrecy to the United States to discuss peace. Our informant says that this Gismian
is at present in touch with persons in U.S. governmental circles. Tt is sa^.^^i^^.^tj^'^
peace proposal is that Germany will leave the British Empire untouched.
; I forward the above information to you just as I heard it and for whatever vd^ue it may have
to'^you.

Trans. 7-5-41

No. 110

FROM: Washington July 7, 1941

TO: Tokyo # 477.

Recently there has been a great deal of rumor concerning American intervention for German-
firitish peace negotiations, according to information obtained frojn financial circles. A
German secret emissary, STJTAARUFERUTO, (said to be an American-born German),
entered the United States by way of Mexico sometime ago bringing with him a letter kom the
heads of the German government, with the intention of making 49&efk0m-^"i^m&i^
British peace. But because the general atmosphere in the United States at that time not being
favorable and also because of the harshness of the peace terms he returned to Germany with-
•wrt broaching the subject. '

However, he reentered the United States just about the time of the Hess incident and siHce
then he has been working secretly to accomplish his mission.

Through the efforts of the ' he became acquainted with Secretary Hull's friend *

who in turn introduced him to Hull, Since then, he is said to be carrying on secret meetings witih
the Secretary of State and is continuing his efforts with somewhat modified peace terms.

I had a certain intluentiMl pemm in WashingtcHi (name kept secret) ascertain the above,
and he confirmed the circumstances of the negotiations. However, it is believed that although
neither the President nor those who are close to him are considering any move in this durection,
^em we a number of persons in his Cabinet who are in favor it,.

I cannot vouch for the accuracy Oif the above mformation but I submit to you for whi^ver
it may be worth.

'DoD Comment: Nttmes withheld.

Trans- '7-11-41

July 1, 1941
#4S§,

A-60

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 1X1 ^ '

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 8,1941

Strictly Secret.

1. I am very much interested in reports like you menticmed in yrair #455", m please con-
tinue to keep me advised on this matter.

2. As I understand it, as a matter of form, the Oral Statement will not be an integral part of

this proposal for an understanding and that, as a matter of fact, this question has been settled
according to my # 329\ However, so that I may be sure, wire me back your views.

'See II, 109 in which NOMURA tells of minors that Germany has dispatched cm agent in secrecy to the United
States to discuss peac». Hie gist of the peace proposal is that Germany will leave the Bniisb Empire untouched.

Tmns. 7-10-41

No. 112

FROM: Washington (Nommal^
TO; Tokyo

(Part 1 of 5)

Secret outside the Department,
To be handled in Government Code.
Re the matter of my # 477°.
The points learned since last I wrote you are as follows:

1. Early in February of this year ', accompanied by — — and * had an interview

with^he Secietairy of State in his apartment in ths Cailttm Hotel here m Washington.

'See n, 110 in which NOMURA tella Tokyo of the rumor concerning Amaican intervention for Germ^-Briti^
peaee negotiations and cS & German secret emta«U9 entering 1h» United States witiii the intention «f making overtures
for a German-British peace,

'DoO Comment: Naaie»i<^lhhel4>

Trans. 7-18-41

No. 113

FROM : Washington (Nomum)
TO: Tokyo

(Part 2 of 5}

2. On that occasion, according to what " tella me, he being an American of German

^1*aerti©W, tmn 1920 to 1939, resided in Berlin as the representative of a certain American
financial interest (since then 1 have ascertained that he has underwritten the Japan Electric
Company through the New York organization of — —°) and while there he became very

July 14, 1941
#506.

July 14, 1941
#506.

A-61

intimate with HITLER, GOEBBELS, and GOERING. Especially the fact that during the early
days of the Nazi movement he gave them financial assistance gives evidence to his considerable

fia^ to the current leaders of Germany. (Incidentally, the " has underwritten this man's

eAt!]%^mi!y because it was through his efforts that the — " rights and properties in Germany
were saved from encroachment.) However, during the latter part of last year this man returned to
the United iStates by way of Mexico and on that occasion the leaders of the Nazi Party made him
an offia£-iSfk%iropean peace plan. Furthermore, in order to certify this man's position, HITLER
and GOEBBBLS gave him a written document and this he offered to Secretary HULL for his
perusfd. ^^^ding to the peace proposals this man carried, HITLER is of a mind to open peace
negotiaffe* ¥^th Great Britain at any time. In order to do this, he hopes for the good offices of the
tJnitfd States, The preservation of the integrity of the Barilish Ehnpire is naturally one of the
essential points of that peace proposal. France, Belgium and Holland are guaranteed their exist-
ence. Poland and Czechoslovakia alone are to be eliminated. The fates c£ Norway and Denmark
HHU^fiot ^ bdlimebed upon in the discussiooa.

DoD Camment: Names withheld.

Trans. 7-18-41

■ f

(PartSftfS)

(Secxet outside the Department. To be handled in Government (x»le.)

3. Thouf^h Secretafy of State HULL looked at these representations, he entertained some
doubt of their authenticity, but on the 15th of February this year, the first meeting of this

group was held in the State Department. " making up one group; the Secretsur of State,

the head of the European Division, other competent heads of departments, a,s well as two mem-
bers of the Intelligence Section, making up the State Department group, participated in these

conversations. At the opening of this meeting, ' presented HITLER and GOEBBELS' letter

and at the same time, in order to substantiate his authority, he requested that telephone com-
munication be made possible for him from the State Department to the Nazi authorities by inter-
national telephone. On the afternoon of that day^ is'lBi^^l^i^g^^^^'^S^j^^llfe^'fil^if^ft^t;
officials, telephone connections Were tnade with GOE£^ELS, and this mim's positiDii mi»
satisfactorily substantiated.

4. Until the 10th of April last (during the interim this man lived in New ¥dl%f!t,'«&hVlaiSa-
tions were carried on on four occasions. On the basis of propositions made by this man in
those conversations, the State Department gave him a diplomatic passport on April II.
Accompained by one member of the State Department staff, thifi man boarded a clipper for
Berlin by way of Lisbon. After havinfj conferred with the Nazi offirialdom, he returned to the
United States under an assumed name on board the same clipper May 27. At the present
time, negotiations are continuing, and he has already talked with the fli^titlenl; '

DciD Comment: Names withheld.

Trskns.

A-62

July 14, 1941
#506.

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HABBOE

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: T<Am

(Part 4 of 5)

July 14, 1941
#506.

5. When he went to Germanst, he was charged with negotiating the sale of German ships
to the United States, as weE as mih the peace proposals. As a result, a purchase arrangement
had been wtncked oat l>efb«» ttie President's order expropriating these ships was issui^lil^
procedure for the transfer of the purchase price to German funds abroad evolved.

6. At the time the aforementioned representative of the State Department and HESS,
O0EI1^'&, and GOBBBELS with tito^ifclSWs of the Army conferred together, HESS stressed
that the group of German leaders were persistent in their desire for peace. In order to bring
this about, if necessary, it was hinted that the retirement of HITLER would be effected with
the mitigation of the Jewish problem.

7. Besides °, a secret German Army representative is now negotiatii^ in Washington.

I understand that the State Department is now in a perplexed state, and that there are great
dist^epaHdes of {>pmi@li.

8. The Germans, in order to guarantee their supply of internal foodstuffs and petroleumj
made demands upon Russia. They expecf^tf S^m^ca W«^to*ftH;his, but'lfelrdte'^itii^b^'
i»uld not be obtained. The United States and Great Britain were of the opinion that the
massing of troops on the border was a form of bluff. It can be said that they were in error on
this point. At the same time the Germans figured that any help to Russia from England or the
United States was beyond possibility. Influential persons in the Government are now Mkiijg
if a miscalculation was not made.

9. It has lately begun to become evident in this coftftecffon that one of the reasons for the
standstill of American-Japanese negotiations toward improvement of relations is that the
Americans mistakenly harbored the idea that there was a connection between the German
peace movement and the Japanese negotiations,

Tlrans. 7-18-41

FROM: WashijBgfem (Nmrnjifa)
TO: Tokyo

July 14, 1941
#506.

(Part 5 of 5)

Trans. 7-18-41

A-63

life lit

WXiMt Tokyo (Foreign Minister) July 8, 1941

TO: Wash«E«ton NftawJfee.

Secret within the office.

In the Oral Statement referred to in your message #326°, the words "his associates" are
used. Please find out in a casual manner just exactly what is meant by these words and wwe
me back.

•See n, 8T, as, and SS—mt of Oral Stetemeat dated Jane 21, 1941,

Trans. 7-9-41

Nq.US

FROM; Tokyo
TO: Washington

(Secret outside Departnient)

Regarding your # 424°.

As the text of the United States government's communication regarding the question of
the "Right of Self-defense" and peace conditions relative to China Affair, which you have
been asked not to transmit to this office, may be very useful in sounding out the Ata«ilC$li|
point of view, thereforejPlef^sendthe test ypiw^ecapt of same.

"Amb. Ntjmura wires Tokyo that in an interview with Secy. Hull, he made the statement that there seems to be
influential people in Japan who do not desire an understanding with the U.S., so, after all, does Japan consider the
composure of relations between,ti(ft cowttries so iinportant. Nomura re|klies that niich concession as the U.S. has
toiui oS&e6. are ootwxtliy of ct^lG^iil^on.

Trans. 7-l(lN«|>

Pfo. 119

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

(In 2 parts — complete)

(Chief of Office Routing.)

(Very secret)

The Secretary of State to The Japanese Ambassador:

In Section 2 of the joint declaration which was entered into today on behalf of our two govern-
ments, statements are made with regard to thft attitude of the two governments toward the
European war. During the informal conversations which resulted in the conclusion of this
joint declaration 1 explained to you on a number of occasions the attitude and policy of the

A-64

July 9,1m
#345.

July 9, 1941
#489.

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

government of the United States towftfd the hostilities in Europe and pointed out tb&t thie
attitude and policy were based on tbe inalienable ri^^t of fielf->d^^se. I call^ special
attention to address which .

(Part 2}

The ifapanese Amlbassador to the Secretary of State:
I have received your letter of June.

I wish to state that my government is fully aware of the attitude of the government of the
United States toward the hostilities in Europe as explained to me by you during our recent
conversations and as set forth in your address of April 24. I did not fail to report to my
government the policy of the government of the United States as is therein explained to me,
and I may aSBure you that tny govemnient understands and appreciate ttilS^4i|iitliifr
position of the government of the United States with regard to the European war.

I wish also to assure you that the government of Japan, with regard to the measures which
gov^ment of ttie United States may be f(»ced to adopt in defense of its own security, is
11^ under any commitment mniiriuig Japan to take any action eontrjsrjf to or d.^tmctive of
"^e fundamental objective erf the Resent agreement.

The government of Japan, fully cognizant of its responsibilities freely assumed by the
conclusion of this agreement, is determined to tak# nO ectitHi inimical to thfe establishment
and preservation of peace in the Pacific Area.

l^ans. 7-U-4X

No. 120

FROM; Washington (Nomura)

Strictly secret outside the DepartBittjt.
(To be handled in Gkivedmment Code.)

1. Does the term "economic cooperation" between Japan and China contemplate the
granting by the Government of China to the Japanese Government or its nationals of any
preferential or monopolistic rights which would discriminate in favor of the Japanese Govern-
ment and Japanese nationals as compared with the Government and nationals of the United
States and of other third countries? Is it contemplated that upon the inauguration of negotiations
for a peaceful settlement between Japan and China the special Japanese companies, such as the
North Cluna Development Company and the Central China Promotion Company and their
subsidiaries, will be divested, insofar as Japanese official support may be involved, of any monop-
ot^tic or other preferential rights that they may exercise in fact or that may inure to them by
virtue of present circumstances in areas of China under Japanese military occupation?

2. With regard to existing restrictions upon freedom of trade and travel by nationals of
third counties in Chinese territory under Japanese military occupation, could the Japanese
Government indicate approximately what restrictions will be removed immediately upon the
entering into by the Government at Chungking of negotiations with the Gov^nmrait of Japan
and what restrictions will be removed at later dates, with an indication in each case tosofar
as possible of the approximate time within which removal of resteictions would be affected?

3. Is it the intention of the Japanese Government that the Chinese Government shaU
exercise full and complete control of matters relating to trade, currency and exchange? Ifl lfi

July 10, 1941
#490.

the intention of Japanese Government to withdraw and redeem the Japanese military
notes which are being circulated in China and the notes of Japanese-sponsored regimes in
China? Can the Japanese Government indicate hpw sooii siter the inauguration of the con-
templated negotiations arrangements to the ab<Mf# !^#f-^M its opinion be c^ied out?

Trans, 7-ll-4i

No. 121 ~

FROM: Washington July 8,1941

m . t^S.

(Parti of 3)

W«ll, since I asked you for instructions already considerable time has passed and still 1
get no decision. In their Oral Statement they make it clear that they entertain misgivings
concerning our real intentions. The instructions in your caption message clarify the lifftiiai-
tions of our Government and did something to mitigate this, but did not succeed in dispellii^
their suspicions. We are delaying a reply and, thinking of this in connection with certafaa
other circumstances, they consider that this mistrust is justified. Gradually they are losittf
hope of ever seeing an improvement in Japanese- American relations. Gradually they are
beginning to believe there is no chance of these negotiations ever anapup.^ing to anything. A
certain Cabinet member confidentially told a man connected ^^ .0#'©9S^*sy that unless
we immediately resume our conferences, it will be too bad and that he is wonied because
the situation is takiii^ a turn unfavorable to the parleys.

'Ambassador NOMURA discusses the altitude of the United States towards the proposal and the three important
discrepancies in the dae^^^^M^@iH|t. -
*Notavailablp,

Trans. 7-9-41

No. m

PROM: Washington July 8, 1941

TO: Tokyo #478.

(Part 2 of 3}

1 am sorry that in my negotiations, I have been unable to drive home your instructions, but
since hostilities broke out between Germany and the Soviet the tendency is to closely scruti-
nize the moves that Japan makes nr aecms about to make. Some say that Japan will now try
to realize the hopes she has entertained for many years of expanding northward and that she
will not put much stress on the Japanese-Soviet treaty. Others say that she will now continue
to move southward and that this coincides with the desire of Germany. There are even some
who say that it does not matter which or what Japan does, and that the thought of her dis-
tiil:t»ag, the peace the Pacific or l^oadening the theater of war is merely an illusion because,
sStxt shf! in m^ mA mi hm no mtemationsl credit. Tiie Meoetirty cf State has talked

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

witli me altogefther seventeen times because he regards the Japanese-American question as
very ^ave» Every time we have talked on this subject he has repeated this fact twice. Those
working on the flank have ceaselessly contacted Cabinet members with whom they are
ioi^ate. The President aho is jui# 9«#at^'^fiieilltt«^ • ' •

Trans. 7-9-41

No. 123

FROM'. Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

(Part 3 of 3)

By and large. Navy quarters also take the same view. This, I think, would be only natural
because of the political situation here as well as this country's defense program. I must say
that I cannot believe, if we stick to our present adamant attitude, that th^ will finally give
in. Everything 1 read in the newspapers and magazines leads me to believe that the Govern-
ment of the United States would not show a softer demeanor. I rather think that there is a
great danger that they will break off the negotiations at the first opportunity. The malb
thorny points in the pending proposal are the right of self-defense, the stationing of troops,
and the principle of non-dismmination in commerce, and I am completely at my wits' end,
but still I feel an urgent impulse not to break off contact with thera> If you want to send nie
another definite proposal, I will present it to them, but cannot you possibly reach some
decision on their proposals which I have already sent you? 1 am sorry to keep troubling you
i»l«h^ matter. ^ - * - ^-^ ^ -

Ttans, 7-9-41

Julys, 1941
#47-8.

No. 124

FROM: Tokyo July 10, 1941

TO: Washington #350.

At, present there are some things under discussion concerning Japanese-American matters
for which I cannot depend too much on telegrams; and as there are certain reports I want tO
get fiiBt-hand from Consul Gener4W<^I^^J^^^I^.pleases«Miti^hi}^

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 10, 1941

TO; Ibkyo

Reyour #350'.

Immediately following the opening of the war between Soviet Russia and Germany, T
noticed that the United States was eager to adjust Japanese-American relations before it
was too late. Ii^i#fi|feir*i^i^1&ice then seems to indicate that she is very suspicious ^itf
M^S^ #tita^, Tf we^aiftotiatil^^^ may be said that the possibility a£ a wttlemewfc

is nut entirely iiopeless. However, under the present circumstances there is no time for you
to recall a man, get from him the facts oi the stfioAtion, and then appoint him to carry on the
negotiations. There is no reason to believe that an understanding could be arrived at by
doing so. It is my opinion that circumstances which would necessitate severance of diplomatic
re-lationa between Japan and the United States are much more imminent than we think they
are and so my remaining here would avail nothing. Since I believe that I should personally
report to you the facts and, also, that my leaving would have no serious effect on the United
Sfett^i iiSTOld lite to baveyeu pifjft^iii^f retufwwgtw^apan and making arejjOTt.

Trana.

No. 12fi

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

Regarding your #495".

As U.S.-Japanese relations become more critical, it becomes increasingly necessary for
ym t<3 stick to your post to represent Japan. It goes without saying that you should remain there
and do everything in your power to improve conditions.

I realize, of course, that there could be nothing better than to hear you report on the situa-
tion in person. However, because of the above consideration, I ordered Minister Wakasugi
home immediately in place of yourself.

Even if we do not refer to our Emperor's wishes, your return home at this time cannot be
countenanced from the standpoint of public opinion. Even assuming that a successful con-
clueioQ of a U.S. -Japanese understanding seems hopeless, I am convinced that you should
remain at your post to the la$t and attempt to figure out ways and means of making the best
trf the sfttiatiett. ttf T we^* ^ express mystrtf blttirrty m ilKta jpttfiat, I'^weaMf saj? that it wouW be
of more importance for you to do so, if circumstances do not allow any optimism.)

For these reasons, this Minister cannot grant your request to return home at this time.

"Jap Amb. Nomura wires Tokyo requesting that he be allowed to return to Tokyo instead of Ministei Wakasugi,

FROM: Washington (NonSUta)
TO: Tokyo

Re #356°.

I am extremely sorry — and I wish to apologize for having caused you displeasure

i^!SiSis^tg0t:-M'm^ lack of experience^ though, in obedience to your instructions, my intention

A-68

July 11, 1941
#356.

July 14, 1941
No number.

THE "MAGIC" BACKGKOUND OF PEARL HARBOR

possible solution. Quite contrary to my original intention, it seems that my successive tele-
grams have had much to do with the decline of our country's honor in the eyes of the people
within and without the country. I will, in the future, be especially cautious and endeavor to
avoid errors even in small matters. However, in view of the fact that the bSfinging up 1 have
had was in a society in which 1 was allowed to use my own judfjmenT more or less freely even
in matters which 1 have been ordered to carry out, and so to exercise my judgment has become
my second nature, 1 eminot be sure erf not troubling you agB.ia aod thisai^.^^^iSihstm. to my
country. Therefore, no matter from what angle 1 regard the question, I CaOttOt help but keenly
feel that 1 should resign as soon as possible for the good of the country. In view of the political

situation, I fiameatly hope that you will not hesitate in transferring my duties to person

whom you have selected as being more in accordance with your desire. I fully realize that 1
am not the right man. 1 am, in fact, no more than a temporary stop-gap. As I have assured you
previously, I have no intention whatsoever of bringing any degree of disaster to this positt^
before my return to Japan. I moftt earnestly hope that you would consider this point care-
fully.

The matter that was discussed recently and for the transmission of which the return of

WAKASUGl* became a question, was an off-the-record discussion of a private nature, and
since it had chiefly to do with political matters, I personally assumed the responsibility.
However, it was not a matter of such imp<tttance that it requires reporting personally in pail^:
that is, in addition to what has already been communicated to you by telegram. As 1 have
already wired you, 1 cannot help but advise you against recalling WAKASUGl and settling
the matter discussed after you have heard the details from him. WAKASUGl was sent here
to assist me in the performance of my duties. He wishes to remain here so long as 1 am at this
post. Will you, therefore, reconsider the matter? However, ii you insist on his returning to
^apan, I have no mca^e to say in regaEilB^^^ #^iito. Xn that case, I «aptMli^e to h4«ep(»
wire m$ your decision.

°See n, 126, MATSUOKA, replying to NOMURA's wire requesting that he be allowed to returtt to Ttol^ inn*M sf
WAKASUGl, aay* it ia ahaolutely necessary that NOMURA stick to his post.

Trans. 7-16^1

No. 128

FBOM: Waahington (Nomura)

*^0t ' ' 'T«^0' ' ■

Be my #426*.

The word "associates", I have been given to understand refers to aU persons who have
conferred with them upon orders ftoHi myself, that iB, WAKASUGl^ OKUMUEA, MATSU-
DAIBA. W^VtiO, and IKADA.

'Text of Oral Statement dated June 21, 1941. See n, 87-^9.

Trans. 7-10-41

Julys, t941
#479.

A-*9

No. 129

FROM: Tokyo July 11. 1941

TO: Washington #355.

(In 5 parts — complete.)

Strictly confidential.

Rfiy0iji-#4T9'.

It should be needless to say that they are on your "staif ' and are not your associates. The
only exception to. rule is when the Foreign Minister names a person to a specific com-
mission. Hence, unless Colonel Iwakuro is specifically named to some post by this Minister,
he is in no position whatsoever to be considered an associate.

With regard to IKAWA, I am sure that you will recall that I sent you a cable in considerable
detail before I embarked on my tour of Europe, that he is in no way connected with the
Premira or with any other member of the Cabinet. He was bsought up in the Finance Muustxy,
and, as you will find out if you.ja*^ anftuiries of :parsoB« in Mimstiy, he is Jii^ ,^ Jew?
esteem by them.

You must be aware of the fact that a person of that sort should not in any way, either directly
or indirectly, be connected with a matter of such vast importance as the one in hand.

It is obvious from the text of the oral statement that the United States is of the opinion that
these men are your associates. This is a point which this Minister considers exceedingly re-
^ettabls;, alBt^CElpipfi^tjiat you take imiaedi»t« 9tep$ to correct this mis<»nception.

(Part 2)

Moreover, the !'oral statement" implies ttefe I* long as there Are qaestionable pmsms in
ib» •i^iaMP' 4lll%te«t, the "tJfiSefifcSndilig f!a^^ ^aniiot be put into effect, evfefi'^esupposing
■ltt(^4ttc&!^ IftiMt'ument is signed. In other as it mast have become apparent to you

upon reading nyar the "oral statement" once, the wording of that statement is tantamount to
demanding that we reorganize the personnel of our Cabinet.

Under these circumstances, it should be plain to see that not only the government of Japan,
but those persons representing it, have the perfect right to reject the "oral statement". How-
ever, keeping mind the condition ctf U.S.-Jap*ftt<isSi^ Mations a» w*ll as the genirel tftttlook
on the world, I, for one, made a decision to suffer in silence.

I, of course, assume that you, realizing the importance and gravity of the contents of the
"oral statement" insisted upon fully dfisMasing the various points. You no doubt pointed out
that you were requesting the detailed explanation on the grounds that t^m^l^ltumeQt has had
only a very fewj if any, comparable parallels in the history of the world.

FfiOf y^ Wl^mmk I 'teffa^ tStft ffeelglleflSlag ^dl^ is^lifae retjue#^a* you explain them
fully to the other side in order to ccHtect whatever misconceptions they msy harbor:

(parts)

1. You will recall that Premier Kon^ interviewed by newspaper men on a train
8tilfe#afert tb tlte agrifat *Wlparate Patft. ¥o& ^tt iiis* ftsmeSnl^'AMt^^lli^^^
of that interview was falsely reported by the press, as was made clear at the time.

2. The greater part of the interview published, which I allegedly gave to an American
magazine writer, was atet> littefe. Magazitite writer even broke his promise to sul^ft «
copy of the interview before it was dispatched. Moreover, he even went so far as to release the
information to the United Press without obtaining any permission to do so.

THE "MAGIC" BACKGBOUND OF PEARL H^OE

The gist of what i actually said at that time was that Japan has every intention of being
loyal to the terras oi the Tripartite Pact. I added, however, that should the United States go
to war, forcing a clash between Japan and the United States, there would be, without a doubt,
a horrible effect on all mankind. For this reason, I explamed, every effort should be made to
prevent its being brought about.

As I reported to you at the time, that was as far as I went in my interview. If all of the state-
ments that I have made to Parliament and to all other persons and groups are read carefully
and in a atmosphere, it teilS lisril^liiul that I have never once goae beyond the
described above.

While on this topic, although it does not have a direct bearing on the subject at hand, t
wish to say that the published report of Menken's interview with Premier Konoye, the
eJBfects of which you recently reported, was false, almost in its entirety. Menken brought along
a letter of introduction from a certain iKominent American, and requested that he be pa*-
mitted to take pictures of the Premier. The Premier gave his permission and while they were
being taken, Menken and the PrCTlier conversed (while standing) for a matter of possibly two
or three minutes. Menken wrote up a story and released it to the United Press; (probably
sold it to them).

This is another example of exceedingly unethical and damaging acts. Even if it is true that
it had little or no effect in the United States, the very unfavorable reaction in Germany and
Italy is one which cannot be lightly discounted. The Premier feels St^ l^ftmgly about thia
case of libel and is determined to act with more caution in the future.

In view of my past experience, I have adopted a policy of refusing to grant any interviews
persons whose characters aBB-LflMteranteed by the United States Ambsssadiar $^d^
whose acts and words the U.S. Embassy agrees to be held responsible.

I mention this for your information.

(Part 4)

3. The explanations made by Chief of the Information Section IMi vAio is frequently
termed "the spokesman fw Japan", to the Approval Committee did not go beyond the bounds
described above.

^■^«i"l&^Ni5i.SlEates expects Japan to double-cross her Axis partners or even wishes Japan
to assume a lukewarm attitude towards them on the basis of any of these public statements,
the United States is being unreasonable, and is in fei a disappointment. I am convinced that
if the United States were in the same position as m ^ wmid iMiiHime th« ^me, or iR^iiMj

even stronger, attitude.

4. If it is generally believed that there is a split within the Japanese cabinet, the so-called
"lying reports" must be responsible for the misconception. As you will have no difticulty
in guessing, these reports are probably based on mmias started hy those who have not been
able to make the grade into the Cabinet.

When confronted with a matter as important as the one at hand, any country's government
would thoroughly discuss it from all possible angles. That is all that we are doing, and any
report of dissatisfaction within the Cabinet is coming from without.

(Part 5)

It is true that the United States and British Ambassadors in Tokyo have a tendency to
seize upon these rumors and place considerable weight on them when reporting on them to
their home governments. It may he that the President and the Secretary of State have an
entirely misfepresented picture of Japan because too much credence has been given to idle
tmm.

A-71

Since this is an exceedingly grave matter we are discussing, please make every effort to
correct such erroneous opinons, if indeed they exist, for as long as they exist, we cannot hope
to ever reach a successful agreement.

There is absolutely no truth in the rumor that Premier Konoye and I do not see eye to eye
on matters. {These rumors have died down in Japan of late.) The truth is that the Premier and
I are in complete agreement where improvement of U.S. -Japanese relations is concerned.
In O^her words, we both are anxious to bring about an "Understanding Pact" between Japan
jS^'tW'fAiited States as I have made clear to you right from the beginning. The War and
Navy Ministries, also, are in complete accord in this matter as are all of the other Mio^ters.

Since this is an exceedingly important point, please explain it to the President and the
Secretary of State eo that they can make no mistake about it.

Seen,m

Ttms. 7-12-41

No. 130

FROM: Tokyo July 11, 1941

TO: Washington #357,

From Chief of Am^icimBureau, Terasaki, to Counselor Iguti:

Message # 355° from Tokyo to Washington contained the Minister's immediate reactions
upon receiving the "oral statement". Please bear that in mind.

With to message #356*, please be advised of t^e faet that the official Japanese

attitude ctmceraing the U.S. proposal will be cabled to you very shortly.

"Matsuoka wires Nomura tljfj^jw l^Si "i«»t.**g*?iaeiit" implteg « miaamception on the part of tltilt taiatiAtll^ M
to Japan's motives and attitu^'«l|#d pact". In a fiW'pagc^ mfisaage, be dariflw^^aritiltol^^

in thia connection. See II, 1^.

•Seen. 126.

Tmng. 7-14-41

No. 131

Vmm^ Washington (Nomuti^
TO: Tokyo

Part 1 of 8.

Re your #356".

1. I agree with you upon the importance of their Oral Statement, but I do not think we could
go so far as to say that they were trying to bring about a revision of our Cabinet. I think that all
they were trying to do wfis to find out how sincere we were in our apparent desire to improve
Japanese-American relations. What Your Excellency complains about was naturally the
result of a one-sided misunderstanding on theu- part. All too often did the American Embassy
M-fSai^ iie«i4 itt M *^|(#rt»^ia llp&^a ^ jteur so-called friends, who wished

July 14, 1941

TiJE "M^GIC" B^KGBQUN^ OF PEARL JrlAHBOK

to thwart these negotiations, engage in damaging activities (take the words of the Americans
as they stand). Another trouble was that Germany (who originated the broadcast containing
raunprs of Your Excellency's resignation) and China engaged in every sort of activity possible
tt> thwart us. Th»e ««! jfiioay indications that this is the case. All along I have repeated to them
two or three times what you have told me in your instructions. Each time they were persuaded
but ere lon^ they received reports from financial circles which upset everything 1 said and

"See n, 126 in which Matsuoka, wplyijog tft Notnma's request tha* JWl'fesiifeSS^ to r*tUBi to Tt&ya ina^ol of
W^mmk Bays it iaabBolvtelyii$ip0Mtt3' A^K^^V&«ti£ki»hi^

Trans. 7-17-41

No. 132

FROM: Washington {Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

2. I helieved and never once doubted that it was at this stage the serious policy of the
Imperial Government to improve Japanese-American relations. But, since then Oh, how
often have I met with opposition! How often have I lost faith in ray subordinates! But, in spite
of that and enduring it all, to this day 1 have held to my post and while enduring every sort of
bitterness I have stuck to my ideal; that is because I have had faith in what I conceived to he
the primary policy of our Government. As I reflect upon the general atmosphere in this coun-
try when I took office, I can see how relations betweeft ««* ^ igqfelttries were following an ever
roughening road. I thought that perhaps I could make our twvd m3SBM.es each understand the
position of the other; but, alas, 1 can see that that was only an airy»tjfly .t<dt4 in a dream.

Trans. 7-17-41

No. 133

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

In order to begin negotiations under the condititms I have described above and seeing how
much dissatisfaction there was over the content of the negotiations (it is clear that there is a
limit to dissatisfaction), naturally I had to make ready. So, I came to entertain the view that it
would be hopeless to deal with the Secretary of State alone and thus try to bring about the
desired results. (On this point the Postmaster General, PlJRA-TO°, and other well-known
men of my acquaintance agreed with me.) When I began the unofficial negotiations which I
am now conducting, members of the Embaaay and the Military and Naval Attaches were
consulted by me and we decided to use underhanded means to feel our way here in Washing-
ton and to hurry along the unofficial negotiations. (As you requested I have reported to you on
this matter.) Since then, under my dttis^^a^ the negotiations have been pn^smESii^ sra^ I
h«v& betn having reported to me tli®- 4M>aiI» of how the underhanded «Jheaj«s «ai #taa^ing

July 14, 1941

July 14, 1941

out. Thus, I have been trying to coordinate the work of the people concerned, I can assure you,
howevet, that in this connection I have overlooked nothing and nothing has gone amiss.

'Kana spdling, probably PRATT.

Trane, 7-17-41

lio. 134

FKOM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

Part 4 of 8.

Furthermore, it is perfectly evident that in making our proposals, as well as in countering
theirs, especially in all important matters, I personally conferred with the Pt^tmaster
General. I naturally expect that you are aware of this, also, in the light of the fact that I have
negotiated with the Chief" as many as seventeen times. Then, there is the fact that I have
assisted the segotia^M* in- tto ssnstiV way eofflEferrihg afsfii "w*^ th^ f<i«ttniHs*^ #fei*«ftl.
In the meantime, as it became clear from your telegram that Germany had sent a secret
agent and also that T. V. SOONG and other Chinese agents had been sent and had been
actively negotiating in secret, I became increasingly certain that, resorting to under-cover
methods in carrying on these negotiations, I had chosen the right method. Naturally. I came
to appreciate your wisdom in having used MATSUMOTO and NISHI in this connection. For
this reason, I was secretly expecting that I would be given your approval.

FROM: WashingtO^B |Jfea»JJ#
TO: Tokyo

Part 5 of 8.

The word "associates" which appears in the Oral Statement they gave us was used also in
the Oral Statement which I handed to them in accordance with instructions (?). The word
simply means HULL's cooperators, namely, such persons as HAMILTON, BALLANTINE,
and the Postmaster General, and it should be taken in a very light sense, for in both cases it
is not a word having a strictly limited legal sense, so I would like to have the word understood
simply as meaning cooperators. There is absolutely no such misunderstanding on their part
as to believe that Colonel IWAKURO and IKAWA and others were authorized by our Govern-
ment to represent us. Because of the fact that the Postmaster General is truly desirous of
seeing these negotiations brought to a successful end, he is naturally one through which we
could carry on our undercover campaign. Whenever any matter is brought up, the responsibility
ef which is clearly defined, he always says, "Go and ask HULL about it." Please, therefore.

July 14„Wm
#508.

July 14, mi

A-74

mm "UAGMy' mf§%m^mm of pmrnmrnm

understand that both of these men have a clear-cut eoiaception as to how far they may

Trms. 7-17-41

No. 136

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

Part 6 of 8.

Before Colonel IWAKURO came here as niy assistant, ! requested the Army and Navy to
send a competent man. I suppose that an understanding was reached between the Foreign
and Military officials as to his duties. Thank you for your caution concerning IKAWA. For a
time, since the last of last month, there was a misunderstanding between him and the
members of our Embassy concerning the handling of intelligences and telegrams. However,
since the beginning of this month, under the supervision of IWAKURO, he has been acting as
an interpreter and in his contacts with American agents of the inner circle he has been quite
zealous and has achieved a great deal. He is continuing his work along these lines, I can
assure yon that all rumors concerning the undspettdaldlitar ^ this man are false.

Trans. 7-17-41

No. 1S7

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

Part7ofa.

The foregoing is the explanation of how the word "associates" has been used in connection
with our undercover activity. Personally, I saw nothing wrong with the word and was very
much grieved to find unexpectedly that in using it I acted against your wishes. The most
pressing question before them is whether Japan at this critical moment should adjust her
relations with the United States or give up all attempts in this direction for she must at this
moment choose either one of these two alternatives. Moreover, if the matter is decided too
hastily, the situation is so pressing that a good opportunity might he lost forever. I, therefore,
do not wish to waste time at this critical moment bickering over the question of procedure.
Besides, for compatriots to be arguing over details and to be casting suspicion on one another
in the face of a serious crisis threatening the country would cause the enthusiasm and courage
of those who are sincerely working in this matter to wilt, and would interfere with the progress
of the negotiations. Since I feel this very keenly, I do not wish to go further into a discussion of

Trans. 7-i?«tl

July 14, 1941

July 14, 1941
#508.

A-75

Pfo.lSS

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 14, 1941

Part s of 8 ,

If, in the negotiations and measures which naturally come within the sphere of ISS^^^j^i^
sibility, you have any faults to find, after negotiations are broken off, since you have not yet
seen fit to order me back to Japan, I am determined to exercise my own judgment as to how
the final details are disposed of. On these points, at least, 1 hope that you will trust me for?»
while. This request is not based upon any willful or dogmatic determination to have my ovm
way in carrying »ut the high policies of our government, nor is it that I am unwilling to listea
to good advice. As I have told you in many telegrams, I have not dealt in any secret talks ai
the negotiations. On all the proposals I presented them, beforehand I always conferred with
the members of the Embassy staff and with the Military and Naval Attaches and got their

No, m

FROM: Washington (Nomiwa) July 14, 1041

TO: Tokyo #507.

While Secretary HULL is away recuperating from an illness at a summer resort where the
air IS better than here in Washington, on the 13th I sent him my good wishes for a quick
recovery. On the 14th HAMILTON came to see me on the Secretary's behalf. He said that Mr.
HULL thanked me for my solicitude and continued that if there was anything on my mind,
whatever it might be, to let him know. I replied: "Well, Premier Konoye and Foreign Minister
Matsuoka both equally hope that relations between Japan and the United States cfilfctMic
harmoniously settled. The Ministers of the Army and Navy and other Cabinet members are
all agreed on this. Among them there is no difference of opinion. Irresponsible high oflficials
have spread rumors and perhap.s officials in the American Embassy in Tokyo have sent in
reports which have done harm.' HAMILTON then said: ''While HULL considers peace
desirable between Japan and the United States, he also hopes that Japan will not make war
Upon other countries," I ffetorted: "Well, when it comes to that, aren't thef0 rumen's that the
United States is also getting military bases in other countries?"

For your information.

Trans. 7-1S-41

No. 140

FROM: Tokyo tMatsuoka) July 14, 1941

to? »msh^J#tea #364.
(Part I of 4)

I have not yet received a reply but in any case, whether they intend this Oral Statement
which you have sent me to be a part of the proposal for an understanding or not, it is a detest-
able document beyond any doubt. For one country to tell another totally independent power

A-7«

how its Government should be organized and criticize important elements in that Govern-
taent and to BUggest that this person or that person be eliminated, is unheard of. Under these
circumstances, even if we would conclude this understanding, its result would be nil. X lojg^t
say that it would be a mere phantasm. In the last paragraph just before the note the^ w
something abominable written. They ask that we change the set-up of our Government and
its attitude. Such a thing belongs to the realm of the fantastic. If my memory serves me
rightly, during the summer of 1905, in connection with the Tangiers Incident, the German
Kaiser asked the French to banish THEOPHILE DELCASSE, but France did not listen, of
course, and the incident was never settled harmoniously. A country can only tell its depei;^
encies and protectorates such things as that. If you will carefully scrutinize this Oral Stil-li^
ment, you can well see that so far as the present government of Japan is concerned, it is
^Ot;^ to c&um a ivptur^ in the ivegotiatitsg|,

Trans. 7-15-41

FROM: Tokyo (Matsut^) July 14, 1941

TO: Washington #364,

(Part 2 of 4)

I, the Foreign Minister, have confidence in the majesty of the Empire of Japan and its basis
as an independent nation and I have worried night and day, thinking of every angle In rhi.s
case because I have hoped to settle the matter pleasantly and without harshness, but this
Oral Statement is something which strikes me to the very heart and which I cannot hear.

Note the ibllowing:

1, This Oral Statement; You, Sir, and your so-called fellow travellers have an attitude which
is entirely at variance with the attitude of our present Government and the horrible thing about
it is that you have willingly allowed the United States to mold your opinions. Saddest of all,
here in Japan you have a few adherents. For the representative of a country to directly oppose
the Government he represents is almost unforgivable and I know of no precedent for iilfftiSa*
history. For a tepiresentative of a given country to allow foreign leaders to influence him and
for him, in turn, to try to infiuence his Government belongs not only to the realm of the pre-
posterous, but also to that of base rudeness.

2, This Oral Statement! Had I been a proud man on my dignity, when I received this Oral
Statement on 8th, Sir, I would have flashed back to you my resentment, but the reason why I
have waited until now is that I did not wish to cause hard feelings and wished to avoid offending
the Americans in the least. Hopeless as it seemed, I still wished to see something achieved in
these negotiations, but when this Oral Statement came, you may be sore that we examined
it from every angle. I do not doubt that you have been put out through waiting so long for in-
structions, but we, too, have had tnat worries over the maitet here.

Trans, 7-15-41

A-77

No. 142

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Washington

July 14, 1941

3. Do you not know that, if the Imperial Government had presented an Ocal Statement like
this to the American Government, their indignation would have been unimaginable.

4. In my opinion, although it is possible that Japanese -American relations may be adjusted
at some time in the remote future, for this sort of hideous document to stand like a shadow
Ijetween our two nations, would bode neither of us ever any good.

5. For the American Government to even hint that so long as the present Government is not
changed in its constituency probably an understanding cannot be established, is inconceivable.
The present Cabinet is not by any means ready to consider this proposal seriously. I do not
think that the Secretary of State thought quite that far, but, depending upon whether he is
sincere and upon how sincere he is, the Imperial Government is disposed to draw Of 8^&>
pqsal which we hope will bring a solution to the prablem.

Proceeding from this point of view, if the United States will not rescind the Oral Statement,
the Japanese Government cannot proceed to consider a plan for an understanding. I feel sure
that the American Government would not like to break off with us. I want you please to go to
the American officials and tell them that this Oral Statement is extremely hateful to us.
Explain to them the position of the Imperial Government and see if you cannot show them
what we are trying to have them understand. Most of all, without any delay, be sure to send
the Oral Statement back to them with our veto. Tell them that the reason why we waited so
long in doing this was because we felt a little delicacy and did not wish to hurt their feelings,
and hoped that the matter could be settled without any wrangling.

Well, I am thinking this matter over seriously indeed and in a day or two I will send you a
revised proposal of ours, accompanied by a list of why's and wherefore's. Will you please
explain this to the Secretary of State.

Trans. >4§*T4Ji

N«. 143

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Washington

(Part 4 of 4)

July 14, 1941
#364.

Trans, 7-15-41

A-7t

No. 144

FEOM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)
TO; Wasitittg^n

July 14, 1941

(Parti of 6) -
Seetet outside the Department.
Bie your #424".

Though their proposals along many important points are extremely divergent from our own,
in view of the great importance of Japan-American relationships, we have plumbed the
depths in endeavoring to bring about some sort of conciliatory proposals. Making repeated
|»ofound studies^ we have at long last finally drawn up a series of proposals which have been
discussed in secret conclave lasting several days. Through these we have hit finally upon a
solution which is in keeping with the plans of the Imperial Japanese Army. This is incorporat-
ed in Iliy #366*. These proposals reflect the maximum limit to which we can comply with the
purport of the American proposals. In spite of the fact that the phraseology and gist of the
preface, clauses 1, 4 and 6 difl'er greatly from our proposals, we have decided to adopt them as
they stand. However, the other clauses in their proposals, not being in accord with the
Empire's fundamental national policy are impossible to accept as they stand, much as I
regret it. We have, however, gone to great pains in order to make our revised proposals in de-
tail and in form as closely similar to theirs as is possible. After your Excellency has given
those points due consideration, 1 would like to have you do your very utmost to bring about
their acceptance of these proposals. The reasons underlying our revisions are as follows.

"Ambassador NOMTJRA wires Tokyo that in an Ihteifview with Secretary HULL li^ made the statement that there
seem to he influfniial people in Japan who do not desire an understanding with the U.S., so, after alt, doe* Ja]»^.
consider I ho composure of relations between the two countries so important. Nomura replies that aucb etmee^^fii
as the U.S. has so far offered are not worthy Of «jateidafaticm, Hanmra ako disenBses tim three imiKtrtatit diatwpaneiea
in the demands of both sides.

'Japan's levigKms d tht or^isi!l text., *

(Part 2 of 6)

2. The attitude of the two countries with regard to the European war,
(a) They will object doubtless in principle to the gist of clause 1 of our original proposals;
i.e., that we, together with the United States, would do our utmost to bring about international
peace by an early restoration of peace in Europe, We feel that it is absolutely essential that the
spirit and object of our activities shall be for the restoration of such a peace, and through from
considerations of internal politics this clause should by all means remain in the final text,
after considering all possible conciliation to their views, it is felt that the words, "At a fittiiig
opportunity in the future," be inserted in the phrase, "assist in the bringing about of a settle-
meet of

Trans- 7-l«-4l

N0.14S

FROM: Tokyo ( Foreign Mihiata-).
TO: Washington

July 14, 1941
#366.

(b) With reg£ird to clause 2 of our original proposals, as long as we do not abrogate the
Tripartite Alliance between Japan, Germany, and Italy, we must insist upon its remaining
in the proposals. Further, clause 3, as the United States pointed out, since the agreement has
already been publicly announced, it is necessary that this be retained, and thrae should be
ife efly^jection to this. It isn't that the Tripartite Alliance is at variance with Japm-American
understanding and that this should be made absolutely clear is a mE^jor issue in the stand of
the Japanese Government. Though I believe that they will permit clauses 2 and 3 to remain
ih the text, after giving due consideration to the position of the United States, in the light of
the temper of their proposals, we will take the first part of clause 2 of those proposals i^Ct-
and place it in the preface of our revised proposals. Thus, the substance of clause 3 of biSfflSfiSt
proposal will be incorporated in that clause. We, therefore, can let clause 3 go.

No, 14ft

FRO M : Tokyo ( Foreign "MSiiiater)
TO: Washington

(Part 3 of 6)

(c) Reviving the fourth clause of our original proposalsi that clause being so dependent
on (a) and (b), we shall make it the third clause of our revised proposals. In the past, this
i£|g^se has found its place in the American proposals. With regard to this, since it is tanta-
mount to demanding the revision of the phrase, "that we will not take an aggressive stand,
though they may continue to oppose this revised proposal to the bitter end, I do not think that
they will. I want you to take steps so that in the minutes of these negotiations, it will be noted
that we have again and again, as on this occasion, assumed the position of not approving the
unfriendly steps taken by the United States in the past against Germany and Italy,

3. The steps for the bringing about of peace between Japan and China.

In referring to these articles and clauses which are of the essence of the Imperial Ck»vern-
ment's policies toward China, as well as for the establishment of the new order in East Asia,
they have consumed much of our attention. It is hard for us to aceept the American proposals
whit h would drastically revise the gist of our original proposals. Hie American proposals re-
ject the tenor of our statements in our original proposals with regard to the fundamental
agreement between Japan and China and the tenor of the joint declaration by Japan,
Manchukuo, and China, In view of the fact that in the statement, "Peace negotiations shall
be carried out with the Chinese Government" {It is clear that they mean the CHIANG regime),
they demand that we nullify our achievements thus far, as well as our policy of regarding the
Chungking Government as merely a regional regime. On the other hand, though it is thought
that much confusion would be brought about by leaving out such important matters as joint
anti-Communistic endeavors, the independence of Far Eastern countries, {?) and other
things which make for the survival of the people of the Far East and the safety of our
Empire, we have deleted phrases and clauses from our original proposals with little con^dw-
ation. Thus, we have, by incorporating Bmil^d revisipM of their proposalSt tf|^^ feflaf
fihmt a. opnciliiij^g^ pttlement.

Trans. 7-18-41

July 14. 1941
#365.

A-80

THE "MAOICr'

BAmtm

Ko. 147

FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister)
TO: Washington

July 14, 1941
#365,

Thus, the statement in the revised proposal "regulations aftd terms already put

on the basis of this principle" means comprehensively, an agreement between Japan, and a
joint declaration on the part of Japan, Manchukuo and China. But since we saw that If we
made this too obvious we could not get their approval, we decided to put it into less conspic-
uous phraseology.

Furthermore, in our revised proposal we are avoiding using the title "Chungking (?) Govern-
ment," which the Americans did not like in our first proposal. You know how we, on the other
hand, detest the phrase "Government of China;" so that is why we have chosen to use such a
simple and vague expression as "the CHIANG regime." We hope that this will be agreeable to
both sides. Finally, in our first proposal, we merely wished to inform the United Stat^ that' W
earnestly desired peace negotiations with China, We merely asked them to intervene with
CHIANG KAI-SHEK. That did not mean that we wished to conclude an agreement with the
•^ited States concerning peace with China. The Chinese Incidwit cannot and must not
decided through the intervention of any third country. That has been, is, and will always, be
our irrevocable policy. Thus, the "annex" to the American proposal must all be eliminated.

I want you to be sure to get a promise from the States that if CtS^|S9l^^l«l^-]»i(t'liisK

t^ their warning, th^ wUl stop asisisting him in any way.

(Part 5 of 6)

4. Commerce between both countries.

In the revised proposal we accept this clau&e bodily from the American proposal. Our own
first proposal will be entirely forgotten. However, if we let that "annex" stand, our commercial
dealings with the United States might fall back into the same state they were before the inci-
dent. We need, for our National Defense and for the development of our industries, military
goods and other important commodities from the United States, and if the "annex" stood,
these could not be obtained and they might lay further embargoes and Umitaiions against us.
This would stand as a great obstacle in the way of an improvement in the (^munerciEl reUticms
between our two countries. That is whv we eliminated it. _

5. Economic activities of the two countries in the Pacific areft.

We Mw e^at^ed tibfe Pacific Area WShtt -^i^y mfentit^ lii'l^yi^ to ''llduthwestern

Pacific" {in the preface we made the same change), thus restoring our first proposal. That is
because the area where we feel the need of cooperation is specifically the Southwestern Pacific.
That is the area wijere we need to cooperate as I say, but that does not mean that we desire or
need ai^ pad; coocemmg this matt^ Tka^^emt the Am^ican prf^^al is totally and abs£h

Tram. 7-16-41

No,14S

FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister][
TO: Washington

July 14, 1941
#365.

lutely at variance with our own. Thus, we will insist upon our first proposal. However, your
message # 234" reveals some changes which the United States already seems willing to make,
so I do not suppose that they will object very much.

"The text of the Proposal for an Understandiqg between the United States asd Japan 4ated ( Apni 17,1941).

Trans. 7-16-41

No. 149

FROM; Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister)
"iOf WaahingtTO

(Part6of6)

' 6» ^6 policy <rf kith countri^ relative toM;li&^litical stability of the Padfic Area.
' We Jbave revised our first proposal concerning the Philippines, mentioned in clauses 1 and 2
the :6th article of the American proposal. The question of Philippine indepfi^^[^6# is a ^Jlf 8-
llte eoncermngthe United States aloil^' Vt^-lit iMt'Ha A^^I^

yet that area comes under our East Asia Area of Co-prosperity. Therefore, they must guarantee
the independence of these Islands and friendly treatment to Japanese residents. It is our
mission to see that the various races of East Asia prosper and receive good treatment. There-
fore, we wish assurance from the United States on these points. As I said, while we do appre-
ciate the position of the United States, if this understanding is to be concluded, it is only natural
that the United States must also consider our point of view. As for clause 3 concerning the
immigration question, we have restored our proposal. That is because we cannot disregard
the welfare of our own country in order to adjust our relations with the United States. We con-
sider the position of the United States and know that such matters as this have to be submitted
to Parliaments. Therefore, we have changed the expression "will give indiscriminatory treat*
ment" to "the American Government will endeavor to give indiscriminatory treatment."

ADDENDUM

W« have restored our first proposal. However, we do not think that any explanation is nec-

Trans. 7-16^1

No. 15«

'H^Qdkl: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minigteir)
TO: Washingtwi

(Part lam

(To be kept secret within the Department).

1. Above "Tiaheiyo Chiiki" {Pacific Area) in the 5th article listed in the beginning of the
American proposal, we will add the two words, "nansei" (gpiithwestem) and clause 7 of the
American proposal will not be an indepen<teb ISE^Iaai, i^tit rather be made (b) of ci*Bi»fe
6. (Seeclgui«$#tht^sp!apii8»l.)

July 14, 1941

July 14, 1941
#366.

2. Clause 2. The attitude of the Governments of the two nations concerning the European
war.

(a) We will make a number of revisions in the first clause of the first Japanese proposal
and restore it as the first clause. It reads "The Governments of Japan and the United States
will have as their joint objective the bringing about of world peace and when a suitable oppor-
tunity comes to prevent the expansion of the BurojpeMi WW* both CPUnMli. will WOlk together
for the restoration of an immediate peace.''

(b) We will revise the second clause of the first Japanese proposal and leave it aa the sec-
ond clause. We will eliminate the first clause of the American Proposal. Thus: The Govern-
ment of Japan maintains that the purpose of the Tripartite Agreement was and is defensive
and designed to prevent the participation of nations in the European war not at present in-
volved in it, but if unfortunately the European war expands, the Japanese Government will
carry out its treaty obligations and, with solely the safety and welfare of the nation in mind,
decide upon her attitude.

(c) We eliminate clause 3 of our revised proposal.

(d) We restore clause 4 of our revised proposal and eliminate clause 2 of the American
proposal.

(e) We eliminate the note at, the end of the American proposal.

3. Article 3. Steps for the restoration of peace between Japan and China.

We will revise this and eliminate the statement under Article 3 and also "The Japanese
Government wishes to point out clearly that the basic principles relative to the settlement of
the China incident do not conflict either with the principles revealed in Premier KONOYE's
statement or with agreements and other measures which Japan has already effected. The
President of the United States will request that the CHIANG KAI SHEK Regime, in order to
bring about an amicable settlement to the war and peaceful relations, begin negotiations with
the Ja|>anese Government," and .

4, Clause 5. The economic activity of the two nations in the Pacific Area.

This will be revised as follows: "Inasmuch as it has been clearly indicated that economic
activity of the United States and of Japan in the southw^t Pacific should be carried on by a
]|^aceful means and in accordance with the principle of non-discriminatory treatment in
^ternational trade, the Japanese Government and the United States Government shall co-
<^^rate in the production and acquirement of natural resources in that IINss ttfa

Trans. 7-16^1

'mm

FROM : Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister)
TOf Wai^ingteis^, .

(Part^irfS)

Jttlyl4,194X

#'^06,

IVans. 7-16-41

No- 152

'^60Ms Tokyo (Japanese Foreign MinistCT) ^Wy 14, 1941

TO: Waafeington #366.

§. Aiticte $, Ht^ifi^y of htsth countries wi^ reftrence to the political stability of the Pacific
Area.

(1) We will make the American revised pmposal the first clause m it stands, and place

(a) at the heading.

(2) Concerning the Philippines, we will revive our first proposal and place (b) at the heading.

(3) Third clause ((c) The Government rf'^thft l^t^ #tii*els "MH «onsi the Japanese
immigrants in the United States in a friendly manner, and endeavor to grant them the same
non-discriminatory treatment as other nations). This stipulation may be made a separate

Article e. ADDENDUM^

Thf last sentence in the last paragraph of the addendum to our first proposal (i.e., The

BCi^i^for the application of this agreement, and the period of validity will be agreed upon

tib^ |^¥#*iijn,«n1s el fee^ft a^^MSm) iriH 1^4L^m^^1^^ teviaed proposal;

Trans. 7-16-41

FROM: Tokyo July 16, 1941

TO: Washington No number.

To Counselor IGUCHI from Chief of American Division of Foreign Ministry, TERASAKI.

¥&reiga -Kfli^tii^ MATSUOKA, who understood the American Oral Statement to mean that
the United States is demanding that we revise our present rabinet, wrote my #364° as well as
#365' with his own hand. How about asking Ambassador Nomura to wire him back this ex-
planation immediately: "There are many rumors at present to the effect that the Secretary
pf State and the other officials did not mean the Oral Statement to be taken in such a way as
that. Its object was only to dispel opposition to an adjustment of Japanese-American relations
within the United States. The Oral Statement was designed purely and simply to route oppo-
sition. It had no other meaning."

Let this matter be between you and me because I have taken it upon myself to wire you this.

■II, 140-14,1.
'n, 144-149.

Ttans. (Not dated)

No. 154

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 16, 1941

TO: 4 m.

On the evening of the 15th, both HAMH^TOS? and BALLANTINE called on me. Saying that
they had cqwe in compliance with the desire trf the Secretary of State who is now convalescing,

A-84

im**fA#I#*ftiCS3&B0mD OF PEARL HABBOR

they stated: "We are now having a series of conferences to discuss questions centering on
maintenance of peace in the Pacific. However, we are in receipt recently of information bo the
i^^l^ttiat Japan is going to acquire naval and air bases in French Indo-China. We would like
to know the truth of all this." I replied: "1, too, know nothing about this question except what
I have read in newspapers. By assistance being given by both Britain and the United States to
Chungking; by the cooperation effected betwe^ the United States and Soviet Russia, JapaRi
is gradually being encircled. Under such circumstances it is not at all surprising to me that
such rumors are current at this time. When you realize that the United States has actually
Occupied Iceland and when it is rumored that she is about to put her hand on Dakar and the
Azores, it would not seem strange at all if -Japan should do what she is reported to be planning.
However, 1 will give you a reply after I have a.sked my Government about it," They next asked;
"Has Japan, m addition to the Alliance Agreement, a special understanding with Germany
and Italy whereby she will fight against the United States in case the latter enters the war?"
To this I replied: I don't think there is such an agreement, but in such an event, the duties
specified in the third clause of the Alliance Agreement will come into effect and as to what
these duties really are, I don't see that there is any need of asking Tokyo about them; they are
included in the agreement. 1 once told Secretary HULL that the Japanese Government will
not be able to tell whether what the United States will do in the future will be entirely in the
nature of self-defense, and, so, would have to consider each move individually. The United
States is, from the standpoint of national defense, the safest of all countries and has little
danger of being invaded by another country. Having a special relation with Canada; with
Mexico in a position similar to Manchukuo; and with the countries north, as well as south of
Panama coming under her influence, the question of safety from the viewpoint of national
defense is not such that can be discussed in comparison with that of Japan."

I then repeated what 1 had once discussed with Secretary HULL, whereupon they spoke of
of Secretary HULL.

Re my #36r.

It has been confidentially decided that the present cabinet must go; therefore, before it is
dissolved, I desire that you dispose of the matter of the Oral Statemtst.iind put this question
to an end without a second's delay. Please cany out my imtructiona.

*See 11,144-149, inclusive.

Trans. 7-18-41

No. 15S

FROM: Tokyt!
TO: Wasiuiigtott

July 16,1941

Ttaos., 7-16-41

A-8B

No, 156

July 18, 1941

(Strictly Secret).

To the Vice-Mihistef from WAKASUGI, concerning the Japaneise-American cmveisatitms

here in Washington. In glancing through your various messages, I can see that the home office
entertains certain misconceptions concerning the nature of these talks. The worry you seem to
entertain over the associates on the drafting committee and the oral statement seems to be
based upon these misconceptions. So that things may proceed better in the future, 1 mention
the following for your information. These are the facts, so please make them known to the
Foreigii Minister also. When we began these parle^^, in view of the internal situation here, we
saw tbat we could not make progress or get the desired effects by official diplomatic iiegotia-
tloos. Therefore, we took what might be called the "nimble road" and enlisted the cooperation
ai"ISsftyential Americans in undercover activities, at the same time having Ambassador
NOMURA carry on a number of entirely unofficial talks with Secretary HULL. These talks
were entirely off the record, and opinions were freely exchanged. We were agreed that as soon
as we found ourselves on cominon ground to turn these conv^sationa into official negotiil^ioiis;
We thought that if no unanimity could be attained, it would be as though these talks had l^t^^
existed. Secretary HULL, himself, said that these exchanges of opinion were not negotiationlB.
As for the scene where they liddlfpl^, the State Department was sv&ided and, as you know
from various messages from here, the meetings took place in Secretary HULL's apartment.
What I say is further clarified by the fact that at the head of all the proposals advanced by both
sides, the words "Unofficial, Explanatory, and without Cottxditment" were clearly written-
You gentlemen seem to have made the mistake of thinking that these wTitten memoranda
constituted what is tantamount to official negotiations. In Part 2, paragraph 4 of your # 365°,
you say "Please have this written down in the minutes of the negotiations." This shows that
|rou did not understand. It seems that you also misinterpreted the explanatory statement con-
flained in my ff528*. In order to sound out the outlook, in addition to members of your staff,
^ dlM^se ui})d^«aiver ftgeiilBi %lew this from the standpoint of normal diplomatic pro-
cedure, this may have been a questionable activity, but as I told you earlier in this message,
in view of circumstances we were forced to take the "nimble road." I must say, however, that
it) of tbe" wHy things have turned out, no advantage has accrued to us. t would farther
say that in view of the present Chinese situation, we could not hope to get anywhere.

Well, that is how it is. Dissatisfied as you may be over certain phases of what has takin
place, though I am sorry, we did the b^t we cOtild, and it
please give us due cansidemtion

*See n, 144-149 inci.t in which MATSUQKA gives. ^ reasons |aitdefb'i»S Japanese revisiona of the Aneric^n

Trans. 7-22^1

No. 157

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
IPO: Tokyo

July 19, 1941

{tn 5 parts'— eomplete.)
(Foreign Office Secret.)

1. I assume, of course, that there is no change of policy in the new Cabinet in so far as its
desire is to improve Japanese-U.S. relations on a fair basis. I would, however, appreciate
your giving your attention once again to my messages pertaining to this matter as well as the
pdn^ listed below. In that light, I would appreciate your giving the matter your c^ideratilMi
and instructions.

2. I have given my undivided attention to the matter contained in your message #366°.
^I^irsagh discussions and thou^t We have given this problem it is now clear to see that there
is a wide gap between the viewpoints of the two countries. In view of this fact, we doubt that
the proposal referred to above will lead to an understanding.

Bearing that in mind, will you please advise me of your opinion on the following points,
(a) The matter pertaining to the attitudes of the tm (Muntries coneersing the war in
ESurope.

( 1) Joint mediation to bring about the return of peace in Europe:

They claim that the President does not wish to say at this time that the two coun-
tries wish to mediate in the European war to bring about peace. For this reason, he opposes the
insertion of this into the "understanding" as an expression of the attitude of the two countries.

Ai'ter discussing the matter with them several times, we finally came to an agree-
ment to delete that part (paragraph 3) and insert in its place the words: "Encourage world
peace**. With this compromise, that point was settled for the time being.

1 do not believe that it would be wise to bring up the matter again for I feel that we
would encounter considerable difficulty in gaining our point. (It is quite possible that this
point could be 1^ out entirely without impairing the main objective of improving Japanese-
U.S. relations.)

(2) The rights of self defense:

They wish to make the wording of the paragraph on self defense as elastic as possible
so that it may be applied on any one of various possible developments in the war in Europe.
It is apparently their intention to utilize this paragraph to prevent us &om fulfilling our
treaty obli^titms.

We cannot, of course, permit the possibility of leaving room for such an interpreta-
tion of self defense. They insist that the term "aggressive military action" is too ambiguous.
We, on the other hand, have been insisting that the simple expression "self defense" was
insufficient, for in this day and age an all out war may be launched in the name of self
d^ense. The Understanding Agreement cannot contain expressions which can be given
ifttt^'tflterpretatlons, we have been claiming.

On the other hand, neither the United States nor Japan wants restrictions placed
on its maneuverability in behalf of a real defensive action, because of the Understanding
Fact. I believe that it would be to our country's interest to compromise on some wording which
^^Id prevent aggressive action but at the same time would in no way hinder action in be-
lief of M'lf defense. It is clear, of course, that the interpretation given by the United States
'ti0'.^i^#^^i^ieely unacceptaUe to m.

A-87

(b) Matters pertaining to tlie China Incident.

Translator's note: from here to Paragraph 3 badly garbled.

With fegaM to this point, they as may be seen ciefifly bjf their proposal,

they insist that unless we come to an agreement with regard to the contents of the "annex"
it would be just wasting time to discuss the contents of the actual proposal. It is clear that
they will refuse to accept om su^stion that the annex simply be deleted and that we plunge
int^ discussions on the actual formula of the proposed agreement.

They take the position that as long as they are asked to advise China to negotiate a
peace, they (the United States) should be advised of the basis on which a peace settlement
if to be made.

I do not believe that we will be able to continue the discussions if we insist upon
deleting the annex. Furthermore, if we do begin discussion on the contents of the annex, I
expect to be asked .some difficult questions with regard to the stationing of a nti -Communist
troops and the nondiscrimination among business firms. I expect this to be particularly true
of the former question and would appreciate being advised of the government's attitude once
stgain.

■3, Vpi| axe awarcj^ of course, difficulties are to be expi|C]^ durii^ the discussions on our
deleting thfe li^^ ito the paragraph on trade'%et«^ <ie^&1^l^isV #
the same treatment in the Philippines as the Filipinos, as was demanded in our proposal in
the paragraph pertaining to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific; and the matter pertain-
ing to our U.S. emigration.

It is my opinion that we could find a way to agree on the matter pertaining to self defense.
At the same time, the matter pertaining to our garrisoning troops to combat communism,
which is an essential point to us since it is one of our basic principles, is going to be a harder
problem. The crux of the situation is to find just the wording in both instances, to make them
acceptable to both parties concerned. I feel that those are going to be the most difficult points
to agree upon.

If we are able to make a peaceful penetration of French Indo-China, 1 do not believe that it
will cause undue excitement here. If, on the other hand, we have to resort to military force,

-j^jSStetary Hull is expected back i^i4^^iil^r tiext Sunday. 1 plan to visit Admiral Pratt's
hornet in Maine, at his invitation. I, ttie£i^bi«, would appreciate your advising me of your
opinions p» the matters contained in this message, during next week.

'List ot deletions, additions, and revtai«nB In tbrn Jap & tlS. pcopmalfi fm m 'lSi^^^l^im P(tct» ^•'iiii^ tte

Trans. 7-22-41

No. 158

FROM: Washington July21, IMi

TO: Tokyo #545.

At the request of Acting Secretary of State Welles, Wakasugi called on him on the 21st,
(The Ambassador is expected' llS^ in Washington tomorrow morning.) Welles said that he
has heen ^vnm careful study to itetm^ «wM cerad^ttf^ J&t teM ^^B^^l^comp to his

(iMce, he said, ao that he could express the opinions reached by Secretary Hull and himself^
in the light of recent world developments, regarding the unofficial discussions which have
been taking place for the past several months between the Ambassador and Secretary Hull.

After thus prefacing his remarks, the Undersecretary said that the real objectives, set up
by the Ambassador, Wakasugi, et aL, of the Japanese- U.S, conversations, were identical tti
those towards which the Secretary was striving.

Accaidiing to information received from various sources in various areas, he continued, there
are definite indications that Japan is planning to take some steps very shortly which would
upset the peaceful status of certain areas. If these reports are based on fact, he said, there
would be a conflict between Japanese acts and the gist of the Ambassador's intentions
expressed during the conversations.

Recently when the Ambassador met with him, Welles said, Japan's position was discussed.
In the course of those conversations, the Ambassador claimed that Britain, the United States
and other nations were applying the pressure on Japan, and described this as an "encircle^
ment" of Jap4i|„ Tbi$ expression is identical to that employed earlier by Germany, he
pointed out.

As a matter of fact, the Undersecretary continued, the above was clearly a misunderstanding
on the part of Japan, because the United States has no such intentions as those Japan
apparently feels. It is because the United States wishes to maintain peace between the two
countries that she has been coiitb^uing the talks.

He went on by saying that the advices received were to the effect that -Japan would take
the southern portion of French Indo-China by force within the next few days. Such an act
would definitely be in violation with the spirit of the Japanese-U.S. conversations wbicb are
being conducted in behalf of maintaining peace in the Pacific.

That is the American viewpoint, he said, but he would appreciate being advised of the
Japanese viewpoint.

Wakasugi, therefore, replied that he was well aware of the fact that the Ambassador and
the Secretary were conducting negotiations aimed at improving U.S. -Japanese relations,
and that he, himself, prays that they will succeed. By "a reliable source of information",
Wakasugi asked, did the Undersecretary mean the U.S. Embassy in Japan? To this, avoid-
ing a clear answer, Welles merely replied that the report was an accurate one.

Wakasugi then said that he would relay the information contained in the report referred
to to the Ambassador. In the meantime, he said, he would like to make an inquiry, as one
emanating purely from himself and one which in no way should be considered an official one.
Assuming, Wakasugi said, that Japan is planning to make a move in the manner described
by the Undersecretary in some direction, what e^Tta^ ^wOlllfl ■thftt hav» oa l^St^-ff^^^S^/S^
discussions which were being conducted?

Welles replied that such an act on the part of Japan would be in direct conflict with the
spirit of the discussions. So saying, he implied that further discussion would be in vain. On
the other hand, he continued, he had been led to understand that the new Foreign Minister
of Japan was a close friend of Ambassador Nomura. Moreover, in view of the fact that very
little time had elapsed since the new Cabinet was installed, probably it had not decided
upon any definite policy as yet. In view of this fact the United States would patiently await
developments before taking any steps to halt the discussions.

Wakasugi told WMles that tie. w^mld repojrt Ibis cooveraaticn to the Ambassador ii^ (letalU
and withdrew.

Trans- 7-25-41

No. 159

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

July 23, 1941
#656,

{In 2 parts— CQmpletfeJ *

Since Waicasugi had called on the Acting Secretary of State, as reported in my message
#645°, I called on Welles myaell this afternoon. I explained to him that our southern occupa-
tion was absolutely essential from the standpoint of national security and economic safety.
I further pointed out the impossibility of Japan to pursue a "do nothing" policy in the face
of the embargoes being clamped down against her by various countries, for KOjch A itic^it^f
would lead to national suicide.

After carefully explaining the above situation, I said that according to press reports the
French Indo-China affair was apparently being carried out peacefully with the full approval
of the Vichy government. I added that in view of those circumstances, it Was my hope that thfif
government of the United States would restrain itself from jumping to hasty conclusions,
and instead would watch the trend of further developments for a little while yet.

1 told him that I feared considerable repercussions among the general public, if measures
such as an export embargo on oil is put into effect at a time such as this.

The new Cabinet in Japan, 1 advise the Undersecretary, is as anxious to bring the U.S.-
Japanese "Understanding Pact" to a successful conclusion, as was the previous cabinet.

To the above, the Undersecretary replied that he would not reiterate his statements to
Wakasugi. He could not, he said, reconcile the Japanese policy with regard to French Indo-
China with the basic principles of the plans being discussed by Secretary HuU and myself.
Neither Great Britain nor the United States had any intention of attacking French Indo-
China, he said. The concensus here is, he said, that Vichy's submission came as a result of
pressure from Hitler and that Japan intends to use French Indo-China as a base from which
to make further southward moves.

The U.S. Government, he continued, has not for the past many years made any hasty
conclusions. Her actions are governed by Japan's policies.

Although he did not mention what steps the United States is planning to take in the future,
he did say, as I was about to depart, that Secretary Hull was expected back at his desk very
shortly and that he would no doubt welcome an opportunity to discuss matter with me.

In reply to my inquiry, the Undersecretary said that traffic through the Canal has been in-
definitely suspended while it is undergoing lepaiii^. «is@er^ tliat npi pf;cti$alar natippt y^sa
suffering discriminatory action. x . .

"Acting Secretary Welles, in a reguested interview with Japanese Minister Wakasugi, states ttuit the reported
aggressive move by Japan toward F.I-C. would violate the basis of proposed understanding with, Japan. Requests

Trans. 7-^25-41

tfimt at preaiiadtiiaaB*^

THE "MAGIC" B4C3P?IlOyNO OF PEARL HAHBO^

No. 160 - —

FWOM: Tokyo July 23, mi

TO: Washingtam

(Foreign Office Sectet.)

As the result of oui negotiations with the Vichy government, we were able to come to an
understanding on tb« 24th, with regard to jointly defending French Indo-China. Under theae
terms, we ate to peacefully occupy the southern part of French Indo-China on get abwt M m
29 July. (These dates are for your information only.)

Please, therefore, advise the government of the United States along the lines contained in
my message referred to in the headi)3« and that you have been J^i 4^ l^p^^

^at in spite of this occupation,

(1) The territorial sovereignty of Ftench Indo-China will be respected by Japan;

(2) Tli^ will be no interference in the domestic administration of French Indo-China;

(3) There has been no letup in interest on the part of Japan in the discussions concerning
U.S.-Japanese understanding being conducted unofficially between the Secretary of State
and yourself. Rather, it is because we desire it so highly, that we make this report.

P^^ffil^li^i^ialsdew tathe|$v9xj^ent^ United

Tokyo informs WteaUjAgli^ &i i^ pB^^^m^kl^1Sl$i!^$j»6m. miSi'l^imf^ t» 4M|#^^Uiime&t of Jap trnmi,-!^
air bases in FJ-C.

^ttans. 7-24-4i

No. til

FROM: Tokyo July 23, 1941

TO: W*#i»gtcm _ #397.

Regarding your message # 545°.

1. You were correct in assuming that 1 have not as yet deternwid upon a definite policy
because of the fact that I have not been in office very long.

As was pointed out in my message #368*, our occupation of French Indo-China was un-
avoidable. This step had been decided upon by the Cabinet even before 1 assumed office. It is
to be carried out peacefully for the purpose of jointly defending French Indo-China. It is my
intention to continue to make an effort to decrease the friction between Japan mid .Britain-
U.S,

Should the U.S., however, take steps at this time which would undub^ excite Japan (such

as closing of ■ for all practical purposes and the freezing of assets}^ an ejcceedingly critical

situation may be created. Please a4lgffiB|%|^||l'@^E^^^.i|^.iq^^
an improvement in the situation.

A-91

2. Please carefully reread messages Nos. 368* and 396', and make as ejfert toi improve the

situation.

3. With regard to your message # 536 (last 13 groups garbled).

"Wakaaugi reports conversation with Under-secretary Welles.

'Tokyo informs Washington ot the ccmtemplatsd negotiftticKe with FVaBce tot ^tablishment (iJ&p rmv$il md air
bases in French Indo- China.
'See meet.

Trans. 7-25-41

No. 162

FROM : Tokyo ( Foreign Minister)
TO: Washington

(Secret outside the Department.)

Re my #396°.

The Imperial Government will issue the statement contained in the separate telegram
#4^ at noon of the 26th, Tokyo time (10:00 P.M. of the 26th your time). A statement will
be ^Ivcn to the United States Ambassador in Tokyo at 9:00 A.M. on the same day, so will you
coniidentially transmit the statement to the United States Government at 6:00 P.M. on the
mi.

July 24, 1941
#401.

"Seen, 160.

Tcrftyo wires Washington the increasingly intimate relations between Vichy and Tokyo, see H, 164.

Trans. 7-28-41

No. 163

FROM; Tokyo July 24, 1941

TO: Washington # 403.

Re my # 68°

Representations were made to the Vichy Government on July 14, and again on July 20. The
French accepted all of the Japanese demands on July 21, with final arranging of details and
the signing of the agreement at Hanoi on July 23. The public announcement will be made on
July 26, noon (Japanese time). You will be advised of the contents of the agreement by special
message #404*.

This message bas al$o \mt^ s^me^i^ setlt to England,

"In which Tokyo infotma Washington that within tiie nesct few dajFS, cownercial negotiations between Japan and
^ Vichy Goventmem^iii^Iii^^ • - ' . - - - —

Trans. 7-28-41

TiiE 'mqiC" BACJCGaOUND OF PBASL BA^BC)R

No. m

FROM: T^m' July24, ilii:

TOf Wiashiiigton

Secret Outside the Department.

Statement ^||i#l0i|teq^||^^nment:

Beginning with the conversations which began between Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and
Ambassador HENRI last August, several agreements have been reached between Japan and
France whereby recently Franco-Japanese relations have quickly become more intimate. Now,
once again concerning the joint defense of French Indo-China, the Goveynments of the two
nations have agreed on a friendly policy.

The Imperial Gkwemment is determined to mamtain the various understandings existing
between Tokyo and Vichy. The responsibility of the Imperial Government, based upon its
solemn promise to support the territorial integrity and sovereignty of France, will be main-
talei^ mA ^eeeafter we wiU «tdeai^i& ineiease a rektioashi^ luaity between our two
ctnuitn^s and thus strivji to achieve joint presperity for both.

Trans- 7-25-41

No. 165 "

FROM; Tokyo i|jjy|yg4, 1941

.(Part 1 of 2) . -

1. On the 14th Ambassador KATO interviewed Foreign Minister DARLAN and presented to
him the demands of the Imperial Government concerning joint protection of French Indo-
China and military cooperation, saying that we would like to have the French reply by the
I9th. Then on the loth Ambassador KATO interviewed PETAIN and transmitted $
message from Premier KONG YE, making the same request. AgmSi^ tfee he ^^tsrslltti^'
DARLAN and requested an immediate reply from Vichy.

2. On the 19th, at the request of DARLAN, Ambassador KATO had another meeting with
him. At that time the French reply was that this demand on the part of Japan, because of its
very nature, required contact and consultation with Germany, with whom France has an
armistice agreement and that unless this took place France herself was not in a position to
make any decision. DARLAN replied that within a few days he would be in a position to sub*
mit a definite answer.

3. Regarding this as a design to hold us off on the pretext of France's armistice agreement
with Germany and Italy, on the 20th we had Ambassador KATO return to DARLAN and de-
mand that he accept our proposals in toto. After this conversation he held another talk with
BUNOIR-MESSIEN and, as a result, discovered that France was inclined to accept the
demands of Japan. On the 21st at noon DARLAN submitted an official reply,

4. In this ofhcial reply it was stated:

(1) T1m.-^Wms^'^^?mm^ the Japanese Govern*

mmt.

A-93

(2) The French Government guarantees jdnt defense of WteMh. fodo-China on the bagis of
cooperation with the Japanese Government; howevet, she will not p8)rti<Fi|pNS|e' ^ St^^jBI^^
WW. - - - . -

Id) As soon as inforflai^ c$l3ie locales wherein Japane^ troops wiU be st&^xaied, fVance will
evacuate them.

{4) The Japanese Government will make public a declaration that she will respect the tfar-
ritorial integrity of Indo-China and French sovemSI^'M^W^'1^fiS)i^^l^^*^^i^^^^i,
and will make this statement at the earliest possible moment.

M». m _

FROM: Tokyo July 24, 1941

TO: Washington tm.

{Part 2 of 2)

5. When he submitted this reply, DARLAN stated: "The reason why we used the words,
'cannot but submit to the demands of the Japanese Government,' is this: We are now resisting
the British forces in Syria and, if it appeared that Japan was taking advantage of this situation
to grab French Indo-China, criticism both at home and abroad would be heaped upon out
heads and we merely wished to avoid this. Another important point is this: Japan must not
demand the retirement of French Indo-Chinese troops now in French Indo-China, nor c(m-
hscate the material the French troops are now using, nor must she demand their complete
withdrawal. If at present it were ordered that French troops withdraw from the areas where
they are now stationed, they would be infuriated and, as a resuit, imfoitut^^lgp^alliWJItM
probably ensue. This point must b^giyeii^p^iicial consideration/'

6. Regarding this as an acceptance lii toto. Ambassador KATO handed the Foreign Minister
a memorandum which he had prepared and stated that he would like to send in news to Tokyo
that France had accepted our proposition and that he would like to have this accord written
dtwn in black and white in an official document. Thereupon he also handed DARLAN a pro-
tocol proposal and the suggested text for a public announcement. This correspondence was
finished on the 22nd, but before that, on the 21st at noon, the text of the French reply was
affixed and we accepted the following incidental terms and desires of the French;

(1) Support on the part of the Jsj^^s^t^^^m^m^nt frtr SM^g|^ei(i«nt9j!y defiensi^iBj^ueea
of the French Indo-China troops.

(2) Continued use of the existent military facilities by the French Indo-Chinese forces.

(3) A statement as earty as possible from the Imperial Government to the effect that the
territorial integrity of French Indo-China and French sovereignty will be respected.

(4) The term concerning the temporary evacuation Of French Indo-Chinese troops shall be
eliminated.

We affixed these four terms and began detailed negotiations in French Indo-China. As a
result, an agreement was signed in Hanoi on the 23rd in the presence trf Rear Admiral (?)
SUMITA and Governor General DE COUX.

{Our army is scheduled to move in mtk^ 28th i^nd 29th. This is for your information only.)

Trans. 7-25-41

THE "MAGIC" BACKaaOUND OF.P]£Ami HARBOR

No. 167

fROM: Tokyo (Foreign Mmister) July 24, 1941

(Secret Qtii«dde the Bepartmeat)
Reywr #650'.

As I have reported to you in my # 368*, the steps we have taken in regard to French Indo-
Cbina were not taken with the intention, as the United States Government alleges, to occupy
that country; it was really a matter of necessity for the fact of peace in the Pacific. Jm It not
clear that we are endeavoring to maintain peace in that area from the peaceful attitude our
government took in the face of the fact that the negotiations with French Indo-China, long-
drami'Out sffak that it was, had ended unsatisfactorily and as a result caused public opinion
to be excited considerably? To say, as the Americans are saying, that we had informed the
Axis powers that the Japanese-American negotiations were only a side-talk which was the last
until Japan completed her southward advance is indeed far from the fact (ray #329"). This is
all the more true in regards to the allegation that Japan was intending to wreck theae negotia-
lions. This is carrying falsehood to the limit. Although those who want to profit by falsehood
Batik%4he in^uatioa that the recent political change in Japan was due to United States pressure
(the Oral Statement is implied), the Japanese Government has become, ds it ware, one body
and as such ia «a^ly wishing that the Japanese-American negotiationa would be continued.
On the basis of my past telegram tuid — — — telegram, I gave the time in my #401' as 6:00 P.M.
of the 25th, but T would like to have you explain at once to the United States Government our
real intention in regard to the Flench Indo-China question as well as the purport of my # 406".

"Not available,
'Tokyo wires Wa
'Seeil, 160,
'See 11,168.

Tt^OS. 7-25-41

FROM: Toky©' July 24, 1941

TO: Washington #406.

Secret outside the Department,

Re my # 397°.

That the leaders of the United States Government will at this time display a high degfee of
statesmanship is what I am secretly hoping Wr^ seke of maintaining peace in the Pacific.
The Japanese Government would do likewise and would like to reciprocate. However, accord-
ing to information received by ua lately, especially according to newspaper reports, there is
the possibility of the United States freezing Japanese funds or of instituting a general embargo
on petroleum, thus strongly stimulating public opinion in Japan. Should this plan of freezmg
Japanese funds be put into effect, it would have an adverse effect on many aspects of our do-
mestic life and mi^t compel us to resort to diverse retaliato]^ meaBHres- This would lead to a

A-95

breakdown of Japanese- American economic relations and we cannot be certain that it would
not in turn hasten the development of the worst situation. Will you please get in touch wi^'
Finance Official NISHIYAMA and, in accordance with the contents of tt» 4iiatpti:0iO telegrant^
request the United States Government to favorably treat this question.

(Separate cable)

Financial Ministry message #34.

Because relations between the United States and Japan have become exceedingly critical
recently, the Foreign Minister instructed Ambassador Nomura, last night, to request the
government of the United States to act with the utmost caution where any application of pres-
sure, such as freezing of assets, against Japan is involved. Will you please be advised of the
various points listed below and, after establishing close connection with the Ambassador, take
appropriate steps.

Recently, when the assets of Germany and Italy were frozen, Japan was excepted from this
ruling. Although, in view of the present trade conditions between the two countries, there was
absolutely nothing extraordinary in this attitude of the United States, still we wish to express
our appreciation because we feel that the gov{!xximent of the United States acted in an exceed'
ingly courteous manner.

Once again, however, rumors of freezing of Japanese assets have flafed up of late. We are of
course in the dark as to whether there is any basis of fact in these rumors. If by any chance,
these rumors are found to be well based, we shall be forced, though reluctantly, to take retalia-
tory measures. These will include the non-payment of principal and interest on debts in the
United States as well as to freeze all of the American property in Japan. (Refer to Financial
Ministry Message #33°.) This will, of course, lead to exceedingly unfavorable economic condi-
hMmwn the two countries, and, depending on subsequent developments, may lead to
complete collapse of Japanese-U.S. economic relations. If the txend in that directioii continues,
it is hard to even imagine what the ultimate outcome will be.

In view of the possibilities of exceedingly grave consequences of effectuating this move, will
you please urge the leaders of the Treasury Department, which will be responsible for any such
move, to give this matter their deep consideration. We pray that through cooperative action we
^NKil^l^ISi p^e^«rtl^l««^##^|^'^m from becoming any worn.

Trans. 7-25-41

fROM: Tofcydk.
TO: Washington

July 25, lii
#408.

Trans. 7-^1

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEAEU HARBOR

No. 170

IfiOlil: Waahington (Nomura)
(Part I of 2)

Feeling the tirgency of the situation on the occasion of a luncheon alone with the Chief of the
Operations Section, I asked him to procure for me a conference with the President. Today at
5:00 P.M. I had a secret meeting with President ROOSEVELT. In conformity with your several
instructions, I explained that because of economic considerations and the necessity of stab-
ilizii^ the situation in that area, the measures we took were absolutely necessary. I pointed
out ^t our intentions are to respect territorial int^rity and sovereignty and said that the pre-
sent cabinet also is el^er for a Japanese- American understanding. Finally, I urged him for the
sake of maintaini^ peace in the Pacific, to exercise a high order of statesmanship. The President
replied, "Already the people have been strongly insisting that an embargo on oil should be
put into effect against Japan, but in spite of this, I urged them to keep calm, saying that it
was necessary in order to keep peace in the Pacific, but now I can no longer use this thesis. '
Tlie President then hinted that an embsago on oilm^tbe

(This messi^e sent at &00 P.M J

'ftans. 7-26-41

July 24, 1941

No. 171

FROM: Washington (Nomura) My 24, 1941

TO'. Tokyo #i5eS«

(Part 2 of 2)

The President told me the gist of the statement issuelt % the State Department today, the
24th, and clarified the views of the American Government. Prefacing his statement by de-
claring that there is a feeling that the time is already late and that he had not already con-
ferred on this matter with the State Department, he continii^ .'fSf/iaite!«iw some method
whereby French Indo- China can be evacuated and if the various countries can (as heretofore)
guarantee its neutrality and if all countries can equitably have free access to materials from
French Indo-China, I mil spare no effort. I myself am extremely sympathetic with Japan m
her need of procuring materiak." Well, I got the impression that some economic pre^ure is
going to be exerted immediately. Undersecretary WELLES and the Chief of the Operation
Sectton were invited and sat with us>

Trans. 7-26-41

No. 172

FROM: Washington July 25, 1341

TO: Tokyo #566.

During my conversation with the President yesterday, the following points were brought
out:

1. The Presidfittt said that world subjugation was Hitler's aim. (When I saw the President on
14 March he said the same thing. On that occasion the opinion of the Sec^taiy of State who

A-97

was also present was sought. The Secretary replied that was indeed the truth of the matter.)
After Europe would come Africa, the President said, and after that there would be aNl^fiil^
him. That being the case, the time may mnm when Japan would be fighting on tiae inoact Aide
as the United States, he said.

In reply to this, I told the J*r«sident that there is an old Japanese proverb which goes a$
follows: "If a country likes to fight, it is already on the brink of being destroyed". I added that
the sword is purely an instrument with which to prevent damage or destruction.

2. Since the President's tone seemed to imply that our occupation of FVench Indo-China
was done under pressure from Germany, I advised the President that there had been no
German pressure, and that Japan had acted entirely on its own accord.

On the surface, the President accepted this explanation. However, as you are awa^^
general public in the United States is convinced that Japan in cooperation with Germany^ or
independently of her, is awaiting the opportunity to move southward and northward.

Trans. 7-30-41

No. m

FROM: Tokyo July 27, 1941

TO: Washington #413.

PleMex^^^iie£ 80,^»i$t}r ^nversation with the President of the 24th in further detail .

Trans. 7-29-41

No. 174

FROM: Washington (Nomurs)
TO: Tokyo

(Parti of 5)

Re your #413°.

When 1 talked to President ROOSEVELT, 1 held in my hand a memorandum which I had
prepared in Japanese. I spoke with the President as joUows in Englishi in which OBATA had

carefully coached me before my visit,

1. "The reasons why we occupied French Ihdo-China are:

(a) To obtain the foodstuffs of French Indo-China which are necessary to the economic
existence of Japan. When we think of the economic measures which the various nations are
now taking (waxing of the economic war) and of the new order to come, if we Japanese stood
idly by with folded arms, we would be crushed while sitting down.

(b) From the point of view of our own security, if French Indo-Chiar the sphere
of influence of some third country, we would be in danger. Therefore, we are preparing jointly
to defend it and thereby stabilize our Empire's relations with its homeland.

(c) The occupation of French Indo-China will take place peaceably, and Japan will respect
territorial integrity and aovereignty. It is desirable that the United States recognize these
£a^ctsand tak« no toa^iiltmf

•11, 173.

Trans- 7-31-41

July 28, 1941
#589.

Am

N0.17S

PROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

2. The kind of understanding which 1 have been negotiating with HUI.L, of coiuse, had the
maintenance of peace in the Pacific as its object. During the negotiations I said:

"(1) I am very sorry to note that you doubt the sincerity of our Government but the fact is
that the Japanese Government is all the time desiring it and the present cabinet has already
on two different occasions issued instructions for this purpose.

"(2) Among the difficult points, as regard to the question trf self-defense, we continue to hope
that somehow the difficulties involved will be overcome and a compromise arrived at. While it
is logical for a country to exercise its legitimate y^ght of defense when it has been unjustifiably
reproached, the question as to what constitut^' ttf^feise o( the right of self-defense, I believe,
would naturally have to be decided trfter a pftaceful retatkwi has heen restofed."

Tram. 7-3Q«tl

July 28, 1941
#589.

No. 176

FROM: Washington (Nomura) My 28, 1941

TOt Tokyo #589.

(^artaofS)

"The stationing of troops in a part of China is not of a permanent nature and will be baaed
Qpon an agreement with the Chinese Government. The question of freedom of commerce is
Oji the road to a spontaneous settlement. In short, in the larger view I think that there is a way
^ let ev^Ything settle itself."

The President replied: "As I have already told you, popular appeal for an oil embargo against
Japan was clamorous. The reason why, in spite of this, I toned it down, was that 1 wished to
keep peace in the Pacific." Changing the subject to French Indo-China, he w«nt on: "iti JapWa's
need for procuring materials I have ample sympathy for her, but now I do not know but wh$|
the opportunity has already been lost. First, let me say that 1 have not previously conferred
with the State Department on this matter, but if it is possible for troops to be evacuated from
French Indo-China, for the several countries to guarantee its neutrality as before, and for the
several countries to procure an equitable share of its goods freely— for example, Japan obtain-
ing tiee and foodstufls, and the United States, rubber— wiU spare no eJSorts.'*

T!eaiw.7~?SMl

No. 177

FROM: Washington July 28, 1941

, (Veryutgwitil.
(Part 4 of 5)

1 went over the principal pomts which the President brought out and he confirmed them.
'^km he turned his head toward WEUjBS «S if toaee what WELLES had to say* but the latter.

A-99

maintaining a humble attitude, did not mention a word. It was about this time that the Presi-
dent took out his cigarette case and offered it only to me. (The withdrawal which the President
spoke of is 6^eJ3g.e in one sense and so strange in another sense. His "good neighbor"

Ddliey'lt diriwMr^mich military power ftot WM. At one time, after ordering troopa to , he

cancelled the order and did not allow the troops to land. Also, in his policy toward Meatico he
has never landed troops at Vera Cruz or mobilized forces on the border, but he managed to
bring about a notmal condition by reconciliation. This avoidance of using troops and the
Ijrinciple of nondiscriminatory freedom of trade are two points which the President himself
l^ke of at tHe tiaJ* of our second conversation and are what both the President and the
§©e^«rsi9f SiAt&fttfoiigly advocate. )

IRBUoa. 7-30-41

If 0. 178

fB^M; Washingtoa ^ July 28, 1941

(Very u^ent)
(Part 5 of 5)

The President spoke disappt^QVlligly to the effect that the recent southward advance of Japan
•Was a result of German pressure and that Japan had gone too far in it. So, I explained that it
*fl&' iiot so and that Japan acted on her own initiative and independently. To this statement
the President replied lightly. I then said: "Previously you said that Japanese-American
relations were deteriorating. I have ever since been endeavoring to improve the relations and
although my efforts have not yet been rewarded, I have not yet given up hope and intend to
carry on to the finish." Whereupon the President said: "HITLER is determined to conquer the
world. After Europe he will conquer Africa and so on, not knowing when to stop. Ten years
from now Japan will find an enemy against whom she will fight on the same side with us."
I countered this statement, as I have reported to you in my telegram, by saying in effect that
from ancient days it has been said that those who take the sword, will fall by the sword and.
Japan is doing nothing of the sort.

*tT&m. 7-30-41

Mb. m

fft^l' Washington July 25, 1941

TG: Tokyo #674.

Regarding your # 390* and # 401*,

I carried out your instructions on the occasion of my interview with t^e Preside&t (Tfas.J^#^
in^ Secretary of State was also present) on the 24th.

On the 25th, I had Wakasugi call on Hamilton and had him hand over a copy of the English
text of the statement which is to be published tomorrow by the Imperial Government con-
cerning the Japanese-French accord on the French Indo-China affair. Wakasugi asked that
the Sme^giry be advised ol the 6oiJtei^Wl^^^^

A-lOO

THE "MAGIC" MQ|i;(Sfi£tUND OF PEAJiL HAeBpa

Taking this opportunity, Wakasugi pointed out that even after the Japanese occupation,
tiWt'lMSi'ereignty and integrity of French Indo-China would be preserved and that Japan wouy
no way meddle in the domestic politics of French Indo-Cliijiat Wakasugi said that tt^a^t
two points were clearly brought out in the text of the statement,

Wakasugi then hsix$^ !BmiX^m> fllSl»^ W^
the Panama Canal.

Then the two men unoflBcially discussed the Japanese-U.S. relations and exchanged
opimons on the possibility of finding ways and means of countering its increasingly unfavor-
able trend. Hamilton said that there was probably not anotiier person who has worked as
hard as Secretary Hull in an eilort to maintain friendly relations between the United States
«lld Japan. In spite of the fact that he has been the target of protests from the public as well
as from his colleagues in the Cabinet, he has patiently strived toward that end. He did so
because both the President and he were convinced that it would be to Japan's interest not to
resort to force of arms but instead pursue a policy of peace.

However, even he could not approve Japan's resorting to the force of arms to carry out an
expansion program in the Hitlerian manner. As long as Japan does not renounce such a policy,
there is no hope for the continuation of the imofficM .i^^mm-VM, ^aunasions which were
^^ilgci^iductedi Hamilton seill;)

'Occupation of Southern F.LC. will take place 28 or 29 July.
'Official st[it0meiitTeF.LC. will be pablishedse July.

Tirsns.

raOM: Washington July 25, 1941

TO; Tokyo #^71,

J^arently Admiral Pratt had put in a good word for me to the Chief of (Naval) Operations,
for even since 1 assumed this post, I have been shown many courtesies by him. His opinions
concerning U.S. -Japanese relations coincide with mine; he once told me that the only msult
of a war between the two countries would be mutual exhaustion.

Once while conversing with the Admiral (Stark) 1 happened to mention that it seemed to me
ttmt the higher officials in the Navy Department here seemed to be men of eicellent char-
acter and qualifications.

To this, the Admiral replied that both the Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations and
the Director of War Plans w«re exceedingly able men. The same is true of the Chief of the
Bureau of Aeronautics. As for the fleets, he continued, both Kimmel and King were recom-
mended by him, and both are of the highest caliber. Although Hart had reached the age of
retirement, he had been kept on in active duty because of the critical twnm^ he added.

Please relay this ^onnail^ to the Navy.

TVana. 7-29-41

No. 181

FROM: Washington July 25. 1941

(Official eode mesfiBge.)

I would like to have Minister Wakaaugi and Colonel Iwakuro return home on the first
available sailing for the purpose of reporting on the state of things in this country. The
approval of the Minister of War should be secured in the case of Colonel Iwakuro.

We have counselled toother over the question of having one person of the Navy return too^
but with the shortage of personnel there seems to be no one to send, and therefore we would
like to have the Navy receive the reports of the Minister and Colonel Iwakuro.

In this connection we are asking that Obata be left here a little longer.

We have confecred with both the Military an.d Naval Attaches,

Tram.7-3X-4i

No. 182

FROM: Washini^om July 25, 1941

T5t Tokyo #567.

Foreign Office Secret.

'We have been having him" make some undercover investigaiions in an attempt to discov^
what economic moves against Japas -jiEei!>M»g contemplated lay the gov«mmeRt ai the Vjtitsd
States.

He reports as follows:

1. A secret conference was held this afternoon by Cabinet members to discuss measures to
counter Japan's southward move. The majority of them were of the opinion that the present
move on the part of Japan was instigated by Germany. The step was taken as a supplementary
measure of the next maneuver in Europe, they believe. There is also a strong belief among
them that the continuance of U.S.-Japanese discussions would be useless because it would be
meaningless. He says that regardless of what excuses he tries to make for Japan, his hands
are tied. It is unfortunate, but that is the situation.

2. Up to now, he states, he has been able to prevail on Secretary Hull and others to keep the
government from freezing our assets and from damping on an oil export embargo. Now,
however, he believes that these measures will be adopted. Moreover, there is a good possibility
that the "freezing" phase will be put int© effect at an unexpectedly early date. Confidentialily,
MK^fg^er, he is trying to prevail upon iftfe tJ.S. goveriiii«4rt& ¥feH4«®a'fts6lf until he hte'iil^
an opportunity to thoroughly discuss the matter with Secretary Hull who i^. expected to
return to Washington this Sunday. (The truth of the matter is that, probably due to the fact
that he is a new member df the Cabinet, he was ignorant of the Japanese occupation of French
Indo-China last year. Upon being advised of this today, he asked me why we were making
such an issue of our latest move. He stated that he has difficulty i{L tryiiig to reconcile himself
to that.)

3. He says that the persons who have really been pvit "on the spot" by recent developments
are Secretary Hull and himself. He says that he recently held quite a long discussion with
BN^^S^ ^letjBevelt wfa& is going to his tu»ne in Hyde Park after granting me an interview
^ fi^t%. On tb&«««^tm of that ^tJHi lie f^|t^^^^(@i»i{ii M| "^tmmtm^i

A-102

could be found to make Japan reconsider her ti<>t$ey so as to enable the continuance of peace
on the Pacific. My informant, therefore, has not given up in despair as yet, but instead, would
continue to put forth his best efforts in an attempt to smooth thinp over. His main hope is
that Japan will respond favorably to these overtures on his part.

4. Germany's atibempta to bring about peace through the good 'Offices of the United States is
atUl being continued. Japan is in no way involved in the terms being proposed by Germany, It
is interesting to note, he said, that though he and some of his colleagues are against the terms
being proposed by Germany, some of those who anrKH^iM i1m^'iLB,*3«^tam''^l0^
are in fawr of the termjp being offered by Germany.

'Tbethwl person te£ptr«dtstiU9iyEl^lj^^^«»^ei^ ^

*■ Trans. 7-28-41

No. 183

FROM: Los Angeles (Nakauchi) My 26, 1941

At 6:00 P.M. on the 2Sth, the local Yokohama Specie Bank and the Sumitomo Bank branch

offices were given a thorough inspection by bank examiners, and all safes were sealed. At
J.;00 A.M. on the 26th, a general license was granted the Yokohama Specie Bank. Business was
e^tduiibfid ^'W^^^B^ii& ihtt ei<^dll^(ilti0^^ the books. Becuase the Sumitomo Bank deals

Trans* lO-*4l.

No. 184

FROM: Washington (N0ai!lf») ■ July 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo ' #534.

On the 25th when WAKASUGI conferred with HAMILTON, he asked frankly as follows:
"As you know from newspaper reports, Japanese ships, fearing seizure by the American
authorities are hesitating to enter American ports. Is it the intention of the American Govern-
ment either to tie up or seize Japanese ships?" HAMILTON replied: "The State Department
has nothing to do with this; in fact, it is hard to understand why Japanese ships are afraid to
enter American ports; so much so that some people even telephoned the State Department to
find out the reason, and so I am not in a position to reply to your question." Then Wakasugi
stated: "If the Uniteid States Government has no intention of tying up Japanese ships, would
not an assurance to that effect be useful in eliminating any such doubt?" To this HAMILTON
replied: "I see no necessity for the Government to guarantee to ships whose avoidance of
#tfeeHuE« American ports k an enigma, whetftef^ U^miiM ^m tkme abips or not." Thus mt
conversation availed nothing. However, I am sending this much for your reference.

I understand that a man acting on behalf of the Secretary of the Treasury stated at a press
int?irnew on the 26th that the SeUfSI^-si funds does not apply to Japanese ships, but that it
is not eertain whethK" their departur* fitom ports wUl not be interfered with in case the

A-103

emergency regulations issued by the Treasury Department are applied to them. I will report
m tim Hubjec:t again afittir g^fe^^^mt^liilic^iii&tif^^'i^i^^

Trans, 1-$(hil

No. 185

PROM; Tokyo
TO: WaaMngton

July 27, 1941
Circular #1622.

In retaliation for the steps taken by the British and United States by which our assets were
frozen, the rules restricting foreign business transactions in Japan which are included in the
rules governing foreign exchange, shall be put into effect on the 28th by order of the Fuian<^
Ministry. Manchukuo will also take similar steps, while in China proclamations by the Con-
sulates will be made subsequently. As an emergency measure, the above regulations will be
announced by the Consulates as a bulletin and n^H W Mailt 4s<fl^ei^ve for all practical purposes.
(All transactions involving Britain and America will be placed on a license basis.) At tiift
same time, the Chinese will receive instructions to put similar measures in effect.

With regard to th^ <?ilat{ims, all exports to countries which have frozen our assets, shall
have to receive licenses in accordance with orders issued by the Financial Bureau, Guidance
will be given to settle all complications which accompany the materialization of these
regulations.

Ample study has been made so as to mak^ Ctiunter whatever measures the

opposition should choose to actually take.

Re your # 412' and # 418*.

The ruling promulgated by the Treasury Department for critical limitations might be
called a recapitulation of the actuation of the President's orders for the freezing of the assets
of Japan, Germany, Italy, and other foreign countries (see my # 579° and my ordinary letter
message of June 17 this year, #312), 2 c, of clause 130 of this ruling under the freezing order
includes among the properties of foreign countries whose activities are forbidden, ships,
cargoes, bills of lading, etc. The legislation upon which this step taken hy the United States is
based, as I have pointed out in numerous telegrams, on the foUowii^ acts. Please i«fer to
them again.

1. The Espionage Act of July IS, 1917 (my # 100°).

2. The law authorizing the commandeering of ships (my Nos. 373° and 374°).

3. I'he law stipulating the order of priority of commercial shipments for the sake of
national defense (my Nos<^ &44* and St9*j.

No.lSS

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

July 28, 1941

'Not available.

Trans. 7-31-41

A-104

THE "M^GIG" BAG^CG^UND Qf PmBL HARBOR

No. 187

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda)
TO: Washington

(Secret outside the Department}

0a the 25th I asked Ambaseador GKEW to call on me, and I handed him a memorandum
giving the purport of what is cowtained in my # 368° and then explained the principal points
therein as follows;

1. It is an undeniable fact that in the areas covered by Burma, Singapore, and centering on
French Indo-CbinSj » line of encirclement against Japan is being fiwined. Naturally, Japan
is afraid that £»te as Syria has met, and Japan's

recent action in J^eh Indo-Chinil has fctt its obj5BCt BOtMng oiiier titaH ^ joint defense irf
that country.

I. Judging fr<ii»'-flte ^CafeiSfeiil Nftfileif AliUffent Secretary of State WELLES made on the
2Sth at a press conference, he seems to think that the occupation of northern French Indo-
China is only a preliminary step looking toward a further southward advance; but this is
clearly a misunderstanding of the truth. This step was taken with a view to bringing the China
incident to a close. The reason why I had informed the American Govenw^t^ Wit St^
before they were taken is that the Ambassador eind I are on friendly terms.
■ The AmbassadOT regarded with a great deal of importance the point, in the memorandum,
cCHieemti^ the fact that Japan has no intention of making southern French Indo- China a
base for advancement into the territories adjacent to that country. He said that this was the
very point which the United States Gipvermnent wanted to know about, and now that he has
my assurance r^|a^^'iSfe^ fjgTff^aely
his government. •

July 28, 1941
#419.

°In which Tokyo informs Washingti<Hi ot the negotiationa to be begun between Tokyo and Vichjr for the establuthment
(tf aaVfil and air bas« lA soutfaera lUdo^China in the name c£ mutual defense.

Trans. 8-2-41

mm

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda)
TO: Washington

Secret outside the Departmrait.

(Part 1 of 2)

Re my #419'.

On the 26th 1 a^ain requested Ambassador GREW to come to see me and I talked over this
iattt^ -with liim-. Aal^iilMidr md-^ mMf^'^<my of *e telegram giving the conversatiito
which had taken place on the 23r(l WELLES. I l^ke

frankly to the following effeet;

ifl> Jhkigfiig -fif^ mt. WEliLSS* o^^afeitei Ife *e^Bftft t& bs under the impression that recent
action on the part of Japan toward French Indo- China was a result of pressure exerted by
Germany; but this is far from the truth. Japan took that action as a result of the conclusion
^.jtt'teeaty in a friendly manner between Japan and France for the poipose irf 4i£^PHlin^

July 28, 1941
#420.

A-105

French Indo-China. In fact, the authorities in French Indo-China themselves were fearing, tS^
bd^sure that French Indo-China will beidUir^eBcape the fate which befell Syria.

(2) Mr. WELLES believes that the recent occupation of French Indo-China by Japan was
accomplished with the intention of securing bases from which Japan may advance to other
places. This, tOQj 16 m. mtitely mistaken view of the matter. As I have repeatedly pointed out,
1^ jpeent acticm of ttapan has had no object whatsoever other than the maintenance of peace
fe^feft Pa(;jiic. TWrefbre, that had resorted to the means which she did, is to me a

regrettable fact.

(3) T am extremely chagrined over the fact that relations between Japan and the United
States have reached such a stage in less than two weeks after the formation of the new cabinet.
This IS entirely due to United States' misunderstacKliQg of the real intention Gi
Government.

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

(Part 2 of 2)

(4) 1 am iifraid that if the United States should adopt further measures which will be pro-
vocative to Japan a most unfortunate situation will be brought about between ttwt two coun-
tries. The Imperial Government has been by every means endeavoring to quiet t^e resent-
ment which the people have been harboring against the United States' giving aid to CHIANG
and against other actions. Therefore, if the situation is made worse, the Government wlU
find it more difficult than ever to suppress their emotions. Furthermore, among what Assistant
Secretary WELLES stated to you were these words of Secretary HULL, "was unable to see that
any basis for continuing the tfillra which Admiral MQMIIRA t»d life* WMA. had beeak^^^ael^
ing." Do these words signify that the negotiations now beiog *Sl^j4ai <» lritJi «^'^
ing Japanese-American relations should be dropped?

The Ambassador avoided giving a definite reply by saying that he was not at all familiar
with the conversation on this question. No doubt, in accordance with the instructions sent to
you, you have made explanations regarding this question; however, I would like to have you
emphasize at every opportunity you may get the fact that Japan's action was one which could
not have been avoided in the light of tiie situation prevailing internally and externally.

Tram. 7-30-41

No. 190

FROM: Washington - - July 29, 1941

TO: Tokyo #600.

(In 2 parts — complete.)

On the 28th, yesterday, I saw WELLES. On that occasion iftfe*«!Hafelsr«ai state-
ment titat during :iiE^ «|i«^<»iig«^ years, peaee^ k^ lieera maiietili^lit> ^^^t^tfl»#i<>l^^

A-106

July 28, 1841
#4m

BteAsm and Japan without one single break. Unless, however, some way out is found from the
pqlici^ being pursued by the two countries ttkb^, dtif ^lations shall become incfeasingly
i^itical, causing justifiable anxiety. If this dark abyss cannot be circumvented tlurough
statesmanship, then, indeed, a great crime on mankind cannot be prevented, I said.

To tfaffi WElLXtES replied that the proposals recently made by the I^esident were sound fmd
that considwable importance should be attached to them. In spite of this, in his conventions
with Ambassador GREW, the Foreign Minister implied that he was ignorant of them,

I therefore replied that at that time I reported only the gist of the proposals, but a detailed
report was dispatched today.

WELLES expressed the same attitude as the President; That the United States would in
no way interfere with the accessibility of American materials to Japan on an equal basis m
to other nations on condition that Japan makes no conquests through the use of fotce.
Moreover, no threat to the safety of French Indo-China exists, he said.

m we look at the treiid isi A detached manner, we find that we are moving alone, heading
toward the worst possible eventuality in East Asia, and may come up against Britain, tlie
United States, the Netherlands East Indies, and China, and probably the U.S.S.R. as well.

Our duty to restrain the United States in behalf of Gtermany — (two badly garbled lines)

the United States and Germany are avoiding armed conflict. In the meantime, and

unconsciously, we are rushing towards a war against Great Britain and the United States; a
w£ir in which we would have to stand alone against them.

I beg of you to give careful considerations before you take any steps. It may be true that
circumstances may arise which need immediate local attention from the military. Politically,
ISIf^Ver, I beseech you to take a broad view, consider all of the angles, before making a
move. It is my undying hope tha^ ||QQcN^,1tai IfM^ i^i^ ^ our

country.

Trans. 8-1-41

No. 191

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

Re»y #611".

When I expressed to WELLES that we hoped for a certain degree of magnanimity regard-
ing ship loadings, in view of the famous "fair play" and "square deal" policy advocated by
the United States, he prefaced his remarks by saying he was pleased to receive a straight-
forward expression from me and would also give a clear statement of opinion. He said that
for the last four years the United States has been long-suffering in the overriding of American
interests in China by the Japanese. He added that he, himself, still desired, for the improve-
ment of Japanese-American relations, tJiat there should be an adjustment along the lines
of the conveKsationg bdd imtwam- Seo^^jp iiUIiL and m^sM^ TJm m-S^i^ ioit your
reference.

''Ifotivaliiiliifr.

July 30. 1941

Ho. m

FROM: Washington {Nomura)
fCte Tokyo

July 30, 1941
#604.

I communicated with the Secretary of State in accordance with your instructions. On the
29th, I received a reply by (note?) saying that in view of the great increase in the number of
Japanese living in New York on a diplomatic status, in the future only the ranking Commercial
Attache and Financial Attache would be placed on the diplomatic list.

In the case of Financial and Commercial Consuls and Secretaries already on the diplomatic list
permission to increase the number or to replace them would not be given, in accordance with the
policy decided upon in 1939; therefore, although the United States GovernnM^^ili^lK^||ii^:Qi%^|tidl^to
to Assistant Financial Attache YOSIMURA residing in New York as a Japanese Gov^ment
official, it is impossible to put him on the diplomatic list.

On the 30th th* Acting Secretary of State requeMted me to call on him. WELLES handed
me the memorandum contained in my #606° and, with an extremely austere look and
prefacing his statement by saying that he spoke in the name of the President, proceeded:

"1, When the Panay incident happened the Presideiit. ||9|\S\|i|i£Nil|S^^ '$^ a thing

would not recur, so why did the present incident happen?

"2. Under what sort of orders did the Japanese forces and responsible officials permit
pieh a deed?

"3. The American Embassy in Chungking and the gunboat are on the other side of the
city, supposedly in a safe place, so how did this incident conie about? Now, I want to get an
immediate explanation from the Japanese Government."

To this I answered, "Well, Sir, personally I cannot bring myself at all to believe that an
act like this was perpetrated intentionally. I myself am quite familiar with the geography
of Chungking. The river there is narrow, to say the least, and novices when they let bombs
fall are quite apt to make this sort of mistake. 1 don't know what we can do in order to do away
with such untoward events unless we either stop bombing Chungking or you move the
American Embassy and the guJabt^t. Jfa any caf^, J spat to repOirt this to Gmmmmt
and then answer you later on."

Thus our convewation ended.

Trans. 8-12-41

No. 193

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

July 30, 1941
#608.

'Not avuilable.

tr^ 7-31-41

A-108

No. 194

FROM: Tokyo July 31, 1941

TO: Nanking, Hankow, Cim]i^^#l^..

Shanghai, Tientsin,

Peking & Hsinking

(Message from Washington #605.)

It seems that one of our naval planes damaged an American gunbcmf, tfie TUTWLA, at
Chungking. On the 30th, the Acting Secretary of State asked me to call on him and told me
that it was a very grave incident. He handed me a memorandum contained in my separate
message # 606° and asked me to get an explanation from the Japanese Government. I will wire
you the details immediately. However, this is a serious matter, and it is necessary to take
unmediate steps.

'Not available.

Trans. 8-2-41

No. 195

FROM: Washington {Nomura) July 30, 1941

TO*. Tfligro #609.

Remy #msr.

Today I knew ftam ik§ tod ktilEs ^ie# i^ees that they meimt iMttlaess dud I maM im

that if we do not answer to suit them that they are going to take some drastic steps.

During my first conversation with Roosevelt after I took office the President, referring to tlie
Panay incident, said that at the time he cooperated with the Secretary of State and succeeded
in restraining popular opinion but that in case such a thing happened a second time, it
would [nobahly be quite impossible to again calm the storm. The latest incident brought all
this back to me wai I can see .^ist hiem ^av^y th^ are regardixi; il. THnk a£ it! Popiilvr
demand for the freezing of Japanese funds was subsiding «yt tilfi hnd t@ hs^^
tell you it certainly occurred at an inopportune moment.

Things being as they are, need I point out to you gentlemen that in my opinien it
necessary to take without one moment's hesitation scmB appeasem^ measures, ttease
wu-e me back at the earliest possible moment.

" 1 ~ ♦

*WeUes oummoiis Namura and damands explanation cfTutuila bombing immediately, see U, 193.

TVans. 8-2-41

A-109

No. 196

FROM: Washmgtojft, July 30, 1941

TO: IjStoP' #612-

I think that the best possible step we could take at the present is to stop bombing Chung-
king for a while and to publish this without delay.

'Notavatlttble.

Tt&m. 7-31-41

No. 197

FROM: Tokyo July 31, 1941

TO: Washington #429.

Before receiving your ff 605' 1 had Vice Minister Yamamoto call on the American Embassy
as my representative even though we had had no ofhcial word from the American Embassy
as yet. 1 sent word to the et^ect that if the injury to the Tutuila was an actual fact it was a most
unfortunate occurrence. The said Minister had a confidential chat with the American
Ambassador who said that as yet he had no instructions from his government but that he
thanked the Minister for his visit. Furthermore, the Minister of the Navy sent an oflldi^
call on the American Naval Attache (last 2 lines garbled).

°Not available.

Trans. 8-1-41

No. 198

FROM: Tokyo July 31, 1941

TO: Washington #435.

2^45 p.m. I requested Ambassador Grew to call on me and at that time^tjb^Hiiittti^^l;
regrets and the Ambassador presented the official text corresponding to your telegram
#606' (?). I said that I was sure the incident was simply a mistake on the part of the aviator
and that without doubt there was something wrong with the "release gear" of the bomber.
I told him that I had previously had experience with aircraft and that I could well under-
stand such a thing occurring. However, no matter what the cause may be it is very regrettable
that such a thing should have occurred for we have been exercising the greatest caution to
prevent the recurrence of such incidents and have issued strict orders concerning them. Not
only that but according to my recollection orders have been issued very recently again
regarding this. As a military man myself I know that the military men are accustomed to
give absolute obedience to instructions, I will do the utmost within my power to see that a
recurrence of this does not eventusite, Isaid.

'Nuttvail^.

Trans. 8-1-41

A-110

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

FROM: Tokyo July 31, 1941

TO: Wiashirtgtcm #4^4.

(Utmost secrecy, Chief of Ofi|ee#«*iaf

Re your #«m _ ,

In regard to your proposal, please tell the President immediately that in view of the general
State of relations between Japan and America, bombing of Chungking will be suspended
a, •time. In w^f^ them relations between Japan and America this step which you
suggested would .1^^ very serious one indeed and if it were publicly announced in America
it would give an'Jiagsficessary shock to one section of public opinion in Japan. This would
defeat the vmy ^pmpm^M ^^ejit, i^i^r "Ble^ call the attenticm of America to this point
particularly. •it

My # 435* is an answer to the thl^ <p'estions {of Welles) brought up in your # 608°.

'Nomura recommenda that as the best possible step Japan could take in the Tutila matter, Japan stop bombing
Chungking for a while, ancl publish thh fact immediately, see n, 19€.
'Seen, 198.

No. 200

FROM: Washington July 31,1^

TO: Tokyo #m

ReyouriN^iV .

I called on Welles on the afternoon of the 31st and told Mm ^at I nH&icI .have the gist
of my separate telegram # 624*' conveyed to the President.

Welles expressed his gratitude and said that he would make arrangements immediately.

I said further that in case there was anything the President did not understfUtd, I d^ied
an opportunity to explain it to him, and closed the interview.

(Time 8: 10 p.m.)

■ ^iftettfa is directed to inform the Presideal:^^ bp3iiai.^jttwag!^ «^r|MF)«]speitded tat a time; requesting
fUsl 1^ action not be publicly announced.

Trans. 8-3-41

No. 201

FROM: WasihinKton July 31, 1941

Wt t^t- #624 (or

(Separate
telegram).

Strictly confidential. Chief of Office routing.

I have come to convey to you personally the regret of my government over the Tatuila
incident, I am instructed to inform promptly the President of the U.S. that the Japanese
government has decided to suspend for the time being all bombing operation^ over the city
area of Chungking. Let me say that this is a step I myself recommeisdi'li&^iSSkM'^ih- tfte
interest of Japanese- American friendship. And I feel that this decision of my government
#hQl4d be held confidential inasmuch as publication of it would arouse unnecessarily a

seetfbh of public opinion in Japan deftefit the very purpose fer ^hicll t!f^^»^4a»

been adopted.

I am fully convinced that the Tutuila incident was an accident pure and simple. This, I
believe, was made entirely clear to Ambassador Grew by our Foreign Minister, Admiral
Toyoda, at the time when he offered his government's apologies, and it seems scarcely
necessary for me to give detailed explanations. I should like to add that the Japanese Govwn-
ment be prepared to pay indemnities toe any ^axit^m to American prc^ierty upon the
a^pletion the neee$a«isy inv^^^s0smii

No. 202

FROM: Washington. July 31:, 1941

TO: Tokyo #^

Re my ^62;^.

During the evening of the 31st, Welles announced that the United States has accepted
Japan's apol<^ in <s)nneeti6tt if!ra^ *fce Tutuila incident and that the matt« was aoweleisect.

"Set 11,300.

Tr«»s. 8-5-41

Ne.203

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 28, 1941

TO: Tokyo • ##1.

( Secret)

According to information emanatii^ -^f^-^ ^^j, AP reperts &9m ISTANBUL

concerning British-German peace negotiatlt^ are iidt en^^ly iwithmit foiini^tt^* However
this may be, the President and the Acting Secretary of State have intimat^' tiWt %S$.p3f
LA GUARDIA of New York, former National Defense Head, has let s(»nethin£8UjP«

A-112

As a matter of fact, the German Government has recently again ^^ed to its personnel and
% successfully eitg^ing in undercover work. This is being fervently supiiort^ by Americans
of German extraction^

_ Trsas, .7-^-41

No. 204

FROM: Tokyo ( Foreign MWurterl
TO: Washington

(Parti of 4)

{Message to Berlin # 708)

From time to time you have been sending us your various opinions about what we ought to
do to help Germany who desires our assistance now that she is at war with Russia. After a
cOD&rence with military, at the risk of a certain amount of repetition which may cause you
iSptne ennui, I am wiring you the Imperial Government's policy and views. Hereafter, will
you please act accordingly.

1. In a cabinet meeting during the forenoon of July 2, the broad outlines of our decision
concerning our future policy were drawn. You were informed of it by Circular # 1390". Ever
^ce then the Government has been and is devoting every effort to bring about the material-
ization of that policy.

2. The China incident has aheady extended over a period of tcm years, and the Imperial
^vetnment's general trend, particularly its military trend, has hitherto been to expend the
greater part of its ener^es in an endeavor to bring a conclusion to the incident, and now a new
situation faces us frpna li» north and from the south. In order to meet it, there is more reason

•lipans^ $-4-^1 •

FROM: Tokyo (Foreig«llto^J
TO: Washington

(Part 2 of 4) (Message to Berlin # 708)

It seems that Germany also understands this position of ours fairly well. The German
Embassy people here in Tokyo are already quite aware of it. And yet I fear that their home-
land is not yet as well informed as they are on our position.

3. Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries^ led by England
and the United States, are gradually becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure
it mach longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life, must take measures to secure
1^ raw materials of the South Seas. Our Empire must immediately take steps to break asunder
Itk ever-strengthening tsbam of encuccleme^t whiph is \mag woven under the guidant^^^^

July 31, 1941
#433.

July 31, 1941
#433.

A-113

asleep. That is why we decided to obtain military bases in French Indo- China and to have our
troops occupy that territory,

That step in itseif, I dare say, gave England and the United States, not to mention Russia,
quite a set-back in the Pacific that ought to help Germany, and now Japanese- American relations
are more rapidly than ever treading titfT xn^. This show? 4^ i^/m it has been to the
ljnit«d States,

No. 206

FROM : Tokyo (Foreign Miiustet|: July 31, 1941

TO: Washington #43^.

(Part 3 of 4) (Message to Berlin # 708)

Needless to say, the Russo- German war has given us an excellent opportunity to settle the
northern question, and it is a fact that we are proceeding with our preparations to take
advantage of this occasion. Not only will we have to prepare, however, hut we must choose
well our chance. In view of the real situation facing our Empire, this should be easiiy under-
If the Russo- German war proceeds too swiftly, oxir Empire would inevitably not have
time to take any effective symmetrical action.

5. I know that the Germans are somewhat dissatisfied over our negotiations with the
United States, but we wished at any cost to prevent the United States from getting into the
war, and we wished to settle the Chinese incident. We were working toward those objectives.
Let him who will gainsay the fact that as a result we have indelibly impressed upon the United
States the profoundness of the determination of the Empire of Japan aad restrained het ttom
plunging into the conflict against Germany.

It should be understood that we started these talks at a time which seemed opportune to us,
and on the assumption that there was complete trust between Japan and Germany. Fot
that matter, did not Germany start a war with Russia because of her military expediency when
i| was least desirable on our part? Now we have not only to settle the Chinese incident but

Ttane. 8-4-41

FROM: Tokyo ( Foreign Minister) July 81, Wit

TO: Washington #433.

(Part 4 of 4) (Message to Berlin # 708)

We are expending our best efforts to cooperate with Germany. She knows it and ought to

understand our action.

6, Well, the formula for cooperation between Tokyo and Berlin, in OTder to realize the funda-
mental spirit of the Tripartite Pact, should be for each country to have a certain flexibility
in its conduct. What I mean to say is that each should understand that real cooperation does

A-IU

other and while stiiving toward one general objective, each use our own discretion within
theboundfiof good judgments -

Thus, all measures which our Empire shall take will be based upon a determination to
bring about the success of the objectives of the Tripartite Pact. That this is a fact is proven
by the promulgation of an Mpi^al mcript. We 9tb bv^ workiiig tammii ^ lesUzation tiS
those objectives, and now during this dire emetgenc^ certalnljF no time to engage in any
light unpremeditated or over-speedy action.

Mmm send to 8^e. Hftve^at to WaiAiztSt^^ •

Trans. 8-4-41

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

Beyoiw #566°. Sectetotttsi^:^455?«Eta

(Parti of 3)

We are now considering the proposal very carefully, although as you may well imagine, it
would require considerable amount of time before the Japanese Government will be able to
express its opinion regarding it because of the fact that the political situation at home and
abroad is critical and the matter under consideration is of great importance. However, I would
like to have you tell the President that we, realizing the seriousness of the present situation,
are giving consideration to our reply and tell him so by covering the following points:

1. The method of disposal referred to in my #434' is an unusual one. It goes to show, in part
at least, bow eager the Japanese Government is to bring about an equitable adjustment of
Japanese -American relations. (This method of disposal excludes the area outside of the
Chungking city limits and, therefore, does not apply to military establishments, air-
fields, etc., in the suburbs. Furthermore, it goes without saying that it is a temporary

"Conversation between NOMUSill <ii IK^GsSESSMf ieiilf^ Hltl^'i WW WJB* SWi #^<iW*fl^«a9»a
cooperation, see II, 172.

'Infonning ROOSEVELT that Chnn|pc^ 1lf»tto|.^^
relations, see 0, 199.

Trans. 8-4-41

No. 209

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

(Part 2 of 3)

2. As soon as I received the report of damage having been done to the American gunboat
by our bombing, I sent to the American Ambassador the memorandum prepared by the
former Vice Minister YAMAMOTO, and immediately upon receiving official wire, I
personally met the American AmbdssadoT. I htt^ tfyeady wired you ^is fact. la addition

August ^..^^
#438,

August 2, 1941
#438.

mm

to ^ing these things, I arranged to offer every facility to American new^per Cdregpondents
and at th& same tim^ I had the report banned heiti m m not to uimece&8a:^'|$»^ p|l^
opinion. Ail this was done simply because we wish to deal with Japanese- Amwican relations
in as calm an atmosphere as possible.

Porthmnore, in order to avoid the rectmence 6£ such tinpleasant incidents as the one in
question, it is ray earnest desire that the United States would free herself from mere legal
theories and cooperate with Japan to eliminate by means of friendly conversation those
matters which constitute the cause of disputes between the two countries. Fot example,
inasmuch as the removal of Tutuilla to safe waters at this time would have a beneficent
etfect on future Japanese-American relations, will you suil^bly inform the American
authorities to take this oppOtTitti^j^ to Ito fifi

No, 210

FROM: Tokyo
TO; Washington

(Part 3 of 3>

If we are to avoid disruption of Japanese -American relations, it would be necessary to
mutually exercise a high degree of statesmanship. It is in consideration of this fact that we
are taking the aforenaentioned attitude. However, if the Japanese Government is to continue
to maintain such a cool-headed attitude and if the public opinion in Japan is to follow the
Government more perfectly with a view to improving Japanese- American relations, 1 believe
fomly that it is necessary that the United States Government reciprocate our attitude by
refraining strictly from behavior of fault finding and maintain instead an intelligent and
constructive attitude. Will you therefore persuade the President to consider this point
carefully. As I have already told you in successive telegrams, it is my intention to have the
Japanese -American diplomatic negotiations continue in the future. Will you, therefore,
taire every opportunity to enlighten the American authorities, along the lines set forth in

Trans. 8-4-41

No. 211

FROM; WashipiEton (Ntanura)
WOt Tokyo"

(Strictly Secret)

In view of the fact that Japanese-American relations are constantly growing worse with
prohibitive limits set on export of oil, today, the 1st, during the forenoon, I secretly called on
A member of the cabinet and asked him for the latest news. At the same time I told him the
reasons for Our having occupied French Indo-China. It appeared that he had already heard
of Japan's arguments from IWAKURO. I said, "It seems that it was clearly stated in the
Japanese- French agreement regarding French Indo-China that the occupation was made
necessary by the present general situation. It is not of a p^man^t nature* Do you not thmk

A-iie

August S^'t|lp{it
#438.

Au(gii^t2,1941

it a good plan to conciudti aii agreement which promises to uphold the integrity of the adjacent
countriM, waters, colonies, and the Ofll^ '^st Indies and to continue the negotiations that
have been carried on and thus to facilitate supply of material?" Then he asked the question:
"Is not Japan preparing to occupy Siberia?" showing that his interest had not been aroused
to rniy extent. Incidentally, he said "Since Hull was so intensely interested in adjusting
Japanese -American relations, he is greatly disappointed. Although he is expected to return
on Monday, he is 'very sick'," Then he said, "We are now being ridiculed by our colleagues
as having been 'easy men' for having played into the hands of the Ja^att^se, but there- wiffl'eSHaEs
a time when we will be quite active."

He spdie further, saying, "You are well aware of the fact that the President does not want
war."

Now this is the way 1 look at the matter: The United States is trying to restrain Japan,
first of all, by waging an economic war, although the government authorities claim that they
ai6 taking counter-measures against Japan's policy. But, that tl^ United States is

at the same time making military preparations against the possible eventuality of a clash
of arms is a fact with which you are already familiar. Furthermore, it seems that in order
to attain het object, the United States is endeavoring to get Soviet Russia and China, to say
nothing of Great Britain and the Dutch East Indies, to fall in line and cooperate with her.
That the Russo-German war is lasting longer than expected has proved to be an advantage
to the United States.

However, the aforementioned cabinet member did not speak so optimistically as the
President, in a newspaper interview yesterday, is reported to have alleged his confidant
IfOI^KH^S to have spoken (sic). The cabinet membe^r believes firmly in tb^ nece^i^ of ^li^^
luting for several years for the re^on that due to destruction of her man (sic) and materials, and
due to the shortage of oili Germany would not be able to (Jo anything on a great scale
«vea aft^r Bg&ting on the Qta^asa has come # «tiv|i«t^.«M that since the United
States will be ablie ia the meaadme tft{>idly inoreese her ^odtjction, ttte tr«nd will ha
in favor of her.

No. 212

FBQM: Washington (Nomura) August 2, 1941

TO: Rio, Bogota, Mexico #221.

(Circular)

{Message to Tokyo # 643)

1. The recent petroleum embargo exercised by the United States is attracting attention as
the first measure taken to back up the fireezing of funds. Its motive has not the slight^t ccm-
nection with the bombing of the Tutuila and is taken to be a warning to Japan against further
penetration southwards. It is reported that the United States will not relax this sort of economic
^eessute until it become clear that Japan is going to put an end to her policy of aggression. All
the: newspapers print a London report that Japan is continuing to make new demands includ-
in|riaim^ bases in Thai and the pre^>c(»ltain& comments to the effect that Japan is further

Simultaneously with the petroleum embargo the Chi«f flf Production and Management
stopped the sale of silk to the public at large; consequently, stocking manufacturing through-
out the whole of the United States, depending upon whether or not they can use substitute
materials, can employ but 20% of tlieir former workers. Great unemployment will be the re-
sult, in fact, it is said that 175,000 people are out of jobs.

2. On the 2nd, the Government of the United States issued a statement to the people that
the fact that Japanese aggression in French Indo-China was not stopped constitutes a threat to
the security of the United States, whose attitude towards France will be determined hereafter
by whether or not Vichy surrenders her territory to the Axis. On the same day, WELLES, the
British Ambassador; the Australian Minister; and the South African Minister, (doubtless con-
{USfniiig Dakar) held a conference on measures to be taken in the worst eventualities.

The activities of HARRY HOPKINS in Moscow are receiving notice and these activities
are being referred to in connection with Russo-American cooperation in case Japan strikes
Jiorthwards.

Relayed tQ , Mexico, Patiama, Rio, Belay from JHo to , Buenos Aires.

(Parti of 2) -

(Message to Tokyo # 142) Re my # 132".

a. Since then, the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Sumitomo Bank haveT&gfe#iiiillS!S*fiir*fe
under surveillence by two Treasury Department inspectors each. Incoming and outgoing wires
and mail have to have their details "checked" by these inspectors. Insofar as the Yokohama
Specie Bank is concerned, though the account books and bank balances are "checked'* daily,
domestic business is allowed to proceed much as usual.

1. Since the freezing legislation went into effect, all individuals must present affidavits of
continued residence since June 17th of last year before they can 0^^' W^i withdrawals from
deposits. (There have be«n OCcasiOm wt^^ I^I^Sl^
submitted as evidence.)

Mr Though statements are made that these measures are not as a result of the freezing
ilfj^ll^WM, when withdrawals are in excess of $500., the Tr^t^U^ j^^^H^Mnp^ uaspectors make
iM^^^Hfons as to what purpose these funds are to be used.

Wkm drafts are requested for dispatch to depehdfeilts I*! Japan, actual proof must be
SUt^lt^that drafts have been sent to these same dependents within the last six months.

■The Treasury inspectors see to it that Treasury Department watchmen are sent t0 both
ttlSttliks to stand guard each night.

Trap%.t-16-41

No. 213

FROM: Los Angeles (Nak^uphi)
TO: Washington

August 4, 1941
Circular # 15.

l^ana. 10-6-41

A-118

No. 214

FROM; Los Angeles (Nakauchi)
TO: Washington

August 4, 1941
CireylM # IS.

<Psrt2af2)

(M^sage to Tokyo # 142)

b. NYK, Mitsui and Miteubishi branch offices are new making applications for general

licenses through their respective branch offices in San Francisco. {Temporary licenses have
already been issued. Routine office expenses can be paid.) However, Mitsui and NYK branch
oflSces were visited by TreaBtU^' department inspectors for the three days of August 2 to 4,
inclusive, at which time their disbursement account books were thoroughly investigated.
Though the Osaka Chosen maintains a branch office, since it is an American agency with an
American manager, it has no direct bearing in the present situation. Th6 Aaano branch office
is making application for a general license.

c. Permanently established Japanese tirms, maintaining partners in Japan, and to whom
money is sent regularly, because of the freezing legislation, may not be able to send funds ac-
cumulated since June 1st to their respective sponsoring organizations in Japan. All of these
firms are now making applications for general licenses. However, none of these licenses, as
yet, hav#:tM!^'-iMB^ -

Re your #621°.

1. There are no objections to your negotiating regarding the three i>oints you mentioned.

The British Ambassador has already made a proposal regarding their foreign diplomatic
establishments and consulates in Japan, in harmony with the principle of reciprocil^y, to the
ejfect that these be exempted from the rules recently put into effect regulating the transactions
of foreigners. Also regarding America's foreign diplomatic establishments and consulates, if
America does nd^ldl^ly the rule freezing assets to Japanese foreign diplomatic establishments
and consulates and their staff members in America and her possessions, then the Japanese
government will in turn exempt American diplomatic establishments and consulates and
l^ir staff members in Japan {including Manchuria, Taiwan, and Chosen) from the regulations
governing transactions by foreigners. There is no objection to your negotiating in harmony with
the above.

2. There has been no propowl o£ any sort (Tern the Amferican ArobliiBftelegf in Japan rtgatd-
ing the order freezing assets.

3. Please handle this whole matter there.

No. 215

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

August 5, 1941
#445.

Trans. 8-6-41

A-ll#

Xo.216

F^OM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokye

August 4, 1941
#646.

Yesterday, Sunday, all the newspapers discussed tbg Japanese- American problem in large
headlines, supporting the government's stiff attitude. According to the Gallup Poll, hostility
toward Japan is running rather high, but on the other hand, the press does express the opinion
thAt the door has not k^ef^ entirely closed. I would say that the Americans at present consider
their relations with us as surpassing in importance their relations with Germany. As the days
pass, I expect the situation to quiet down more or less. However, much will depend upon the
course of the European war, and no man could do anything but guess what the future has in
store. IWAKURO and WAKASUGI will make their report to you in Tokyo, but do not forget
that things change rapidly these days. Now I am in a responsible position. Though I could not
offer any excuses, if I made a miscalculation now, there might be regrettable consequences.
Furthermore, my astuteness is quite limited. Therefore, as soon as there is a means of trans-
portation available, I would like for you to send me some such Foreign Office expert well versed
in all affairs at home and abroad as Ambassador KURUSU to work with me for awhile.

I know nothing at a,ll about the government's high pohcy which is shrouded in secrecy, so how
can ycd espi^ mt to taS^ ^i^actltaj whatever when my hands are thus tied? Please think this
over, and send me & man immediateli^.

(Parts 1, 2, 3 of 4) (Division of parts not indicated)
Strictly confidential.

Wakasugi talked with Undersecretary Welles for over one and a half hours on the 4th. They
left no stones unturned in their exchanges of Irank oiflmoxts. The foHowtng is the gist of their
discussion:

Wakasugi said that on the eve of his departure for home to report to his government, he would
like to get a clear idea of the attitude of the U.S. Government. Also, if there was WH^^M^'i^i^
the U.S. Government would like to have relayed to his home government, he would like to be
advised of it, Wakasugi said. After that, Wakasugi continued, he would like, (1) to be advised
of what the United States wants of Japan in coimection with Japanese-U.S. relations; and (2)
to exchange opinions on the set-up of the world following the termination of the European war,

Welles replied that both Secretary Hull and he were exceedingly int&rested in maintaining
and prconoting friendly relations between the IMtiti'Stii^-aii'ii'^Si^l^; ^sd the Secretary has
told the Ambassador so on many occasions.

Over a long period of time, he continued, peace has been maintained between Japan and
the United States. The tinendship which has bound the two together over those years is, indeed,
a rare phenomenon in the history of international history. The United States is very anxious
that some means be found to make possible the continuance of this happy situation. The
l&tted States has absolutely no desire to take aggressive or oppressive steps f^aSmt^^pan. At
ptemm, iuweve^, US. iiM^ciSr Ipwiiids ^ (Ntmuered cmmtries somettsifis ^a^^ ^^iHi

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokvo

August 5, 1941
#652.

t

what th£ United States really wants to do with regard to other countries, vMch causes some
CFiticdl situatiohs. *" ' " t -

He has had much adoration for Japan since he had a post there 25 years Welles said. He
has never experienced as critical times as these, he said. The only remaining hope now is the
displaying of ettraofdiiistrily brilliant statesmanship, (meaning, not r^orting to force of arms).

Wakasugi said that Welles had described the present situation correctly and asked him what
sort of statesmanship the United States had in mind. He went om to point out that Europeans
and Americans would not or could not- c@ffi|»efeend Japanes^' asJtioas in the Far East. The
basis of the differences is that European and American territorial penetrations and applica-
tions of economic pressure of recent years conflicted with the ideals for the Far East that
Japan— as the mainstay of the Far Eftat-^ ^striviBe for. The European and American policy
described above does not harmonize with the Sikp&tmt piogmm ctf national security which
has a direct bearing on Japan's very existence.

Wl^es T«pHeiithat^lie-^t tt^^r^lte^dltepBfli's aspirattafi^ that the only point

that was objectionable was the resorting to arms to gain these aspirations (one line

missing) that which was proposed to the Ambassador was done so from this point of view.

At the request of Wakasugi, ii#1^1ained that proposal in the fioUowing manner: Funda-
mentally, French Indo-China was occupied by Japan, the Japanese say, (1) to counter the
danger of joint action by Great Britain and China (probably including the United States)
Bg^Mt Japan; atid (2) as a meand«f being assured access to raw materials.

Now, upon the evacuation of Japanese troops, if Japan, United States, Britain, and China
(and possibly the Netherlands) could agree not to threaten French Indo-China's territorial
ittlegtlty, attd :se£ :^ka^. a^'i|>JE^'H strict neutral, Japan's aim No. 1 would be automatically
satisfied. Incidentally, as wa» reported to the Ambassador recently, Thailand is to be included
in this area.

With regard to Japan's argument regarding the assurance of accessibility to raw materials,
Welles said that he could hardly believe that French Indo-Chinese production would satisfy the
demands of Japan. However, if Japan agrees to the terms set up above, the President is ^^k-
Jpared to insist to all the nations concerned (including Britain, NetherlandSv «nd Cbi>»%4*
alleged) to grant Japan's desires of putting her on an equal basis.

Welles added that the United States awaits Japan's reply to this proposal with much expect-
ancy.

"By the above explanation," Wakasugi then said m effect, "do you imply that the United;
States is prepared to conduct negotiations with Japan concerning the Japanese demands,
that the United States is willing to use her good offices to discuss them with the other nations
referred to above if Japan does not resort to force of arms?"

Welles replied that that is exactly what he had meant,

Wakasugi continued along the following lines: "Under the national policy of 'Western Hemi-
sphere solidarity', the United States has seized control of the Western Hemisphere for her o#n
benefits. However, from all outward appearances, she is unsatisfied with that for it seems as if
she is trying to participate in Far Eastern affairs on the pretext of having special interests there,
in spite of the fact that the said special interests date no farther back than fifty or sixty years
at the most. This make^ d06 that the United States is trying to seize the police pCW»i^«lf
the world."

"Thse is very little jttstififlgti»B for the United States having that power," Wakasugi said,
"Why doesn't the United Stal^l&iit her spheire of influence to the Western Hemisphertt Why
can't she leave the Orient to the Orientals?"

Welles admitted that the special privileges of the United States in the Orient (most of which
are in China, he said) dates back only fifty or sixty years, "Hcwevet," he continued, "U.S.

actions are not based on those. The United States is prepared to give up those special privi-
leges at any time. The point on which the United States places the most emphasis is her op-
position to the use of force of arms. World peace and order cannot possibly be brought about if
a power such as Japan is permitted to convert the small countries in her vicinity into
protectorates one by one in the Hitlerean manner." (At this point, Wakasugi intrarupted by
saying that the occupatiqn of French Indo-China was carried out on a peaceful basis with the
iuU im&Mt^ lM.$^9t&tMi i^Sfmiiim6nt. Welles retorted that the Vichy Government did not have
aftteC will and that the above mentioned "Full accord" was forcefully foisted upon it).

■'When two countries such as the United States and Japan," Wakasugi then said, "which
9^ slUTound6d by entirely dissimilar circumstances and which are based on different policies,
InsHit on adhering to their respective arguments and wants, an armed clash between them
caoQOt be avoided. If, however, the prevention of such an eventuality is sincerely desired, the
actions of each must be geographically, or by some other meanSr limited. In the light o( that,
what is the scope tsf U.S, demands upon Japan? What are the limits of the wmts of the United
States herself?"

Welles avoided making a clear reply to these questions. Instead, he said, in ei^ct;

"We are in receipt of reports that Japan is preparing a further southward move Into Thailand.
I greatly fear that conditions will become worse,"

'-"tiai^ tj^l^;l^j^^ OIl0.^^ ll$'j^^ wmlth and goo^i^^^ would

come Japan's way if only she would pursue md adhere to a strictly pea<:e£ul policy.'*

N"o.218

FROM: Washington
TQ: Tokyo

<Part4 of 4— Parts 1, Si *Bai^lidnsIated 18 August).

With regard to the peace set-up, subsequent to the conclusion of the war, Welles had sorae-
thii^ to say. The occasion was the dedication of the addition to the (Swedish ?) Legation here,
at which time he said in his speech that the basic principle would be the equal accessibility of
raw materials by all the countries of the world, and the establishment in one form or another
of a leajjiie which will include the entire world. ( Unlike the present League of Nations, the one
under consideration will have arms to enforce order). He enlarged upon that speech now, in
his talk with Wakasugi, After strongly promoting the above two points, he went on to say that
talk of disarmament would almost certainly be brought up. He pointed out that nothinif but
disillusion could come of disarmament talks without first settling upon the accessibility of
VBW materials.

Wakasugi then brought up the subject of the Stimson policy as it was expressed at the time
of the Manchurian Incident at which time Stimson said that the United States would not
Cognize any gains which were made by the use of arms. "Isn't it a fact, though," Wakasugi
asked, "that most of the world is what it is today, such as — for a glaring example — the U.S.
Felicy with regard to the Caribbean, the fruits of armed warfare? You may say that by main-
taining this status, you are maintaining a status quo. Howevej, ftSffl^iSOft-'^yee o£a lust^^Kl^^k
is merely a matter of the time element, isn't it?"

Welles replied that he himself could see points which were objectionable in the past of the

A- 122

August 5, 1941
#652.

Certainly, if history is permitted to repeat itself, forever, no progress could be made in man-
kind. He went on to pdint out that one Had to change one's poUetea in ae&x^e^^^M^'^li^
>|inies.

I shall ncA go into the other points they discussed.

Tirans. 8^22-41

.■-..-..It ' <

A-i23

No. 319

FROM: Washingtmi May 19, 1941

TO; Tokyo #319.

Re your #4l? «B#'#4#^5.

I have had Terazaki' of Intelligence make an official trip to New York for the purpose "flf
keeping in touch with the Consul-General'' there, and we have come to the foUow&ig
conclusions.

1. We are of the opinion that Roosevelt's dictatorial attitude is becoming more pronounced
apd^ the governroent is jeaiun|[ toward jtU>^l war.. Therefore, we desire tfa^t you remit
'^imiikMy' ^ atT tMbHt' k "tli^si^ we may 'ifi^

carry on intelligence work in the emergency <;iy^^l1|^ America's entry into the war . Boif 3)1^
purpose we assume that Japanese- American reiatif^ 1^1 continue as at the present.

2. The duties of £flf leitelligence office are becoming increasingly -l^^uMs # tile
existence of the Dies Committee and of the application of the regulations regarding Americans
in foreign employ and regarding foreigners resident in America the gathering of accurate
^et$ef information is far from 'Tim is only one example and tbere are many other
"delicate" problems, m 0m» \liai^^i$mi

for information).

We «riih to ifia&« Wii^iftitetn ifld'^j'ew'¥'a!l4^;^ Ut^ tft^
Therefore we wish to get your approval before Terazaki starts for his post. We wish to have
Consul Inagaki come here to serve. We feel that we should have here at least one-third
of the personnel that they have in ShanghiA for intelligence. Therefore, we are looking; tst
temporary employees, (non-career clerks). Furthermore, we wiah ta< Iiavift 1^ J^iC^ ul (dui^
of intelligence visit New York about the 10th of every month.

4. The title of the officer in charge of intelligence will be that of "press attach^". His
duties will be as decided in the busine^ |!««M|eteaee OA March ^^^tf^^l {^^^^

A. Ordinary investigations and,

B. The development of intelligence.

"A" will of course include the investigation and gathering of secret information on the
division in American public opinion regardiiig the rapprochement in Japanese-American
relations based on the peace movement. But we wish to preclude such polices m the strategy

Jlieing employed in the present negotiations.

5. A summary of the present state of the policy is as follows:

We are making personal contacts on every hand. However, at this place and in Ne'^ ^^Hitk.
we are continuing the existing formal contacts and gat hering j8^95rma^Ott, In aiSnj^ixfSBii

to this, the officer in charge of intelligence has contacts with;

(A) J, and W, who are in close tafueh with the President and his wife.

The President is cultivating power through the "relief workers'" and the "W.P.A." and
other agencies, hi addition to this, since his third term anyone who opposes him becomes
the target of his attacks and his dictatorial tendencies are becoming more marked, therefore
it is natural that we should pay special attention to those in close touch with him.

One or two items regarding Roosevelt's position: Evidence was brought out in the Senate
to the effect that the former Ambassador to England, Kennedy, had not paid his 1932 income
{^ro^dent maintained eileiice. Acc^vdii^ to o^ier iwcret ntfi^aaile^gt ^ifili^ile liad

A-124

laB "I^€JG^' a*eKSRC>WD OF PEARL HARBOIi

a secret understanding with Roosevelt and attacked him in his public speeches taoM fkajx
was neceiisary as a Presidential candidate and enjoyed scandalizing public opinion, however,
had he by any chance become President he would have become a mere puppet of Roosevelt.

Again, told Terazakj that originally he was an isolationist, but that now in view oi the

opposition he was keeping silent. Six months ttom now if he Said he wests an bc4ationist he
would not be able to go about in safety.

(B) W of the State Department.

When Teraza k i was a student kt Brown Uaivasity h* hecame well ^K3<i*fatotS^aj^%1l5,

(C) G of the Senate.

When Terazaki was in Brown University he was greatly helped by this G.

(D) The relationship of the "AfiaatUaFirst Committetf*ieMadfeiBS:«li^W<i.

Every time Lindberg makes a speech the German newspapers approve and American
newspaper reporters in Germany write it up and American newspapers make a big thing
of it so that the impression is conveyed that Lindberg is an agent of Germany. Because of
this, Lindberg and the Committee are very perplexed and according to W, Lindberg hfts
been cautioned by the German Embassy. Since then he has been in touch with W.

(E) D, an Irish American.

D told our intelligence officer that a Jewish American Justice of the Supreme Court,
Frankfurter, was packing the key posts of the government with Jewish Americans. But that
American antipathy toward Jews is increasing to such an extent that eventually anti'Jewisb
influence would prevail,

(F) Persons with religious affiliations. (1) Catholic (2) Protestant. (3) Undfeditied*
The Catholics are the ones who are ccmcemed in the present negotiations.

(G) The Brown University Club.

This meets regularly once a month and at other times at which times he (Terazaki) is
^sent.

6. Concerning the salary for employing nationals and foreigners. The future is another mat-
ter; however, judging from the past unless our general funds are increased it will be im|>oasible
to move. We wish to have you cognizant of the aCtui|tl^U|UjiQ3i fllMi

comes we wish to take decisive action,

7. Looking at the funds for general intelhgence, of the $30,000 income, only about $3,900 a
.■jwar is available for actual development of intelligence and about $1,800 a year for entertain-
ment and receptions. However, in the decision of the committee held on March 4th of thi^
year regarding intelligence business, and the stipulations of the policy regarding propagation
tsf itttii^ll^imce, it was v«triously affirmed that of course the utmost effort would be put forth
and that we would need no small sum for expenses. According to the present allotment we will
need for the present year the sum of $500,000 for the development (rf intelligence. We
respectfully request this.

view of our deci^on to d«emphasize propaganda and cpncentiate m iRtellieence, as directed in lay dUpatcb
-f 44, please make recommefida^iim'l^feiQS^>I»S|(^^
'Not available

'Especially SBsigned to U.S. tor intelligence and propaganda work.

'Macffitumaj he had long experience in intelligence work in Manchuria and China; Counselor of Embassy,

Trans, 5-21-11

No. 220

m&M: Tokyo (Matsuoka) " ' -i-* ^ May 16, 1941 ' "

TO: Singapore # 120.

According to a telegram from our consul in Colombo, a New York Reuters dispatch states
that it is reported that the United States has already stationed a fleet in the Indian Ocean.
Please pay great attention to the movements of American warships.

(Strictly Sfcrel)

Trans. 7-23-41

No. 221 . ,

FROM: Washington June 10, 1941

TO: Tokyo #386.

(To San Francisco, Los Angeles, & Seattle, Cir. # 121)

Secret.

Because of the suppression exercised against our Naval representatives (Language Officers)
by the United States authorities in a series of memi incidents, our Navy has, for the time
being, stopped stationing these officials by limiting the personnel. Inasmuch as in the light of
the relations at present prevailing between Japan and the United States, observation of the
movements of the American Navy is one of the most important matters, will you observe the
movements of ships and gather other information that may be of iQtereat to our Navy^^^
wire us the required information as it comes to you?

Trans. 6-25-41

*Io. 222

FROM: Seattle (Sato) June 23, 1941

TO: Tokyo (Gaiinudaijin) #056.

(1) Ships at anchor on the 22nd/23rd (?):

(Observations having been made from a distance, ship types could not be detmnined in
most cases.)

1. Port of Bremerton: - •< ■ ■!

1 battleship (Maryland type)

2 aircraft tenders (one ship completed and has letter "E" on its funnel) .

2. Portof ; " - ' • . -

1 destroyer

11 coast guard cutters

(Ships under jsspaeisr}!; , ^ ^ „

1 destroyer

11 (appear to be) minesweepers
4 eoast guiuKi )^g;3t»s

A- 126

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

>l^#«»d Point: ' • -

!^|»wly oonstmcted hangars

New constnu^tai IraAt m »ewl^ tmilt tmm^ fen^il^ #E Kl^UMon work on <M
faet^ buildingB. i. ■

Tram. 7-14-41

No. 223

FROM: San Francisco (Mute) June 5, 1941

TO: Washington "' ' ' • " ♦'♦'•'>••■ #022.

Action Tokyo as #092. (Abstract)

Report to Washington and Tokyo on announcement on the 4th by the Maritime Commission

1 into service for the Army and Navy (7 to Army, 21 to Navy), etc.

No. 224

WB^i '' Hollywood (Los AngeUs) June 2, 1941

TO: Washington f^^y ,

(Circulw)

Mes^e to Tokyo #83.

On the 20th, the Saratoga, and on the 24th, thv. Chester {?), Louisville, the 12th Destroyer
Squadron and Destroyers #364, 405, 411, 412, and 413 entered San Diego, and all of them

t^.«-tO-41

No. 225

FROM: Washington (NomurA) June 2, 1941

TO: Panama # 16.

Please find out if the aircraft carrier, Lexington, has paiesed through the canal recently
from the Pacific Ocean, , , .

Secret, v •■ . t,;i- , ~ ^ . >, - , 4 ,.; p«

Trans. 6-20-^41

No. 226

FROM: Panama (Izawa)
TOi Washii^tcm

Message to Tokyo # 48»
MovementB of Amencm warships as I have observed them:

The following shipa iwtt ieoBI ll» j^lo tlifi l^kfl^ #e

Canal;

1. bn May let, four destroyers (four Itonels, #100, large sizeH 0B-4iife;M, ft ^t^fS^
#436; on the night of the 4th one light, one heavy cruiser and five <iiK*tOj^^^J^^^ IS^CH]!^
not ascertained); on the 5th the army transport ship '"Republic".

2. Tbe teilowing ships were observed moving from the Atlantic into the Pacific:

On June 1st, a transport ship which appeared to be also a repair ship (two funnels, two
Blasts, extremely high sides and bridge, two turrets, directly behind the foremast there was

one — ^ one winch araidship and one on the st^n. On the afterdeek, there were three

scouting planes) . On the 5th, three naval special service ships.

Furthermore, at about o'clock on the 30th of May, while sailing along the Central

Amirfciit coast, itots iiat ^Ni^wt^ observed five sMp, Mp^sm^^^ iS^ismifmi.
moving off to the north.

3. On the 2nd, two naval special service ships came to anchor off the Balboa piers. These
were seen to come from the Atlantic. One of these is discharging anti-aircraft shells. At the
same anchorage, an army tranapwt ''John B. Uk^S^WMC' is uiUoadinK bomfeit .

Belayed to Washington.

^ans. 6-19-41

June 6, 1941

No. 227

FROM: Panama (Izawa) June 17, 1941

TO: Washington (Koshi)

(Parti of 2)

Action Tokyo as ?62,

The Italian Minister showed me many secret charts made by the Canal Zon^ Administra-
tion, showing tilg- tosiigliKtt^ pUil-uAl^ ^il^ military estsla^^l^ts in the
Canal Zone.

I glanced through them, and found them to btf esftiffitely detailed. Irt edA8i^eiteel^fe lSi«tcess
by which these charts were obtained, I feel that it would be absolutely impossible to obtain them
in the future. Accordingly, I approached the Italian Minister regarding them. It appears that
he bs& no objections to our making copies of them, provided that this is done in Tokyo, after we
have delivered them to the Italian Embassy there. However, as all ports here axe being v«ry
Kslosely watched, there is no other way of taking these charts out except by plane.

I wonder if it would not be possible to have some Japanese merchant in South America,
who is either returning to Japan, or is being transferred to some other country, take these
charts out; or to have one of our office^taff deliver them to a deso^uated |^ce? At present,
all the places where recent defense operattojift amtisA ^ S^^t^ed ^

these charts. This work ia esttnaated to tato M^C^^^wmA^^^Bish^

mm

The Italian Minister stated that if (handling) of this in Japan caused too much delay,

there is no other way than to take them by plane from to Washington (?). In this case,

he stated that would want to have it (fiQpk4 1) 9t (Washingtem IJ» Please send instructions
without fail.

Ttsm. 6-35-41

No. 228

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Miflistfef) June 23, 1941

TO: Mexico (Koshi) #106.

Regarding the plans for procuring maps of the Panama Canal and vicinity, please have
uareer attache, Kihara, make an c&cial trip fe? Panama. It might be well to have gecretarjr
Yoshimizu accompany him.

Have the maps tak^ out by plane, and then have Sato, the Naval attach^, bring them to
Tokyo with him when he returns.

Furthermore, since the Panama Legation, in their report #62° of 17 June from Panama to
roe, mentioned the question of a trip, get in touch with them regarding date and time of
arrival. (American surveillance will unquestionably be vigilant. There are also some
suspicions that they read some of our codes. Therefore, we wish to exercise the utmost
caution in accomplishing this missiitm. fd^^ams exchanged between you aad

Panama should be very short for security, or be in innocuslos irlaitt language.)

No. 229

FROM; Panama (IsKiwa)
TO: Tokyo

Prom Minister YAMAGATA.

Re message # 219 from Mejtieato tJie ii'oreign Minister".

There is also the matter of Minister MIURA's admonitions. When he inquired as to the
method of handling baggage upon arrival in Guatemala he was told that as a general rule only
ba^^'itiits^^ould be taken'l^^^M^^WBM^imm^ be examined upon depaateA^ The^-
fore, each person's hand baggage as well as suitcases containing diplomatic documents, at the

present time, cannot be taken out without being opened or going through customs.

, Our idea is that the Customs authorities should merely

place a seal on the suitcases without giving them a thorough examination. Then on departure
there would be no need to demand investigations of the contents of these bags and, of course,
each person's hand l^^e^i^^ikBi^^mll^

Relayed to Mexico^

June 26. iHl

#67. ■

A-129

No. 230

June 27, 1941
#230.

Be my # 219' igiilliBama's # 60" to the FWei^ MinistKC .

In the case of Minister Yamagata as well, with the exception of the "sealed" suitcase con-
taining diplomatic documents, they insisted that It was necessary to inspect his baggage as
usual. Only, as a matter of fact, at the time of departure, the inspection was not carried out.
On the other hand, in my case, in view of the fact that in Guatemala, a country to which I am
accredited, rights that ordinarily are recognized by international law were violated by an
aviation company with U.S. affiliations, and in view of the fact that this violation was tolerated
by the Guatemala government, I think this ought to be made the subject of appropriate steps
either in Washington or in Tokyo. It may be that independently of this a protest should be
presented to the Guatemala government, with demands for assurance that such a situation
will not arise a second time. If the said government, because of pressure from the U,S,i;^|^9^
refuse to comply, I think we should give serious consideration to further counter measures.

Please give me your opinions 1^1c#^ dispatch.

Your # 1 lO' was relayt^ This has been relayed to Washington.

Note: Above appears to be explanation for delay in taking out SECRET MAPS fiom Panama
by plane.

'Set 11, 231— Tokyo directs Mexico to transmit a former message to Washington; as it bears a relation to the post-
ponement of instructions pertaining to the proctuing and forwarding to Tokyo of charts of the Panama Canal and
Canal Zane.

Please transmit your message #210'' to Washington. The substance of that message, has a
relation to the postpweai^ait for awMle of the putting intoeffeetof my message # 106*.

'See n, 228. The Jap Foreign Minister wires the Jap Amb. at Mexico City, directing procedure to be followed for

procuring maps of the Panama Cana) and vicinity, and forwarding to Japan by Naval Attache Sato. IXt0&IMi^l&S&^
caution in carrying out this mission and in exchange of any telegrams between Mexico City and Panama,

°Not available.

No. 231

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Mexico

June 27, 1941
#110.

"Not available.

Trans. 6-30-41

'mm "MAGIC" s^c8c^(^i&}& ^ wmmL msmn

No. 232

FROM: Washington
TO: Mexico

July 1, 1941
#11081' '

Action Tokyo as #453.
Regeixdine^vw #317*.

On the 20th, I sent Iguiti to the office of the chief of the Far Eastern Section to protest the
unlawful treatment shown to Minister Miura by the officials of the Pan American Airways and
also to request that the company in question be instructed as to the proper method of handling
hand linage of our dipilinaal^^li^ill^'&Aa'eouriers hereafter.

However, since the acts committed concern the procedure of the aviation company alone in
its effort to assure the safety of Bight and to avoid the air accidents, it is questionable whether
we can rightfully make demands on the United States government on the grounds of diploma-
tic and consular prerogative. (Sometime ago when similar questions came up in the Philip-
pines, I understand that it was decided not to handle this question on the basis of diplomatic
and consular prerogatives).

I am inclined to believe that it should be considered more rightly as a question of courtesy.
Furthermore, if we are to claim diplomatic prerogative, based on international law, it would
be more proper, just as was stated in Minister Miura 's telegram, to make representations to the
Guatemala government. For this reason, in dealing with the State Pepartment, we avoided
bringing up the question of diplomatic prerogative.

The violsticHi of ow rights by the PX.E. (F.A^ ?) Co. is imju^ and the continued tc^ation of this by the U.S.

Re your #230".

Will you please file a written protest to the Guatemalan Government through its Ambassa-
dor in Mexico. I have already issued instructions to have a protest submitted to the State De-
par^ent (^the United Statti; B^Mi^^iJbwi^tl^iSel^^

"See U, 230. Mtrxic!i asks Tokyo to take steps to protest llit violation by an aviation company in Guatemala of
rights ordinarily recognized by international law. This message refers to a message pertaining to the procuring and
forwarding to Tokyo of charts ctf the Panama Canal and Cansl Zone.

Trans. 7-3-4X

No. 233

FROM: Tokyo
TO; Mexico

July 2, 1941

A~m

Xo,234

FROM: Panama (Izawa) June 21, 1941

fO: Tci^e.i No. number.

Thie^ Legation is now old and insecure, so we have discovered a suitable furnished house to
let with three stories and an extensive garden. The third floor consists of three bedrooms and a
wide verandah; the second has a dining room, guest rooms, and porches in various places,
while the first floor is chiefly a storeroom and a gymnasium. It is probably capable of accom-
modating two hundred people at a reception. I believe we can obtain a two year lease at $400
on it beginning July 15th. Since there is a scarcity here of rentable houses and since we have an
option on it only until the 25th, please answer immediately, and in the meantime I shall pu|
in an application.

Trans. 7-2-41

\o. 235

FROM: Panama (kawa) June 26, 1941

fiOte;- - -.1^. # 1. '

Due td^^^^dden change in the international situation, our mission here will probably

given up. This is for your it^^jgtaUon.
Relay to Buenos Aires.

Trans. 9-20-41

Ko.236

FROM: Tokyo July 4, 1941

TO: I^«»a J(0iitti»l>er,

To Coas«a'4lef^iA¥.ft^^T^.

I would like to have you remain in Panama for awhile and work on our flanking policy as a
consultant to IZAWA. As to your trip to Chile suggested in my ^47" there is no objection to
your visiting that country on your way to your piost, and to your giving up your trip to Columbia.

No. 237

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 4, 1941

TO: Panama ##«

Please transmit this to Minister YAMAGATA,

You are ordered to Chile as of the 4th.

Trans. 7-23-41

A-m

No. 238

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 10> 1^41

^|fe:Mini8ter Y AMAGAT A.

Your credentials and Minister SHIOZAKI's release will be issued in two or three days. As it
will be impossible to deliver them before your arrival, a translation is being sent immediately
by telegraph. Please accept this, as its presentation in lieu of credentials has already been
discussed with the Chilean Gowniment.

^0.239

FROM: Mexico (Miura) JulyS,
TO: Los Alleles * 10-

The Diet party inspecting Central and South America is scheduled to leave Los Angeles oa
the Panama plane. Please let me know by telegraph if arrangements for seat reservations have
Ibeen made.

Trans. 7-20-41

FROM: Buenos Aires (ISmH

TO: Mexico City #203.
To Secretary USUI.

As Minister YAMAGATA has been relieved, they are very busy at that office. Therefore,
please go to your new post by air. Please acknowledge this by return telegram.

Traas. 7-23-41

No. 241

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) July 12, 1941

TO: Panama #3.

If Minister YAMAGATA and party are still at Panama, please convey the -MlewnE^te itttem.
If they have already left, please transmit it to their forwarding office.

1. To Minister YAMAGATA, I have received reports that your tour to Central and South
America has been given up. Please let me know if tM» it t*«e, is it fias a beariihf m.
preparations.

2. To Secretary USUI, If the tour of Central and South America has been given up, ple«8t
return immediately to yo«if ftiition by air and let rae know by telegra,^'B^B.:jttU will arrive.

Trans. 8-S-41

No. 242

FROM: PsM99liS8e(Izawa) August 4, 1941

(Message to Tokyo # 110)

According to intelligence emanating from a close relative of the President, it is understood
that in the last cabinet meeting he stated that in the event of American participation he
could see no course but for participation on the part of his country in keeping with the terms of
agreement. Until such time, however, he continued, the current neutral stand will be main-
tfiined and the com^tiy ^iU ^tvoid ti^iog ^^pciiminating measures against helU^ren^ coun-
l^es as well.

Relayed to Washington,

No. 243

FROM: Havana (Nanjo) August 2, 1941

TO: Tokyo

(Strictly secret)

Between the 16th and the 24th of July, the following American warships were anchored in
the naval harbor of Guatanamo:

2 battleships; 4 light cruisers; 4 destioyers; 2 Coast Guard cutters; 2{long vm$K.%J^^-
bombing planes.

Trans. 10-13-41

No. 244

FROM: Manila (Nihro) June 2, 1941

TO; Tokyo #315.

Concerning the cargo ship referred to in the last part of my secret letter # 467°, we have in
the meantime had no reports; however, one of my spies informs me that facts concerning
the ship in question are very vague. However, the transport "Washington", after docking here
on May 8th, went immediately to the port of Olongapo and disembarked troops of an
uncert ain number who are ostensibly to keep watch over Subic Bay*.

The eight destroyers and four submarines anchored here left port on the 2nd.

"Not available.

Trans, 6-6^

A-134

No. 245

FROM: Manila (Nihro) June 7, 1941

TO; Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #326 (?).

Ships in port m the Itk:
(1) MANE.A:
TON

MATTO ' i^'

BUKKU
8 destroyers
PASU

14 Submazines

BECK

HON

i target towing ships

Transport Henderson left the 5th, destination uncertain.
(2) CAVITEi

None,

The REI left port, date and destination uncertain.

Trans. 6-12-41

N o. 246

FROM: Manila (Nihro) '* ' ' ' ' June 13, 1941

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #335.

Be my #326* .

^ It has been ascertained that the two supply ships were mine layers.

On the 9tjt(, two niore ships of the $ame cla#s entered T^k^ were both <3iktxi IroRi
America.

On the nth, an dht, TURITEI, entefied pf>rt.

.6-17-41

No- 247

FROM: Tokyo ^ June 21, 1941

TO: China Net ' Chcular # 1289,

Action Manila as #176.

According to a Tokyo Nichi-Nichi dispatch from your place on the 17th, an officer of the
American aviation force, a Major KONROO, together with 10 othets, arrived there by clipper

A-135

on the 16th, and left the following day for Chungking via Hongkong. Please wire as to the
actual circumstances.

No.248

FROM; Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 1, 1941

TO: Manila (Riyoji) #191.

According to a reliable source of information the United States Navy in your territory is
desirous of requisitioning half of the American Consulate office space in the Tourist Bureau
Building until September 1st, for vigilance and anti -espionage work.

The above may be a part of the plan to establish a special service organ for the British-
American- Chinese military liaison chain. Therefore, please verify the above report and watch
the conduct of the Na%'y personnel and reply information.

As the sQuree of this information is strictly secret, please esercise caution in making
investigations.

Trans. 7-5-41

No. 249

PROM: Manila (Nihro) June 28, 1^41

TO: Washington #51.

At present, not only are there a great many questions pending, but there are also numerous
persons who, for the sake of convenience, entered the country as temporary tourists, and
whose period of sojourn in the country is about up. Since I think their representations, as in-
dicated in my caption message, are probably not more than a matter of mere formality, I
would like to have you bear in mind, in addition to this, the considerations for an immediate
settlement of this matter now. Please wire results. I have transmitted this to the Minister.

'Not avaiUbte.

N«. 250

FROM: Davao Ji4^l8il941,
TO; Wm #88.

Secondary intelligence.

According to a spy, it 'S^ta^, in view «f tfei nspM tmsibwsf «f Americans having charge of
stevedores who are being used in customs duty, as well as by us here for observation of
American submarines entering port, that investigation and collection of intelligence
f^srding Japanese vessels and Japanese personSf'tt' S^i^aflii'^ being carried out by

A-136

THE "MAG,IC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HASBOE

British and American authorities — — ™ ■

On the whole, it seems that this is being done through the British Honorary Consul BROWN
(Ker Company). This man is understood to pass information along to the M— gda Hongkong
continually.

■ Passed by cipher letter to Manila.

Trans. 10-11-41

FROM: Manila July 11, 1941

TO: Tokyo #399.

Re your Circular # 1408°.

According to », check up at the Immigration Bureau, there were 1013 (some of whom are
reentry) Chinese immigrants who arrived during the month df ^ne. This is a tremendwis
increase over the past monthly average of 250 persons. The greater portion of the above
immigrants appear to have been summoned by those already residing here and they do not
appear to be contract laborers, referred to in your message. H am ehecWng up on the Mx,
age, etc., of these summoned immigrants.)

According to our informer, these immigrants have nothing to do with military construction
projects and their migratlfflft is thought tt> Ite im me iwif^ in €Hm. However, 1 will
make further invest^ation.

'Not available^

No. 252

FROM: Tokyo July 5, 1941

TO: Manila #203.

Re my message # 160".

In view of the changed conditions after that message, please wire your opinion regarding
sending Negishi to look into the present tenant farm conditions.

'Not available.

Trans. 7-14-41

No. 253

FROM: Manila July?, 1941

RejflQur #203".

It is qtire¥ Wm linii v^iir $i^^t conditions it is exceedingly difficult to conduct cultui^
propaganda. Wmmsc^ «tt8a^'ie^^

A-137

this area. We would like to have him make ccmtacts with various iwrscms in the^i^>^3dfl

individual, and through such contacts engage in gathering intelligence.

(The Japanese people of this area have become very fearful of being looked upon with
susptctmi^ eyes by U.S> 6ffidak ^ US», Baar this teason, they become very «vasive and
defensive when I or any of my staff try to get in touch with them. You are aware of this stdte
of atfairs and of the consequent difficulty we are encountering in collecting intelligence data^.)

At the same time, we would like to have Negishi do some solid gloURd Worit {br the Ofieiti^
of the Cultural Hall which, according to plans, is to take place shortly.

For the above reasons, will you please send him here as previously planned.

It is an absolute certainty that upon his arrival in Manila, he will be bombarded with
questions concerning the international situation as seen from Japanese standpoint as
well as on various domestic issues. Please, therefore, have hira well versed on all the answers
bdbre he iieppj^jN«|i Jf dpan.

Trans. 7-14r41

No. 254

FROM: Manila July 12, 1941

TO: Tokyo #401.

BARYOTTO" and JOSE LEIDO have both come to this office reqtiestiltg financial assistance
for the purpose of running in the general election for the districts of Aatwn' and Mtedoio
respectively. In addition, OPUSU", whom we are now using in our schemes within the
Assembly, too, has come to us asking that we (contribute toward?) the campaign fund of his
followers. With regwiA W |he possibilities of their nsmiiifttaeQ as csjididates to the offices held
by retiring members of the Assembly, we are continuing our secret investigations in regard
to these three men, but since there is also the matter ol our replying to their requests, after
you have perused this, I would like fo tli^ve;^^' wilse i^ to'to^ own personal information
^vhether it is possible for us to make those a^e^Stinments.

1. The necessary amount of OPUSU'a Usris 15,000 yen, BARYOTTO and LEIDO together
require 25,000 yen, making a grand total of 40,000 yen. This disbursement should be made
by the end of July when the Nationalist Party is scheduled to open its Convention here for
the purpose of deciding its candidates. Therefore, 1 would like to have you let me know by
then what the possibilities are.

2. With regard to the request made by OPIJSU, 1 would like to have you comply with it
from the point of view of increasing his party adiliationa and establishing his influence in the
Assembly.

3. Now, BARYOTTO, as you know, is an intimate friend of PAREDESU" who is the publisher
of a Sulu native-language newspaper which we subsidize and which professes Pan-
Asiaism (the papet al3ri^tg|^'-<sa|^)rated by some of the up>&dlet^ ^ Pan-Asiaism),
Thaufh he ran for Governor last year, he failed to be elected. It seems that P.^^^&§U
privately promised to do his best in order to help him win the election.

LEIDO now holds the office of the Chief of the Income Tax Bureau in the Treasure Depart-
ment. ARASU", former Secretary of the Treasury, and RUNK", a f<^jn£r. member of the
Assembly from the district of Mindoro, strongly support him.

TH3S "MAGJC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Though there is a po^ibility of these two men being elected, because of the confused
situation within the local convention, it is extremely hard to predict whether their chances
.■sS ginning the election are good or bad. However, both of these men are simple fellows and
lite said to be m«n of dependable character.

4. No direct aid has been requested by RAWURERU", our legal advisor, who is running
as a candidate from BATANGASU" {he is the son of RAWURERU, Judge of the Supreme
Court); by MAGARONA", at present member of the Assembly and Chairman of the Labor
Immigration Commission — a man connected with this office; and by BAMENTA", now a
member of the Assembly. Should events necessitate, I believe we should assist them at this
6me. We are continuing our private inv^tigation with regard to the above-mentioned
BARYOTTO and LEIDO's supporters. Now, should we feel that their chances of nomination
as candidates are slim, then I think that it would be appropriate for us to delay aid at such
a time. Therefore, please arrange to transfer the mms of mon^ requested above before
that time.

Trans. 8-13-41

No. 256

FROM: Manila (Nikro) July 10, 1941

TO: Tokyo #396.

1. The United States ship, American Leader (10,000 ton class) entered port today and
unloaded what appeared to be ten some odd coast guns (length about 18 feet), also ten some
odd gun platforms of what appeared to be such and twenty some QNftd!l||^£''t9^kti

% The Trinity (?) left port yesterday; destination unknown.

Trans. (Not dated)

No. 257

FROM: Manila July 11, 1941

TO: Tokyo #398.

The requisitioned ship, I»re8idenfe Taft, arrived in harbor 10th, with from 800 to

1000 soldiers on board for the Philippines. All vessels in port |)«t l!0 «ea far ftfecHlt three weeks
on the 17th, it is rumored. This will be investigated further.

Trans. 7-18-41

A-139

No. 258

FROM: Manila (Nihro) August 2, 1941

TQi Toky© #474.

1. Anchored warships— Dfionomi".

2. There is (are) anchored Danish ship(s) garbled after loading at Webu°

(Ebu ?) will leave for America. In addition two ships touched port on the 1st and 2nd from
Orongabo".

3. Harrison and C^i%e entered port on the 31st and Ist respectively.

Trans, 8-5-41

No. 259

FROM: Manila (Nihro) July 25, 1941

TO: t^im

The United States is making a concentrated effort to strengthen Philippine defenses.
There are at present 460 planes, and about 1300 pilots. Army force numbers 10,000 and an
effort is being made to increase this number. The Philippine Army numbers about 130,000
including those on active duty, reserve and the gendaraii^4t. In an emergency, about
100^000 men could be turned over to U.S. officers to command, it is estimated by the bureau
cwceined.

Trans. 8-1-41

No. 260

FROM: Manila July 31, 1941

TO: Tokyo ff465.

There are differences between my telegram ff4?8 (?), paragraph (2), and my report ?75 on
the number of Philippine Army aeroplanes to be included in the American Army.

However, the first figures were taken from a newspaper without further verification. At pre-
set we are making investigations relative to the number of aeroplanes and aviation officers
and men.

A- 140

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND QF,P|^ HARBOR

No. 261

FROM: Manila (Nihro) August 2, 1941

TO: Tokyo *476.

In observing planes on practice flights, I notice that the color of military and naval planes
has not been changed and that they are not caraouflaged. However, I have heard that among
the naval planes there are those which have been observed to be painted a light green. Though
I am making additional secret invest ijiations, that is all for the time being.

Furthermore, in recent times, the number of planes flying above the city has decreased
considerably.

'Nctavtiiltible.

mim. usnimmnfo) August 4, mi

TO: Tokyo #480.
InW%ence of primary order.

1. Two destroyers sailed on the fourth. All the war ships at anchor have sailed. There are,
however, several small destroyers in the neighborhood of Corregidor'. (This was observed by
theear^wsof the Koden Maru and the Kaischu Maru.)

2. About six-hundred American soldiers have arrived in Maijila on the Coolidge. (This was
learned from the crew of the Coolidge.)

'An island in Cavite Province at th« #ntran(se of Manila Bay.

FROM: Manila (Nihro) July 15, 1941

TO: Tokyo #407.

On the morning of the 13th, the master electric dynamo was struck by lightning and put cmt
of commission, and electricity is being supplied by an auxiliary system, however, consuttip-
tion of electricity is to be curtailed in every way, it was announced in the newspapers. Repairs
will take about three weeks. This is having a grave effect in the U.S. Navy and military prepa-
rations at Cavite.

• • " • Trans. 7-23-41

A-141

No. 264

FROM: Manila (Nihro) July 25, 1941

#422.

Veiy Seoet. FtHr Official Code Handling.

As there is serious likelihood of orders being enforced fait freezing of assets and for strict in-
vest igat ion of all funds connected with foreigners, we have decided to keep the larger part of
this othce's funds in cash, but when this is used up it will be dif&cult to secure remittances of
secret funds for this office, and if the situation becomes serious, th&« is danger that much
trouhle may be incurred. Therefore, after conferring with branch manager Yamamoto of the
Specie Bank, we have decided to be ready against such time by some such arrangement as
described in the last part of his message to the Specie Bank. Please have this in mind and do
your best to secure their consent to this. The amount involved, unless some very special emer-
gency should arise, will be as heretofore, and of course we will use it only within the limits of
approval received &em 0$ WmiifP^ Office and we will take the responsibility ^ its In
this office.

TVans. 7-29-41

No. 265

FROM: Manila July 26. 1941

TO: Tokyo #438.

(Bequest Message)

J Wm> MA3;gyjiAW4 1« ^^^m4m^rli^ taSssii>Mtsmh of the ISHIWARA Produce Com-
pany:

Money frozen this morning. For time being stop all remittance. Cannot hope to contiiiue
business as before, but can only take necessary measures to preserve existence of firm until
things get better. Think it best policy to endeavor to bring about elasticity in quota system.
Bedm Wsm C^ed and w^tmt'^obnter policy.

Trans. 7-3i-41

FROM: ManUa August 2, 1941

TO: Tokyo #477.

55 from this office to the Amb^gsftdot mthe United States.

Re your # 203".

— - mu

The High Commissioner here has advised me that Washington would grant permits and if
this is done it will be Very fortunate as you well know. With regard to this matter, we would be
able to keep Davao advised of details which we hjl,i^ i^ected.

1. As you know, the secret funds used here are relatively high because of the status of the
office. Consequently; in fidci^n to paying monthly allowances to members of the staff we ap-
f«^^l entertaimneat ttUsw^ocm t» l^mm m ^MgMted pU^Egeitj^ ^

These monies, after they have 'heen. received at this office, ^ire impiediately handed over to
the members of the staff; Should you ha^'tt6*iSbjeetioii, we wfl^'dlifce to have you arrange so
that essential secret funds other than for purposes mentioned above can be utilized by us.

2. Sul^idy monies for conferences we would like to apportion as heretofore providing you
have no objections. (It is our intention to apportion hospital subsidy funds as well as monies
for the use of companies in outlying actions.)

the above mentioned two points doubtless will prove of interest to other oflices in the United
States, Please 6«nd me youii^ly. • •

Some of the reactions and measures taken in this area in conneetion with the French bido-
China affair are described below:

1. For some time past, the people in this area have been convinced that Japan has had her
hands full with the China affair. Moreover, it was popularly believed that s'lili^ence of opin-
ion arose in Japan itself following the outbreak of the German-Soviet war. Fnr these reasons it
was firmly believed here that Japan would make no southward move which would risk the
necessity of a military e^paign.

When our final note regarding French Indo-China was published and when subsequently
our forces showed signs of actually moving into French Indo-China, the people here were caught
more or less flat-footed and there were indications of some confusion.

2, In view of the locale, considerable attention was centered on the attitude the United
States would take regarding our move. With the issuance of Welles' statement of the 24th, and
tbe t*t«sident's speech tif the it ¥m }t«ipmed litsit the UniteiS: 'ge^ U Wse
strong retaliatory actions against Japan.

Particular attention was paid to that part of the President's speech which promised that
iM^ttUdMr^ action against wQuy be taken within tw^ijti^fiittr ^temiSt ami ala^ tc> WjeOii^
statement that developments in French Indo-China Will lia^^portant bearings on the fate
of the entire Pacific including the Philippine Islands.

As soon as the order freezing our assets was announced, it was predicted here that that
only the first retaliatory step. It was further predicted that under certain circumstances an
export embargo will be placed on shipments of oil and other war materials to Japan from the
United States. (In his aptM^b, the President stated that the reason no export embargo had
been placed on oil shipments to Japan was because he took Japanese reaction over such a step
into consideration. Men here refer to this part of the speech and point out that the ft«si(Jent
put all of it in the ^ast tenste, and £fe^. indirectly the President suggests a diSierent future
policy.)

Other probable steps, they claim, are the seizure of Japanese v^isels. (This was rumored in
tbeCuatiKas circles^, and the i!liHi^^4li|NI»^<:0nmila^ in t|tt

'See 11,252.

Trans. (Not dated)

No. 267

FROM: Manila
TO; Takyft

July 27, 1941

A-i.43

II

3. With regard to the recent agreement with French Indo- China, it is locally claimed that it
was only as the result of application of pressure by Japan that it was agreed upon. Thus, the
lack of resistance on the part of France was strongly censured.

There are indications that the local people are considerably confused by various and varying
«tefK»t,-Wieh as reports ttf^ifee^itteet that as a consequence of this ap«ement, the Japanese have
■detained military bases; that Japanese vessels regularly coming to this area have been requi-
sitioned or will cancel this service; that Japan is mobilizing at home on a gigantic scale; that
foreigners may no longer travel, etc.

These l^v^ilvso eonfu»g^ w#h^^|yia^ «B^^^

here.

Trans. 7-30-41

No. 268

FROM; Honolulu (Kita) June 13, 1941

TO: Tokyo {Gaimudaijin) #099.

The I^denl i^»e»i1sB^m jri^tvi@&|^lll^4H9i;^ pil^ and saHfl^&f the

Philippines on the 12th.

Trans. 6-;9'4Jt

No. 269

FROM: Honolulu (Kita) ' June 14, 1941

TO: Tokyo #100.

On the 11th, (?) two English converted cruisers entered Pearl Harbor and are at present
undergoing repairs at the old (?) dry docks.

.'%|MHjl4rfi"30-41

No. 270 ' * ■ ' '

FROM; Honolulu (Kita) June 16, 1941

■ Wh.- Tokyo - #101. -

Re my message ?f 100".

Upon inquiry, |;lefti»d[i'lb»fi it WAftfit^ Mm^tl^iaiia^iMt il^ft 'ImSt^f^Itt^ '^H^ INWL
light cruiser.

This message has been transmitted the same as the caption message.

'See U. 269.

1iBia»ifesf2|-^41

A- 144

TifE '■'m.^^^M^mQi^m op mmL mmm

No. 271

FROM: Manila July 19, 1941

TO: Tokyo «4tf,

(EeiiabilityA),

1. Four destroyers left port on the IStJi. Six submarines (type 140) entered port on the same
day.

2. Ships in port an the 19th;

(A) Manila:
BUKKU

6 submarines

(B) Cavite:
RET

(ReliabiHtyB). '"" " " ^

(C) We have heard that there is a British Hght cruiser lying at anchor in Cavite (see my
# 415°) witbfe^*3h9tes in the side-J^t.h|t gji^jy^^^^t^.J^^ repaired.

■• - i . » ',■ 1- ,ii . 1,1

Trans. 7-23-41

».

A-145

PART C— JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC Al^lfrnE*? THROUGHOUT THE WOKUS

So. 272

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
"tO; Berlin (Koshi)

May 15, 1941
#093.

Aetiott Tokyo as # 311.

Opinion is divided in ^vernment circles regarding the problem of cohvoys and that is the

reason that President Roosevelt has maintained silence concerning it. It appears that on the
13th he interviewed King, the Commander of the Atlantic Fleet, and on the 14th, Forrestal,
Undersecretary of the Navy recently retujfned from an investigation tour of Britain, and got
their opinions on the matter. However, Roosevelt himself wishes to avoid the danger of warfare
in the Atlantic with Germany and therefore hesitates to put convoys into use. He would rather
lend part of the destroyer flotilla to Great Britain and let her do her own convoying. However,
Secretary Knox in particular and the Navy Department in general are opposed to lending U.S.
ships to Britain and thus weakening their own naval strength. For one thing they are thinking
^i^fMf^se relatitmship and if worst comes to worst and England goes down then the United
Sfatfis would have to face Germany with a weakened fleet,

0ft the 15th the New York Times, under the caption "Let's have a showdown with Germany ",
sl^v^vitig-1^d'%ilf«8 of the shipping losses of England for several days, said that if the Uilited
'States would provide England with 200 long range bombers, they would have the same effect
is a "patrol" and would serve to hold the activity of the submarines in check. This summar-
izes the opinion in U.S. government circles^t^tb^ iBl»tJmi$e^lg|i3&«^

For your information.

Belayed to Germany and England.

3li^sage to Tokyo as

1. The Italian method of handling Roosevelt's speech is as I have told you in my #330°, but
the local American correspondents here are warning the Italian people against the tendency of
considering this speech as the handwriting on the wall. In addition, it is understood that they
are propagandizing the statement that the deelArKtion of an unluaitid ^DS^nal emergency is
not just another way of saying full mobilization.

2. Furthermore, in view of the fact that Roosevelt in this speech stated that, should the
Azores and the Cape Verde islands fall into the hands of Germany, the freedom of the Atlantic
and the safety of the United States would be directly threatened, there are many here who say
that this is a manifestation of America's aspirations for the occupation of these islands.

Trans. 5-20-41

No. 273

FROM: Rome

May 30, 1941

'Not available.

Trans. 6-3-41

A-146

Ni

0. 274

FROM: Shanghai
TO: Tokyo

May 30, 1941
#882.

According to AK, Chungking is disappointed in President ROOSEVELT'S fireside chat

because it did not refer to Japanese-American relations. (U.P. reports that on the 29th

also referred to this point, stating that this encouraged Japan's ambition and that even when
viewed from the standpoint of military strategy the United States could better win absolute
victory if she would first settle her war in the Pacific). The chat was especially disappointing
because it gave the impression that China's political set-up was an anti-Nazi defense line,
whereas in fact Chungking wished to preserve the German-Chinese Cultural Association
organized by SHUKAKA" as an instrument through which to negotiate with Germany in case
Germany win^. ChW^iag avoided any ref^l&nce to thi^ oir^^ijistion and had its Foreign
iiliTiister WA^' iiitte i imere perfunctcv^ statement (please "M^f ta "Sif a^de l^rbtw

t^s, as an oriental nation she has kept silent.

On the other hand the Chinese Communist Party regard that the fireside chat was a blow to
those Chinese who have been expecting aid from the United States and that it had a beneficial
influence on the investigation now being carried on for the adjustment of Chinese- Russian
relations and consequently for the adjustm^t of the relation between the Nationalist Party
and the Communist Party. The CommuHist fsrty also is of the o|)inion that the United States
purposely avoided reference to her attitude towards Japan at this time when she is pressed
with the necessity of making that clear and also making her attitude in regard to China-Japan
incident equally clear, and tkat th« VvSt^ Stateid ^'Icdlbwilig tik6 p^ey <^ sounding dat tkti
JlfiSSibility of peace with Chungking on the one hand and on the other hand preparing for coop-
erations between her and China, at the same time endeavoring to estimate the actual fighting
strength of the Chungking regime''.

On the 28th, SINKA NIPPO'' expressed the view that the fact that no reference was made to
United States-Japanese relations and no criticism was made of Japan is indicative of the
United States' intention of stressing the war In the Atlantic and paying little attention to
developments in the Pacific. This paper, furthermore, referred to a Renter dispatch expiefistng
disapproval of labor strifes in the United States and of suppression of ilie peoples' rights.

Relayed to Peking, Tientsin, Nanking, Hankow and Hongkoni/

•CHU CHIU-HUA— Member of the Central Executive Yuan; ako formerly the Head of the Educational Depart-
'Not available.

'Sentence as ttaosleted (DodcfMf^iilit))^
*A Chinese twfw«|^.

TO: Washington
Message to Tokyo # 93.

The fact that in his Fireside Chat, ROOSEVELT referred to the Azores, gave Portugal a severe
shock. The Brastilian Ambassador told me that in case England and the United States win the

Trans. 6-4-41

FROM: Lisbon

June 4, 1941

Hnal victory the domineering manner of the United States will be much more difficult to en-
dure than that of Germany and that henceforward the position of the extreme pro-British and
pro- American wing will weaken and a strong anti -American sentiment will sweep the country.
From the 28th to the 31st hostile editrafelft afipeared in the newspapers, but since then no
comment has appeared. 1 have received a report to the effect that condemnation of the speech
which was to hava been published in the Government organ on the 1st has been withheld. I got
i«i i6MW^«i«^Kj^.^3«t^^C[^ssy Co find out what had happened in the meantime and the
German Embassy informed me that on the evening of the 31st a special envoy arrived in Lisbon
by plane bearing a message from Secretary HULL to the effect that the United States does not
stew ihteiul to occu{fy)«£l^v;Azores. The German Embassy said they got that information from
two places in their communications net. On the 2nd, an official, second in attendance on the
Premier, confidentially told me that within the Government there is a mounting cry for the
Premier to make a tour ^i3^i4(3j#?f|i5«y, I® ^reclaim sovereignty 1^f«^t«!#-1^i'«^P!«se
and to the outaide worlds

Ttans. 6-14-41

PROM: Lisbon (Chiba)
TO: Tokyo

(Intelligence report).

On the 14th the President's son, Captain ROOSEVELT, stopped here on his return to the
United States. The censorship authorities of this country, being anti-American, the news-
papers were not permitted to publish this as front page news. The local ffl>v,ernme)5t also main-
tained an indifferent attitude toward him and there is no evideiwW'liiiirllt'^^'^dmed by any
of the higher-ups.

Relayed to Ws^infto» and Berlin*

Trans. 6-28-41

.No. 277

FROM: Lisbon (Chiba)

(Report of Primaiy Importance).
Se message « 63° from our Ambassador in Madrid to Your Excellency.

It has been discovered that a group of anti-SAI^AZAR* plotters in Mozambique' recently
proposed to the Portuguese Government that in case England and the United States take over
the Azores, they will assist the Portuguese Government in }tl@il^l&l^tyt^ <MI (tf

involved will soon be taken to Lisbon under guard.

In the lace of this situation, the loyalty of the people of this country has apparently vacillated
to a certain extent so that the gov^nment news organ published an editorial now when the
GQuntrjf is in such dire straits, and warmag them against plattij^ and subversive activitias.

June 20, 1941

June 20, 1941

THE "MAGIC" PACi^GBOIUNP OF PEARL HAi^ag

■lO any case, it does not appear that the present government is in any great dangaf.

available.
^Premier of Portugal.
'Portuguese colony in S.E. Africa.

Trans. 6-26-41

mm

FROM: Honolulu (Kita) June 6, 1941

TO: Tokyo ^92.

, :iM^?^^ to San FVaa^eii^ # ISjk

On the night of the 5th, a local broadcast reported that the Tatsuta Maru, which left San
l^ncisco on the 2nd {?) took on one or two Germans of very dubious character. The ship's
'^ptain, on the as9illi^f£$^ 41^,4 'ti^^. would be no British warships in the vicinity of San
Bsncisco, permitted these men to board his ship* This is for your infofination.

Trans. 6-19-41

No. 279

FROM: Honolulu (Kita) June 9, 1941

T<%0. #096.

A German named Mehner Toklaus, 35 years old, resident here, has rraerved a room on the
Tatf l^a Mara .sailing from here on the 10th. He has been an instructor of history at the Uni-
VS^Qp ST Hawaii for the past four years but has resigned recently. He says that Ambassador
Ott is cognizant of his resignation and of his trip to Japan. The matter of his embarlcation, etc.

should be handled by the ship's authorities in accordant; with telegram # 246" of last

year from your Minister to San Francisco.

'Not available.

Trans. 6-30-41

So. WO

iteOM: Washington June 13, 1941

TO: Tokyo #395.

Bishop Walsh" sailed from San Francisco, May 5th, aboard the Tatsuta Maru. He is well
known to Matsuoka and is continually working for Japanese-American diplomatic friendship.
He is travelling to the Orient. Please extend every courtesy.

'James E. Walsh, Superior General, Catholic Foreign Miasionary Society in America, headquarters Mary Knoll
MissicHi^ N. Y.

A-149

FROM: Tokyo June 7, 1941

TO: Beriiii #487.

HegBfdingyour #635°.

During your conversation with Hitler and Ribbentrop, the other day, what impression did
you get as to the German government's opinion regarding the probable date of the United
States' entry into the war? Please reply at once.

'Ambassador in Berlin re|Kirt« cdnvetsationt with Hitler and FUbbentrop aa S and 4 June. 1Se« SiCtioo C, JaiMt-

FROM: Berlin June 7, 1941

TO: Tokyo #655.

Ribbentrop believes that so l^ng as member nations of the Tripartite Pact maintain a firm
attitude, the United States wti hesitate to eiiter into the war, and the war can be brought to
an end in the meantime.

He is convinced of this even in the face of the threateninji G«man- Russian war, as already
reported in Paragraph 1 of my message # 64?*,

'^asibiltty of a Soviet- German war was reported in Paragraph 1 of Berlin's # 638.

No. 283

FROM: Vichy {Sato} June 16, 1941

TO: Tokyo #309.

Part 2 of 2°.

3. Without a searching inquiry, it would be difBcult for me to say whether or not a German
invasion of the British Isles is imminent, but since the beginning of this m(mth the activity
of submarines in the Atlantic has been waxing fiercer and fiercer. The North Sea is so beset
with mines and the danger of bombing is so great that already any activities on the part of the
British fleet in that area are impossible. I believe that Germany is ready to make a c^wider-
able sacrifice, and if she can get a foothold in part of England, say on the Thames, the British
army could not withstand the onslaught. Great Britain, I think is continuing to repeat hw
recent series of errors, for I doubt if the United States will enter the war. It appears that she is
already taking her maximum measures. It is probably true that she is keeping England going,
and the fact that the war still continues is probably due to the United States alone, but even if
she does-'l^t, all she can po^ibl3( #ll^10«.4ft#^@ti# longer^ I knowtbattNefr

A~150

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

are various tepo^ Wl^m^mm ^ ^hm ^ihm»-m^ the Ututtid

States will fi^t.

'Pati one. mt available.

Trans- 6-1S-41

No. 284

FROM: Havana ■ June 16, 1941

TO: Tokyo #27.

To be kept secret within the department. Intelligence of primary importance,

A certain peraon close to the Ptesident, and a newspaper correspondent told me that early
last month INDALECION PRIETO" had a secret conference with President BATISTA and said
that if either the United States or Spain enters the war, the United States will cease to recognize
the niANCO regime, and will recognize at once the former Red regime. At that same time,
it seems that Cuba likewise will be asked to do the same, and to effect the return of the Spanish
ambassador and consuls. This interview was held at the instigation of the American officials.
It seems that the United States plans to coerce the Western Hemisphere as a whole' to take
prarallet action.

No. m

^83Q(ff mum July 2 1,1041.

TO: Tokyo #478.

A€Cording to secret information received from Vatican circules, TITTOMAN, the Papal
representative in the United States," on the 16th reported to the Papal authorities, that the
United States Government, on the basis of information received from the U.S. Embassy in
Japan, is of the opinion that there is increased likelihood of an agreement being reached soon
between Japan and the United States, and that when the United States enters the European
war, Japan can be prevented from interfering. The said agreement would include a decisive
settlement of the Japan- China incident, providing that if the Chiang regime does not accept
the conditions submitted by the United States, American aid will no longer be received.
Great Britain mm\d also participate in an adjustment of all problems involving the South Seas,
the Pacific Ocean, and the Far East. Japan's desires for a victorious settlement of the incident
would be satisfied in a peaceful and advantageous manner, and thus any reason for Japari*s
i^ftlriference by force would cease to exist. It seems to have been suggested that if as a last
#Kt influ?»«e # the Vatican is found neceasaiy in tlus matter, their mediation will be
sought.

'RtHaaa was an American representative in Bfaa6^

mm

FROM: Washington iN^tttsI June 10. 1941

TO; Tokyo ,.^389,

Be your #279°.

On the 10th, IGUCHi' called on the Far Eastern Section Chief HAMILTON and spoke to him
concerning the harsh treatment given to Lt. Commander OKADA by the police. He said that
there was a great discrepancy between that and the treatment being accorded United States
Naval language otficers in Japan; that not only the Japanese Navy especially was displeased
over the successive occurrences of incidents related to it, such as the OKADA incident, the
TACSH^iyi^ incident and the TAIEI MARU incident, but also that this incident being likely
to arouse Japanese public opinion considerably is a bad thing when regarded from the stand-
point of Japanese-American relations. For this reason, he would like to gel an expanation of
t|tK'3E^I«r from the State J3^«elB»csM:'tia«$^teiil^sl«^^>^^
occurrences in the future.

I understand that HAMILTON replied to the etfect that, since he was not infeamed OH this
mattei^ l)« wmikl>ftc!^^«tLftd^^
reply.

It seems to me that there is ground for suspecting that this incident was made use of by such
<a^aiiizations as the F.B.I, and the Dies Committee for finding a pretext whereby witnesses
may be tbund so that they could interfere with Japanese propaganda policy just as these orga-
nizstiotis feave done with Germany and Italy. Inasmuch as this is likely to spread to other per-
:«»pa*^ ||UMS^tel)rf^ it would be w«ll for us to take every precaution.

"In which the Japanese Government complains of the mistreatment accorded Lt, Cijwoitpd*!* iJ]KAfl*, whd was
af rested k>r speedins and requests an explanation froaitheStW'^De^rtinlrtlt. Siftfel^.fSli
'Japanese Embassy Counselor in Washington.

mm

FROM; Tokyo June 9, 1941

TO: Washington *279'

Refer to Los Angeles* * 85 to Foreign Minister*.

Regarding the case of Lieutenant Commander Okada, who is charged with speeding. The
American government should consider the social status of Japanese naval otficers. The ex-
tremely unpleasant attitude of the American authorities in this matter, if not discontinued,
would result in similarly unpleasant ri^u^l^ American Queers in this country, ami wouW
create a Japanese- American quarrel.

The American authorities should make adequate explanations, and promise that similar
incidents will not occur in the future. Please request the State Department to consider this
matter carefully and request appropriate promises. Telegraph the results of your representa-
tions.

'Not available.

Trans. 6-9-41

A-i^

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Si&,28S

FROM: Tokyo (K(!#i.
T04 Washington

Regarding Los Angeles to Tokyo # 89°.

As circumstances referred to in the above message must also be considered, we must
exercise a great care in making representation to the United Slates government regarding this
matter. Therefore, when presenting our note (my message if 279)' to the State Department,
please ascertain all facts concefniii|[^^i^, matter and reply result.

Trans. 6-9-41

No. 289

FEOM; Hollywood (Nakftuchi)
#>f ' *" Washington

Secret.

To the Naval Attach^ from TERAI.

1. Our lawyer is of the opinion that KONO" should be (kept in the country for thirty days ?)
in view of the danger that he might give evidence unsatisfactory to TACHIBANA*. It would
be wise to subsidize him. Furthermore, as KONO has no funds, the lawyer has suggested that
the Navy be responsible for paying this man a subsidy of $25,000 an3 ill court costs. In order
that the Navy be kept out of the picture, some of KONO's friends should be selected to appear
to be supporting him. We are in the process of making these arrangements. Should you have
any objection to this manner of procedure, please advise us.

Furthermore, in view of the fact that is a good friend of the Intelligence Chief and in

eahoots with the iny§sty[gi$ing authorities, it would be wja^e for the Navy to have little to do ytij^
the matter.

2, Though our lawyer would not predict the outcome of this incident, as the hearings will be
complicated, at the very earliest it will be tomorrow, the 11th, before counter-schemes
can be developed.

It is going to be necessary for TACHIBANA to have frequent communication with the
lawyer; therefore, we believe that it would be ill-advised for TACHIBANA to go to Washing-
tCHi at the present time.

•TACHffiANA's chauffeur.
^j^paiMse Naval Lianguage Qgicial who has been held on charges gif espioiHge.

Trans. 6-25-41

June 9, 1941
No number.

June 10, 1941
*36.

FROM: Hollywood (NalWaeW) .. June 18,

TO; Washi^ton #44.

Secret.

Re wire # 99* to the Minister.

At noon on the 18th, the immigration official stated that there was no relationship between
this and the incident in which Commander TACHIBANA was subpoenaed. Though he stated
that he would make a detailed report of the results of his investigation, he has no objection
to the condition that this man has resided in the country (a period of twelve months beginning

the month of ) and has gone to and from Mexico without having secured a visa from

the American Consul in Mexico. Though it is felt that in order to establish an excuse for his

violation of the immigration law, which should appear to have no direct connection with

incidents, we should make it appear to be of simij^'«i$^i^ 1%^^ <6f: <
Commander OKADA* and Secretary WAKATSUKI.

Relayed to Tokyo.

"Not available.

'Japanese Naval Lju^tt8|{e Qtficfer.

Trans. 6-25-41

No. 291

FROM: Tokyo (Jap Foreign Minister) June 21, 1941

TO: Washington (Koshi) #307.

Regarding my # 294":

Although we have not yet received a reply, please let us know, at once, the facts and the
background of this incident.

While it is time that the United States did make a friendly gesture in connection with the
TACHIBANA affair, we are constantly watching the restrictions placed on g^line expoarts

Japan as a sort of bar<oapu6|^f!|r evaluate the suweril^^'^lln^^ i^tl^4«!P«9C^^

'Tokyo requests Washington to wire his opinion regarding the order prohibiting loading of lubricating oil on the
Azuma Mori) at Pbiladelfthis, and piraspeets of future supplies of kemgene, etc.

Trans. 8-115-41

FROM: San Francisco (Muto) June 21, 1941

TO: Washington #026.

Commander Tachibana sailed" from here without mishap on the 21st by the Nitta Maru.

Trans. l-l-iX

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

f^^: Los Angeles {NakaadM) June 17, 1941

TO: Tokyo (Agimudaijin) # 098.

On the 17th, courier Yamazaki is sailing for Japan on the Nitta Maru with various docu-
ments, wherefore, please see to it that he meets no dithculty with the customs inspection.

Trans. 6-19-41

No. 294

FROM : San Francisco (Muto) M«y SB, 1941

Strictly Secret.

While the Nichi Shin Maru, of the Pacific Whaling Steamship Company, was coming into
Port Costa (approximately 20 miles from San Francisco) in order to take on petroleum, under
suspicion of carrying contraband drugs the interior of the ship was searched by customs officials

about noon on the . In order to burn them, should the need arise. Naval "SA" code, secret

Naval documents in the custody of the captain, secret wireless telegraphy documents in the
custody of the Chief Radio Operator, meteorological codes belonging to the Central Meteoro-
logical Bureau, planning board codes, and other secret documents, under pretext of passing
inspection were taken away. As soon as I had been informed of this by telephone, I immediately
filed a protest with the local customs ofhcials and demanded the return of these documents. They
replied that they had decided to return these documents at a later date te the flshii:^ vessel after
an investigation had been made into the facts of the case.

Trans. 6-11-41

No. 295

FROM:
TO:

San Francisco (Muto)
Tokyo

May 28, 1941
#86.

(Part 2 of 2)

I think that it is necessary, in addition to immediately stopping the use of these codes,
to take drastic emergency measures to prevent the recurrence of this sort of thing.

Furthermore, according to the report made by the captain who presented himself at this
office immediately after the incident had occurred, these documents had been placed for
safe-keeping in the Chief Radio Operator's room because of the great inconvenience of
keeping them in the captain's room. While the Chief Operator was alone in the room six
customs officials burst in in order to search it. Upon finding these documents, they laid hands

Trans. 6-11-41

No. 296

FROM: Tokyo May31,lMj.^
TO: Washington , #263.

Re mefisages ^ 86° and # 87* from San Francisco to this otfice.

We understand that our Naval Attache made a representation to the U.S. Navy Departmej^
concerning this matter. Regardless of what the official reasons were, it scm^ afipVEijn^ ,tO m
that it was done at Britain's request. It was done in the hopes of obtaining some definite ptoof
that Japanese ships on the "black list" prepared by Britain were aiding Germany.

Even if we put aside the legal aspect trf the incident, in which such extreme measures
were taken with the vague excuse of searching for narcotics, the effect this incident has upon
the already critical U.S. -Japanese relations is very serious. In view of this fact, will you
tiaake appropriate representaticms to thebWilW^^cernedoitheSt

'Available, See U, 294 and 295.

^ottc^s seizure ctf papm m, Ovisac by na^tcottes agents,

Trana. 6-2-41

No. 305

FROM: Tokyo July 2, tHl

TO: Washington #325.

Re my =319°.

On the 20th of June, the Othce of the Governor General of CHOSEN submitted a telegram
saying that if the State Department or the mission headquarters will arrange to have this mis-
sionary removed to his native land, the Governor Generalcy is prepared to settle the matter in.
the manner described in part 1 of my caption message. Will you immediately go and ask the
^^^(l^tsleat td'J^^^bi mljMtoM^' Pease wire me Imck itjbwf^pi^^ ■

"In which the GovenWf'iSiM^l a^eed to cancel the prwiecotiOH of miasionariw alle^d to have distributed dsn0t-
m$ Ut«r«tm« on mi4itio» that they aee<9§^e^l9W'!i-

Trans. 7-5-41

No. 306

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 2, 1941

TO: Tokyo

Re your ~ 325".

Will you please wire me back the names of an memflfSff^ i?eiieftmirtg the Americans in
Queestion?

The State Department says that the appellants are only accused of distributing disturbing
printed matter and that this is not enough to warrant our demanding the removal ef all fourteiilt
ttfth^, -

Tram. 7-^1

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 307

FROM: Washit^Gi^llillp^lv July 8, 1941

TO: Tokyo #472.

Re your #332'.

None of the names of those concerned are known at the State Department either. Please re^
peat, giving the full names in English.

'Not avAilabte,

Trans. 7-10-4t

No. 308

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washingtffla

Rfemy #325".

We have received the following advice from the office of the Governor General of CHOSEN:
The trial of OKADA was finished on July 4th, and the verdict will be passed on the 21st. The
United States has put it up to us that, if we expect a lenient decision, an indispensable term
will be that the defendant must be taken out of the country. Now. the prayer meeting incident
is a parallel case; so, will you please negotiate with the Amerifian Government to have the ac-
cused likewise evacuated.

In spite of what you said in your w 458', we do not wish the question of the evacuation de-
manded by the office of the Governor General to be left pending for a long time now that Japa*
nese-American relations are so strained. Therefore, we think it quite proper that you return to
the State Departwentawi mfepm the officiaU tfaftt m wsk tivm to comply with our request.

•See n, 305 in which Tokyo requests Washington to ask the State Department to have the missionary brought
home.

•See II, 306 in which Nomura wusea Tokyo that the State Department does not think the accusation of dietributiiig
l^urbinf printed .matter U enouglh t» wanant demandinf the removal of all 14 of the Americans bi question.

— . Trans* 1P?##I

FROM: Waahln^on (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

Re your ^ 344".

On the 8th, IGUCHI'' informed Section Chief HAMILTON of the contents of your instructions,
saying that he hoped all of the accused would be evacuated. HAMILTON replied, "The State
Oipartment knows that BOTT (?), etc., are charged with distributing pamphlets advocating
^ace which were distributed in various countries throughout the world. The crime is very
^ight and the deportation of all people concerned would be a severe punishment. Furthermore,
#e Chi&dl 4«ihoFiti«s m also tpdesiroue el a|^j||r^i^ |Nii^^i^t«4. ^ «x(^iiRgft £^

July 8, 1941
#344,.

July 8, 1941
#480.

the friendly manner in which we handled the TACHIBANA incident, don't you think you
could drop this matter in some way or other? Now, with respect to DeCAMP and ROWE (?),
you are pressing us very hard. If possible, I would like for you to have this matter discussed
with the Church officials in Korea." IGUCHI replied: "The Chosen authorities, in view of their
policy of a political solution, are combining the two incidents into one and, unless those in-
volved in the prayer meeting incident are also evacuated, it may be difficult to show any
leniency to DECAMP and ROWE (?); however, I will report all you say."

Will you please report this to the Governor General and take what measures you deem
proper? Please wire me back.

*See II. 308 in which Tokyo tells the advice received from the Office of the Governor General offSlos^ and asks
(hat the State Department be informed that they wish them to comply with Japanese n^fuesta for &V iW^MSUstioa of
■ '^^acctsed missionaries.

Embassy Coim^lor in Wa«^jiy|^.

Trans. 7-14-41

No. ;tio

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
Re my #480'.

On the 9th, Representative HOOPER of the Presbyterian headquarters in New York came to
Washin^on and 1 had IGUCHI interview him. HOOPER said: "Our branch in Keijo will first
decide upon whether or not the missionaries are to be evacuated from Chosen and then seek
the coneurtence of the main headquarters. Now, if as a result of representations made by the
Governor Genera) to our representative in Chosen, HERBERT BLAIR, the latter should request
the headquarters to agree to the evacuation of DeCAMP and ROWE (?), we will wire them back
our approval immediately." Furthermore, with respect to the prayer meeting incident,
HOOPER presented the following piea; "When the accused translated into Korean the English
text, they did so in such a manner as to prevent any misunderstanding on the part of Japan.
They even first submitted them to the Police. They are endeavoring to cooperate with the
Japanese and since Dr. Clark, Miss Covingtop ajwlMrs. Moore have already decided to leave
Korea, cannot the matter be dropped at that?"' "

I rtiinkthat it would be a good idea for m Wt0mmt^m»^^^lft^M^^
have settled the TAC HIBAN A incident.

'Jtily8,I941;U,301.

Trans. 7-14-41

July 10, 1941
#491.

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

FROM : Tokyo ( Foreign l^^^j 1*. 19431

TO: Washington #3^.

Special.

The "prayer-meeting incident" comes under the Army- Navy Criminal Law and the Law for
the Provisional Control of Disturbing Literature. In connection with this important event, the
Procurator's Office has started investigation of 16 of the approximate 30 persons concerned. As
a result of the prosecutor's investigation, four, BUTTS, BLAIR, POLLARD and MOORE, are
regarded as ringleaders. Others considered to be deeply involved in the incident are BERN-
HEISELL, HILL, CLARK, DELMARTER, ROSS, COVINGTON, COOK, BERGMAN and
CROTHEGS. Magnanimity is shown in the r^uirement, along lines of fixed policy, that the
above-mentioned 13 persons must withdraw to their liotfle country. The others are being over-
looked (disregarded) ,

The sentence of the two involved in the Oasa affair will be postponed until the 11th. In regard
t5 this withdrawal (return), with the consent of the Executive Committee of the Northern Pres-
byterian Church in the Eastern district, it was advised that guarantee of withdrawal Ise given.
This will be submitted after the urgently convoked resolution of the committee.

Trans. 7-16-41

No. 312

FROM: Tokyo July 17- 19*1

TO: Washington #380.

We have settled the incident mentioned in the Director of the Foreign Section Suwa's tele-
gram #50 to Tokyo by having two members of the legal committee of the American Presby-
terian Mission in Chosen, Miller and RAINA give guarantee that RO and DEKINYANPU
would be evacuated.

Regarding the prayer meeting incident there has been a request to have the matter "dropped"
with the return of three members, however the authorities concerned are doing their best from
ai tepd standpoint t» settle the matter as leniently as possible but they desire to have arrange-
U^te made with the other party immediately for the return of the 13 peratms mos^ 9^^}^$
iiSi@i¥©4f (excluding Clark who is returning on account of illness) .

^fi^wiMiOrti, Mrs. Mocae U a Methodist missionary and is not a member of the Northern
Presbyterians. The members at the New York headquarters of the Northern Presbyterians
said at first that they would have the English translated into Korean and then before distri-
trtjtftiftitt! literature they would send it to the police station. However, there is no evidence of
their ever having done so. In spite of the fact that this point concerns the publication we are
willing to overlook that point, and merely treat the question as matter of seditious literature.
Please convey this to the New York head office.

Trans. 7-18-41

.mm-. Tokyo July 17, 1941

TO: Washiufton #^70.

Re my ff 362'.

The government-general sent word again as noted in ray separate telegram #380^ In reply,
1 told the government-general that it was impossible to show any more leniency than had been
shown. Please make strong representations to America to tnake setttement &loag th« lines of
ray sepwa^l^jj^ftMtap^ wire the result.

Trans. 7-18-41

FROM: Washingten
tOt Tokyo

The State Department has taken the position from the first that this matter was not a request
from the State Department but rather an appeal to Japan's "goodwill". Moreover, the church
headquarters say that conditions are such that it is very difficult to advise the return of the
missionaries. The State Department goes a step further and says it cannot interfere in the
matter and while it regrets the matter it cannot act as an intermediary in the return of the 13
missionaries. (It requested that it be informed upon the settlement of Matsuo incident). Again,
the church representative Hooper was summoned by Iguchi, who made an earnest statement
regarding the government-general's kind intentions. (Indicating your telegram ffSSO"). Hooper
expressed his thanks for the government's kind intentions and at the same time explained that
the church, from matters of policy, could not return the missionaries living in Korea in connec-
tion with the prayer meeting incident, nor issue orders for their return.

In regard to the RO incident he said that he thought there was no other way to handle it than
to confer directly with the local church authorities on the spot. Please arrange t^ have this done
immediately. If this does not result in a solution to the problem I think there is nothing to do
but drop the matter of the return of the 13 persons.

Furthermore, inasmuch as the pamphlets concerned in the prayer meeting incident were
translated directly from the English to Japanese in Tokyo and then distributed, I do not see
how there could be any problem in this connection.

'The authorities concerned art- tioms iheir best U) settle the prayer meeting incident as leniently as possible, but
tfae^ desire that arrai^emeftts be made lor the return of the 13 persons most seriously involved. July 17, 1941, II, 312.

Trans. 7-24-41

'mm

My 19, 1941

THE '•MAGIC'' BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 315

FROM: Tokyo July 19, 1941

TO: Washington #3^6..

Re your #472°.

The fuU names of those whose evacuation the Gkivernor General demands, are as follows;

1. Miss Alice Mabel Butts j

2. Mr. H. E. Blair

3. Miss H. E. Pollard

4. Mrs. J. Z. Moore (B^fel|eni«ai^)

5. Mrs. C. F. BernfeeiaaiHWeisK.)

6. Mr. H.J, Hill

7. Mr. C.A.Clark

8. Miss J. Delmarten

9. Miss L. Ross

10. Miss H. Covington

11. Mrs. W.T.Cook (Maude H.Jj _

12. Miss G. O. Bergman

13. Mrs. J. Y. Crothers (Ellen Mti McClung)

'Ambassador requests a repetition of names from Tokyo. July 8, 1941; U, 299.

Trans. 7-21-41

No. 316

*'Ws8aiaBgton (No signature) * ' 3mt 5, 1941

TOt Tokyo (Oimatu)

As Japanese Embassy has already been infoTtted- in regard to Kokuyo Maru, should Japa-
nese government wish to establish for Toei Maru the full status of public naval vessel further
information with regard to the ships is desired by this government*. If, in the meanwhile, Toei
Maru should enter Los Angeles as commercial vessel, no objection is perceived to such visit.

Trans. 6-16-41

No. 317

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 13, 1941

TO: Washington (Koshi) #290.

Re my letter # 84 under date of 16 May,

We have been advised by the Navy Ministry that the movements of the Iro (commanded
by Naval Captain Jyoe Mizuguti) have bm dms^ to arrive hm Ami^^ ^ ^n^, t»
depart the 14th. Please arrange accco'dingly.

Also please make the following changes in the schedule pertaining to the same cruise:
Eliminate "Sada 7 July", and under Oudo change "23 August" to "30 August" (Saturday),
and under Siriya change "30 August" to 9 August" (Saturday) respectively.

Trans. 6-20-41

\o.3l8

FROM: Tokyo July 1, 1941

Translator's note: Several bad breaks in ti^rif^ totter part of this menage. Not too sure of
reading.

Please convey the following to New York.

(1) Please instruct the various Japanese steamship firms in your city as per the following:

TokaiMaru ^ the 16th

Amagisan Maxu. the 17th
Awajisan Mttlftt the 18th

Tozan Maru — the 19th
KiyozumiMaru — the 20th
Kirishima Maru — the 21st
Norfolk Maru — the 22nd
AsukaMaru — the 22nd

(2) To Kawasaki S.S. Co, as follows:

Unload all discharge freight at New York, and tie up at the ore berth at Baltimore. Assuming
that it will take three days to unload ore, 1 think it should be possible to reatsh Coloo on thfe 21st,
but how about it? The generator(s) will be loaded on the Asulm MaiM, Coant BOt the 1000 tOUS
of Boston asbestos be loaded with the New York freight — — *

(3) To the Kokusai S.S. Co. as follows:

Kiyozumi Maru i'Teiaht will be unloaded at the one port of New York, the instructions from
the main office re freight for the return trip are entirely cancelled and she will proceed from

New York directly to Panama as soon as possible. If there is any time during unloading

operations, there would be no objection to loading some return voyage freight at New York.
Rush the loading and unloading at Cristobal as much as possible, whatever the expense may
be. The Kirishima Maru as per instructions from the home oiffice. •^•^^^fi^lSiSS^ry *.

14) To Mitsui Co. as follows:

You will please take such measures as may be necessary to shorten up — as there Baay

be decrease in freight loading on the Awajisan Maru and Amagisan Mam.

(5) To Osaka Shosen Kaisha as follows:

The Tokai Maru and Tozan Maru will proceed as per dispatch from the home office on the
<6) To Nippon Yusen Kaisha as follows:

Asuka Maru freight for return trip to New York. besides machinery loaded at

Gtenoa. ~— cotttm and Boston imitation asbestos in as large quantities as possible, qut out
the atop at New Orleans, and go directly to Panama (garbled ont) (incomplete).

Trans. 7-3-41

'.Mm

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND QF FBAKL HAUBQft

H«.319 «

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

Separate telegram # 267 from New York to Tokyo.

1. I have seen telegram #52 ftom the Japanese steamship company. The Asuka Mam's
schedule and tonnage to be discharged are asfoUoWi:

Arrive Philadelphia, June 30

Depart Philadelphia, July 2

Discbarge 4135 tons of ore. LoA^ at^iig.

Arrive York, 4th

Depart 1th

Discharge 400 tons miscellaneous goods, and, including
New Orleans discharge, 1900 tons of palm oil

Load 500 tons of machinery and 1000 tons of raw cotton and 11 tons of miscellaneous goods
Boston, arrive the 8th
Depart the 12th

Discharge, miscellaneous 199 tons, sugar 2500 tons
Load asbestos, 1000 tons
Cristobal, 20th

Please wire as to whether it will be necessary to go to Los Angela tm business on the return

voyage.

2. From the Mitsui shipping department.

Arrar^ments have been made for loading of the 1589 kiltons of cargo on hand by July 1 on
the Awajisan Maru to be completed during Jui^ 2 and ^ boat will sail by the morning of
July 3 at the latest, for Los Angeles. ^ .

The Ama^san Maru will sail for Tampa Erotn ii^ Vis^ m the dvuB^fti duly 2 and will
Jtttlflrom New Orleans by July 11th.

3. From the Kawasadi Steamship Company:

Since there is no asbestos to 1im8'^ New York, the unloading of the 550 tons of — — - will be

completed and the unloading of the ore m Baltimore should he m^^^^^iS^ S ^^i^ i^'iim
the 3rd), Hence the boat is scheduled to f^vie ili Colon on 20th.

Trans. 7-7-41

July 3, 1941
#400.

Mo. 320

FROM: Washington June 12, 1941

TO: Tokyo #394.

Re letter # 21, dated April 23 and addressed from Manila to me and also telegram # — —
addressed by you to Manila.

I had IGIJCHP negotiate with the State Department along the line set forth in the last part
of the previous letter. It seems that they are contemplating according the same treatment to
Ji^mnese entering llf^'fl^ippinra as we would accord Filipinos entering Japan as international

traders; for the State Department has sent us a note inquiring what arrangements we are tttSJcing
in order to accord favorable treatment to Filipinos going taJ^an as international traders.
Will you kindly wire me in regard to this matter?

'DnisUl in New Yoifc.

Tirans. 6-14-41

No. 321

FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 14, 1941

TO: Tokyo #396.

Re my ^ ;]94°.

On the 13th, when IGUCHI called on the Chief of the Far East Section, he asked the latter if
j^e^teistatices made it necessary for Japan to inform the United States Goveiifiment exactly
Japan is doing about this matter. The Section Chief replied that it would be well for the
Japanese to include in a note to be submitted by the Embassy, a clause stating, in effect,
that the Japanese government shall accord to Filipinos who are international laradOTs thp same
kind of treatmt^t aad privileges in Japan m mm accorded Japanese international traders in
the Philippines.

I believe that this is an attempt to get from us a writ^ pmfin9e"le[ vipm t^ii^H^^At
Japanese- American Trade A^«ement is no long^ eiristant.
Relayed to Manila.

"[n which Washington tells Tokyo that the State Department is contemplating according Japanese entering the
Philippines the same treatmea(i|ii'Af,:|lilKI«g;|tat^ t3>
1941;I1,3U.

Trans. 6-18-41

No. .^22

FROM: Manila (Nihro)
IHj Washington

^ my 340*.

Based on instructions from Washington, I have been informed that a decision has been
reached to discontinue granting permits on scrap iron. Therefore, though we continue our
current negotiations, I believe that it will take a considerable time before a settlement is
reached. In order to lessen losses incurred by stoppage of ships and lighterage costs, providing
I have not i^eivfd imtTOfltiens to, the (?ontrary by 5:00 P.M. on the 17th, I plan to have part of
the ships unlbaaea'^fll fb-Ssfiftief ttii^hieau* Mam to sail for Mashin* Rodt.

Furthermore, in view of the current shortage of shipping, it is too bad, though it may be
national policy, that Japanese vessels be utilized only in the transportation of American

Jttne 16, 1941

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

essential products. Therefore, in view of America's utilofta»ate policy of applying the permit
system, I think that it would be wise to consider the rerouting of our ships ia order to ii^|^«^
upon the American authorities the need of reconsideration.
After you havegi'f^li^s^'^^^tsi^^tion, please ^M^aftfr^^l^ts$#l$>

'Not available.
*Kaoa spelling.

- - — • Trans. 6-19-41

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 18, 1941

WQi Manila. # 172.

Re your # 342" and # 344*.

Regarding the above report, the situation is now such that we will have to dispatch the
Bordeaux Maru per schedule to take on a cargo of chrome. However, we are now hurriedly
conferring with the competent heads as to our attitude with reference to undertaking ship-
ittW^ fflf materials to the UniteiStiWei. ^0m.M a decision is reached I will wire yoa.

"Manila wires Tokjw that in view pf America's unfortunate policy of applying the permit system, it would be wise
to consider the remtj^ flS^W)p^to4i«||»**-i»ips*» i^ aathOTttks owed itf recotMidejatam.

16, 1941; U, 322.

'Not available.

No. 324

FROM: Manila (Nihro)
TO: TjdsyR

Reyouf #36S'.

When I went to see the President on the 2n4'ftrthe purpose of introducing former adminis-
trative official KOYAMA, I spoke to him about the report that some Japanese fishermen had
run off with fisMng boats of Philippine registry and expressed regret Mflift matter, going on
to say that we are doing our beat to locate the absconders.

However, I tried to impress him with the fact that the Philippine authorities have been
overly severe in their control measures over people like these, and that as a result Japanese
fishermen have found it extremely difficult to engage in business at all. I talked along the lines
outlined in your caption message and asked him if he did not think that under such
conditions their own business would not suffer as well? - -% ^ ..^ » » •

The President isf U«4 |luk| 1^ iif«»W like to Hm a speci*! cwtEMwacfe m tjse aubject a
little later on.

July 2, 1941

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii)
TO: Tol^

Re your #108*.

According to what the captain of the Awajisan Maru told me on the (date), it will be

impossible for him to secure permits for his ship to enter the harbor at (date). Therefore,

after he has detoured by way of Cape Horn, he would like authorization to proceed immediate-
ly to Japan. Please tran^nit flie $9«(Sf0i(|g t$ t%W flt^ W to Ifate blHr on the
morning of the (6th ? ) .

'Not available.

Trans. 8-28-41

No. 326

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: New York

(Strictly secret outside the department.)

tRlsqimt mess^e.)

Alter you have duly paraphrased the following, please convey the message to the Export-
Import Branch of the Mitsui Comfimy located in your city. This ia ftoia the home office
of the Mitsui Company.

1. Please advise us from day to day concerning the Awajisan Maru which we would like
to have go through the Panama Canal.

2. Should it be impossible to pass through the Panama Canal, wiilt^ no objections to h«r
passage around Cape Horn through Magellan Straits. However, in the event passage is made
through Magellan Straits, the Ministry of Communications will send instructions to - — 0
— — . Ambassador TOMII in Argentina has already been advised of the possibility.

No. 327

FROM: Panama (kawa) July 9, 1941

f!^ . fokyo #52.

The Army and Navy Canal authorities have prohibited tht entrance and exit to and from
the Canal during the night from the 5th on, and say that a rigid investigation is being
conducted to determine the r^ponsibility.

Trans. 7-26-41

Julys, 1941
#250.

July 3, 1941
#115.

A-166

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

PROM: NewVork(Morishimai JtjlyW,
I!®! Wsifcington Circalar#40-

(Message to Tokyo # 291.)

According to reports from Japanese steamship companies, surveillance of Japanese boats
by American authorities on the East Coast has lately become more stringent. The following
actual examples are given for your information.

1. On the 11th, at Boston, the N.Y.K. boat ASUKA MARU was boarded and searched by a
party of about 20 Coast Guardsmen, and on the following day its bottom was inspected by
divers.

2. On the 11th, the KAWASAKI boat NORFOLK MARU was scheduled to leave Baltimore
^ut was delayed until the afternoon of the following day because of divers inspecting its
iaottom. (Meanwhile, the Embassy was negotiating with the authorities.)

3. On the 13th, the YAMASHITA boat YAMATSUKI MARU entered Cristobal and took on
fuel. It has been waiting permission to transit the canal since the 13th, which permission
has not been received this in09ia^.':<||^^-i9^^^^N^-ilfc^'-lt9t^^»

Waibittgton at present.)

Trans,

No. 329

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 19, 1941

TO: Tokyo #525.

The British Embassy in Washington announced that from July 15th, all "transit" going
by way of England will require import permits. (In case "transit" had been dispatched to
England prior to the 15th, or in the event it had been transported by the same ships, this
would not hold. ) In the event that no p^mit is obtained, they will seize the freight.

Trans. 7-30-41

No. 330

FROM: Panama (Izawa) July 22, 1941

TO: Tokyo # 102.

According to various newspaper reports concerning the closing of the Canal to Japanese
ships, the Defense Commander, General VAN VOORHIS, made the following statement
on the 21st to the United Press: The delay in allowing ships to go through the Canal is a
temporary measure due to the emptying of the locks for repairs. During this period many
$hips will be delayed due to being stopped in the harbor or between the locks. Others, like
the Japanese, are changing their course and going around Cape Horn or the Cape of Good Hope.

Trans. 7-26-41

No. 331

WQi BM^a^ #39.

From Ministry of Overseas Affairs to special officer SAKATA, In charge of immigrants
aboard Buenos Aires Maru; In regard to your future route, follow decision of ship's captain.
Also cooperate with FUNAGAWA and do everything in your power to keep the imm^rants from

txsm. 8-13-41

No. 332

FROM: Manila (NiJtrojt July 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo 441.

The Ganges Maru left Davao on July 22nd and has not yet reached Cebu. She is carrying a
^bti!"iSfi^' passengers, 6000 bales of hemp anfl ragee (?) and 20,000 board feet of lumber. At
Cebu she is expected to pick up 11 passengm and 31^' hira^'lil^ >S^^
gassengers and 1500 bales of hemp.

The passengers are all Japanese. All of those who expect to leave from Cebu and Manila have
■l^eir permits but since attached to these permits is the reservation that they may be can-
figlled there is danger that their ship will not enter port on the pretext that it might be seized.

If ^r judgment ftasfed tibe ^enetai sSttiii€lMl fh«if« is danger of seizure, I wish you
would arrange, especially with the naval authorities, so that this ship may sail directly tm
Japan at all speed, and also send instructions to NAGAO with regard to customs procedure.

Trans. 8-13-41

No. ;133

FROM: San Francisco (Muto) July 30, 1941

'■^t Washington ^126.

(Circular) (M^age to Tokyo ^143.)

This afternoon, the 30th, I was informed that thftlte^la Maru was to enter port. In keepiat

with Your Excellency's wire to the Foreign Minister ^t593° the local Nippon Yusen office,
doubting that even though the Tatsuta should enter port and though WELLES had made
it statement that permit to leave port would be granted, in the light of the current situation
and the manner in which the American authorities occasionally load and unload vessels, and
because the American authorities avoided making any commitment when Ambassador
NOMURA called at the State Department the other day (29 ?), not only wired but also
telephoned the captain of the vessel to delay entry temporarily. They were in constant contact

with . Repeatedly they requested a definite reply in this connection from the State

Department, but no guarantees were forthcoming with regard to the freight carried by the
vessel. This morning at 9:30 A.M., upon iiml^uction from the central authorities (the Chief of

the San Francisco Customs Office ?) told the Nippon Yusen branch office that

when the Tatsuta entered port, though she was not to unload, permit would be issued for her
mtum home. With regscd to loadijig and unloitding, h« s^id that he could not gwaireratee the

A-ie8

results but that he would immediately consider such an application. After making telephone

contact with immediately the poissibility of leaving port .

Relayed to Wa^iingtMi, NnW Ywk luui ^-^-ro^.

MiUi^.lllffiIJ^^ assures NQMURA that ships enteriill port would be allowed to refuel, take on supplies, and
leave apfis^

FROM: New York (Morishima) July3, lfi41' •

TO: Tokyo #272.

(Strictly secret.)

Please communicate the following to the home office of the Kokusai Steamship Company.
The Kirishima Maru, upon leaving Boston, is scheduled to sail from (New York ?) on the

{date); (Baltimore ?) on the (date); and firom on the (date). It is scheduled to load a

cargo of 4,000 bales of American cotton goods. The Kiyosumi Maru, having completed

loading in , has taken on 2,700 bales of American textiles, 100,000 tons of asbestos, and

proceeded to Sl^ «UI imftt |^ m {iS^ «^ <ajN»M' llA^

than (date).

Furthermore, she is scheduled to take on several hundred additional bales of American
textiles in the port <rf;-'->-*», - -

TVans. 8-28-41

No. 335

fltOM: Tokyo (MatsuoM
TO: New York

i^li^tieUy Secret,} Request Message.

From the head office of the Mitsubishi Company to the branch office manager in your city.
Because of the urgent need for ships here in Japan and the consequent shortage of bottoms,
the chances of dispatching ships to the Atlantic coast of North America are very slim. However,
there will be no change in the movement of ships to the Pacific coast. Please wire an acknowl-
edgment of this message after you have — — possibilities transcontinental .

Trans. 9-8-41

July a

#116.

A-169

No. 336

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) July 14, 1941

"mt Catmm

(Circular) (Sent to Ko as Circular # 89 on July 6th.)

Message firoffl Tokyo as Circular # 1427 otn the 4th,

2. Recently the United States took over German and Italian ships and we are not without
fear that similar steps may be taken toward our own vessels. There is much Japanese shipping
in American harbors and these vessels should, at as early a date as possible, return to Japan,
avoiding the Panama Canal in so far as possible.

3. Recently the Philippine Islands have granted permits for the export of military goods to
Japan. Since it is hardly fitting in view of such a pass that Japanese vessels be used lor the
transportation of military goods between the Philippine Islands and the United States, we
have decided to take some of the Japanese vessels off the Philippines- United States run.

4. For the reasons given above, henceforth, on the basis of my instructions, before their
i#eparture, please acquaint the captains of the Japanese vessels now in American harbors of
%e steps to be taken. Japanese ships on the west coast run will be increased and such Ameri-
ian products as are takeii on will be loaded at those ports.

■Part 1 oiimi avaUablft,

_ Trans. 9-18-41

No. ;W7

FROM: Rome (Horikiri) July 10, 1941

TO: Tokyo #447.

On the 9th, various newspapers here reported ISHII (spokesman) as saying that Japan has
decided to withdraw all her commerce ships from the Pacific. Plejttft 'fl^e at once if this
included all ships plying regularly between North and South America.

Trans. 7-14-41

No. 338

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Rome

Circular. Secret outside the Department.

1. Ships plying between Japan and the Philippines shall continue as at present (1,512??).

2. Ships plying between the Philippine Islands and the east coast of North America will
be taken off. I do not know but what freight steamers plying between the Philippine lettn^
and the west coast of North America may make return trips on occasion.

July 12, 1941
# 1498.

A- 170

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

3. Bhips plying to the east coast of South America shall ccmtinue as at present through

August. It will become impossible to dispatch ships after the first of September, Of the ships
now on the east coast of the South American continent run one part we plan to have operate
Ground the Horn (9) .

4. From the first of August ships on the east coast of North America will be completeljr
taken off that route (II).

5. Tihree ships will be added eafly in September to the Soutii Am^iiean ;#^-^flrii tt!^.
After that time, two more ships will be placed in that service (9).

6. From August one ship will be added to the North American west coast run.

The figures within the parentheses represent the number of ships now on those runs.

Trans. 7-14-41

No. 339

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) July 14, 1941

TO : Sao Paulo, Caracas and Lima # 92.

Circular. Message from Tokyo as Circular # 1423.

Figures within parentheses represent the number of ships on the respective runs.

1. From (September 1st ?) all ships are to be taken off the run to the North American east
coast (11).

2. Navigation will continue as heretofore to the east coast of South America (8)- Later on we

hope to add additional ships to this run . A portion of the ships now sailing

off the east coast of South America are scheduled to sail homeward by way

Straits (8).

3. From September, one sailing will be maintained to the west coast of North AjQisarfcll (4)-

4. Three ships will be maintained on the run to the west coast of South Ameticii'^ike — K
I<ater on, two additional ships are expected to be in operation (8).

5. Navigation between Japan and the Philippine islands will continue as heretofore (1-2).

6. Navigation from the Philippine Islands to the east coast of North America is to be
diecontinued. We do not know but what we may decide to operate more vessels on the run
&0m the Philippine Islands to the west coast of the United States.

Trans. 8-27-41

No. 340

FROM: Washington (Nomura) J"ly 12, 1941

Tokyo

Message from New York #285,
Please transmit to the Foreigji Minister.

ReyQur##li -

ii*- JSSl^'k Wder issued with regard to disposal of merchant ships, the Japanese
jfi^ i^^W"!^ K«* W ^Jprating wifli p6 wholeheartedly and doing everything possible

td enable the ships here to pass through the Canai by the date specified in the order. For this

purpose they havG can(?elled contracts for loadin;? the ships (of course, because of this cancella-
tion the consignors will hie claim against the shipping company; and due to the fact that this
'<!^n^ suffers tm& temiffic^sijenr tif l^ips, there is a danger of Japanese shi|» being for-
bidden to leave the ports when the worse comes to the worst) and unloading the ships during
the night, as well as during the day. At the same time, they have been offering to Americans
the ^planayud '#^lMid ordes>ed them to offer, and so on thk^aeemint newspaper reports on
this subject have not been sensational (please refer to my ~ 274°). In the meantime, an in-
struction was wired to the Naval Attache in Washington signed by both the Chief of the Office
of Naval Operations and the Chief of the Naval General StafiT, that "as regards the recent order
issued by the Government, there was some slight misunderstanding in the procedure. For this

reason, it may have had the effect of being alarming. The real purpose was to — — on

itficount of shortage of ships in the seas near Japan and on account of circumstances which
preclude loading on the eastern coast of the United States," etc., and asked that the truth of
the matter be broadcast. On the 8th, the Naval Inspector here communicated this message
to the Japanese shipping firms. As regards this communicaticm, insofar as the shipping firms
are concerned, they said that it was not a question inasmuch as it goes without saying that it is
no more than an explanation to be given to Americans and, furthermore, that they have already
taken steps in this direction.

*Mot available.

fmm, 7-14-41

mOM: Washington tfti^UCil),

Message from New York
(Part2of2)«.

B. If there has been an administrative mix-up, {the united opinion of superiors and
subordinates as well as that of the Department of Communications and others h^ been
questioning the insufficiency of connectbns) in the issuance of strict ordetsi it 18 tiiA the
intention of those sincerely r'xiperating to become informed of the superior policies of the
Government, but, nevertheless, they are not convinced by the explanations given out to the
Americans. (With all the hurry about the Pflflttm^ Canal and the possibility that it may be
closed, they are questioning why only the west coast ports and ports in Central and South
America would be safe under such conditions.) In spite of the present orders given out by the
Navy, confidence in the Government is weakening and furthermore, doubts are becoming
stronger. Continuing along this line, together with keeping secret that each one in his own way
is seeking explanation, the control over nationals resident in this country has a displeasing
taf^Mqice. (Although proper business men should be led Along as indicated in your succ^sive
instructions) in connection with present conditions, there are sufficient connections there in
Tokyo so the orders should only come through the Minisbry # Foreign Relations. Please make
JDS^jiaKrsi^ements. .

TrOttii 7-17-41

July 12, 1941

A-172

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PJEAJIL HARBOR

No. 342

Received &tm. Manila m 5tb.
C^i,

Re your Tokyo- Manila # 195.

#381. According to representation s from local shippers here, the Bordeaux Maru (of the
Kawasaki Line) and the Kyushu Maru (of the O.SK. Line) were recently ordered to discharge
American-bound cargoes at Kobe, while the Nojiina Maru (N.Y.K.) which was enroute to this
port also received instructions to discharge her American-bound cargo, and proceed homeward
at once, and it is said that many of the ships that regularly come here, have cancelled their
calls. Lifluenced, likely by a succession of representations which the Filipinos have been receiving
from us, on the 1st, the President and Cabinet members concerned met with Sayre and urged
that as far as consistent with the needs ot U.S. national defense, steps be taken to avoid
untoward results coming to the economic situation in the Philippines through the application
of the export license system. (Just prior to this meeting permits had been issued for the
exports of 13,800 tons of iron ore). It is planned that from now on the conclusion of contracts for
shipping goods to the U.S. will be prohibited or restricted, unless goods are loaded for Japan,
and the steamship companies will be directed to determine the allocation of ships to these
ports always with a view to shipment of goods to Japan. This will make the operation of the

expOTt license system work out for the advantage of Japan, but if we go as far as to

unload cargoes that have already been loaded for America, it will cause the Filipino shippers
to hesitate or even to abandon the use from now on of our ships, and it will not only become
ittp^ible for us to mitk#iis« df the Mlipinos in the operation of the export license system,
but also the U.S. in retaliation may place obstacles in the way of the issuing of permits for
export of such goods as are at present permitted or may even go so far as to prohibit the export
of iron ore, or resort to the freezing of assets. Accordingly, unless we have resolved upon, and
have made thorough preparations for, a show-down economic warfare with the U.S. there is
a danger that we will find ourselves in an unexpected predicament. (In the case of the Nojinsa
Maru, the local U.S. Naval "neutrality officer" sajra that if the freight is to be reloaded at
Kobe, sailing permit cannot be issued, unless there is an export permit.) Therefore, in order
that goods already loaded might be allowed to be shipped to the U.S., I wish you would WC*k
with the authorities involved, referring to my # 382°. Also for my information, I wish you would
advUe me by return dispatch-ai^jrenTOals S3(t 4f!!?i<^as ij|^o«i the^e measures.

"Seen, 343.

Trans. 7-8-41

July 7, 1941

s<t,m

WpM: Manila (Nihro)
"I^i Tokyo

Julys. 1941

Gogai.

(Retransroission of Manila-Tokyo #^*>

(I) The securing of permits as well as the loading operations have been going along fairly
smoothly for some time and we have managed to keep at least three or four vessels in the
Philippine territorial waters at all times. However, while Sydney Maru was taking on
manganese ore, she was ordered not to leave pwt, m a reprisal, aiid the whole a*8^$«p agaiitt
in danger of becoming bogged down.

In accordance with measures referred to at the end of this message ^within parenthesis)
the departure of Nozima Maru has also been held up, and it will take a considerable time to
unload the chrome ore. Therefore, it would be a better plan to substitute another vessel and
allow Nozima Maru to proceed to America.

(HA) Sugar and hemp which were to be taken on Aobasan Maru, whose scheduled sailing
has been cancelled, have already been paid for by the Mitui Co. However, although we might
forego the shipment of hemp, to permit approximately 800,000 pesos worth of sugar to remain
in the Philippines will mean that our countrymen will be the losers.

(NI) As the affair in question took place originally simultaneously with the Imperial
Conference held on the 2nd, there are all kinds of speculations as to its reason. Therefore, I am
making every effort to explain that it is due to the shortage of bottoms and to the extreme
reduction of exports of goods to Japan and is not due to sudden change in international
situation. However, if this situation persists, there is a great danger of its developing into a
desperate economic war (as explained in my #381) .which will bring extreme hardship to
people in general.

(HO) I feel that the important thing now is to either accept the principle referred to in my
ff 369", making it applicable to both the contracting agencies and to all vessels prior to their
departure from Japan, or to ehter into a general agreement with the United States regarding
this matter. I feel that to order the cargo to be unloaded in this itigtdftce i& carrying matters
8 bit too far.

Action DML (Mamls t^M
Re your (Manila's #382"):

(1) Out handling of this matter la as stated is ^ -(Gircular) #1427*, and our measures
for meeting the shortage of shipping, as well as our means of precaution as regards the U.S.
have early been decided upon; therefore, you will please explain to the American and

'Not avaikble.

Txms. 7-15-41

So. .'i44

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

July 7, 1941
#336.

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

4

(2) We have made inquiry of the N.Y.K. in r^ard to the freight loaded on the Nojima
Maru, which has now been requisitioned, and it is reported that there is every prospect that a
satisfactory understanding will be reached with the consignors, by assuming the expense of
liDf^ag and unloading, and tlterefore, it has been decided that it will be unloaded. Although
no understanding has been reached with consignors in the cases of the Bordeaux Maru and
Kyushu Maru, the freight is being unloaded just the same. It will likely give rise to complica-
tions, but we will do all we diS<fi$^^iil!iuade the firms con<»med to ship the freight that is to
be reloaded, to the U.S. west coast within the shortest possible time. Therefore, if the
Americans and Filipinos have any misgiving on this point you may give assurances as may
be necessary.

(3) Besides the above mentioned loadings, there are still some 22,000 tons of Filipino
goods for which shipping contracts have been made, and for this there will be nothing to do
but to cancel the contracts "by government order" due to changes in ship dispositions as per
our # 1428'. However, there are precedents for such cancetlations among the nations* and
there will hkely be no great trouble over it.

Have relayed this together with your reference message to Washington.

(Manila to Tokyo # 369, 26 June.)
Re your tt 202".

Please understand that I am retransmitting my message of 26 June as follows:
#369. Re my #359*.

(1) At present the Philippine Islands have a shortage of bottoms for loading sugar and other
products for the United States, and apparently due to the President's having taken it up
with fhem, on the hasis of my reference message, Rojas and Vargas ^vul^d the fact to some
of the Japanese dealers, on the 25th, that they are greatly concerned over the question of
ships, and that they will make an effort to secure an easing up oi the restrictions on exports
of hemp, etc., to Japan.

(2) The steamship companies have told their local representatives that because of the lacif
of export to Japan and the likelihood of a reduction in the number of ships allocated, they
should either refrain from accepting goods for export to the United States, or at least reserve
the right to cancel the shipping in case of changes in the allocation of ships. As the Kokusai
and Kawasaki companies do not have Japanese representatives resident here, please
arrange for the main offices to send instructions directly to their agents here in regard to
accepting shipments.

(3) I think it would be productive of good results to adopt and put into effect the general
rule that we will not permit the assigning of ships to this run merely for carrying exports to
the United States* unless th^ also carry a reasonable amount of gcpds that art now on the

"See II, 343.
'See II, 336.
'See II, 3^.

FROM: Manila
TO: Tokyo

My 7, 1941

mm

restricted list for Japan (besides high grade hemp and iron ore). Of course, the prospects

of securing ore are very meager whatever we do. Then, again, if the efforts of the PiUpinos

mentioned in (2) should happily bring results, and permits be given for shipments to

America together with shipments for Japan a link system could be applied in giving

permits for loading for both countries. As the Filipinos are now negotiating with the Ameri-
cans regarding this matter, it is my idea that we content ourselves for the present with
n^B^tng silently in all quarters to bring influence to bear and wait for results.

°Nt)t available.
*Not available.

Trans. 7-16-41

\». ,146

FROM; Washington (Nomu*a) July 31, 1941

At 6:00 P.M. on the 30th the State Department notified me to the effect that:

1. In case the cargoes are being sent back, the Japanese boats may have until 2tQ^ f^^,
Saturday, the 2nd, to enter port and will be given a reasonable time to depart.

2. In case the manifest shows American ports as the destination of the cargoes, this should
be changed (for example, to Kobe) before reaching port (this is a temporary measure for
getting around the customs ofhce regulation that goods manifested for American ports must be
unloaded before vessel is0im ^^m^mm}:, iiilllliSi'P^t^^

. the customs authorities.

Trana. 8-12^41

No. 347

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) August 2,1^

TO: Honolulu #65. ' ' ' '

Instructions were issued on the 1st by the N.Y.K. for the Tatsuta Maru to stop at Honolulu.

Trans. 8-8-41

No. 348

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) August 2, 1941

According to a Domei dispatch, a part of the cargo of the Tatsuta Maru was seized for
the owners. Please telegraph in detail soon as possible the tit ue facts of the matter.

Trans. 8-9-41

A-176

No. 349

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) ' August 2, 1941

TO: Seattle #24.

According to a message received by the N.Y.K. there is danger of the cargo of the Heiah
Mam being attached by the owners. After conference it was decided to have the entire cargo
unloaded at Vancouver. Please telegraph in detail as soon as possible the latest facts of
<lhe matter.

No. 350

moU: Seattle (Sato) August 4, W

TO: Tokyo #82.

The Heian Maru left on the 4th direct foi Japan. Nothing was taken c«i except fuel and food
for the use of the ship.
Belayed to Washington, all consuls in U.S. (and Honolulu), Ottawa, and Vancouver.

No* 351

PROM: Hollywood (Nakauchi) August*. 1941

TO : Washington , D. C . #58.

Since 1 have already received a wire from the Captain of the special duty ship "Shiriyo"
saying they would arrive in port on the 9th, please let me know if the above-mentioned ship
has3«tefl«efedUiaAilS^l|^«»^l^ • *■

Trans, 8-12-41

FRO M : Tokyo { Matsuoka) June 12, 1941

TO: San Francisco #62.

Secret outside the Department.

Will you have Consul INAGAKI gftlfe ~- and find out from TOTARO IWASAKl (YOZEN)

in strict secrecy and, if necessary, ftaiBi^i^e American concerned, the and the present

condition of the Silver Shirts Movemtert. Then wire me information concerning the necessary
travelling expense, date of sailing and other expenses in connection with preparations for
IWASAKl to come to Japan inasmuch as we would like to use him under our direction in
connection with the Silver Shirts Movement if you find that hia personality and 'training
(judged not on the basis of his reputation) are suitable for this purpose. What I would like to
do, in carrying out our political policy toward the United States, is not to depend on mere
pecuniary connections, but also to direct the aforementioned movement in order to
establish justice in the United States, WiH you, therefore, send me detailed information

A-n7

regarding the ww^d views which form the basis of the movement, the per«)naUty and inteUec-
tual capacity of those catiying OB the mevtmftnt ateoi s«cb other in^psatlip that mi^t
be of interest to me?

(3-part message complete.)
Secret outside the Department.

1. This Silver Shirt movement was founded in 1934 as a juridical person under Delaware
law. It is anti- communistic and anti- Jewish, and has representatives in every state, all led
by Chief PELLEY, and at one time had 30 or 40 thousand regular members.

and pamphlets written by f^tl^ 'sStf^'I^J&tMi^C ^rilifl^" ' a

republican congressman from Montana. Their line of propaganda is as follows:

The administrative and juridical branches of the ROOSEVELT administration are shot
through with interh»tft«tiii ^daism and coMtitWttf&sft and is coming under the influeitce of
the British royalty, which is under the thumb of these elements. America must be defended
from them. America's foreign policy must be to save the human race from the enslaving
grasp of the international Jews. As for the Orient, the United States must not interfere. As for
Euroipe, the United States must not interfere. She must look after herself.

Silver Shirts organizatioft i» being investigated by the DIES committee as a 5th
l^asfes activity (volume 6 ^'Wi^'tf^mi^^^ *«^rt) and cannot act openly. Last year,
either under legal pressure or of its own accord, it dissolved and began an underground
movement. However, its weekly mouthpiece and other publications are being shipped from
Indianapb^ tind'llk^l^Ati^d M& fmt tib eoUntry. It seems that this is being accomplished
through huge special contributions. (According to the DIES investigation, those contributors
alone who have been so far discovered, for a year and a half, beginning in 1937, had contributed
$66,000.)

■2. Well, I had INAGAKI confer with IWASAKI, who said that on April 20th he had first
received an offer from PELLEY, at whose suggestion he sent a letter the last of April to Lt.
Col. SUGITA, of the Headquarters of the General Staff (who will tell you all about it) asking
if the Japanese government would not help out with the Plans; and that again he had asked
JIflO KOGA of the Society of Brethren Overseas to contact the German Ambassador in Tokyo
in case Japan could not grant this help.

Since then I understand that PELLEY has asked time and again if we had a reply, but I
fear this plan could hardly succeed in America under the present conditions. I think it would
Be dangerous for us to have anything to do with this. IWASAKI tosli^li^ in the guy because
of his past failures but the fellow is a very earnest and studious maft« He concentrates m
the Jewish problem, and is possessed with Pel ley ism. Already he has, it seems, furnished
the ChM of Staif with pertinent information, and, remembering the KOJIMA affair in Los
il^^&l^ l think we should make use of him after fully instructing him. I want to give him

Trans. 7-7-41

FROM: San Francisco (Muto)
TO: Tokyo

June 28, IMl

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

$S00 with which to settle his accounts and enough money to travel second class in Japan
about three months; so please wire back at once.
I am shipping the Silver Shirts printed matter.

Trans. 6-29-42

No. 354

FROM: ToHyo (Matsuoka) ^wne 11,1^1

TO! ITashington #58?.

With reference to propaganda among Negroes as a scheme against the United States, your

immediate reply in regard to the following points is reqt|«Hl|il|;.

1. Training of Negroes as (fifth columnists ?),

2. The wray trfutiliae^iti*ttiBdrder to b^iii meme^^mnfifl*?).

3. The method of contacting the agitators and leaders among the Negroes, as well as both
right and left wings. Also, the amount of expenses involved.

The Minister requests that t^-nlriswe message be forwarded to New York, New Orleans,
S«n Francisco and Los Angeles.

psm. 5-27-42

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

(Parti of 3.)

(Message # 257 from New York to the Foreign Minister.)
Re your ff 287° to Washington.

1. Approximately 25 /c of the total population of the United States is Negro. In the north,
centering around New York and Chicago, there is a movement to equalize the status o£ these
people. They are being educated along general sociological lines, and gradually their political
position is being equalized. In last year's presidential election, one Congressman, two state
Senators, 50 members of state Legislature, and two Justices were elected from among the
Negro population. But still the political strength of the Negro organization can be used much to
our advantage, so long as the bread and butter of the Negro depend so utterly upon the white
man. Taking advantage of their economic unr^, we might use them to slacken the progress
of the United States' plans for national defense and economy as well as for sabotage. However,
I must point out the following facts: With the exception of a few pioneers, the Negroes are not
organized into a strong racial group, conscious of the fact that it consists of an oppressed
people. There are certain progressive organizations working toward the equalization of the
Negro, such as the Negro Congress, the Negro Alliance (both Leftist), and the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People. It is to be noted, however, that the largest
Negro organizations are financed by the Jews. I do not see much that we might do aside from
cooperating with these organizations m elevating the status of the Negro, from which we could
expect very great results. Another thing is that the movement to equalize the Negro was
originally fostered ideologically and Anancially by tb& Communist Party, and among Negro

July 4, 1941
#468.

leaders there is a rather large Leftist element. Doubtless, however, many of them are quite
compromising for convenience's sake, and instead of trying to start a social revolution are
following the single principle of elevating the Negro. Therefore, they could not be called
atrictly ticftist.

•See 354,

Trans. 7-8-41

No. 356

FROM: Washington (Norawa) July 4, 1941

TO: Tokyo #468.

(Part 2 of 3.)

(Message - 257 from New York to the Foreign Minister.)
To be kept secret within the Department.

2. Since the close of last year, 1 have been using a Negro literary critic named ° and have

had him open a news service for Negro newspapers. The Negro press is so poor that it has no news

i^ice of its own, and as I have told you in various messages, ° has been getting relatively

good results, and because of the advantage we have in using men like this in our political and
subversive activities, the effect of propaganda upon the Negroes is naturally limited.

3. HIKIDA is in most intimate contact with Negro groups and Negro leaders. I am going to
have him continue to work along that line and have him foster the organization of Negroes
of great ability, thus advancing our own purposes. Concerning the advantage of using Negroes
in procuring intellisentes, since I have not yet used Negro spies directly, I am unable to judge.

However, as an experiment 1 am now instructing Mr. °,an official of the New York branch

of the National Yqiiiib jyiiftilsailiiatMSn, and a graduate of to be a spy.

Trans. 7-8H11

No. 357

FROM: Washington (NomuraJ
TO: Tokyo

(Partaof;^.)

(Message = 257 from New York to the Foreign Minister.)
To be kept secret within the Department.

4. In organizing our schemes among the Negroes, in view of the fact that the organizations
practically all have their headquarters in Washington, naturally that city should be our hub.
However, in actually carrying out our plots, we would be met with a number of difficulties^
so at first we had better center around Mr. HIKID A's work in New York, while at the same tiiKU^

July 4, 1941
ff468.

THE "MAGiC" BAGKOROJU^D OF PEABJ* HARBOR

workiilg assiduously in Washington, After we see what results we get in this manner, we
can undertake our job in Chicago. In view of the fact that the United States lacks skilled labor
to carry out its defense production plans, naval arsenals and other military establishments are
gradually admitting Negroes to technical lines. At present there is a fairly small number of
Negroes in the naval arsenals at Norfolk and Portsmouth, Virginia, In the arsenals at
Philadelphia and Brooklyn there are also a few unskilled Negro laborers, so I would say that iti
the future there will be considerable i»ofit in our getting Negroes to gather military intelligence^
lori^ Ii^(^^ii^1^iei^'«t'§#l^ md New Orleans.

No. 358

FROM: Wmhms^&^imis^ July 8, 1941

TO: Tokyo #475.

(Intelligence Report of Secondary Order. )

Before attacking the Soviet, Germany secretly carried on some peace talks with Great
Britain, From Churchill down they steielftstiy reftj^ to harken to the

case the Soviet is quickly shattered according to Germany's plans, and it appears imminent
that Great Britain will be invaded and the foundations of the British Empire shaken, and in
6ms ■^^artamf ^ peace t^ms are not too severe, peace pailsyB- liifiy «xi8iie. iHtf'tMtiSd States
is serving as a check or a brake and there are men in the State Department who favor peace
in order to prevent the annihilation of the British Empire, There are also such men in the
Cabinet, for example. Secretary of Commerce, JESSE JONES. LINDBERG told a friend ttf
mos^ ^«it ppi^ieti^wiUbad aMI^

FROM; Tokyo (Japanesef^^*j^ii^3!, . July 10, 1941

TO: Washington - - - - ^ ^^^^

(Circular)

Message to Berlin w 630. Secret.

There have been a good many reports 6Dm the United States and other places that Itftl^ aitd
Germaay iuiivfienplussed. Although I, myself, (the Foreign Minister), have complete faith in
the explanation made by Ribbentrop, please send anything you can about it. It is said that
the peace rumor is a machination (activity) of England and the United States, Please find out
bom Ribbentrop at a convenient opportunity exactly what the German opinion is oi the teva^
intent of this activity. ^^m» tdegisph. th« .^. TMs has. b«m £^ Jis^^nd^ A«ftwi0^
theSoviet.

Trans. 7-24-41

A-18I

No. 360

PROM: Chicago (Olrocd)
TO; Tokyo

August 2, 1^1
#25.

As you are well aware, it is best to observe the conversion of automobile factories into
manufacturmg centers of military goods in order to secure an idea as to the extent of United
States Government's stepping up all defense plans. T^ie detaUs .conceft^i^-eurreni ctHitract
amounts and items of ^^l^
this area are as follows:

'*fhe General Motel* Corporation has defense contracts amounting to $275,000,066: /Sl^
call for the production of trucks, antiaircraft guns, airplane parts and airplane engines.

Ford has contracts amounting to $778,000*000 calling for the production of bombers, air-
plane engines, armored caxs, and trucks.

Chrysler has defense contracts amounting to $375,000,000 for tfefi production of tanks,
traeka, anti-aircraft guns and parts for bombers.

^cfeard has defense contracts amounting to $245,000,000 which call for the production of
aircraft enffines and airplane .

Relayed to Washington and New York.

With regard to HOPKINS' rtii^iefti tn €he Soviet, though officials in Washington generally
giv£the explanation that he has gone there to confer on aid in the form of supplies to the Soviet,
DENNY, diplomatic editorial writer for the Script Howard newspaper, wrote under date of
the 31st in a Washington dispatch that since Germany and the Soviet were so deeply involved
in war, the Soviet was demanding not only complete material assistance, but also that joint
British and American military activities be commenced not only in Germany's rear, but
in Norway as well. On the other hand in England and the United States it would seem that
there is a desire that, in the event of thorough going activity in the war agair^t Germany and
against Japan, that the Soviet otfer a guarantee to attack Japan.

Whether ^ nel II05*3B^ and STALIN are able to decide upon an agreement cannot be
predicted, but it would seem clear that such was HOPKINS' mission there. LAWRENCE
DENNIS on the same day in his "Work Letter" said that he had heard that HOPKINS' mission

in the Soviet was ^-^^ The ''Daily Worker", in a front page editorial, reported

that HOPKINS' mission was to bring about joint British, American and Russian intemational
cooperation. This is for your information.

^liSfed to Washington. ' •

Trans. 8-8-41

FKOM : New York ( Morishima )
TO: Tokyo

August 2, 1941
#379.

Trans. 7-8-41

A^182

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No.3«2

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 4, 1941

TO: Mosctw, Berlin #225,

(Circular) (Message to Tokyo #648)

1. I have made a thorough study of the notes exchanged between America and Soviet
Russia which extend the validity of the American Soviet trade agreement of August 6, 1937 up
to August 6, 1942.

2. The above-mentioned notes were exchanged between America and the Soviet at the
same time as were those, the gist of which you received in my wire # 649°

Relayed to -

'Regarding Am^riccui-Japnii^ relations with regard to exports and the French'Indo China question;

Trans. 8-U-41

No. 363

FROM: Washington (Nomura) May 20, 1941

TO: Tokyo #325.

I have decided hereafter in the case Uitell%«nee6 which I consider reliable to start them

with the word "joko" (first priority) and in the case of those which are mere heresay, but
Bufiiciently important to be brought to your attention, with "jootsu" (secondary importance).

Trans. 5-22-41

No. 364

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 4, 1941

TO: Berne, Washiap#ffi» it Mfi»ico #1180.

(Circular)

Hereafter when you have intelligence messages to send us, please consider where you got
them from, their substance and degree of reliability. Those which you consider almost
^^n mark "Joko", primary importa»(|«i;^|«l#ti|Sife'i?,i(^^^ is questionable

mark "Jootsu", secondary importance.

Trans. 6^14-41

A-183

FROM: Washington (Nomaiia)
TO: Tokyo

Re your Circular 1367*.

I think it would be well to:

1. Burn up all the aci:mint^(3j^J» the .l^.^^r!^

four years. % '

In order to insure against any disruption of financial management of the respective
offices, collect all funds to be paid up to the end of the fiscal year and wire the same.

3. Aiter checking up on the fixtures now in possession, without reference to the ledger,
prepare a list of the fixtures actually necessary.

4. If a tuitable purchaser could be found, sell th& Ptficipl land situated on "N" Street in mt
city.

"Sot available.

Trans. 7-9-41

No. m

FROM: Washington (Nomura) . May 17, 1941

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) Unnumbered.

(Washington to Tokyo ^il3J

(Re your extra.)

I redispatch my memt$^'»% §oll<Stmi
No. 313.

Re your Circular message # 584".

I am having the person in charge put matters in order. However, the ricocds of this office
have been kept in a rather disorderly fashion, and furthermore, the number of items which
are handled by this othce as a daily routine is fairly high.

For these reasons, it is practically impossible for one man to even attempt to tackle the
older documents. We would like to select some one to assist in the work of putting this office
fai ofder immediately. (;Fhte> |l^eH» be one who ;^.«lfi^l^.#|'^ Ffianeiail

Consulate-Cleneral.) 4 .:»►». . ^

Please give the matter of employing this man at one hundred dollars a mDf>|bi;^<i: fl3|Q*itef
ItelflSO travel^^ilKp^ys*®, jeeijr etiasadwation. In view of the critical tip«i, witt sm irs^Sf
immediately.

""Because of present critical international situaticm separate at once all secret documents into a special class. Burn
•U Other documents iranwdiately, in tbrict wecte^^ «9»^tins a few that.may be &m^^)ii^0lS>'*

tram.

July 8, 19411

#473.

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No.M7

PROM: Washington (N<3^&#/ '^^^V ^.

TO: Tokyo ff456.

(Secret, to be kept inside department.)

I would like your permission to bum certain codes which I have in this office, the use of
which is to be stopped and which will in the future be of no use, certain ones rarely used, and
certain (j^sei^^fe^li I have too many. Woidd Sf« jjlefSimd me instructions?

Trans.

No. 368

FROM: Washington (Nomuia) July 18, ■

TO: Tokjm *516.

(Strictly Secret.)

In accordance with your instruction, I have been compiling aiy i>ecords, and the materials
which should be returned to the home office I have packed into S2 wooden boxes. These have
been loaded on board the Kawasaki Steamship Company steamer NORFOLK MARU whicfe
left Baltimore on the 12th. I am mailing you the details and .

Furthermore, because this steamer will stop at ports of call in South America, it is under-
stood that rt will not reach Yokohama until the end of — todift^.'^Sb^ It' it 'tltet^tf
that in the light of the international situation that is too late a date, please arrange to have
this ship not stop at its ports of call in South America but sail directly to Japan.

' "The two letters givit^ the ©umber of the month are very badly garbled and could not represent any number; how-

Trans. T-IS--^

FROM: Tokyo July 7, 19^

TO: Washington ? 335.

As a means of sending our communications from here, if worse comes to worse, we have
plans for making use of the intelligence dispatches that are being sent out each night; but as
«. meems of making contact from your end, we have been thinking of the possibility of having
a wireless set with an operator of exceptional ability in your office, and at the time of the day
that is most favorable for dispatches, sending tbem in relay via South America and Yaruto*
in the South Seas. However, I would like to know your opinion as to the feasibility of the ^an
as regards the following three points.

(1) Could a transmitter of about 100 or 200 watts, or its parts, be assembled in your cit^
under the guise of "amateur" use?

(2) Could this be set up and trial communications carried out as an "timateur" with the
relay staticms'? Then after having it set up secretly in your office, wotild there be aiiy eb^ietd^'til

Mm

(3) It is expected that if the situation takes a turn for the worst, that extreme limitations,
if not prohibitions, will be placed upon the use of the radio in general. In such an event is
there any likelihood that the above-mentioned equipment could be used to good advantage?"

'Yamto, principal island of Jaluit (BonhamJ Atotl. (6° Off N., l&S^ 3€' E.)

Trans. 7-8-41

No. 370

FROM: Washington
TO; Tokyo

July 23, 1941
#558.

Re your #335".

I have conferred with our navy experts in regard to the technical points involvf(J^ |Wfil M^S
result our opinions, on the points you asked about, are as follows:

(1) Thiswotikl be possible.

(2) and (3) While it would likely be possible to send communications as "amateurs", with
the highly developed detector equipment in use here, it would be impossible to keep secret
the existence and use of such a radio set in the Embassy compound. This would be especially
true whenever the situation should become worse, and with interference to be encountered
in wave lengths, there would be little hope of our being able to make any efficient use of such
means, and looked at fiKSsa the situation as a whole wt think it would be inadvisable to try it.

"Tokyo questions Washing;! on on the possibility of setting up a wireless set at the Ambassador's office as a pro-
ewtion against developments leading to limitations to or possible prohibition of, the use of radio. July 7, 1941; II, 361.

Hit yout circular # 1013'.
Secret outside the Department.

In our present telegraphic room we have no space for the equipment, so we shall have to
revise and expand it in order to accommodate the equipment. The best place to land this
would be in Baltimore. I can send a member of my staff there and I am sure we can get it
to Washington without any trouble. As soon asj^ij^^^ at an ^itliaS^^-ffj^t^'^^gBI^ fef
t^g^|i^il4i9l^^s«jjijB3|j^!S^n4 WW^^

"Tokyo says it would like to ship a special size safe to maintain custody of code machines and code books, and
a8k» for immediate information as to place of installaticHi, whether or not it will be difficult to bring in, and where it
sk>uld be unloaded.

Trans. 7-26-41

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

May 26, 1941
#337.

Trans. 5-29-41

tHE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 372

FROM: Washington May 27, lUl

TO: Tokyo # 339.

From New York as follows:

Re your Circular to America # 1013°.

As you wrote in your letter, the present office is too small and unless we rent other quarters
there will be no room to install a safe. Also, we wish to get a place rather removed fifom the
present office. Even if, for example, we enforce our night watch as at present, (as you are well
aware, the matter of the night watch is illegal and very inconvenient), it is extremely
4f£SctiIt to maintain adequate protection for our secret codes. Furthermore, Hirasawa has
informed us that unless we have a separate house it will not be possible to install a code
machine. He has also communicated this to the head office. Our lease on the present othce
««pij?es in Septeoiber of this year. We msh ^ meiri%^» p&te&'that will be suitable for the
teli^Sphic office also, and there install all the equipment we need. This will also be the best
platw to install the safe to which you refer.

W* have made tentative arrangeme»t& fcfr moving to a suitable location in October of this
year with rent about the same as here and only await your approval, HowevM, the landlord
must have definite word by June 1st, so please wire approval immediately.

In regard to the expenses rannected with the move, maintaining a separate office and an
apartment will necessitate more employees. This, together with the heating and various othar
commodities involved, will mean that our operating expenses will be several times what they

' Matsuoka wires Washington he is sending a safe for mainfatjflu^ CMto^ljf machines and bodfS. Wants to
know wheit^-ffiUJbe installed and where it shall be unloaded.

Trans. 6-6-41

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 2, 1941

TO: Bpm#,,«r«i^lie^i®||*^|il$(l^ ettwJsr#U66.

(Urgent)

(5 parts— wmplete) (Waahington Circular #126)

In various countries the science of cryptography and cryptanalysis is beijrq; practiced mote
and more. To tell the truth, no absolute confidence can be placed in the siectecy of a coi^
We, ourselves, in this office are worrying about drawing up a set of new codes, so we wotHH
like for you to give us some suggestions from time to time as to suitable procedures. Please
pay the strictest attention always during the transfer and tenure of codes and heed the following
points on the maintenance of the security of codes, independent tf reMmt^'M'^tl^Wdiitk

1. Needless to say, courier mail is a more secure method of transmitting information than
by reliance upon cod^, so when there is some secret matter which might arouse a given
nation, please send the message by courier mail or some other method equally ds safe.

2, I am having an official in charge of this work keep the various offices informed. Each time
you get a list, keep one eopy of it only and burn the preceding list immediately.

Ami

3. Hereafter, as a matter of principle, code messages in — toe not to be sent anywhere
except to this otttce. As a matter of fact, all other code nxm^^iSSi *»e«pt thiose to this office,
save in cases of necessity, are to be stopped.

Please see to it that there is no misunderstanding to the effect that after abolishing this
sort of dispatches it is not our intention to increase the difficulties of those in charge of tele-
graphic work tlu^ugh the necessity of safeguarding dispatches, or the sudden complication of our
codes, biit that 1 am m&i^ty tiyit!^l£»«|ajp6^#^pfa^ more ss^iMW^^

No. 37a

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 2, 1941

TO: Rome, Vichy, Moscow, Berne, Berlin, Bangkok, Washington, Circular v 1167.

Singapore, and Batavia

As stated in circular # 1166° fitm ^e- Poreigii Minister, the strictest carerfe i^eessary for the

protection of the secrecy of codes. Well, our telegraphic staffs are already busy without the afore-
mentioned innovations, and this is but another added burden, so please have them cut down
dl^ati^ies to the abaoltite minimum.

'See 11,373.

Trans,

No. 376

PROM: Washington Ju^<^l:8M^*

TO: Tokyo

Message = 268 from New York to Tokyo.

The duties of telegraphic cierk for this office are being handled by Watanabe alone and up
to now he has be«n able to accomplish the work by being very faithful in the discharge of his
duties. But in view of the present increase in the number of telegrams which must be handled
through this office for the various departments, as for instance the instruction regarding ship-
fi^^ia f tit more imfffidrta^^^ tetii^tia^ «en£<^ng cQmmmM^at&, hmiks, and intelllgefte^
agents, and the necessity of maintaining secrecy, it will be necessary immediately to have some
one sent here temporarily at least from the nearest office. At the same time we wish to request
that you give immediate ^^isiilwation to the matter of increasing the clerical staff here and wire
us immediately a.s to what action you have taken.

We are well aware of the shortage of help that exists all along the line. All of the staff here are
doing their best to help out in the telegraphic dcpariment. However, the complexity of the
telegraphic art of the present day does not lend itself very well to part time work, {Our three
clerks here all hold additional posts. One is engaged in correspondence, another in accounting.,
and the other in commerce.) Due to the pressure of busine^ it is very difficult to handle the
telegraphic code. Please give this matter consideration.

Trans. 7-9-41

THE 'MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 377

FROM: Washington July 24, 1941

TO: Tokyo ff554.

(Parti of 3)

340 from New York to the Foreign Minister.

(Strictly Secret.)

Re message # 339° from the United States to the Foreign Minister.

Though we are now searching for a separate building, we have not been able to find one,
iild in the meantime, time is awasting, and there is the matter of instructions received
from you on successive occasions with regard to the emergency situation. Under the
pr^nt ^tuation, in ortlti' that we might pfepai^ ourselves Us tsm^ eriticsl developments,

at least, we have given up the proposal of attempting to find a fiil^^tory building of our
own. We would like at this time to effect an expansion of our business ofhce and to acquire
the necessary equipment for such an expansion, in addition to which we feel that the equip-
ping of our telegraphic and document rooms as well as a night duty room is ot the utmost
iojEton^ce. In order that we may immediately realize these things for the time beii^ we
fisetiwemust st least rent additional office space immediately and along the foUowiitg lines:

1. The business olQBces of the Consul-Generalcy at the present time are more than over-
crowded. We have been forced to use the two old ordinary reception rooms to serve also as docu-
meat and night rooms. When we are anxious to use the reception room for the entertainment of
A caller, we find it most inconvenient to carry on anything like a secret conversation. In order
that we may use the reception room as it was originally intended, it is going to be absolutely
necessaiy that we rent another room.

'Notavaikbte.

Xo.378

FROM: Washington Jfuly24, 1941

TO: Tokyo #;^-

(Part2of 3.)

2. After hours, in order to maintain a watch for the purpose of the preservation of our secrets,
we have had a member of t^e staff on night duty since August of last y^iff'^^^use there is tiNi
suitable room in the office which can be assigned to such a purpose, we have been forced to use
a studio couch in the reception room as a bed for this meinber of the staff, la spite of the fa€t
that this duty v^^^ i'mii^^^t^t^'i^Miip upott #1 iei#<M^lt#%dM^r'^^
liealtb, should the situation here become more critical, there would be no recourse for us
but.te assign two men to this duty, but with the present facilities this is impossible. Now there
v^:1^ScBttg i^guhilH^ heeving to do with night duty in 'the office, %ut we have come to an
$tS||b|KBtanding with the owners by saying we are working twenty-four hours per day. How-
«V^<Iiavii^ reached that understanding, it is most inconvenient for the man on duty to have

mm-

10 go to the bathroom in hia night clothes. Consequently, it is absolutely necessary, if we are
going to do a satisfa«tory job in the operation of this night duty, we will have to rent a room
which at least has a minimum of conveniences.

3, The room which we are now using for telegraphic operations is exceedingly small. There is
no room tor two be mi tt the same time. Therefore, we would like to have you consider
expanding this office so that we may take care of special safes aiid llMSWas© in the personnel
(please refer to ray 368°) which we hope to have in the future.

"In which NOMURA advises Tokyo that the Times stated that Japan has been considering a neutrality

Last summer it was necessary to change the reception room into a document room. This
room we are now using for the custody of important documents, the classification of documents,
the operation of Japanese type mimeograph machines, and for the collection and disposition
of documents. Not only is it impossible to use this room as a reception room, but for purposes
of document collection and disposition it is much too cramped. Should you give your permis-
siQtt increasing of our staff itf Japanese typists by one person, it is a fact that there would

be no room for the machine he or she would use. Therefore, at this time, it is of utmost
necessity that we increase our floor space to take care of one room to he used for document
collection and disposition. With regard to the above, a total increase of appro|xr|||f^n would
be required in the amount of $3,700.00, and the equipment fund would require an increase
of $1,093.00, (Blue prints and estimates on the cost of equipment we are sending you by air
mail.)

Though this increased appropriation seems very high, it can't be helped. On the one hand,
in order that we might continue renting the present official residence as it stands, we have
finally secured a reduction of $1,000.00 in our annual rental as a result of our determined
negotiations with the owners. After you have considered that a deduction of this amount from
the increased appropriation requested a balance of $2,700.00 remains to be appropriated,
please be so kind as t« sanction this increased allotment immediately. Furthermore, in these
times it would seem that should the vacant room immediately adjoining this office be rented
by an American, it might be mo&t embawa^mg from the point of view of the maintenance

Tmm- 8-9-41

^OM; Washington (Nomura)
'¥0: Tokyo

(Part 3 of 3)

July 24, 1941
#554, ■

Traiis.S-9-41

A-m

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 380

FROM: New York (Mco^ishima) July 30, 1941

TO: Tokyo #371.

Lately our telegraphic duties have been gradually increasing. Telegrams from the Finance
Otfice and other governmental messages as well as request messages from merchants and
banks have been piling up. Dispatches which require Immediate attention have grown rapidly
in number. Therefore, I placed another member of my staff with Mr. WATANABE, who

is in charge of such business, and had Secretary KIHARA come to our assistance from

and Secretary KAJIHARA come up from Washington. They are pressed in Washington also,
and for technical reasons KAJIHARA cannot be spared long, and I shall have to send him
back to Washington this week. Our telegraphic section must have help, however, so I have
asked, Waahiogton to send us an aide from thm Embassy. Please order them to choose a man
«^ ft^feH^ce in Urgent telegrams and send hitt «^ toe liMnediately. '

Trana. 10-10-41

No.381 . . ,

FROM: Washington July 29, 1941

TO: 'I\jkyo ff601.

There is a request from the Military and Naval Attaches that due to the situation prevailing
at the present time they be permitted to move their office to the Elmbassy, for a time at least.

I recognize this as a reasonable request and wiU mak« the neces^uy arrangements for room.
Please grant the request.

Trans. 8-1-41

No. 382

FROM: Washington July 29, 1941

TO; Tokyo #596.

Re your Circulpf #13^.

After consultation with the ^inliie^' II 'hi^t lie^ ^ i^ttoitt. tlie Imperial PtxmSt

to the Embassy.

To forestall the possibility d their office in fioreisn countries bdng closed without waminff, by the countries
involved. Matsudca iwu«s inxtiuctiMis that [precautions shall be taken for the safety of the Empeiw's portrait and,
M ^ ^qpectoiBit line. #f <tew^^

Ttans. 8-1-41

W^M: Washington (Noiwuia).
TO: Tokyo

July 30, 1941
#61&.

Heference yotu #3 0.

The imperial portraits at New York and Chicago are en route to Washington. Student clerk
HASHIZUME will leave by train on the 30th for San Francisco where he will place the
imrtraits m the Asama Maru. Minister WAKASUGl wUl take over the pictures on board and
will return th«m to the home office.

We have appropriated 100,000 yen lor your intelligence and enlightenment expenses during
the current fiscal year, and I am hereby sending you the first installment of 25,000 yen. This
money is to be used as follows:

1. II' worse comes to worst, we consider MeKico City, along with Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires,
and Santiago as mtmtt impoirtant hm6& f&t {fitelftfe^ce emtcemn^ tlia!ted Stat^. Prom a
geographical standpoint it is most natural that we should endeavor to set up in Mexico City
im establishment where we can carry on routine business in the matter of collecting intelligence
liatiieeniing the United States. This point I stressed particularly in the outline in the first
paragraph of my secret - 62° with reference to propaganda activities.

2. Though the funds are in the main to be used in intelligence concerning the United States,
wMl l^%#«1i«naM'1b^''tii^ ift gathering intelHgeieiiiSft ^'Mexico. Bear in mtnd that in putting
this policy into effect our principal aim is to collect every possible bit of intelligence concernii^
the United States and, with this in view, 1 want you to contact and work out a cooperative
fioltcy wHlr ^ir^ffi^e^ Ib'&os Angeles, Houstofi, Heir Otii^»» Fip:^bi^rnKNre,
in this connection, Mexicati might well be used.

3. Please also plan to use RAFAEL MUNAS fas purposes of interception.

4. Concerning propaganda and enltghtment, in «^ tM Ij^tsd States joins the war, we will
endeavor to use our nationals there to our best possible advantage and we will do our very best
to use Rightist and Leftist Labor organizations and promote their anti-American revolutionary
influence. Please use your best effcsts t&Sciiiewtib^

Secret outside the Department.

Trans. &-2HH

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Mexico

June 2, mi

#93.

*No« available.

Trans. 7-1-41

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

mm

Mexico Citsi'fSatt^)
TO: Tokyo

June 14, 1941

I wish to send JOSE LLERGO.

This man is thirty years old, youthful and energetic, and is already an influential reporter.
His elder brother is the editor of the weekly periodical HOY. Although it seems to me tfcai
by and large Mexican newspapers are following the tendency of yielding to pressure from the
United States, nevertheless HOY has steadily maintained unbiased editorials. I believe that
through this man we can greatly influence the press of this country and that it would be much
to OUT advantage to use him in the future .

I iw«3JdiiketoaendhiTOte1^4e*t plan(&,80 his traveling expenses?

Re my ? 206°.

1. On the 18th, PAPESU came to call on me to bid me farewell. On this occasion, he
Imni^ht a man by the name of ISAKU DETYASU (Isaac Diaz ?) (he is also a reporter on the 01
(?), and is said to be PAPESU's best friend). Since touring Europe, Diaz also has become
very desirous of traveling to Japan. So, seizing upon PAPESU's visit to Japan, he has decided
to go there too, at his own expense.

Some time ago, I had members of my staff make investigations into the characters of
these men. This was the first time, however, that I met and talked with Diaz, and was happy
to find that both men were exceedingly pleasant.

They are both underlings of Maximino Camacho and are well qualified for future utilization
by us. I was firmly convinced that it would be to our interest to have both men travel to Japan.
I, therefore, told Diaz that because there was no time to advise my home government of his
coming, I could not say definitely whether he could be given any financial assistance or not.
However, I would do my best for him, I said; and told him to go to Japan on the assumption
that he would have to pay his own way, ( in part, at least).

Because of these circumstances, I would appreciate your giving consideration to allowing
Diaz the same sort of treatment as has been extended to PAPESU.

*Jmie 14. II, SiS. Comul Geiwral Smtb at Mexico City ft«te» fcts desu« to send Jose Ll^or, oumandins Mexican
news reporter and brother i^ ttte Bifitor of Hey, weekly peiaodieal. Bdte^ tltat the Mexfcsm pte^ «^ be jfrn^tty
influenced through him.

Trans. 7-3-41

So. m

FROM: Mexico
TO: Tckyo

July 19, im
#280.

Trans. 7-23-41

FROM: Mexico (Mtura) June 24, 1941

TO: Tokyo

From Minister YAMAGATA {en route to Peru). ,

1, The Question of Obtaining Military Materials.

Both the President and the Minister of Economics kept on running away from me;
consequently, I was unable to have them attaw me to confer with them. Both the German and
Italian Ministers advised me against undertaking negotiations in any way conspicuous. Even
if I opened the negotiations by bringing up first of all the question of rayon and proposed
either a barter system or compensatory trade, there is very little likelihood of my succeeding
by approaching the question through the front door. There is no way but to approach it from
the back door. At any rate, it is a question whether I would succeed in this matter, inasmuch
ks additional pressure is being exerted at present by the United States. Mexican business
jnen in this field expect that sooner or later an embargo or export license system would be put
into effect atfecting the export to Japan of mercury and other materials. Under these circum-
stances, I think it is very important fi^ US td m» M m \»3^ fifmi^ti^Si^ msi
in as secret a manner as possible. . ^

2. As regards political trends in this part of the W€ii^/,f wiU wire you information after my
arrival in Panama since tiencts lA %he Caribbean and C«el^ Americiin eountrti^ mi8M^ also
be taken into consideration.

Trans. 7-1-41

No. 388

FROM: Tokyo June 20, 1941

1 U: Mexico City #

Re your #208". ►

1. In reference to the purchase of expwts referred to previously, a high price was offered
for 15.000 boxes (bales, crates ?). Following up the idea of your suggestion, 7,500 boxes were
finally agreed upon. The price was lowered from $83.00 for 120 denier to $81.00 for 150 denier.

2. In order that outsiders may be kept from getting in on this export purchase, it will be
fut^re^*^ Ministry of Copaias^ Jp^t^ f0 0^^t a warm^ ^IgMn the near

3. Please continue endeavoring to obtain a barter of artificial silk for mercury. In addition,
try to obtain assurance of general essential materials by offering the Mexicans any sort of
stipulations desired, such as offering to make a deposit of guarantee. Also, it is desired to make
barter arrangements for necessary industrial materials. Please answer by wire, giving your
opinion about this.

'Not available.

Trans. ^S3-41

THE "MAGIC" BACKGBOUND OF PEAEL HARBOR

No. 389

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Mexico City

To Minister YAM AG ATA.

In view of the fact that there are at present certain delicate trends in Columbia, on your
way to Peru will you please stop for we«k at Bogota.

Trans, 7-1-41

No. 390

FROM: Bogota (Yanai) June 18, 1941

1EI0£» . I^okyo #60.

Aecordit^ to ytiur message #96° to our Minister in Mexico, Minister YAMAGATA* is soon
to visit me. Both from a geographical and a business point of view, our petroleum interests in
Mexico are being curtailed. Consequently, I feel that it is necessary to have official NAGUMO',
who is stationed in Quito, come here and sit with me while we discuss this matter with
Minister YAMAGATA. Therefore, will you please ammp to bsve NAGUMO MtAt
visiting Lima? I have discu^d this with NAGUMO.

I •'Seen, 389.

'Kiyoshi Yaiua^ata has held important positions in VeB«aueU. Fiaeifii Of&(X> in Tflkyo, EHid in legations «t tcmdnft,
Washington, and Brussels, accom pained by Secretary TakagL
'Consul in Quito, Ek;aailor.

Trans. 6-25-43l

No. 391

FROM: Mexico (Miurai
TO: Tokyo

(In 2 parts — complete.)

Relative to getting this office organized on a war time basis, I explained all the circumstances
within the office to Minister Yamagata and discussed plans with him thoroughly. As a result
we have concluded that the following measure would be most desirable and therefore, we
would like to request your cooperation in bringing them about at the earliest possible time:

(1) We (have been expecting ?) the arrival of Secretary Fujii and he seems to have arrived
in Spain (?) but we have already received a dispatch from him saying "I have been trying to
secure steamer accommodation, but under present conditions there is little prospect. The
Foreign Office understands this and therefore, you will please be advised accordingly." Now,
with the outbreak of the German-Soviet hostilities it will be still more difficult for him to
come, and therefore, we would request that some other person be appointed and sent forward
|tt once.

(2) As mentioned in my # 134°, we have here greatly desired (closer contacts with ?) those
ccmnected with trade relations, financial matters and the intelligence work, and if there

June la, 1941
#96.

June 25, 1941
#224.

dirticulties in the way of getting these hooked up together at this time, why not appoint
someone now who as the ftbpve i^jeptioned fitsit jt^cretary could have general charge over the
business in the ttffi«e, «ft<J iii adiiSlicm sfed Itave the responsibility of either the trade or the
intelligence work. If this could be done, then we could have Secretary Sato look after the other
duties. Or in case no suitable person can be found of the First Secretary class, if we could have
some young person with experience in either of these lines of work sent out immediately, we
could put Sato in general charge of the office work and one of the other lines.

(3) Please appoint as capable a person as possible as Fukushima's relief at once.

(4J Kataoka and Samijima att both competent men, but they have been here many years,
and from the standpoint of bringing about a new atmosphere in this office we would like to
have them transferred elsewhere and new men appointed in their places. In case it is im-
^6*i8llrt& tew tfeew tfaraaWed elsewhere, we would be pleased to have Kataoka appointed
to Salvador and Samijima to Mexicali, and have TskasfaiSiS and Miyazawa from those
places, respectively, appointed to duty in this office,

(5) Then, although Kato of Mexicali does have a situation in his family, in view of the
needs during this seriou.s emergency, I wish his return home could be deferred a while longer
and that he be instructed immediately to take up duties in this office, or else have orders
issued iot Kato of ^g^tina, who is said to be returning home soonr leport for service hesre
for the time beii^. lo tfais hktter instance, we vmild have no obaKitipns t© Kato's beijig ordered
to duty elsewhere.

Re My

In view of the times and conditions, we do not believe that it would be to our interest to move
Katp of Mexicali. Please, therefore, do not issue orders for him to return to Japan, but instead
have him stay where he is for the present, and have Miyazawa come here and assume his
post alone.

Will you please also consider ways and means of making use of Kato in the event that (the ?)
Mexicali (office ?) is strengthened?

'See II, i3Sl. Amb. Miara «t Mexico City wires Tokyo of his piaas, after e<iiij«ien«e with Minister Ysfrai^sta, fw
(WfCantzinK the Mexico City office on a war time basis. Suggests several ^StHHliiK^ ptsnmmBl at the office and tieipieata
ilm someofw tw mat thei« to substitute for Secy. Fujii who is in SpaiaiiMlt iuMl9)le to Irave because of lack of steams

'Not available.

Trans. 7^1-41

.No. :m

July 3, 1941

T^ans, 7-7-41

No. 393

FROM; Mexico City (Miura)
fO; Tokyo

1. KATO, of Mexicali, spoke to the following effect to Emissary YAMAGATA and to the
Baembers of this office when he visited this office recently for the pus^Si^^bimBf^Jl''^^
at that time visiting the other country to which I have been accredited). t - v - . •

He said: "In Mexicalt and vicinity American influence is predominant (All officials from tll£
Gov^Tior down are puppets of the United States). Although there are many Japanese inhabitants
there, since not one of them belongs to the intelligentsia, if intelligence work is to be carried
on, it is absolutely necessary that both funds and the personnel be reorganized at the branch."

2. I believe he is right. Although it is difficult to conduct intelligence work, which is liable
to be noticeable, in a border city having a population, according to recent figures, of 15,000, I
l^lieve the work there would prove useful, provided Idbat the intelligence net in Los Asglii^'
and vicinity is well organized, especially if a situation occurs in which we find it necessa^
to withdraw our officials now in the United States. Now, if this is so, I believe we should at
i&cc establish connection with Loe Angela and make ne^ssary |>reparations.

'See II, 398— Tokyo asks Mexico Ui reply as soon aa postible ivgarding the plan to contact and work otit a cooperative
jpoUcy with officials in Ija^ Angeles. Houstoiit N«w OrlewtB, m& iiiw Vorjt in «n effixt to cotleet eveiy pcHsible bit of
ib^^igtn^ concemiiite the United States.

FROM : Mexico City (lifiUrd)
TO: Tokyo

Re my 229'.

1, With regard to the AP dispatch referred to in the above mentioned message, the Foreign
Office issued a statement on the 27th, the gist d which was as follows:

The aims of an agreement of this nature between the governments of these two countries
are, as outlined in the statement published on 8 June (refer to my message ff204*} to
mutually supply each other with materkis netSiid ^miet ^ pres^ w&itA iSdtiiKtions. Tlie^
text of the agreement can, undoubtedly, be made public shortly.

2. We have been continuing to work on the matter contained in paragraph 2 of my message
#208'. Since we have been able to establish connectloe^'intb Maximtno Camacho recently,
(we shall be able to make a detailed report shortly), we postponed making the demands contained
in your message # 134' for the time being. However, in view of the manner in which the above
statem^t was made, we now believe that it would be well to discuss the matter openly with the

'Not avaUabte.

itfgotlatioa » underway between oificials of America and Mexico which fo&pmei to iiutUute m fpeeinent
between tbe two coimtriiH to supply each other with needed eoaii>odities,''et^^
'NBtavaibhle.

aWBttoble. I^obsli^ a pirbled nvai btx.

Trans. 7-1-41

July 2. 1941
ff236.

June 27. 1941

#232.

A-197

FROM : Mex icQ City (MtUfiiJ June 24, 1941

XO: Tokyo #220.

We have studied the situation here with reference to the matter of Japanese ships fishing
in Mexican waters and are agreed that for the time being there is nothing for us to worry
about and that we should metely wj(tch eooUy {he course of events. A Naval message of the
20th will give you the details.

Trans. 6-30-41

No. »%

FROM: Mexico City (Miural _ ^ July 2, 1941 ,

TO: Tokyo ' * #238. ' ' "

(Part lof3.)

1. On the 2nd, i went to see For^pt. Minuter PADILLA and ^ted: "From statements made
hy the Foreign Om&e on the Stft, -atti t7^, Wl^m&^^W^)^i^ it^^i^ the United
States and Mexico are considering concluding an agreement concerning the supply of materials
necessary for the manufacture of arms. On the 20th and today A. P. reports from Washington
that this treaty aims to prevent the shipment of materials anywhere outside the American
countries. Would you please tell me the truth about this?" Foreign Minister PADILLA
replied; "It is true that we are considering an agreement of this sort, but this is a question
concerning only the American powers and has nothing to do with any other countries."

2. Therefore. 1 stated: "1 know that it is quite natural for the several American states to
took out for themselves in the matter of necessary materials, but what I would like to know
is this; in case you Mexicans have more materials than y»u need and are able to sell some
abroad, will you be prevented from selling them to us Japanese?" The Foreign Minister
answered: "As a matter of fact, only today we received from the United States the proposal
aiiei^ticved in the A. P. wire (See my 239°). The gist of it is that American goods are not to be
shipped out of the American states. We are carefully cansidering the matter at present and
have not yet made our minds up."

fmU: Mexico«%fiptoa) July 2, 1941

TO: Tokyo #23d.

(Part 2 of 3.)

At this point I interposed: "Well, you know how friendly our two countries have been for a
long time and the fact that not once has anything unpleasant occurred is something rarely
seen in the markets of the world. Even today Japan is selling Mexico some of the materials
which siie iu^n% qee^uires and she is, 9$ you knp^, mm o£ Mexico's best customers. So,

THE "mm^" BACKGROUND OF PEAEL HARBOR

if through an agreement like the one you mentioned Japanese -Mexican relations are marred,
I will be blamed and will find it difScult to understand why you treated me so." The Foreign
Minister answered: "Well, to tell the truth, our relations with Japan are causing us the most
itgret. That is precisely why the Mexican government is hesitating, but, considering the fact
that Mexico will have to obtain machinery and other goods which she needs, she finds it
necessary to sell her own goods to the United States, and that is the whole point of this
agreement; consequently, to say that you Japanese could sell us the machinery and so forth
instead of the United States is quite beside the point."

4. To this I responded: "Japan is now progressing in the production of heavy industries
goods and is in a position to sell surpluses in the line. Let me enumerate for you the list offered
by the Chief of the Commercial Section which Minister YAMAGATA brought along." But the
Foreign Minister replied: "All these points ar« being studied by experts in th# cqmpetent
departments." Mr. PADILLA made a gesture as if to end our conversation.

Trans. 7-8-41

FROM: Mexic*©H|r|Wtoif
TO: Tokyo

(Part 3 of 3.)

5. However, I continued, "There are finally tw<l tilings which I would like to say to you.
First, the goods which we Japanese purchase are not to be transshipped to Germany; and
second, 1 have every reason to believe that the European war will end sooner than expected."
The Foreign Minister expressed confidence in my first statement, but concerning the second
he asked: "Well, then, if you are so sure it is going to end so quickly, about when do you think
that will be?" I said, "Being located here in Mesxico, I am not in a position to know the course
of world events, but I can assure you that this is the feeling of the Japanese Government." The
Foreign Minister was silent for a minute or two; then said, "There is a lot to what you have
come and told me today. When I come to consider the treaty I will give full consideration to it."

That last point seems to have been bothering the Mexu^fU^ ewsiderably and what 1 said
about it appears to have moved him greatly.
Sept also to WiUhington. Will Washington please get in touch with New York on this?

Na,399

FROM: Tokjff) * June 28, 1941

TO: Meadcoeity #111,

Re my #93'.

1. Please establish communications between the tMliii' S^ift
also report regularly on the progress of our schemes.

2. Please reply as soon as possible on the plan described in flij^'^iAd paragraph of the above
message.

°SeeU,384.

Trans, 7-1-41

July 2,1041

A-199

No. 400

FROMi Mexico (Miura) July 4, 1941

TO; Tokyo #246,

(Parti of 4.)

1. It is clear that one of the most urgent requirements of the present time is the establish-
ment of an (international ?) route for the communication of intelligences between the United
States and Mexico, In my opinion, this route which is to be established should be used by our
emba^y, the consular offices, and other semi-official offices in the United States, as well as in
espionage net connections with Mexico City.

2. In the case of war, the method under consideration involves the direct linking of all our
espionage agents in the United States directly with this city. The various observations and
opinions gathered from our espionage net in the United States should, in my opinion, be
carried out here. However, judging from the current examples of German and Italian officials,
it is clear that the American Government will not permit too much movement trf officials
from the United States to Central and South America. Therefore, this very day, please order
the reduction of these intelligence agents from official status to civilian status at as early a
date as t^miblie. Tbm 11% ^iOi sttte B^e^ili^^Q^ to the M^ican Government m indi-
viduala.

No. 401

FROM; Mexico (Mlu^i
TO: Tokyo

(Part 2 of 4.)

Persons in the border areas should secure passport visas before it becomes too late and begin
to perform their duties.

3. In my considered opinion, the persons carrying on the activities of the aforementioned
route should make possible the tr^^erence and contact between our espionage net in the
tinited States and our officislli li^e iiR' Mexico which ean 1># ttloai^ «l^eti¥l%^ in Mes:^.
In cooperation, therefore, with army Sad naval authorities, offices should be established in
Laredo, El Paso, Nogales, and Mexicld^. Conferences have been going on with army and naval
otiicers in regard to this matter. Is to be done, much planning^wiU be required with partis
in the United States who will be getting in contact with me. With this in mind, on the
occasion of a recent trip to the United States, I stopped off in New Orleans and Houston, and
fti^',wfaat I learned there tn those plac^. such a ^ing^tu4»>t been given the sli^ht^ cansidora-

Trans.

July 4, 1941
#245.

A-200

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Tokyo
(Part 3 of 4.)

When I was in Washington, the official in charge of this matter, after establishing Washing-
ton and New York areas in the espionage net, made the statement that he would like to
wait for a little while before making a tour for contact purposes. Since that time until today,
the question stands as it did then. Furthermore, in regard to Los Angeles, when Minister
YAMAGATA's party recently passed througfh there, he was told that they had no acquaintance-
ship with such things as intelligenc* iflii»fe, ^id! Ifeif tliHt reason they had made no special plans.

Since then, all of these offices, on the instructions of the home office gradually

are bringing their plans to a head for . At the present time, as far as civilian agents

are concerned it will be impossible to make (It ?} more concrete. •

July 4, 1941
#245,

NO.40S

FROM: Mexico (Miura) July 4, 1941

m Tokyo ff246.

|f^4pf4.)

In reading your message on the intelligence route matter, I have received the impression

that there is no clear distinction made between the question of this route and the

establishment of an intelligence net in this country dealing with the United States (with
regard to the details of this latter matter, I will wire my humble opinions separately). How-
ever, it is clear that the question of the intelligence route does not imply the establishment of
the espionage net in the United States by civilian agents. This is definitely a function of the
diplomatic offices in the United States and is absolutely impossible for us here in Mexico City
to bring into being. Army and naval officers here feel that the questions are quite apart and
separate. In ordc* that m wo^Ir M^^^^fSmyfm^i^mi ItSWSWt I m inquiring for addititwiM^
information.

Tmrn. 9^:^|

\fi.404

FROM:

TO;

Mexico (Miiira)

Tokyo

July 22,
#286.

1941

Re Part 1 of your rr 349° to Washington.

In my #236', I told you more about the advantages and disadvantages of using Mexicali.
To confer with me on the matt^ mentioned in my #278^ I had TERAZAKI, ITO, and KATO
come back there, and we again looked into the situation. We decided that our previous conclu-
sions were based on peacetime and that in case there is an emergency, Mexicali would probably
not be a good place a& i

(1) Mexicali is far away from headquarters, and not only are airplanes the only con-
venient means of transportation, but also conimuntCfftiiMlB liif^ %ad. If something started,
we would not even be able to use American planes. ^ ^

(2) Pour days would be necessary for contact by railway.

(3) In Mexicali there is not one single daily newspaper, and we could only rely upon
American- Mexican journals so all the news that came to our ears would be late. Another
thing, Lower California is now, to all intents and purposes, under the jurisdiction of Southern
California, and in case something began to pop, it would be inevitable that the United
States would bring tremendous pressure to bear. To tell the truth, the activities of Japanese
citizens in the border cities are even now being subjected to the closest scrutiny, so in time
of crisis, Mexicali would be no place for any activities Of oyprs,

I have transmitted this to Washington.

"Seen, 411.

'In which KATO of Mexicali S3ys that if intGUi^ence work is to be cozried on in l^^zicali, tt will b6 ncc^csfiaiy
that both funds *nd personnd be reorganhESd. He also tells of th* difficulty of intelligence work in a bordw town.
See 11, 39a.

^Bp^MCii^llMltireiectiBg of JapanM^nationals zesiding in Mexico in caseof w«r,

FROM: WashingtMi Julyl9,#«|"
TO: Tokyo #534,

Re your #387°.

Secretary Terasaki has already left for Mexico. How shall we handle this item? Please wire.

•Teriuaki was to havfr tsk)9^e'Ci|<lt»toli^ fa-eusbtftom London.

Trans. 7-28-41

No. 406

FROM: Mexico July 26, 1941

TO; Panama #8.

Secretary TERASAKI left here the 26th arriving at your place the 27th.

Trans. 8-16-41

No. 407

WSOM: Mexico (Miura) July 26, 1941

T^. Washington #41.

Secretary TERASAKI left today for South America.
Relayed to Tokyo, Caracas, and

Trans. 8-2-41

A-202

Tm "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEAKL HARBOR

No. 408

FEOM: Mexico (Miura^ July 27, 1941

TO: RiodeJaneiico #3.

Secretary TERASAKF left here yesterday for your p!ace by air and exi>ei^i|t*«l^|N|«4iy|p«fti
2nd. He will stop off three days in Panama and three days in the Port of Spain.

Trans. 8-1-41

No. 409

FROM: Mexico (Miura) July 28, 1941

TO! B^dedamiiKr "a*— ' — • - — - #4*

Diet Member SHINOHABA left here on the 28th and will be accompained &om Panama

Tran&. 8-^13-41

No. 410

mOM: Mexico City (Miura) July 22, 1941

TO: Tokyo * * ' ~ #285.

Strictly Secret. To be handled in government code.

Re your Excellency's # 349° to the Ambassador in America.

From Terazaki and Ito (after consultation with Minister MIURA),

1. It is believed best not to regard Mexico, as heretofore, as the main base of intelligence in
comparison to Brazil, Argentina and Chile for the following reasons:

a. As it is difficult to get information about internal conditions in the United States except
by newspapers and magazines, there is no other way ^c^ible Other than the assignment of a
S)>ecialist, for this work takes a great deal of time.

b. The general feeling of the public in Mexico is good; but aside from Japanese-Mexican
relations, it is judged t^t at the present time Mexico may be properly viewed as a dep^tdency
of the United States.

c. Referring to the last part of your caption message, should the United States join the war,
Mexico would follow suit, if not formally, at least practically.

d. Should Mexico go to war it would be impossible, because of commimications, to exi^nd
(or it may be translated 'to transfer') the intelligence organization.

2. It is not expedient to have Mexico as an important or the chief base. It is believed
suitable to make the country you mention in your caption message the main base.

Of course, in case of war, in using all available points, Mexico may be properly utilized.
In accordance with the idea of your suggestions along this line, a eoatiauM k being
made of practicable plans for intelligence 'routes' and ccmnections.
This has been transmitted to the United States.

*^a, 4U; in which Tokj^9fii«frl>mraI ITO anflS^

Trans. 7-28-41

A-2G3

No. 411

July 10. •

Secret outside the Department.

(To be handled%,^rgimament CodeJ

Re 18° from New Orleans and ff 244 (?)' from Mexico to this Foreign Minister.

We wish Consul ITO to go to Mexico City, Lately the offices housing the German and Italian
{3«aSis«}fttes were closed aisd 'tiuilE' intelligence net broken. Intelligence activities in the
Americas and suitable Uatson are now essential, so we wish Secretary TERAZAKI also to go to
Mexico to confer with out Minister there, in order to realize our plans in a concrete fashion
based on the policy described in i^evious messages. We want Secretary TEBAilAKt^ and hfafi
only, to stop off at Quito, Los Angeles, San Francisco, etc. In this G^ooQectkin the points whicb
we would like to bring to your attention are as follows:

1. We mil have three routes to Mexico from the United States, consigting of Lare<j4*
Ciudad Juarez and Mexicali. Mexicali in particular is a convenient point for us oi^'tfet
coast. In case we need more personnel, we can get them from our Ministry in Mexico.

2. We w!B MeKrisfi a CMie »mk» ^tm Mexico to Manzanillo and a &effi^ tmuW-m^d^
Vera Cruz.

3, Various officials in the United States and Mexico will work out all the details of their own
espiona^ nets, correlate them, and devebp a concrete plan for making contacts and ex-
changes on the border.

4. In order to succeed in the objective, ways and means for keeping in contact through tele-
graphy, telephones, memoranda, and word of mouth will be decided upon and put into effect.

5, These routes are to be established against the day of evil and, while all is calm, nothing
muBt be done which would jeopardize their security; therefore, at present investigate only the
(em&^ity of circulating over them .

6, The expenses are to be paid by the several offices.

Because of its geographical position, Mexico is the main point for intelligence work in
Brazil, Argentina and Chile, as well as in the United States. Therefore, before we think til
relying too much upon Brazil, Argentina and Chile, let us concentrate on Mexico. However,
the other three bases are different. In case the United States joins the war, they would
inevitably come under her control, but so long as Mexico does not offirially joui the war, we can
continue our intelligence schemes there. Paralleling these plans of ours, if you can also work
out a plan for establishing a liaison net with Brazil, Argentina and Chile, it would be
excellent groundwork for the establishment pr^ently of an intelK^i^atce iM, Pleasti'lMi^aait
this'to MexisQ€i^iim^ lat|ce:iiii|^you to New Orleans.

1^

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Ho. 412

FROM: Mexico (Miura)
TO: Tokyo

Stoictly seia'et— To be fattney^^ 6(>v«niiaeiit Code.

Afisst conferring with the "L" Agency, I send you the results, together with my humble
t^iaums. After you have conferred with the naval officials fully on this matter, please send
3Bwiastiuctions.

1. The "L" Company also seems frequently to have felt the need of this sort of thing. For &
img time they have been highly in favor of this kind of proposal aad hope earnestly that we
ma. put it into praiCAice. Be sure, «(i fsr «a receivii^.iijj^in^piwi, to use
^"L" Agency.

2. The transmitter should be placed in the office at the very beginning. While we are experi-
menting and while we are actually transmitting, we will take every technical precaution possible
to conceal it. We will have to be particularly careful to avoid the method of exchanging messages.
We roust rather rely upon broadcasts. If this apparatus should be discovered by Mexico sometime
&i tiiWf ftitoire, we are determined to hold our ground on the basis of inviolability. If, after experi-
menting with the machine as amateurs, we took it into the building, that would be dangerous.
Such a plan would not do.

2. <Sic) 1 have three suggestions concerninfi
if possible, i would like for you to use the first,

(1) If there is a sufficient margin of time, you might obtain such a machine in one unit
ftom the Navy and ship it to me as a private piece of furniture.

(2) After purchasing the manner of machine you have mentioned, in the United States.
me might bring it into Mexico. (Concerning the quality, price, ete., we would have to get in
touch with our agents in the place of purchase.)

(3) We might purchase the parts here or in the United States and assemble a composite
instrument. However, we would encounter many technical difficulties in the last proposal
and would have to enlist the assistance of our special naval officials in New York.

3. In the matter of the transmitter and personnel necessary to operate it, the "L" Agency is
prepared to cooperate with us, and I do not think we would have any trouble along those lines.

4. If we use the 6rst proposal mentioned in paragraph 2, we could communicate directly
with Jf^an, so when you come to consider thisj^ please consider direct communication and
relay liaison in separate categories. (I do a^ A^^M^^^h^^ ^bme is any objectim
to your considerinii^ia!^t9tH»Ujay U«^^

I^ajM. 7-10-41

July 8, 1941
#264.

No. 413

FROM: Mexico (Miura)
^pietly Secret.

(Parti of 2)'.

Re your # 93* and my #244'.

1. Need I tell you that I will try my very best to knit closely and strengthen our American
intelligence net (please consider the question of the route in an entirely different category) and
to foster the anti-American and anti-war atmosphere in Mexico? But, still I feel I may say
fairly conclusively that, in the light of existing conditions in this country, we cannot expeet
to achieve very much along these lin^^

2. I mean to say that the pfflifrtt^ and foreign policy of Mexico is directed by President
CAMACHO and his cabinet, which is with him body and soul. It is not too much to say that
tte^ idll brook absolutely no interference or even suggestions. Not only that, but every one of
^^^e Ifetttlemen is strongly pro- American and it wouM be absolutely impossible, t think,
to procure any information which would stand our glorious Empire in good stead. Since
CAMACHO seized control here, particularly in recent times, there has been a fierce and

campsign to control or stamp out labor. Communist, Nationalist and anti*American
;p@^|»s. lam sorry to say that I cannot see any chance at all of our succeeding bere with any
'0f%dr schemes. '

3. Well, the Rtsl and foremost aim or our schemes is to ruin the position of leadership which
the United States has with regard to the other nations of the hemisphere, to break up its so-
called "Good Neighbor Policy" and thereby destroy any possibility of future coordination
among these nations. Glinted that this is our main objective, if we are to itlceetisdrt'^iKiuld
think it would be a better policy to turn our eyes elsewhere, rather than to pin our hopes
upon a fruitless nation like this. I do not think it would be amiss to try some relatively simpler
plan. . - . _ . » . , i I .

'Part 2 of 2, See II, 414.

'In which MATSUOKA says 109,000 yen have been a.ppto'ptieied fot intelligence and enlightenment expenseB during
llie cuirent fiscal year and gives instir^iction^ ^ to its use. See % 3$*-
'^|j«t avtilable,

Trans. 7-9-41

No. 414

FROM; Mexico (Miura) July 4. 1941

TO^ #247, ■

{Part 2 of 2)*.

Secret outside the Departnwnl.

Military Attache NISI, attached to this office, has a great deal of conficti^ in the possi-
bility of planning a f^aUi^A in €Hi9i«#(«kt i^ttte^ 1# bj^j^lh^lleid his m^m^t^ albm^

A-206

three months ago to the military authorities in Tokyo, he was dIdViiiia to wait and watch
developments while maintaining liaison with those interested, because at that time our
relation? with the United States were delicate. On the other hand, is it not also a good plan
feJ get Marshall URUTAADO of Nicaragua, concerning whom I made reference in my secret
message # 62*, to lead a rebellion, since he not only a very influential man but a greatly
respected person?

5, Such a plot might not necessarily be a success in every respect; however, even if it fails,
if it's carried out to a certain extent, it would have to be quieted by the United States usin^
its armed forces. In « it would cast a shadow on the so-called "Good Neighbor
Pelicy" itf State cause a cleavage among the countries on the American
continent. It would also endanger considerably the fundamental policy on which the United
States attaches the greatest importance, a policy which envisages placing within her in-
fluence the regions extending to Panama, tf it succeeds to an extent, it would at least upset
at once the political balance among the countries as far as Panama. It would seem to me that
there is considerable likelihood of its turning that region into an arena of political confusion.

6, Therefore, I wish to request that you give this matter your careful consideration in the
light of our national policy. Furthermore, even if we provide the funds necessary for this plotj
it is plain that the plans would not be carried out immediately on the following day, and so
it seems to me that we should provide funds sufficient to commence preparations for the
rebellion in accordance with the contingencies that may arise.

7, In case the above plot is carried out, I am of the intention of placing the entire leadei^i|»
in the hands of a mnitdry official who has had the greatest amount of training and expe^e^dt
4S a specialist in plottic^. May l have a reply as soon i» possible?

Trans, 7-8-41

No. 415

FROM; Mexico (Miura)
TO: Tokyo

Secret.

Re your # 92°.

1. It has become extremely difficult to obtain definite information or get hold of best
opinions here in this country. Your attention is called to my # 247' and other telegrams. (At
present, I am leaving on a two months' inspection tour of Central and South America. At the
end of that period I am returning to my post here. According to reports made by the Military
Attache, there is no nation on the American continent that feels the hand of, and has been
influenced by, the United States as much as Mexico.) This is evident but the government
here is in reality an absolutist one. The relations concerning the recognition of the CAMACHO
administration have been a delicate problem. The government authorities have been daring
in directly announcing their feelings in order to lead along the masses who are not necessarily
in accord (with the delicate problem of recognition, etc). This (action of the authorities) is
smn to be an «a!cepti«» cm^an^ |6 mm i3*i«ff qciantiies. mi mi^ he mm^ *

July 6, 1941
#250.

A-207

distinctive phenomenon of this countty. Conditions have become very difficult and this may
well explain why PADILLA, the Foreign Minister, has been abl« to make explanati^is, which
are apparently not in keeping with the position he holds,

2. The ccmditiogas of the countries where there are missions are leapecCively differeiM;.
Furthermore, there are changes from time to time which are brought fe) your attention. As in
ancient China, there are those who say one thing and others who say a&other, and this sort

ia^emiito w&s sMMicei^. ^ mimt ^^ai^^ lSt» t»»fr <^ this methcfi'ift ail
■U^ntries throughout all times. The missions abroad are submitting to the home country
^i^urate judgments and it is not asked whether or not these are (just) newspaper articles.
'A^^^fiB^^>l'll#eȣiel^ mias the above-mentioned means as well as noticing the public
announcements made by the President and PADILLA, the Foreign Minister, in their
character of public othcials. These have been systematically reported, together with "comments".
As other materials, de^o|»n^tg t^oOnditioti^ in this country have been reported.

Reply has been made in accordance with your telegram. (I have beci»ae fatigued and
exhausted from this sending of telegrams for successive days and nights.)

'Not available.

*Se« II. 414 and 413, in which MIURA discusses the JapBn^j^i^;^4p«li|gtlMni ^^0^A^i^ltsilSmBK»ia^
and to foster ant i- American and anti-war atmosphere in Mexico.

T^ans. 7^14-41

\o. 416

FROM: Smi Francisco (Mutal' July 6, 1941

TO: Tokyo #11$.

To Cluef Archivist SHIGEMATSU from Courier TAKI.

1 have the Imperial portraits with me on the Kamakura Maru. .Arriving Ytdtahama <»
^6th with ten courier pouches. Please arrange to have my clearance expedited.

Trans, S-4-41

X©.417

Wl0Ui Mexico City (Miufs)
TtJ; Tokyii

Secret.

Julys, 1341

Re your Circular ^ 1366* to the Ambassador in the United States.

1. I am keeping in mind the essence of your instructions. If the United States (in view of the)
preparations made, enters the war, it is impossible to tell when Mexico would follow the United
States into war. If Mexico should not do this, it is not hard to imagine that Mexico would fall
into a position similar to that of actual participation. In any case, it would be impossible to
carry on trans-Paci6c commerce, It is, therefore, doubtful that the Emperor's Portoait could be
ratuRied and so plans axe being considered for retuniing it, for the time being, to the (Foreign

2. Alter the Emperor's picture is placed in a iltmlilie WKxlen box am! siScfl*ely wrapped, it is
to be taken to Acapulco by a member of the office and will he registered mth the Mexican
Foreign Office as baggage belonging to the Naval Attache, SATO. It will be entrusted with the
captain of the "Ginyo Maru" leaving Acapulco on July 20. You are to arrange that someone
firtHn the main office make an officnal trip to Yokahama tat it. If there are no 3bpction»
plan* please telegni|da en immecUdte reply, ^

''bi whjch instniciiom^ pven forlmuilnig the Empei^'$iiwtratt in am tf wat.

J _ Trans. 7-lS-4t

No. 418

FROM: Mexico City (Miura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

Regarding your Circular +f 1366°:

With reference to the purport of your instructions, complete arrangements are under way for
handling the situation in the event that the United States should enter the war. Mexico would
inevitably follow the United States, and we would have to withdraw upon her actual
entrance into the war.

Our position under such circumstances would be insecuret and it would become axiomatic
that communications on the Pacific would become impossible, and it is feared that it would
be impossible to return the Imperial Portrait. Consequently, we are considering the mosi
secure means of sending it to the Foreign Office.

Twenty cases carefully packed and addressed to the Foreign Office have been taken Ui
Acapulco under seal, as personal luggage by Naval Attache Sato, and are held there in care
employee Ide, to be entrusted to the captain of the Ginyo Maru leaving on 22 July. Please make
arrangements to send someone from the Foreign Ministry to receive them when the ship
arrives at Yokohama. If there is no objection to this procedure please reply promptly.

This is a retransmission of my me^ge of the 5^.

'To forestall the possibility rtP thSir oiflices in foreign countries being closed without warning by ttie toaiUries
involved, Matsuoka is«uea instructions that precautions shall be taken for the safety of the Kmperot's portrait, and,
M tht of^ortime time. tti« destruction of codes «nd official documents.

Trans. 9-19-41

mm

FROM: Tokyo (Matsudka)
TO: Mexico City

Re your # 249'.

There are no objections to the procedure you suggested. Take care that information about
this matter does not get outside the Department. Also, be cariftful in dealtlie witk the captailB

*S«e H, 417— Re Me<xico's plan for shipment of Egaperor'9 poirtrait back to Japan.

Trans. 7-18-41

July 7, 1941
#249.

July 10, 1941
ff U8.

No. 420

FROM: MexIcoCity (Miura)
TO: Tokyo

JttlyW, l&4t
#262.

I would like 10 have the Imperial portraits at the Salvador Consulate handled in the same
manner as those of this oHice. Therefore, please issue instructions to have theitt sent to catch
the Ginyo Maru leaving Acapulco* on the 22nd. In case they miss this boat, have them use
the next mail steamer, the ''Bali|yM\|IW^'^^%ll#;4^S^
staff to Salavador.

■See II, 419.

*A seaport on Uie SW coast of Mexico.

1. I understand that the great majority of the Japanese residents in the United States intend
to remain in that country in the event matters come to the worst between Japan and the Unitefl
States. In the light of the manner in which both the United States and Mexico have been
treating Germans and Italians recently, there is, of course, no possibility of Mexico's allowing
Japanese residents from other countries to enter within her border. For this reason, instil
as we are concerned, the question of accommodating the Japanese now resident in the United
States ill aoi en immediate one. Circumstances affecting this question have changed from
those wWcfciwftuenced my former views on the matter, , - ■ - j

2. Furthermore, the Japanese residents in this country, who are to a large extent permanent
settlers, entertain the same views as those residing in the United States. We may expect that
there will be a lapse of a certain amount of time before Mexico definitely takes an attitude
completely in harmony with that of the United States. However, since by that time it will
^tl^ady be extremely 4iffi^It to sail on Japar^ese ships or to take airplanes for South American
eiuhtries, japaiiMie te^rietttg the ebotrti^ fteeltMiinf the mwnljCTS of this offic«)'^wt«rid i«igf

likely be obliged to remain here.

3. Therefore, on the basis of the situation described above, we are making preparations at
this office to eatl, 6n aboat the ISth af^Is «soiitit, in an incoaspicuous manner, fourteen
fifteen representatives from various parts of the country so that we may learn of the situation
existing in those parts as well as discuss such questions as mutual help among Japanese
residents in the respective districts, maintenance of liaison between Mexico City and these
districts, promotion of friendly feeling toward us among people in Mexico and protection of
enterprises as well as property of the Japanese residents. We are, also, considering dispatch-
ing members of this st^tff to the va^ous localities as a result of this conference and in response
to political developments.

Trans. 7-23-41

Xo. 421

FROM: Mexico
TO: Tokyo

July 8, 1941
#251.

A-210

No. 422

FROM: Mexico Gity

Rfi your message # 144' to Brazil.

In accordance with the cotlt^ts of my message #251^ I summoned the more inffu^itial
people in Mexico City and representatives from the various areas in Mexico, to my office. I
relayed to them your instructions with regard to our giving guidance to our nationals residing
in Mexico, Following this up, I warned them of the things they as Japanese should he pm^
pared to face, and asked them to consider ways and means of making the best of them .

The various pmints listed below were decided upon as being the best way of meeting the
present situation. All those present assured me that our national would usditiiiifii^i.'flll^
and would do everything in their power to adhere to our decisions.

1. In view of the times, it is of the utmc^t importance that there be an efficient system of
liaison with this office so that we may act in unity. We decided tbat we could best accomplish
this by, first of all, strengthening the Federation of Japanese Associations. At the same time,
we divided the country into nine areas, taking into consideration its geography, transporta-
tion facilities, and the distribution of the population of our nationals. In each area a liaison
officer will be installed who will offer guidance to our nationals residing in his area as well as to
report, at suitable intervals, the general conditions of his area. He will, also, relay in the most
effective manner instructions issued by this office to the Japanese population in his area.

2. As a means of protecting our nationals in the event of unfavorable developments in the
future, we shall endeavor to at all times promote better feeling toward the Japanese people
among the Mexicans. Towards this end, we should urge the members of the Japanese Associftr
tions and more particularly influential Japanese persons, to make an even i^eater effort than
heretofore. When and if worse comes to worst, each area will put into effect the most appropriate
means of protecting the people thereia. Fun^ to twB med ua such a» ^oaea^ndy wiil be col-
lected within the areas themselves.

3. Means of protecting Japanese businesses in the event of unfavorable developments as
well as steps which shall be taken if there are indications that Japanese as^^'^ lil^fia^

be frozen, were decided upon along the lines contained in my message # 174',

"Not available.

'See II, 421. Mexico City wires Tokyo that a gKRt majority of Japanese residents will probably remain in the U.S. in
the event of a break with the U.S. That Mexico would probably not permit Japanese from U.S. to enter that country. A
conference of Japanese representatives from varioiiB parts of Mexico wiU meet shortly ui Meiico City to formulate plate
for mutual heip.K^io^ At^lf^!/^ diatricta.

Trans. 7-22-41

No. 423

FROM: Mexico City (Miuia)
TO: Tokyo

Strictly secret.

The port of Manzanilte is the ^atest ig^iSlil^^'^^SSSA for imports and exports from th*pfi
to Japan. Furtfaermar% il90f^* ^Sf^in^ ships. For a

July 19, 1941
#378.

July 10, im
#257. -

A-211

Ions time I have felt the need of establishing a consulate there. The United States, whose
interest in this port is relatively negligible, has a consulate, and lately Great Britain, who
has never had any interest at all in ManzaniUo, has also established a consulate there.
According to reliable information, the American Consul is bringing to t)*ttHSift«gliit*ftt)le
pr^sure on the Mexican officials in unison with the British Consul, and they are closely spying
upon our merchants to see what goods they ship to Japan. This is easy for them because we
lack a diplomatic office of our own, and that is why we feel all the more keenly the need of one.
Thus, summing up all 1 have been able to learn, if we Japanese could establish two or three
consulates and branch ottices throughout Mexico, we would get extremely gratifying results.
B^ause of its central position and particularly because of our imports and exports to and
fytm this point, we consider Manzanillo the best choice. Moreover, last year our consulate at
Mazatlan was closed, and now our nationals there suffer many inconveniences as a result.
Therefore. I would suggest that you also condder ^tabli^Bife^g^Sffiiistant consulate there.

Tram, 7-18-41

Xo. 424

mOUi Tokyo July 10. 1941

TO: Mexico * 119-

Re your * 237%

Inquiry is being made of the Artificial Silk Export Association. Because of the shortage of
ships, there was no export plan for July. As yet no definite plan has been evolved for August.
Already there is a plan for the export of about 12,000 boxes (because of the shipping shortage,
there is slight [jrospect for 6,000). In order to form a decision, your reports are being studied
at this time. Because of the Government's order in connection with the defense plan, it is
necessary to obtain permits for tbe export of silk thread. A step has again been taken in this
connection. Please give your opinion of the limits of the exports to Mexico. The Department
of Trade and Industry has given its approval. (Inform the Export Association branch about
this.)

In the Mexican exports to Japan, the list of goods prohibited from exportation (must be

considered ?) (garbled) — because of the strict control of munitions, follow

out the plan given in your # 298*, Part 2, by trying to guarantee the supply of quick-silver
04 materials for militaiy \m.

"Available, not iranslated. Contains discussion of steps necessary for exportation; the necessity of Japan for
certain materials: and M<ac^*f fHjNtf»**W^»i>:W^MlftS^
'Not available.

Trans. 7-12-tl

gCHE "MAGIC" BACKeftOUNP OF PBAliL HAJEtBOB

FROM: Mexico City July 13, 1941

In 2 parts^^(HQplet«.

1. I have eeqmeBted an interview with the Minister of Economics several times since then,
bmt 8S usual he continued to dodge it. On the 9th, however, on the occasion of the Foreign
Iliiin^Ffeer's party, I cornered him and as a result I was able to secure the interview on the 12th,

2. First of all, referring to my conversations with the Foreign Minister, I said that 1 'under-
stood that the technical aspects of this matter were being studied by the Economic Ministry.
In view of the fact that this matter affects Japan very vitally, I said, I would like very much to
be advised of the opinions of the Minister of Economics.

The Minister evaded the issue by replying that the only role his Ministry played in this
matter was to eitpress its opinion, from a purely technical standpoint, to the Foreign Ministry.
The Foreign Ministry, he continued, has complete jurisdiction over whether to accept or
feject l&m Si^nomic Ministry's bndines, as well as to determine the form and scope of the

3. I pointed out, therefore, that the Economic Ministry would be held re.sponsible ti^r the
maintenance and promotion of economic relations between Japan and Mexico, and asked him
W trade between Japan and Mexico could be continued to the present extent in spite of t^ie
signing of the U.S. -Mexican agreement being considered at the present time.

The Minister replied that he desired continuance of the present status oi the relations be-
tween our two countries on all materials which do not come under the terms of the agreement
which is now being drawn up to meet emergency conditions.

I pointed out that we were afraid that should the major part of our present trade come under
the teitns of the abeve'taentlonecl agteemetit, we wti^M ik '^fiMe t& «^tintt6 <nif '^i^neHt'
close relations.

The Minister replied that the Foreign Ministry had been advised by his Ministry of the
materials wMch were essential to Mifs^liitl He added tits^lipinese ts&m wm iwdu40d'%
that list, * • •

(Part2.) . , ^

4- At this point, I pointed out to the Minister that Me£ie^p,^rcury and other items were
essential to Japan in #$iQ$ msifier thAf M^m was needed by Mexico. How

would it be to consider ways and means of mutually supplying the other with such essential
materials, 1 asked as a feeder.

J^^jg^JSHSnistei replied that he is in a position «i$ii^imakes it impossible to discuss such a
|B|^|r until the above-mentioned pact had been agreed upon. He added that in his own
p@(SOnal opinion, a domestic law would be put into etiect restricting the exporting of certain
materials to nations other than those of the American continents.

5. 1, therefore, changed the subject and told the Minister that Japan is now in a position,
under a smooth working control system, to definitely supply a great deal of products of heavy
industries and chemical industries. I asked him to bear that in mind, and {(lHi!iW^><tll>fS'^
by reading off the list of articles which could he supplied by us.

Tiie Minister thanked me for the important information and added that as soon as the scope

A copy of this message was cabled to Washingtoi). Waehington will please send a copy to

'Not avaikUe.

Trans, 7-18-41

FROM: Mexico City (Miura) July 14, 1941

TO; I^I^O -» - #^1.

Intelligence of a primary order.

1 have heard that the United States is soon going to establish here in Mexico City a branch gf
the Treasury Department.

I think that this must be to persecute and break up deals between Axis commercial concerns
and American dealers and when a pact is established between the United States and
Mexico ;^ecuring for the United States the desired products, to carefully see that the treaty
is etlRie^ Qut, Therefore, 1 am carefully watching this development. I have wired this to
;^|[t9|Si3|^,<Jli^^ Wflshingtc^ please get in touch with New Ywk?

Trans. 7-17-41

No. 427

FROM: Mexico July 15, 1941

TO: Tokyo #269,

Re my - 265°.

Immediately, on the loth, I summoned the businessmen involved as well as the military
and naval attaches and made a special point of listening to their opinions on the matter. As a
result, the following d«^ion9 weff-.ipi^d and it is our intention to dispose erf the mattef aIa^

these lines:

1 . First of all, hive them approve the exporting of goods already contracted for.

2. Have thtts-'i^^er ways of excepting those- goods which are essential to Japan and
Mexico.

3. If by some chance, the U.S.-Mexican talks have prc^ressed to such a point as to make
Mexico feel that they need not rely upon exports from us, we shall refuse to supply Mexico
with the goods, such as rayon (contracts for which have already been signed). Moreover, we
shall refuse to allow the shipment of copra, rubber, etc, on Japanese ships on which they have
practically depended, heretofore. We shall continue to deny them the use of our vessels until
such a time that they beg us on bended knee {on the pretext that they could not depend on
being supplied by the United States, or some such excuse) to allow them the use oS these
feottoms.

4. The Takaoka Maru is scheduled to sail from Manzanilio on about the 17th; the Sagami
Maru on about the 21st; and the Ginyo Maru on the 23rd. We shall be able to get a pretty good
idea of this country's intentions by watching the steps it takes with regard to exports of goods
already contracted for which are scheduled to be shipped on the above-named vessels. (The

A-214

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

shipments consist of about 2,000 tons of lead, about 1200 tons of mercuiy, and 250 tons of ,

etc.)

On the other hand, the Kunikawa Mam and the Kagi Maru which are carrying loads of rayon
{totaling about 3800 eases) arrived tm the 16th in Manzanillo. Unloading of this cargo has
already begun so there is nothing that can be done about them. However, the Heiyo Maru,
also loaded with rayon, is scheduled to arrive on about the 25th. We could, if deemed neces-
sary, prevent this cai*go ftam being unloaded.

A copy of this ittesaage was sent to Washington with a request that Washington relay it to
NewY<alt.

'Not available.

Trans. 7^22-41

So. 428

FROM: Tokyo July 18, 1941

TO: Mexico # 131.

Re your #272".

We have been informed that the customs otficials at Manzanilio will not give clearance to
the Akagi Maru until the 800 tons of lead for Mitsui, which have been loaded, have been
unloaded. As our ships are in use, we cannot permit their demurrage. Please make reprdseti-
tatimis and wire result.

'Not avalltbU.

Tram. 7-1S-41

FROM: Mexico (Mlura) July 18, 1941

TO: Tokyo #276.

Re your #131°.

1. On the 16th, while the Akagi Maru was being loaded with goods to be shipped to Japan
at Manzanillo*, both the British and the United States Consuls at that port strongly urged,
on the grounds of the Presidential order issued on the 1.5th, the Chief of the Customs to forbid
the loading. However, the Captain of the ship refused to comply with the demand, saying that
he had not received any order to that effect from the management. Consequently, the ship was
able to sail as I have already reported to you in niy W 274" and there was no ssuch incident as
that which you inquired about,

2. Investigation on our part revealed that the news had been sent to New York from the
^^0B.cy at that port and then, as you have indicated, it was transmitted to Japan misrepresent-
|pg ^e facts. However, for future reference, will you please investigate where the news
tifistoated and wire me your reply? . -

A-21§

.11

3. The Captain of the Akagi Maru wisely supervised the loading as long as the ship could
take on the cargo and until the last minute before a formal order was issued to the Customs
Office and was thus able to sail out of the port. On the other hand, the Captain of the Kunika-
wa Maru of the Kawasaki Company refused to take on cargo despite the fact that the consignotrs^
did their best to explain to him the Presidential order and the utter necessity, because of the
pl^sent political situation, of loading the ships, and stood his ground for reason of the fact
that he ha^iaMTtieeWigd sny order from bis company. He finally sailed at mi^ii^iliKti^l^^
This Captain's lack of appreciatio^d^||^iie|^|;|^^ bi» la^^^igK^^
being made a target of criticism.

"See [], 42H. in which Tokyo directs Mexico to make representations for the clearance of the Akagi Maru, whicJ^ bSS-
been deOin^d ManzaniUo becmNtjl^ll^Wqi^atfADtonaofttad.
'Seaport town in Mexico.
'Not Bvaikble.

TfWEtS. 7-22-41

FROM: Tokyo JulST^, 1^1

TO: Mexico City ffl33.

Re your = 276°, paragraph 2.

This report was wired from the American Metal Company of Manzanillo which is a sub-
sidiary of the Mitsui Shipping Company, to the New Ywk branch of Mitsui as the above
j^iim|iii«y%iK@M nfcp»t and was wired from th«re to us.

*dn the leth, the Akai^ Maru had ditticulty in finally getting clearaitce from Manzanillo because of a cargo of 800
tons of lead she was caking, over objmioiis of U.S. and BntUh Consul*. Please investigate where the news originate4-
Q^investiiatticmshaivMtt w«&siiUtgX«w T«4^tb>»)^^ II, 4,23.

No. 431

FRO M : Mex ico City (Miurfi)
TO: Tokyo

(Part 1 of 2, Part 2 missing.)

Regarding my message - 269°.

1 immediately asked for an interview with the Foreign Minister, but was rebuffed on the
grounds of excessive bminess. Therefore, I called on the Foreign Vice Minister on the 16th, and
inquired of him as to what effect and implication the U.S.-Mexican a|^%<e^ent t£ yesterday
has upon Japanese-Mexican relations.

The Vice Minister replied that the true character of the said agreement was explained in the
Presidential proclamation. It is of a very general nature and, as a means of continental
defense, it merely prohibits the exporting of certain specified articles beyond the confines iSir

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEAEL HARBOR

the American cofntments. It is in no way intended to bear unfavorable effects on the friendly
relations between the two countries.

2. I, therefore, said that I assumed that this law would not be put into ettect until the detaik
mentioned in Article 2 of the f^F^^^^'^^SIiimation were wCErked mt. Was I correct in this
ft^umption, I asked .

iTii VicB Minister replied that the terms contained in the proclamation could be carried
out without awaiting the working out of the details. Moreover, he said, the nature of the exjwt
embargo rule would not be affected by the details referred to.

I then said that it was the customary thing in these cases to exempt all articles for which
•eentracte had previously been signed. Could we expect this in this instance, I asked. The
Vice Minister replied that he would have to make inquiries of competent authorities for the
ofhcial decision, before he could make a definite reply. In his own personal opinion, he
thought that the embargo law would be interpreted in its strictest sense. He believes that even
those articles previous^ contracted for would immediately come under ih6 terms id the
proclamation.

I pointed out that if that were the case the husin^men concerned would suffer enormous
losses. It seemed to me that Mexico could make a concession to that degree at least, I said, in
behalf of maintaining Japanese- Mexican friendly relations which Mexico did not wish to
IflB)^^, as he, himself, had ^mA 98giSi&. f^thermore, I saM, «eeording to information I had,
exporting of goods which had already been sold by U.S. merchants in Mexico to Japanese
merchants, has been approved by Mexican official circles. If that were the case, I continued,
it seemed that the same nilii^ shtmld he a]^d!ieeile on all similar iiristaftties.

In spite of these strong arguments on my part, the Vice Minister was adamant. He insisted
that the Presidential proclamation was applicable to goods previously and subsequently
contracted for and regardless of the nationality of the merchant handling it. If Japanese
merchants suffer loss^ as a consequence, these was nc^tdng^ he could do exce|>t tcr
his regrets, he said.

'July IS, 1941; U, At a meeting of Japanese biisiMfism«l and attaches Ml Mexico Clty^ decffiions were ntade
r^arding «t«i» to b« tafcei) in the pmn U.S.>Me«M;w Mlk& feacb tte vAifirt ^^tD^tm need not depettd

on cxpoits ttium J^mu. '

Regarding my isess«^ v 273',

1. On the 19th, the Foreign Vice Minister requested this Minister to call on him^ so t
complied. Upon arriving there, he told me that m promiaed. be bad the Mf^iewo. reply
pertaining to our discussion of the 16th.

According to the earlier interpretation of the Foreign Minisrtry of Mexieo, the export embargo
proclaimed by the President was to be applied on all of the goods listed, whether or not
contracts for their exportation had been signed prior to the proclamation. The Chief of the
Trade Section's Opinion was soi^ht on this interpiretatiim, the Vice Minister me, and lie

No. 432

FROM; Mexico City
TO: Tokyo

July 19, 1941
#279.

c2. Upon b^l^^vised of this, I said that there were some points I wished to be enlightened
on, although thigy concerned a different matter. I have been advised, I said, that a certain
amount of time is allowed before a ruling is put into effect, so that the areas affected can be
notified of the new law, 1 inquired whether that law was applicable in this instance.

He replied that laws were put into effect upon the passage of suthcient time after the pro-
clamation so as to make certain that it has reached the destination. This time depends on the
distance from the capital to the extremities of the affected area. To the number of days
obtained through this calculation, three more days are added, and at the expiration of that
time limit, the proclamation becomes law.

The actual day this procl3matioii(.l^t<pg@b^l^^'g^!^tei9:^''^;^

( Rest of message unreadable. )

°July 17, 1941;U,43L

Tt&m. 7-24-41

FROM: Mexico City July 19, 1941

TO: Tokyo

(In 2 parts— complete.)

Re my taesBBge ff 279".

In view of the fact that Mexico has clarified her attitude, I sbM\ not cable you a report on our
behind the scenes i\ctivities as 1 ^hould^ fpr the time beii^. We are advised from all of our

fnt^igeni* 86&6ea ih£ftthe t)tiJt«^#tate»ciBilnot supply Mexico with rayon.

Our strongest weapon with which to settle various pjubleiBg with Mexico isr therefore, mi^
threat to cease supplying her with rayon.
'On the mco-ning of the l9th, 1 summoned all of our nationals engaged in this business to my

offices, and made this point clear to them. Various opinions on this matter were exchanged, as
a result of which the following general decisions were agreed upon. Please advise me of your
opinions of them immediately.

1. Regarding the matter referred to in paragraph 4 of my message #269'. We gave consider-
able thought to ways and means to avoid unloading the approximately 2800 cases of rayon on
board the Heiyo Maru, as follows:

a. -Unloading it at Los Angeles and storing it in the customs warehouses had drawbacks. We
cannot foresee any bottoms available to ship it back to Japan. On the other hand, the United
States may, under some circumstances, interfere with its being reexported.

b. If the ship arrives in Manzanillo and unloads all her cargo destined to that port with the
exception of the rayon, there is a good chance that the government of Mexico will delay the
issuance of sailing orders.

c. Even assuming that the vessel does depart from Manzanillo and Acapulco with her rayon
cargo, it is feared that the space taken by the 780 tons or thereabouts of the rayon would
seriously hamper the transporting of cargo she is expected to pick up in South American ports.

Of the above, possibility "b" is looked upon with the most gravity. There is little doubt
that this country will make every effort to obtain the cargo, and will prevent the ship's sailing
until every pc^ibiHty has been tried. Smh m eventuality would he eontraiy to the dissires
you expr^sed in your mes^e #^131".

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

On the other hand, as long as no agreement has been reached between the United States
and Mexico with regard to rayon, the rayon stock of this country will be exhausted in only a
few months even if we do let them have the twenty-odd hundred cases on board the Heiyo
Maru. This is, of course, on the assumption that there will be no further rayon shipments to
Mexico from Japan. Moreover, we are convinced that the men connected with the rayon
business in this country who are completely at the mercy of a few capitalists who control the
raw materials, will become agitated as soon as our attitude becomes known to them.

For this reason, we believe that it would be best for us to have the rayon on the Heiyo Maru
unloaded without any fuss and at the same time, notify the Mexicans that no further ship-
ments can be made. We would appreciate your granting us permission io use this threat as
weapon in conducting further negotiations.

2. Please, therefore, prevent the loading of any rayon on the Sanuki Maru which is
scheduled to sail early in August.

3. Please have the rayon merchants in Japan cable the rayon merchants in this country
that official orders have been issued to the effect that there shall be no further shipments
after the shipment on the Heiyo Maru, (The merchants in this country may file suits on the
^unda of breach of contract. In such an event, our merchants may refer to the abfive Cfbln
and point out that the breach was due entirely to unavoidable circumstances.) *' '

'July 19. mi; n, m.

*Juty IS, 1941; II, 427. At a. meeting of Japanese businesaiiien and attach^ at Mestico City, decisiaitft were made
ligarding steps to be taken in the event U.S. -Mexican talks reach the stage where Mexico feels she need not depend
'09^ ex ports from Japan.

'July 18, 1941; II, 428. Customs otticials at Manzanillo have refused to give clearance to the Akagi Maru until 300
tonft of le«d[ for Mitsui hsive been lutloaded. Ibfcyo directs Mesico Cl^ to mike i«|it«fliei^|a^<gM« ~

No. 434

FROM: Mexico City July 19, W4t\

TO: Tokyo ff282.

(In 2 parts — complete.) ^

Re your message # 132°.

1. Our strategy of working on Maximino Camacho through DOUEENIYASU was brought
to an end, for the time being anyhow, by the Presidential proclamation of the 15th.

We, therefore, mapped out a sli^shtly different strategy, and had the above-mentioned
DO make inquiries of the United States Embassy here and also of the FLA. As a result, we
were able to definitely ascertain that the United States could not supply the rayon. This fact
was further substantiated by DO's partner in New York, CHERUMU.

Armed with this information, I had him call, during the evening of the 16th, upon the
Economic Minister who I had contacted in advance through Maximino Camacho. For
being assured of receiving rayon from Japan, the Economic Minister accepted mitt basic
li^posal of trading rayon (20,0(K) cases) for mercury (8,000 bottles).

%. In view of the above circumstances, DO says that he would like to have the contract ms^
retroactive to June. If the followii^ terms are agreeable to us, it is hi& opinion that the ccsii-
tract can be signed during next week:

mm.

U) Maximino's commission upon the successful conclusion of the original agreement tiras
to _ have been 100,000 pesos for trading 50,000 cases of rayon for 20,000 bottles of itawctwy.
Since this proposed agreement involves 20,000 cases and S,000 bottles, the commission is

.|0 be 50,000 pesos.

(2) Since the mercury must be purchased immediately here, Japan must make payment
for it.

(3) if by some chance traffic on the Pacific is stopped before tbe mercury shipment is made,
japan is to ^sume the loss incurred through reselling it at the present buying price quoted
by the FLA f $170),

Although the rayon will come through the branch offices , it will have to then go through
the hands of DO. Since DO will do the buying of the mercury, he will make a certain handling
cha^e per bottle of mercury purchased.

;i. Our manipulations through DO had progressed to the point outlined above. It is our
intention, however, to use rayon as our weapon to obtain not only mercury but all the other
ifII({^^jb«tiln^iN»^'^^^ For this reason we did not 5ublHilt««^pt»t immediately.

As 1 reported in my message ^ 279*, the attitude of the Mexicans was made clear during
the morning of the 19th. Hence, 1 have been having DO make investigation among the men
in circles concerned, as to tfoe advisability of continuing Our behind the scene manipulation.

In view of these circumstances, 1 would appreciate your advising me whether you have
any objections to continuing the manipulations if it seems as if there is a chance of success.

^^^«i«tft of 7,000 boxes of a^«i^iedliieii»f«^|^Wlilj^^ tt^^mi^'il^a^ Cft^ to

ttle'tliris as a tever in his negotiations. Jutj^ IS, ld4I; 1I,<^.
•jfllyl9, 1941;11,432.

Re your ^2B2'

1. Please {Ntoceed Immediately with our plans to procure oiiuitable exchaniges of quicksilver
for raywo.

2, After conferring with the Department of Commerce and Industry, we have decided to
sbEip the already contracted -for 7,000 boxes of rayon to be shipped from Japan early in August,
Explain this to the Mexican Government by saying that this measure originates in the princi-
ple of our trade policy to recognize only such deals as will assure us the obtentitni of the goods
we need in return and that that is merely a legal execution of the trade control regulations.
Unless and until we can get some results through our schemes, will you please negotiate for
||#«ieABtige of already contracted-for goods, with the exception quicksilver, for rayon. TtHs
department has just made a survey of already contracted -for goods, which is as follows;

Quicksilver — 4,683 tons (Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Showa Trading Company)
Lead Oee— 1,200 tons (Mitsui)
Fluorspar — 605 tons (in transit)
Molybdenum — 23 tons (Mitsui)

No. m

PROM; Tokyo
TO: Meiico

^ly22. IMI

4^

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Tungsten — 23 tons (Mitsui)
Isinglass — 18 tons (in transit)

In addition to the above, the Naval representatives have purchased the i'otiowing; however,
please get in touch with the Naval Attaches coacerning this: ■•
Quicksilver — 1 , 500 tons
Lead Ore — 1,350 tons
Molybdenum — 75 tons

3. We are very much interested in knowing just to what extent the United States is going to
be able to furnish supj^ies to Mexico because this is going to have a great effect upon our
activities. Therefore^ ^b^ase ev^ inteU^&nce ym. p^Hfy^W^i^'^^MKlS^^l^^f

Trans. 7-2^-41?

FROM: Tokyo July 18, 1941

TO: Mexico

Re your # 269°.

Please do the best you can in this matter. Furthermore, the Artificial Silk Association has
planned to send 7,000 boxes the 4th or 5th of August. This shipment of contracted orders is
being held up (a conference was held with the Department of Commerce and Industry). Use
this (prohibition of shipment) as a lever in your negotiations. Please wiie tbf leskUt (^Qur
caption message of the 5th has not yet arrived.)

Trans. 7-21-41 .

No. 437

FROM: Tokyo July 23. 1941

TO: Mexico City *136.

Regarding my message 134'.

In view of their attitude, expressed by their putting into effect an embargo on exports of
materials essential to Japan, and for the purpose of making effective the reorganization of
our export program as outlined in my circular message 1394*, the Ministries concerned have
decided to prohibit the exporting of not only rayon, but of all other general merchandise, to
Mexico. Arrangements to put this measure in effect have already been made. It will be in eflfect
until they voluntarily change their attitude.

Please be advised of the above and make use of it in the best manner possible,

"See II, 435.
'Not available.

No. 438

FROM: Mexico July 26,1941

TO: Tokyo #293.

Re your ^ 135'.

I cannot contain myself because of your instructions by telegram in which I come to realize
that the government is spurririg itself on to its destination by having made a deflntte decision
through the arrangements for a genera! embargo, if necessary, in order to make Mexico re-
consider. On the other hand, it is easy to realize that the various Central and riouth American
c^ntries would adopt a repulsive attitude should such a position l>e taken by us. Al.s* to be
considered is the fact that several materials needed by us have been left out of the President's
"list" (such as petroleum, petroleum products, pine tar, cotton and "cotton 1 inters").
Although all plans possible have been tried, this trump card of complete prohibition of exports
must be thoroughly thought out. Should it be carried out now in a comprehensive form or
should this policy be generally explained? The merchants mentioned in the last part of my
telegram could be inlormed of this policy and I would not formally communicate any infor-
tamtim t0 the government here. No move should be taken until the AbQye hs» been well
studied.

*In which Tokyo advises Mexico City that thf» Ministries concerned have decided to prohibit the exporting of not only
raym, but of all- other funeral mmhandise, to Mmico.

TVans. 7-29-41

No. 439

FROM: Mexico July 26,1941.

TO: Tokyo #294.

(Part lof 2.) ^

Re your ^ 132''.

The following is an account of conditions up to now relating to the survey by the United
States and Mexico concerning the present capacity of the United States to supply Mexico
with necessities, especially artificial silk, as well as the endeavor to find a way out of this
problem through the Mexican companies handling artificial silk and mineral products.

d. The Artificial Silk Question.

Reports obtained from othcials and business firms concerned entirely agree that the United
States is unable to supply the customary needs of trade and that stocks in this country are
not large. Naturally the course to be followed by the Mejypan Government is that of requesting
the supply of needed amounts from the United States. If the United States is unable to
furnish suitable supplies, there will be no way other than the softening of the President's orders
to allow MO- exchange of needed materials. Recently the Minister of National Economy
summoned KATO and listened to the Japanese side of the artificial silk problem. This
seemed to be nothing more than preparation for negotiations with the United States. Later
this same minister let out to the director of the controlling company, who was present at the
meeting, that negotiations with the Foreign Office ( Department of State ?) were contemplated.
The pubUcation in two or three days by the newspapers (^tft n^otiations had been initiated

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

with the United States was confirmation of this surmise. Furthermore, the United States
would not stand for the amelioration of the embargo order against Japan which would permit
50,000 cases a year. It is feared that the United States wilt not be able to supply the necessary
amount even at the sacrifice of the difference (about $1,000,000) betWiea-^S!!^ ;^9^S<!^,«^

'Si l^pmeiit cf artificial silk. July 18, 1941; U 436.

Trans. 7-31-41

N'n. 440

FROM: Mexico July 26, 1941

TO: fy^f^. #m

(Part 2 of 2.)

2. Quicksilver and Other Mineral Products.

In connection with quicksilver, which occupies an important place among the contracted
materials, MITSUBISHI con^dPntially informs us that although the Credito Minero, with
whom they have a contract, is making all efforts to get shipping permits from the Ministry
of National Economy, there are no hopes whatsoever. Also, MITSUBISHI'S letter ctf credit
was returned (revoked ?) on July 23. As MITSUI has no such cancellation clause ii» thitfir
iCdntrsct, they will have to assume full liability.

But again, not only is there some hope, but as mentioned in telegram 12° from New York
to me, the companies with American Connections (partly American ownership ?) are bringing
commercial and effective pressure to bear upon the government which, if successful, will
have a beneficial influence upon most of the contracted materials. MITSUI can be advised
to *'|HMi"'ir[ this same way. It is seen that as far as the American merchants are concerned,
it is impossible to make any movement for the tempering of the President's order which was
the result of |i^essure on the pwt of the United Stat^ As explained* there can be no
optioiis#'l^^^«^^ ji^Xf ^ giavernmeoVv

Sieititlso the Uaife^ikli^lte M ttfei^^fttii^^^^ Nesur

'Not avaikbte.

Trans. T-ai^Hl

No. 441

FROM: Tokyo July 31, 1941

TO: Mexico City ^ 142.

Re your #294°.

If the United States attempts to furnish Mexico with rayon at a cheap price, regardless of
loss or profit, we are prepared to counter this by furnishing them rayon at about 60 dollars, or
one half the price of American rayon, if they will assure us of expdrt*, in corresponding amou^Hi'
(tf the coionw^ities that are ess^tial to Japan. (We have conferred with the #»«ctment8

concerned.) You will therefore communicate this fact to the Mexicans in some suitable
manner, and while thus checking the actual supply of rayon from America, endeavor to
secure a modilication of the Presidential order. If unfortunately this should prove impossible,
you will make Use aS this proposal, as material for fostering dnti-American ideas, as one means of
increasing America's ^^fices, as per paragraph iW your message referred to above.

"See II, 439-440.

Trans. 8-1-41

No. 4-12

FROM: Mexico (Miura) July 30, 1941

TO: Tokyo ^299.

In connection with what I told you in my ?f294', we have 1,200 tons of lead left oviar^'ls

Manzanillo for which we wish to get a permit. The American smelting, however, said that
out of consideration for its relations with the United States it would be impossible to move it.

ifke Mit^ utiieiate n^^^i^att directly with the MMIj^M 'B^^omii^ lltfr
Iter said that the American Government had requested that J&^^.j^t be allowed to
this because it is material necessary for defense and that he wOul!^ ($ierefore, have to
B:>I jipi$1:^0:^it^a^lp^^;^ please get in toueb with New York,

Tram. 7-3l~4l

So. 443

FROM: Mexico July 30, 1941

TO: Tokyo ^300,

L -575° from Washington and =73' from me to the Minister suggest means whereby you
may make remittances to us now that our assets in America are frozen. 1 suppose that you are
considering these, along with other possible means. My monthly output, including secret
expenses and expenses in connection with Japanese residents amounts to $7,000 (telegraphic
expenses $4,000, salaries $1,000, other miscellaneous expenses such as loans, etc., $1,400.)
But at present all I have is $12,000. Now, if we deduct the salaries for July amounting to $1,600
and telegraphic expenses for June and July amounting to $11,000, it leaves me with a deRcit
of S600. So, you must figure out some way of furnishing me with sutiScient ftjods Immediately^
(I am sending by next wire my own opinions on the best method.)

2. By the way, on the 29th t got eleven checks for salaries, and the two large banks here both
refused to cash them because of the freezing order. 1 told them that since the United States
was losing $500 more or less for ordinary living expenses, it naturally would seem that Mexico
could do the same thing. Inquiry concerning this is being made of New York through the
BaQkctfM^i«d.

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOIt

3, By the way, the Army and Navy, as reported in a government code message of last Janu-
ary 24, furnished their people directly with enough money for a whole year. For your informa-
tion.

Note: This is d retranslation of a message sent 8-1-41 which was incomplete.

*Not available. -
'This is probably a garble for r 273 which Ulls of an interview with the Foreign Vice Minister tegardins the etfect
and implieation of the United States- Mesicaa embargo agreement upon Japanese-Mexican relations. July l7, 1941;

Trans„8-4-4l

No. 444

FROM: Tokyo {Foreign Minister)
TO: Mexico City

(Secret within the ofhce. )

In view of the situation in Mexico there is a feeling in government circles that the $350,000
which is said to be the capital of the Pacific Petroleum Company in Mexico should be
immediately withdrawn. Since this money is necessary for the continuance of business of this
company we are also thinking of placing it in the name of our Legation so that it cannot
touched. Will you pl^se let me have your comments cm these points by return wire?

Trans. 7-16-41

FROM: Mexico (Miuf a)
TO: Tokyo

(Secret outside the Department.)

Re your 121°.

Regarding this question, there are the following two opinions:

a. In view of the fact that prospecting has been carried on thus far and also that the Raguuna'
Company, being a Mexican firm, naturally has rights which we should expect in discussing
whether the 10,000,000 yen investment should be revived or not, tb@ opmion thajt the ren^ain-
Sftg $300,000 be paid back to Japan ii'ja^y '^^fflaMi. 'tf tliffe mtfe^Sf is p^^^
investment so far made would have beeaiBBde in vain.

b. Everyone knows that the RA Company is a subsidiary of the Taiheiyo Company. Further-
more, it is impossible to predict what will happen to the company in case of en emergency, for
the company has as yet no supporters among the influential members of the present regime.
And, too, inasmuch as only a short time has elapsed since it began prospecting, it is hard to
say whether with the $300,000 balance it would be able to hit an oil vein. If there is no prospect
of future investment., it would be well to give up the venture altogether for the time being.

The opinion coming under aforementioned "A" is naturally to be expected of those who are
Itf l^^ga' Jii «^ vwi^ ^ ^3mst vm ^riew» fdumM ftee^l^ h-% ifsm^m "mWiM iimiiM ^

July 12, 1941
#121.

July 14, 1941
263.

decided in Tokyo after various matters have been taken into consideration. If the basic policy
is to carry on the venture, regardless of sacrifice, on the ground that the venture is one into
which the nation had entered as a long range plan, the viewpoint "A" should be adopted. On
the other hand, if oil is hit, the money should be kept in the hands of the Taiheiyoand there
will be no alternative but to adopt the point of view "B", though today, when it is impossible
to send ships into the Atlantic, the oil is likely to be useless, and regardless of whether or not
there is some other valuable or safe enterprise in which to make an investment.

'In which Tokyo suggests placing the $350,000, which is said to be the^tt^i^xi^ the i^MSpe ^s|^«d«ttffi ComtMtny in
Mexico, in the name ofthe Japanese Legation so that it cannot be touched aAldd^f^ Me^tieQ%cM^^£tt6». July 12, 1941;

11,444,

'Kana spelling. (Lacuna Oil Company.)

Trans. 7-18-41

No. 446

FROM: Tokyo July 17, 1941

Re your #263*.

The following points were dedded upon ^er eonierring with the various departments
involved. Please make the necessary arrangements.

1. The $300,000 capital is to be given to them immediately. To prevent this fund from
being frozen or seized, have them keep it in the oHice of the Japanese legation. Disbursement
shall be made from it at will. (If the Legation is to be closed at some future date, this fuil4
will be turned over to the Laguna Company. Under such circumstances, Turu will be in-
structed to prevent the enterprise from being discontinued.)

2. In the event that additional funds are required, the matter will have to be given further
consideration, after which a decision will be reached, (If it becomes necessary for the com-
pany's statf mmftems^f x^oAta^ere to emt^ ©ot some special measures. )

44a.

Trans, 7-19-41

No. 447

FROM: Tokyo July 26, 1941

TO: Mexico ff 146.

Request telegram. From the Pacific Petroleum Company to OKUMURA,
As the United States issued an order on the 25th freezing Japanese funds, please
immediately hand over to the Legation the funds on deposit, 3,600,000 pesos. Also, as the
use df code telegrams has been prohibited since the 22nd, in the future we will send all
telegrams through the Foreign Office.

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 449

FROM: MexicQ|Mi^>.
TO; Tokyo

August 2,. |S^-
#308.

(Courtesy Report.)

The following is to the Main Office of the Taiheiyo (Paciilc} Petroleum Company — from
OKUMURA to KUBOTA:

31 — See your # 44. If worse comes to worse we will:

(1) Set affairs in order as per your # 37 and # 39.

(2) As for our employees, we will send NAKAMURA. ANDO. and NAKAGAWA home at
once and keep AMAYA, KURTTA, and tbeif families, together with KANEKO and KAWA-
HARA here until the end.

(3) We wired the Navy a request for the well-digging in # 29.

(4) Who sent theuttr«t^j^^|iie88age mentioned in ordinary telegram # 18?

Message to Tokyo tf 191.
(Part 2 of 2)°.

6. Should the Suez Near East situaft^ develop unfavorably for Britain, America's Pacitic
policies will necessarily teim to pfe>ve»t ^ftfrito ^!&m attltektia® England in the Far East as well

as her back door,

7. America's attitude toward Japan is becoming stronger and stronger and more "warlike."
She is increasing the number of her bombere in the Pacific. Though she is taking some

measure in China, it is thought that they will not become . While she is planning to ship

essential military products to CHIANG'S China, soon as economic embargo direct at Japan

— - — will be established.

8. Germany, it is presumed, will bring pressure upon Spain and Portugal after the HsrvtSt
of (month) have been reaped. On the basis that this is the assumption held by those lit the
Government, it is rumored that the United States will prevent German penetration into the
Atlantic islands of these two countries, as well as Dakar.

9. Though there are some bases for the rumor, it is imagined that there will be an armi-
stice declared either this summer or fail, but the Government does not anticipate an "early
peace" and has been planning for a long war.

10. Plans for economic warfare are being drawn up. A complete export embargo will be in-
stituted (aimed principally at JapahK At the same time, the Government, in order to pre-
serve and to defend others from going over to the Axis camp, as well as to prevent the
economic bankruptcy of South America and other friendly nations, will enter into a program

Trans. 8-4-41

Na.449

FROM : Rio de Janeiro {Isbii)
TO: Washington

June 4, 1941
#7.

Trans. 6-17-41

\o.450

FROM : Rio de Janeiro Cfefeg)
TO: Washinfjton

June 4 1S41
?r7.

Message to Tokyo = 191,
(Fart 1 of2)°

1. The patrol has been proposed instead of the convoy system but it will soon clash with
German submarines or planes, and an inevitable situation will occur.

2. Tlie Government, in connection with its revisions of the Neutrality Law, is now in the
process of sounding out opinion in both houses. Though much time will be lost in debate,
fk»ngress will undoubtedly pass ttieiii^asiifie;

3. After American ships have heen sunk, the Goveaffl^^ ^I^f^i.^i^l^ WUI bec0l^
much stronger and will insist upon defense of shipping, 1^. $<• .-^^ . . ^

4. Though they talk of avoiding war, such expressions %r4»a<»n ^'t*^ i^'a^ iut a
"side entrance" to maintaining control of the seas.

5. The maintenance of "non-belligerency" is but a stopgap while preparations are being
made until an incident breaks out or until public opinion has come around to the point where

t Circular)

Message from Tokyo as -100
(Part 1 of 2)"

Recently, due to machination on the part of the United States, there are some Central and
South American countries which either have instituted or are about to institute export U<:0ttse
systems and other measures for the purpose of limiting exports to Japan.

•bt ftettHng with this tendency: (1) that although the reason for placing limitation

on exports to Japan seems to be based on the assumption that such exports are being re-
exported from Japan to the belligerents, the fact is that because of scarcity of ships, Japan
is importing but 60% of what she herself needs of the Central and South American products
and lor this reason she is by no means in a position to reexport these piioducts to any third
country.

'Fwt 2 of 2 not available.

Trans. 6-16-41

No. 451

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii)
TO; Santiago

June 10, 1941
134.

Trans. 6-^-41

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 452

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 14. 1941

TO; Lima # Wi.

Your assistant naval attache KAMEDA (extra duty) will be relieved in /^bUJitftr future and
Lt. Commander SADAYOSHI NAKAYAMA, now on duty in the United Sta1%& appointed in
^18 place.

tRBw. 7-^31 -41

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July U, 1941

TO: Rio de Janeiro #140.

Your naval attache (extra duty) SHIGEHIRO will be relieved in the near future of his
assignment as extra duty naval attache and appointed to your office as principal duty naval
attache. Lt. Commander SADAYOSHI NAKAYAMA, now on duty in the United States,
will be appointed as assistant naval attache. Lt. Commander KAMEDA will be relieved as
extra duty assistant naval attache.

Trans. 7-31-41

No. 454

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) July 14, 1941

TO: Santiago 9 14.

(Me^gfrfit)mT<*ig»-.#J^' ...

Rear Admiral KATSUMI YUKISHlfA has been appointed Naval Attache to your Embassy
and also to Chile. Commander SHIGBtltABO has been relieved. Please transmit this to Chile.

Trans, 7-25-41

No. 455

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 16, 1941

TO: Rio de Janeiro * 146.

Student Secretary (?) KUSANO is leaving Yokohama, August 9th, on the HIKAWA MARU
fi)r his new post via the United States.

So. 456

W&iX'. Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 16, 1041

TO: Rio de Janeiro #147-

Semi-official employee KASAHARA, accompanied by his family, is leavii^ Yokohama on the
Loan on the 24th, for his new post.

Trans. (Not dated)

No. 457

FROM: Santiago (Kawasaki) July 18, 1941

TO: Lima #2L

Message from Tokyo # 75. ^

Lieut. Col. MARUO TESHIMA is appointed Military Attache to Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia
as of the 16th. Ueut. KOKO is relieved.

Translator's note: Lieut. Col. TESHIMA does not speak Spanish but speaks English
fluently. He has spent several years as Military Attache in India.

' *' • Trans. 7-29-41

No. 458

FROM: Sao Paolo (Hara) August 2, 1941

TO: Tokyo #81.

I arrived on the 2nd and have completed taking over of the duties iwm'M^lX^&»^^''^*
porting by letter to the Embassy in Brazil.

Trans. 8-12-'41

.No. 459

FRO M : Rio ( Ish ii ) August 4, 1941

TO: Santiago #5.

Rear Admiral SAKAMAKI and Commander NAITO left Sao Paulo on the 6th and Buenos
Aires on the ? by (Conelor?) plane for your place. They will not make connections with the
Rokuyo Maru. Please make arrangements so that thiy will catjch Shuyo Mam without
fail. (Request Message.) *^ « • • . - •

Trans. 8-16-41

TJ^ "J^^tP" BACKGROUND Of PpAKU HARBOR

No. 460

FROM: RioCIshU) August 4, 1941

■1% 'mm '«si.7*

from Rear Admiral SAKAMAKI to Vice-Minister of the Navy.

Irhe schedule of movements of Commander NAITO and myself are as follows:
By air arriving Buenos Aires on the 6th and Santiago on the 11th. Taking the Heiyo Maru at
Valparaiso.

This has been tranatnitted to Argentina, Chile and P«ru. (Request miessage.)

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii) July 22, 1941

TO: Los Angeles ff 1.

Please mail me ten copies of the pamphlet entitled Americanism issued by the Central
Japanese Society of your city. Also several copies of any such pamphlets which may be issi;^
in the San Francisco area. Also please telegraph me briefly the impressions and comnoentS
on these pamphlets by the first generation Japanese.

Trans. 3-11-41

No. 462

FROM: Rio (Ishii) June 26, 1941

TO: ^^ei^ '

(Circular)

{llf«8&age to Tokyo #^.)
(Part 4 of 4)".

4, The United States seems to be in a quandary as to how best handle the existing govern-
ment and it is being said that in circles she is using the Integralistas Party (the

American Ambassador GAFFERY has the reputation of being a person well versed in the
control of instigators of revolution). It seema that, with a view of frightening VARGAS,
America recently had her hand in the matter of bringing former President WASHINGTON
RUIZ out of many years of retirement following his explosion by VARGAS. There are many
who profess such theories. Furthermore, the United States, taking advantage of the corruption

of Brazilian circles, is using large sums of money. Without a doubt, their "infilt^^tit;^','

is quite deep rooted. Many say that the President's authority is wasting away.

Among the ABC powers of South America, Brazil is the most vulnerable to the pressures
applied to her by the United States. This being the case, it is re^ettAble t)pt the Axis is not
taking counter- policies to combat it.

Trans. 9-20-41

No. 463

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda)
TO: Sao Paulo.

Re your message 5? 60".

We have no objections to the establishment of youth training centers. However, in actually
putting these into operation, should we intend to set up Japanese teachers to instruct
Japanese residents in Brazil in a manner similar to the instruction given Japanese heref-ia
the light of current Brazilian policy it seems to me that it is necessary to take progressive
Steps in order to forestall suspicion on the part of the Brazilian authorities. Not only that, but
IMIieve that it is advisable to give a great deal of study to tile pdteibiKti^ of the dismember*
ment of our cultural dissemination associations and our general counter-policy to such
measures. This sort of an enterprise might put a curse upon our total policies toward Brazil
should we put its budget and actual operation directly in the hands of our diplomatic offices
in Brazil. On the other hand, we would insist on having direct supervision in the hands of the
diplomatic otticials only to the point of setting up the organization. Our policy now is to post-
pone. Cor a short time, the question of disbursing subsidy funds because we would like to have
the functioning of the organization dependent on the instructor's personal merits.

Furthermore, alter you have referred to the similar opinions expressed in secret message
«:lSt. |]J«ase wile tl^ illl3ij^<^IIM^|^l Mai what you intend to do.

"Not a%'«J|tMN»t

Re your circular ~ 1366*.

1. We have been burning all secret papers, including telegrams, official letters, etc., dated
up to the end of 1934, and have taken precautions so that the other papers may be bui1].ed''fit,
any time. We have also instructed the offices under our jurisdiction to do likewise.

2. Since the possibility is increasing of ail steamship services between Japan and this
country being given up, and in view of the present international situation, we would like to
send the Imperial portraits in care of the captain of the Nan -A Maru which is scheduled to
stop at Rio de Janeiro on August 5. I would like to have the portraits in the other offices under
our jurisdiction sent back in care of one of the ahips which are sailing southward with a view of
ppc^i^diSf 1^ wj^ of the Straits of Magellan.

'In vAAth Tokyo says that in view of the present international situation the Imperial portrait should he carefully
protected, and that there is no objection to returning it tp Japan. Also, if the occasion demands, code books iMnt
documents ahtuild be burned, but this should not bedtmetacfaotmas itwoutd inconvsoience communication.

Trans, 10-15-41

No. 464

FRO M : Rio de Janeiro (IsJiii)

TO: Tokvo

July 30, 1941
ff299.

Trans. 8-15-41

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 465

FROM: Santiago (Kawasaki) June 2, 1941

TO* &ij^i^^'W^Mi«^i:IE^M*^J« ^l*"

Circular.

(Mess^toTokyoaa #111.)

(1st) I understand that the other day a member of the Chilean Military Commission confi-
dentially informed the German Ambassador that in reply to a request by the United States for
the use of the Straits of Magellan, the Chilean Government replied that in view of this country's
|ieace policy, this would n6t be possible^

Trans. 6-21-41

No. 466

FROM: Santiago (Kawasaki) June 6, 1941

TO: Tokyo *116.

Part 1 of 3.

1. dn the 2nd, I questibfiy IRASUMSU", a member of emgriss, ikttd he gave the following
as his view of the matter:

Because the United States had begun to prevent, by refusal to issue permits, export from
country of materials wWch sli^'cenBiders necessary and vital, Chile also has had to ri^<wt
to the same method. The Conservative Party would have to approve of this action if it is to
keep in step with the general trend of affairs. However, since he already realizes the impor-

tansse -iSf itade and with Japan, when the question coSite* «S 8t the plenary session on

the 10th, he JwoaW fj^fe jg^atest aajg fflropoaal that would place obstacles in the ws^f «f (jade
with Japan.

'Kana Gpelling.

Trans. 6-21-41

No. 467

EBOM: Santii^d^iCiiiitflil • Jiinie6.mi
TO: Tokyo #lli.

Patt2c»f3.

2. 1 met and discussed the matter with Chairman DEYURAN" and learned that what he was
consulted on by the Foreign Minister had to do principally with the question of reexportation.
Hie stated that he thought there would hardly be a possibility of a total embargo being placed

(HI export to Japan of such items as minerals, but that inasmuch as it is not easy to

they would probably prohibit reexportation of (war materials?), institute the license

system and reserve themselves materials needed by (the) industries (in this country?) He
promised, however, that he would make an effort toward having a clause inserted to tfee
effect that no export limitation would be placed on such items so long as there is a surplus Off

Trans. 6-21-41

A-233

\o. 468

FROM: Santiago (Kawasaki) June 6, 1941

TO: Tmm ' aim

Part 3 of 3.

3. Although the btli has not yet been announced to the , I had an opportunity confi-
dentially to peruse it in advance and found that under the date of the 31st, it dealt principally
with two points; reexportation and the export license system and that (the supporters) were
strongly urging its early passage.

I understand that during the debate held on the 4th, th^ even, ibad voted against ref^ing
thebill to a committee. • ' " ^. , ..

4. Senator BARESU' (a Mitsubishi advisor), I undentood, spoke quite pessimistically about
the prospect.

S/'f^ie^'le%ei6^'i*l^ days. I am wiring

yoii this much for your information.

'Kattaspdllii^.

Trans. 6-21-41

No. 469

FROM: Santiago (Kawasaki)
TO: Tokyo

(In 2 parts— complete)* '

Convey the following to RYOSHA:

"Cobaltera" has secured the following definite proposals and requests immediate instruc-
tions as to whether or not to accept them.

(1) For a period of 5 years they are given the handling of the entire annual output of ore for
<!^apan.

(2) Ore of 1 content and up will be loaded in bulk, |si4lf^tid.(H;e *^ Ili^>|tp wiU be put
^ bags and delivered F.O.B. at Huasco or Coquimbo.

(3) Price to be fixed every six months by mutual agreement taking into account the
Canadian prices, the general market, actual costs of mining, etc.

(4) In the event such agreement is not reached, it will be permissible to sell to a third party
on a 15 day notice; however, the Japanese reserve the right to accept within this period after
reconsideration.

(5) Settlement for the first year's production of ore of a minimum of 1 'f grade, will be made
at Huasco at one dollar per unit (one pound of pure cobalt), but in ^9'eSSi^%iit0U^'tai>)i^'
settlement will be made later.

(6) In case any ore should remain unshipped after six months from the time oFiti arrival at
Huasco interest at the rate of 6'V per annum is to be paid on the original cost price; the
company is to do its best to ship at least 30 tons per month of ores of 1 'V grade and up,

(7) Previous to shipping, samples of the ore are to be taken out, at the expense of the pufcbits-

June 7, 1941
#118.

A-234

(8) 80 'f of the price will be paid on the basis of estimates made^Ss ship loading papers.
The weighing and collecting of samples is to be done in the presence of a representative of the
seller, and in the case of those in Japan, this is final, and the balance v/iU be paid when th^
weight and analysis has been ascertained.

(9) The analysis of the Japan mint shall be fiiuA, CM^ of tO^
the Ledoux analysis is to be the arbiter.

(10) Immediately upon the conclusion of the contract, a loan of one million pesos will be
made to the company from the Japanese, on the condition that it be used directly in the
development of mines. This is to be paid back in 5 years with interest at . Payments to be
tuade by deducting 10 ' V from the purchase price. In case of sale to a third party, 15 ''r is to be
deducted from purchase price to pay on the loan.

(11) The mine-lots are to be written into the contract as security for the loan. However, a$
the 6rst mortgage on these is held by the Bureaus of Industries, this will be a second mortgage.

(12) If it is impoa^ble to pay up the principal and interest in the five years, the sole i^ency
contract will be extended until the full payment can be made.

(13) If four months elapse after ore reaches Huasco without shipment having been made,
80 ^ f of the price is to.be p«id.

Inasmuch as there has been a great deal of delay in waiting for them to make up their minds
in regard to stock investment privileges, rates, the dispatch of engineers, etc., we would like

to see this €ont»^«o^^tdfd it:'^!^. memm'l

Trans. 6-20-41

So. m

FROM: Santiago (Kawasaki)

TO: Rio, Lima, Panama, Washington, Buenos Aires
(Circular)

Message to Tokyo ff 158.

Since the beginning of the (German-Soviet conflict, the attitude of the Communist Party here
has radically changed. In the Houses of Parliament, too, speeches proposing aid to the Soviet
are being made. Throwing the peace and order of the past into disruption, they, together with
pro- American wing of the Socialist Party, are creating dissention. Joining the front of
^dtemocracy, the Communist Party has forgotten its age-old war against British and American
Capitalism and is taking a strong editorial stand which is principally anti-German. Though
'0^^ have planned street demonstrations, the GpYewiment's control of such demonstrations
^strielimTidi&^ho^^ they hav«be«n dMpt^s^.

4Uaong the moving pictures shown, anti-German ones hav€ been banned. The

, realizing the increasing influence of the Communist Party, is attacking it as presenting

an unpatriotic threat to the 6bweffi«i«fit. ^lie4hB«witial newspapK' "Mercurip" like the —
ya", however, is printing in large headlines the pr!|#e^wi' attimate defeat of the
Soviet. This matter is evoking a great deal of attention.

Trans. 7-11-41

July 1, 1941
ff43.

A-235

No. 471

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii)
<Cireular).

( Message to Tokyo ^ 1&8. )
Re my 183".

On the 12th. the Chief of the Trade Bureau, I understand, told NAKAMURA' that the
presidential decree issued the other day would have no unfavorable effect on Japan, inasmuch .
as Japan has a trade agreement with Argentina and that Japan need not be concerned because
he was of the intention of bringing about a more satisfactory trade relation with Japan.

It seems to me that the United States has had something to do with this question.

Relayed to the United Stat^ and Brazil.

°Not available.

*Camiii«tcial Secretary, .lapitnese Legation, BmimMM*

Trans. 7-11-41

\o. 472

FROM: Buenos Aires (Toraii)
TO: Tokyo

Re your message ~ 1525".

In view of the situation there has been a great IntntA^ in the nttmbsr of request messages
between firms here and their home ofhces and this is giving our telegraph personnel a great
deal of trouble. I would like to have these request messages designated in the "Z" table.
Please wire as soon as possible if this fits in with the procedure mentioned in your caption
tneswgf>

'In which Tokyo sends out a circular giving instructions for controltinfthe useof mtelesstetegrftphy and telephony
for the purpose of increasing the etKciency of counter-espionage work.

Trans. 10-17-41

Xa.473

VmW' 'B«^»K%nai)
TO:

(Part 1 of 2)*

In another message, I will wire you more of the details of the general situation in Ecuador;
however, I thought I had better send you immediately the important impressions I obtained.

I. fnun the highest to the lowest, the people of Ee»tt4or entertain the profouncUil iiiAifei
for the Peruvians and there are many, pan^ ^ them who mpm, Pmi attack at aits'

June 10, 1941
5t70,

Augusta, 1941
^317.

June 14, 1^1

THE "MAGIC BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

moment. Of all the countries in South America, Peru i8 the only (anti-Axis power ?>. The
(British who live in Peru earnestly trust that Peru is going to help them. Taking advantage
of this situation, the United States has established propaganda headquarters in Guayaquil'
and is spreading every day such fantastic st^ttim m m^e nmex^
saiti the newspapers are publishing such stones serially day by day^.

'Seapcnt and commwcipl city in Ecuador.
'S«U.475.

6-30-41

FROM: Bogota C^etolj MmM, m$

TO: Tokyo -77.

Germans here in Colombia tell me that Nazi activities are not doing so well. Powerful govern-
ment oflicials like the President, a former lawyer for British oil concerns, are turning in favor
of Englantl mi the Unfits^. S^»69v Si»}a4t$ ia ^tGNiEi%l& Wm^i^e^m Mm m^H^^ s&i^
Peru.

Tr»ns,.7-l2-4i

No. 475

FROM: Bogota (Yanai)
TO: Tokyo

(Part 2 of 2)

I told you more about this in my ^ IT from Quito. When I talked with the Foreign Minister,
as I told you in that message, he told me that the question of the Peruvian border was
gradually growing more and more "grave"- In a quaking voice he said to me: "Peru is preparing
for War."

2. Contrasted with her relations with Peru, Colombia's relations with Ecuador are most
amicable. As a matter of fact, save on Government buildings, both Hags float jointly every-
where. You might say that the two countries are flying one banner. Now, I was to jointly sefve
in Peru but I prefer Ecuador. I inquired of the Ecuadorean Government from Bogota if it
would be all right for me to represent my country there, as weli as in Bogota, and they express-
ed great satisfaction. The Foreign Minister and all t}m^^^hmpf0^0i^-i^e^fB^'

°In which NAGUMA says h« has explained to the Peruvian ForeiEn Minister that newspaper repofteMj^ll^liim
iMreS,OD0 J«p«iMHieW)ii|p «!m^ the bw#r WTO wfoundeel. Sf¥ II 47? for port one.

Trans. 6-30-41

June 14, 1941
if 76.

No. m

I

FHOM; (Lima?) July 18, 1941

This government has demanded an apology from Ecuador for the attack on the Guayaquil
consulate as a preliminary to accepting the conditions proposed by the United States, Brazil,
and Argentina. Ecuador has done this, and, therefore, this country will (1) withdraw its army
to the line agreed upon by both countries in 1936; (2) this will be carried out under the direc-
tion of a joint military commission; (3) flying of military planes will be prohibited in the
evacUatCHd mne* (4) she will sign the various peace documents; (5) this government has
announced that on th« 16th it replied to the m.eitliatjw« powers that she agreed with );he soXn^m
of the afi'air.

Trans. 7-29-41

No. 477

FROM: Lima (Sakamoto) June 28, 1941

The Peruvian GovernrnlECl .pl^dwftBal decree dated June 27th, to the effect that

tor reasons of the maintenance cf neutfslity, jflb entrance into Peruvian waters and harbors
by submarine;! oi" belligerent powers was prohibited. &9t«iisi^Wilif %

Trans. 7-25-41

TO:

Caracas (Qhgimi)
Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

July 25, 1941
ff67.

Foreign 0th ce Secret,

The wife of the oldest son of the former president of this country received the information
given below from the wife of the present president. The former passed the information on to
her best friend, who is the wife (Venezuelan) of Yazawa, President of the Forei^er's Assoeia<-
tio»;

* 'T?Jl6 'f^eisident told hii "Wfffe that all of the Central and South American Governments
received a suggestion from the U.S. about three weeks ago, to apply the pressure on Japanese
residing in their respective countries. Methods whereby these Japanese would be forced to
teave tiw countries were pointed cHj|>i^**il^ -• • ^

No. t7»

FROM: Tokyo May 30, 1941

TO: Berlin #462.

In the near future we would like to make radical revisions in the method of using cryptographic
^tems as, # ^ jpresent sitotttio^, it is- fm^i^Mf Mip^^lt Ibr us in thii ^ce

A-238

THS "^GIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HA^QS

to communicate with the Embassy in England, let alone make courier contact. Therefore,
please have KIMARA immediately draw up new methods to be used between this office and
London. (Fundamental and radical changes are thought to be desirable. Furthermore, if it is
potsible, there should be two or three different methods.) As it is understood that Secretari?
MATSUI", who was in Vichy when I went to Europe, Is shortly going to England, please have
KIMARA go to Vichy so that he will arrive before MATSUl leaves. (Another plan would be to
have * come to Berlin.)

Please arrange to send us the revised system for use in your office, as well as the new system
for use between this office and London by the next courier or have FUKUDA bring it when he
returns home. - -

Relay to Vichy.

No. 480

FROM: London June 14, 1941

(Very Urgent.)

We need to change the rules tor the use of systems, but inasmuch as no convenient courier
connections could be made with your office, will you have NOMOTO" develop an entirely
3^|9|»l»ft of rules for the use of your office, and when you return to Japan, have these rules taken

.l^#iir as Lisbon. From Lisbon, they should be transmitted to our Ambassador in Berlin

by^ Ambassador KATO and courier, and have our Ambassador in Berlin transmit them by means
of courier to our respective ambassadors in the European countries, as well as to the Spanish
Minister in Switzerland. Will you, yourself, transmit them to our Ambassador in Washington?
The rules should be of threte or four different sets. As to the date for commencing the use, as
well as the extent that would be put into use, I will wire you tfy using one of the arrangements
}»^posed by your office after we have received them .

Relay to~ — , Switzerland; relay message from to all ambassadors in Europe.

'Ftobably KAWAMOTO. The name U garbled.

Trans, 7-9-41

m

FROM: Tokyo (Jap. For, Min.) July 26, 1941

TO: London

We have received in good condition ^ 1, namely, regulations for systems, worked out

by Telegraphist NOMOTO. These rules will be used only for messages exchanged between your

A-239

■ii^ce and this department. I will wire you the date m which we will begin using them. In
consideration of the fact that the messages may be transmitted, we have sent copies of these
regulations to Manchukuo, Peking, Tientsin, Nanking, Shanghai, Canton, Hongkong, Mexico
and Maitll4t^;Pto#se tfKOfmit th» same to the Uni^ States Sm^i^^^ aad have them
transmit it from S witzerland to Germany, Italy and Fran^.

Tram. 7-29-41

No. 482

FROM: Tokyo June 11, 1941

m Berlte ff502,

lain transtnitting No. 13 from Cape Town to me as follows;

Re my No. 12°. We had a telegram from the Ambassador in Berlin via the Minister in Portugal
regarding British shipping, but inasmuch as 17 days elapsed from the time it was sent till we
' received If' ^ wonder if Britain is not exercising a strict «ai^ehip over (eli^s^ from* that
source. Because we cannot be sure that there is no danger in maintaining the secrecy of our codes
in transmitting such information, from now on we will transmit to the Ambassador in Germany
throii(jfc.T<)kyoinste|Kiofth3Fough^ae|^^ . -r

"Bi^ relS9fliW8 t#tfte ABiljas8ado3f in ToJqsflRt^ether with my -

'Report on British ship movements.
*Re British shippiiij; in Soutti Africa,

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) May 13, 1941

TO: London (Ambassa^lli

Be my 160°.

Concerning this item of the request to close, please propose that the British government
recommend immediately to the Egyptian government its revocation. (Under date of May 5th
the Egyptian government in an otlicial communication consented to removal to Cairo and
ciutying on business there but any further concessions were impossible, they said,!

Furthermore, the Eg>ptian government, under date of March 5th forbade file tise of any
language but English and French in ordinary communications and forbade the use of code
messages entirely to the Alexandria coiisulat^. Plef^e take «ip both of these points with the
British government.

'Not avsilaMe.

Trans. 5-16-41

So. 484

FROM; Rio de Janeiro (Ishii)
(Circular)

Message from Tokyo as Circular # 1124 (Part 2 of 3)*.

1, Australia is faithful to the mother country and is growing more hostile to Japan.

2. In India the Punjab troops will not kneel to England, and many favor Italy. The Sikhs
and Mohammedans are at outs and peace and order are broken. Of the Indian troops sent to
Malaya, the SiK^' lefi||^i.ieiH^ be the saffi# 4^pe|fg» ittti'

angrily.

" Trans. 7-12-41

May 26, 1941

.No. 485

FROM: Tokyo May 20, 1941

TO: China Net sllDl/

(CfaBniar)

From London as ?r 362 on the 16th.

In connections with my ff360" and ff361', on the 16th, I conferred with Undersecretary
BUTLER and he said; "Among the Englishmen arrested in North China it seems that Mr.
DAVIS has been in jail for four years now. This man is a minister and the Church and other
organizations are as angry as hell. They have protested to the Government and we are on the
spot. We are keeping this as much as possible out of the newspapers in order to avoid further
confusion. We are anxious beyond words about this. Now, I don't care on what grounds
you do it, but I want you to see that DAVIS and the others are released. You might free thera on
the grounds of extraterritoria lity .

I replied: "Well, I will refer your request to Tokyo,"

'Not available.

Trans, 6-2a-#

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) May 23, 1941

TO: i>^|^4Ai^tiil»;#|. . ,, - #043.

.Investigate and wire back regarding the truth of a Domei cable stating that 11 seamen from
the whaler, Tonan Maru, had been placed on the "blacklist" by the British consulate in Los
Angeles.

IVans, 5-28-41

A-241

N0.48T

FROM: Rio d« Janeiro (Ishii)

June 2, 1SI41

^ctly Secret.

Lately England has been very loathe to grant visas readily for our people to travel in British
territory. Consequently, from now on when Englishmen (Canadians, Australians, Hindus, etc.,)
wish to travel in our country, we will hold up consideration of their applications for passports
for a corresponding length of time. In the case of diplomatic, business, and ordinary passports,
in each instance have a request message sent in to this ottice. (However, telegraphs requesting
diplomatic passports will fcjfefiiaSE&a.)

(Circular.) Messaj^ to Tokyo #908.
Remy ?847*.

On May 22nd, and on June 3rd, I requested representatives of the Army, Navy and the Far
Eastern Reconstruction Bureau to meet in a conference and discuss the question of rights
claimed by Germans for owning and operating factories in Shanghai and its vicinity. A3 »i
result, it was decided to put into effect the following decisions:

1. As regards the claim of ownership made by the German firm JIIMUSEN* of
ilVUK' factory of the SUIDEI^ Company of Shanghai, we found it to b& based on in^ifficieall
reasons and, inasmuch as it is possible to regard it as mere nominal transference of registra-
tion, we shall refuse to recognize the claim and reject it after giving our reasons for so doing.

2. Furthermore, as regards a ^mmArme^ to MINDOZOSHISHO^ by the SIN CHANG
Company, a British firm, for the payment of 1,500 pounds for machinery sold to it, we shall
immediately make the payment since the attitude of this firm is quite gentlemanly and the
amount is ascertainable.

;i. Also, in the matter of the claim to possession made by the German firm of BEN-MAIYAA'
relative to the aforementioned paper factory, we shall have them rescind the claim inas-
much as it is based on no grounds whatsoever and those of the machinery purchased
which are at ptemnt in Kako'' (Message incompte^.).

°Not available.
*Kana spelling.

'Kana spelling—probably thtnatue oCa paper mimul'sctutit^ <xmpm^.
'In Chekiang Province.

Trans. 6-4-41

FROM: Shanghai
TO: Net

June 4, 1941

#456.

Trans, 6-11-41

A-242

No. 489

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hanfe^i^^lllMtfi^,

(Circular)

Message to Shanghai # €03.

On the 6th, the Commercial Attache from the British Embassy called on the Chief of ^
Far Eastern Bureau. He handed him a memorandum in which it was stated that on account of
prohibition imposed upon British firms in Gisho" against remittance of money, these firms
were unable to pay the workers on lighters and that the British Embassy in Shanghai had
requested the Japanese authorities for permission to pay $8,000 a month to the Taizo Company
and $6,500 to the Taiwa Company but that no reply had been received. The Commercial
Attache appealed for our assistance in this matter.

Meting out this kind of treatment does not benefit us in view of the general political situa-
tion. Since it is liable to lead to a misunderstanding of our real intention, will you endeavor to
correct the situation and wire me the result? ' '

Relayed to Nanking.

'Giiho (Ickang) in Hutiao l^ravince.

Jimeio, 1941

No. 490

FROM: Bangkok June 12. 1941

TO: Tokyo #333.

Summing up the report from Vice Consul KATUNO, we learn that the "gesture" of the
British along the border has become of late quite systematic and threatening and shows signs
of being made on a large scale. Such incidents as the invasion on May 10th, and 22nd, of
southern Thailand by planes, and the arrestmg and imprisonment of two British othcers who
had crossed the border .

(Messi9|je incwnpletKjl ,^ _ , ,

-No. 491

FlipM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) May 22, 1941

IT©? * London No number.

Your Honor will never return to your post, so please make arrangements with that in mind.
Great Britain made an inquiry and in reply I informed CRAIGIE' that while in Europe, I
had no opportunity to confer with Your Honor and consequently now am ordering you to return
to get first hand reports from you. Will you please give the same explanation to the British
(jrovemment.

'British An^smdor ^fSgig^

iTrans. 5-26-41

A-243

No. 492

FROM: London (Japanese Ambassador) June 3, 1941

"fOi New York (Japanese Consul Generalji KSQi8» ■ •

I, ' accompanied by Clerk Ushiba, am leaving Lisbon by Clipper on the 25th ot this month
headed for New York. We wish to leave San Francisco sometime about the middle of July
so, if possible, please make reservations and wire back.

'Ari Wsadtw i^higetnitsu, recalled from London,

No. 493

'^EOM: London (Japanese Ambassador) June 13, 1341

TO; W^hington (Japanese Ambassador) ? 058.

I am returning to Japan and have made my schedule so that I shall arrive in New York the
26th. I should like to see you either in New York or Washington. Have made reservations on the
Yawata Mafi&Iim^^j; San Francisco July 13th.

FROM: Dublin June 2D. 1941

TO: Tokyo # 12.

Following are the views on international affairs of the Foreign Ottice Official as told to me.

a. Although the people in this country talk as if they are going to fight until victory is won,
the prospeet of a decisive victory on the battlefields is dim insofar as they are concerned. So
long as the Government is firmly determined, the people will, in accordance with their
characteristics, follow the Government, but once either the Government or some peat
statesman should submit a peace proposal the people will gladly suplMBft 'ii, IS l^biBfeF
psychology. For making such a proposal, there is no one but Lloyd George.

b. Churchill's influence has, of late, been declining. However, Bevin has no intention of
becoming the Prime Minister in his stead.

c. Putting together information coming from Washington, it seems that the United States
is certain of Japan's never joining the war. This is evident from the fact that she expressed no
anxiety at the time the i^Q^attons betfj»eit ttet gfi^f fifl^ iftd Japan wfie l^^^
oif.

Trans. 6-24-41

A-244

No. 495

FROM: Berlin (Osima)

July IS, 1941
N0 number.

{Message to Tokyo ff 923K
Re your #630*,

1. I had a conversation with Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP on the 14th. Time and again
did I broach the subject of British- German peace talks, and just as many times did the
Foreign Minister say that ftevif Mce'lttts Germany either directly or indirectly started any
conversations concerning peace with Great Britain such as you mention. He says that these
rumors astir in the United States, which you mention concerning mediation between
England and Germany are absolutely news to him. He says that he cannot imagine for what
other reason they could have been invented except to try to divorce Japan from the Tri-
partite Alliance, because just as soon as Germany finishes up with Russia according to
schedule, she is going to fling her whole air force on the British force and stage a landings la
his own words he said, "Now I want you .Japanese to rely upon Us GcdNnH!lft$'J0d''|lf^;p^'-#!^^
attention to these rumors abroad throughout the world."

a. All talk ot^0^ between England and 6@rmany ia so far merely guesses. We have heard
them here in pi^li'but always figured that such was the natural course of events now that
ti*ft-^Gfe^anss'i^«^|yg-<}ie RusBians. I, mj^lf, thinking that there «ight be something to
some of them, have been paying close attention to everything I heard* but in no have I
so far found anything which would support this heresay.

b. I think that the fact that such rumors are going the rounds in the United States merely
proves that London and Washington are cooperating on lying propaganda. I mean to say that
Great Britain wishes to ruin or at least weaken Germany's war- lust and to win over third
countries to Great Britain's side. London Is naturally anxious to emasculate the three-w^
pact and to sever Berlin and Vichy and is using the United States for hex own aims in restrain-
ing Japan.

c. VltA only do the statements of the German high ^cials indicate that there is no basis
for peace talks now or in the future between the Teutons and the Anglo-Saxons, but the
whole European situation shows it. 1 have wired you this repeatedly. Granted that there may
be a small group in G«inany interested in bringing the German and E^iptfe&vleaders to the
peace table, un^er the prosent circumstances I jcftft^^ 'il}^^ nG^ :P^iHUt3^ M. Ilveir
success

Trans. 7-3 HI

No. 496

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

June 11, 1941

1. On the 6th, 31st, 27th, and 29th, British ships of the 10,000 ton class entered port and
left on the 29th and 31st respectively, and they had on board about 3,000 English soldiers,
I suppose.

2. On the 5th, 31st, and 30th, two British ships of the Eddington class efill^ ]^ :if£^
left on the 11th, 7th and 3rd, and they were transporting 3,000 English troops.

3. The names of the above ships could not be identified but the destination was Egypt and
vicinity. i ii

Further, the above transports were not protected by convoy when csnterini! or Ififiiviftg port.
Th^ were to Durban or TOZ, British territory in East Africa ,

Trans. 6-14-41

\o. 497

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Berlin

- 19 from the Consul in Capetown to this Minister is as follows:

According to int ellif^ence in this office.

1. One British ship, one French ship, names unknown, together with the Netherlands ship
"New Amsterdam" (each of them about 30,000 tons. The French and Netherlands ships have
been commandeered by the British since the beginning of the war), convoyed by a British
cruiser {of the 3000 ton class), carrying 10,000 South African troops, left the port of Durban
bn the 10th, bound north.

2. (Seven ?) British ships, names undiscernible (20,000 ton class), carrying British home-
land troops (the number of trop|ps could not be ascertained), entered the port of Durban on
the 13th and left port on the l^^h bbund north.

3. A Belgian ship whose name was unknown (of the 8,000 ton class), carrying approximately
2,GK)0 native Belgian Congo troops, entered the port of Durban on the Uth and left for an
unknown destination.

The destination of the vessels mentioned above could not be definitely established, but it
seemed to be the Ei^ptian aiea.

4. <hi ttje'i^^^iS^nMiMFl^ patrol ship entered the port of Duiiaf^-

I am passing this on to you as it came to me. » -

Trans. 6-28-41

No. 498

FROM: Tokyo June 11, 1941

TO: Berlw

Received from ^«i>e^ew« as ?

Cape Town to Berlin w 1.

f he moments ol#^|^j^{3i|iiig ;^tititefl3r ie^t atiJtM^

At present, iftere hit tafiesi '« gr^ increase j^ l^pig vi& Bi»3^,^0^Sm6jim^J^^

A~t246

June 24, 1941
#551,

Tm "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HA8B0R

war. Ships are being expropriated and on crowded days about thirty vessels are anchored
tismporarily in the outer harbor, and there are never less than ten vessels waiting to enter the
Inner harbor, sometimes waiting tive days. Before the war, there was usually no delay, after
stopping for an hour in the outer harbor.

This is generally true also at Durban, In clear weather, when it appears dangerous outside,
shipping from Northeastern India is ordered to put in at the Portuguese port of Lauretlco
Marques.

Defense work seems to be in progress.

Though it is ditficult to do so, I hope to obtain information on the nationality, numbers
and routes of such ships, especially their number.

'Not available.

Ito. m

FROM: London June 15, 1941

10: Washington

'C&r^^ parts— 1 tl^H^v)

Action Tokyo as # 438.

Oin the occasion of my talks with Foreign Minister Eden on the 4th and the 9th, I repeated
nay attack on Britain's China and economic policies. Whereupon, he repeated his previous
jlssertion that he could not help it if these policies offended the Tripartite Pact.

I then told him that while Britain views her relations only in connection with the European
war, Japan must view her relation with Great Britain in connection with the China war.
Therefore, if we are to clear up our mutual dissatisfaction we must do so at their source.

Judging from various indications, it appears that Britain is gradually coming around to
giving greater consideration to the question of her relations with Japan, save the question of
American aid to Britain.

Although peace appears far off, Britain is preparing for it even now, thi^i^Qfet Jl^i^l tl^titis
important for our country to give due consideration to this problem also.

Trans. 6-18-41

\o. 500

FROM: Shanghai (Moriuchi)
Singapore

(Circular) Message to Tokyo # 14^.

Much attention is being attracted by a San Francisco U.P. dispatch dated the 1st to the
effect that the British Naval Attache to the United States has stated that in case the United
States enters the war she will, of course, have use of Singapore, and also by the following
Reuters dispatch from Chungking dated the 1st, both piiblig^hed in the E^ticdi 'llkipdge

A-247

/

August 2, 1941

—"English and Chinese authorities are avoiding statements concerning their collaboration.
It is believed that there is no special treaty or agreement between the two countries; never-
theless, there can be no room for doubt that there exists close understanding and cooperation
between them. Especially is it clear to the world that the military authorities of the two
countries are maintaining close contact. Ambassador KERR says that the relations between
England and China are closer than is generally supposed by the world, etc"
Belayed to Nanking. Hon##tg/ii^|i^ai^€ ^dfigo^ii^

Trans. 9-^-41

FROM: Tokyo June 9,

TO; Moscow #581.

Action London as ~ 196.

It has been reported that the British Ambassador to Moscow, Sir Stafford Cripps, is
returning to England via Sweden. In view ot' the strained relations existing between Germany
and Russia now, it is necessary to watch British -Russian relations; so plealit,|s^Spiii^to' above
Ambassador's movements under surveillance after his return to London.

No. .=>02

FROM: Tokyo July 23, 1941

TO: London *229.

For your personal information:

According to a reliable source of information, China is making every effort to force the
British- Soviet agreement to cover the Far Eastern situation, with the intention of provoking
British 'Japanese collision. Ambassador HU (Ko) is said to be agitating to this end.

No.

FROM: Tokvo June 30, 1941

TO: Canton S^1362.

(Circular.)

Mfesstu^e frdi]iH0agk(»ig =315, June 2S.

. ^EI S0 HA*, who arrived at on the 25th, in order to assume the position as diree^ of

^le seven great newspapers of the Seiji' chain, as well as manager of the KO library (refer
to page 405 of Who's Who and to my letter ~32'S\) spoke confidentially to an agent of this
oltlee, HYO JIN SI'', (a member of the educational committee and one who was on especially
good tsfitts with TEI in the days <rf the <W(U WO N JPI^I as foUows:.

THE "MAGIC" BACKGRpUND OF PEARL HARBOR

1. On the 21st, the day before the war began between Gemany and Soviet Russia, the
British Ambassador in Eiome, acting in accordance with instructions from London, conttrred
with the Soviet Ambassador and said, "BRITAIN would like to see the threat on the eastern
bcwder of Soviet Russia eliminated and assure the British colonies in the Pacific safety by,
jointly with Russia, urging Chungking to compromise with Japan on condition that the
latter withdraw from the Axis." To this the Soviet Ambassador replied on the 23rd, stating
that he was speaking on instructions which he had sought from Moscow. He said, "While
on the other hand there is no possibility of Japan withdrawing from the Axis, the Chungking
Government cannot believe that Japan would submit. Consequently, until Japan's attitude
become definitet Soviet Russia dees not wish to take any positive step r^arding questions
in the Par East. It is not that Soviet Russia considers it advisable to regard the Japanese-
Soviet treaty as important, but that the Japanese-Chinese war is an important tactor at
present in keeping Japan from aiding the other Axis Powers."

The two diplomats conferred for four days without coming to an agreement (PA' also
admitted that the British Ambassador conferred with the Soviet Ambassador).

2. On the 23Td, the Chinese Communist Party wired Chungking a message expressing its
friendly attitude toward Soviet Russia, demanding the closing of German and Italian
Embassies as well as Consulates, the expulsion of Germans and Italians from China, and
promising full cooperation with Chungking in the war. On the other hand, the pro- German
faction leader SHU KA KA* urged the government to confer with both German and Italian
authorities before announcing its stand.

'Kana spellixiK.

*P«)bflbly "StM" cfttin.
'Not available,

''Kana spelling for Feng Jen ChiHaj

'Kana spelling, a newspaper.

'Panyushukin, Russian Ambassador to CtKiDl^ki^.

'Ksna Qielliiigfor Clm Chia-Hva.

Tttm. 7-5-41

No. ii04

FROM: Tokyo
TOr Washington

Action hmdrnt m v 21?,

On the 4th, Ambassador Craigie called on this Minister and requested information as to
Japan's attitude with regard to the Russo-German war. I replied along the lines, somewhat
abbreviated, of my explanation on the 2nd to Soviet Ambassador Smetanin, (see my
message to Moscow ^GSS").

Subsequently, I pointed out that the Tripartite Pact in no way affected the individual
relations between the Soviet Union and Germany, Italy or Japan. In the same manner, the
Japanese- Soviet Neutrality Pact, do^ not in any way affect the Tripartite Pact.

I further explained that the terms of the Tripartite Agreement, according to my intenireta^
tions, in no way obligated Japan to go to war with the Soviet Union. The German government.

July 5, 1941
#3S3.

I pdnted out, however, that the Tripartite Pact was the foundation on which we have built
out national policy and Japan intends to act in accordance with its aims and spir^.

Tram. 7-14-41

No. 505

FROM: Tokyo • JunSlQ, 1941

TO: Shanghai #502.

Recently the Army has desired to take over four ships of the Foochow" customs which are
now anchored, according to reports, at Keelung', but they have been listening to me. The head
of the Kowloon (Chiulung)' customs union stated that this action would be against the (inte-
grity) of the customs. We have instructed them that we will act in regard to the customs as
we please. The English In respect to the commandeering of these ships take the same sort of
position and there will not be any objections made in answer to this. There will be no parti-
cular questions involved and it is seen that approval or disapproval of the commandeering of
the boats will soon be reached. No matter what form of a reply is made, it will not hinder tht
present (Japanese ?) Mezu'' negotiations, or this might be used to instrumentt^Js*^^
these negotiations. Please reply concerqi^ this matter.

'Capital of Fukien Province, S.K China.
'Seaport in S.E. Formosa,
'English leased territory «t)|»Qi^ HQnt^to^
'Kana spelling.

Trans. 6-14-41

FROM: Tokyo July 4. 1941

TO: London ff215.

Re Part 2 of your - 464°.

1 will handle the matter as you suggest. At present when we are short of ships, we have decided
that it would be better to load the second and third allotments of nickel on the YAMAKIKU
MARU arriving the last of July, and the MOMOYAMA MARU arriving approximately August
20, which will take on 5,000 and 7,000 tons, respectively. Thus, we have decided to defer the
loadingot the iron ore. _ ^

While 1 do not think that they will object to our taking on the third allotment so close to
second, perhaps you had better ask them for their approval and wire me back what they say.
Furthermore, so that there may be no trouble at all in carrying this out, will you please ask
IpEN to advise the Governor QleAfr idi let us proceed unmolested? Later on, I am going to
wire you how to negotiate from now on concerning what you mentioned in (1) of your caption
mes&age, and increasing otlrqfuota,

'Sol available.

Trans. 7-9-41

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 507

FROM: Tokyo (JapBi»eseFGrti^i!ii|»er> July 26, ^<

TO: Vancouver ^1610,

(Circular.)

Because of the growing fear that England and the United States will detain our ships, will
please secretly instruct the captains of all ships at anchor under your jurisdiction tCiligi^.
tiiua«#tt^^> BNp^las#^ IM^i^t int#^)»^i «t instmctinf 3ma

SO.S08

FROM: Tokyo (Tojgiill July 26, 1941

TO: Batavia #1510.

(Circular.)

Secret outside the office.

Because of increasing danger of the United States and England jointly detaining Japanese
vessels, please secretly instruct the captains of all Japanese vessels in areas under your
jurisdiction to leave port; give them special orders not to enter port for the time being but to
anchor at some suitable point in the ocean. (one sentence unintelligible) .

Trans. 9-5-41

No. !>09

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) July 31, 1941

TO: Londoa #16Si.

(Circular,) (Message to and Manila as Cir. 1671 on July 30th. )

(Strictly Secret)

Re my Cir #1610".

The principal reasons for having called back the J&ftawm shiTm were to insure the safety of

the ships themselves and to avoid the danger of the cargo, as well as the payment for the cargo,
being frozen. Now that anxiety of possible detention of our ships has lessened, they should be
allowed to enter port one aftet the itthisr. The c^insignors, in fear of the payment being frozen,
-1^ that they want the cargo unloaded. However, we have been hoping that unloading of the
could be avoided because the act might attract attention and excite further antagonism;
imifM the same tjme the cetrgo should not be retained so long as to call forth formal rejection.
Since the country to which you have been accredited does not necessarily have any intention
of cutting off trade with Japan entirely, I shall wire you instructions with regard to the general
question of frozen assets later, afttt our counter-measures have been considered* For the time
being, 1 would like to have you negotiate so that they will give some sort of a guarantee for the
payment of the cargo (for example, getting them to issue a general permission for applying the
payment for the cargo to that for exports to Japan), and then have the cargo unloaded on tbitf
bast» of wch a guarantee. Will you, tbirefoi:«t take this matter up with them at once and —

, Furthermore, if anything has been left behind by the ships which had suddenly

left port in obedience to the caption telepaphic instructions, will you confer with the persons

Ti-ans. 8-8-41

FROM: Canton July 24, 1941

TO: Nanking #134.

(Circular.)

To Shanghai as Circular # 133.
To Tokyo as # 275.

In compliance with the urgent request of the Supreme Military and Naval Commander in
South China to our Hongkong oliice on the 24th, I sent a note to the British Consul General to
the following effect:

Recently British militarj- planes have frequently flown over areas in which our forces have^
been operating and aviators have openly reconnoitered our troop movements.

We shJSfU h»m to r^ard aiiplto^ Je^ftSpied territory and the positions of

Imperial Japanese warships and transports as enemy planes. In order to avoid the posaihilitjS
of untoward events, therefore, we should like to have the practice stopped.

If, iti spite of thi$ watn&^t lights go on, it will be neeessary for us to take military steps
to prevent them ancl the respoosibiHlaf foe aU lo$ae8 will test squarely upon the shoulders of
the British.

Trans. 7-29-41

No. .^11

FROM: Canton July 26, 1941

TOj Net #278.

In response to a request originating with the Chief of Special Duties Section in the Navy to
protest against the following action on the part of the British, 1 submitted a protest to the
British Consul-General on the 26th: On the 16th of July about noon, a British warship
(Ojfclope type) carrying large and small airplanes approached a Japanese submarine which was

at that time sailing at a point 112 miles from the ORAN lighthouse ( southeast of ORAN),

aaid after shooting three shells close to the bow of the ship, sailed off in the direction of
Hongkong. Furthermore, shortly before this shelling, a British land plane came to about 50
meters of this submarine. Then on the morning of the 22nd, a British plane flew very close to
a Japanese warship which was anchored at a place on the HAINAN Island, and after reconnoiter-
ing at low altitude, took a position for dive bombing over a Japanese Naval transport which
then happened to be sailing nearby. These incidents are acts not only of disrespect to warships
but also of interference with our m,aneuvers. We have for some time been calling the attention

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

ti tke British authdirities to just such acts of disrespect, hut the British have not changed their
attitude and repeatedly interfere with our maneuvers. This naturally makes us suspicious of
how much sincerity there is on the part of the British authorities. Should the British again
resort to such acts, m might take suitable st«$i iS» selNtH^!^ <^ Ig ^bHI^ ffiiC^, ^
British must be held responsible for their poiule(J:U0nc^
Relayed to and Hongkong.

No. 512

mOM: Tokyo

Washuigton

(Circular)

On the iSth, Ambassador @>1gill^^ called on the Vice-Minis tet«ii^.«tated: "I would point
out that in Me in Kampf Hitler says that regardless of the length of the war, the terribleness of
the sacrihce, and regardless of how unprepared Lhey be, compared with other countries, the
British people will fight till tte^-^^^l fitoftk that Great Britain is sure to win, but if it so be
that Germany whips us, there is the danger that she will subjugate the whole world. Germany
has ambitions regarding the Netherlands Indies in particular, and the United States and
Buasia are abed^itely certam to be involved in ttie struffile. Japan alone of all countries is m m
excellent position to maintain neutrality. Now, if you Japanese go ahead and use force in
connection with the Netherlands Indies problem, Great Britain will be terribly aggrieved. I
would like to know what the Japanese government is going to do about the latest reply from the
Netherlands officials." The Vice -Minister replied, "Well, we have decided to bring Representa-
tive YOSHIZAWA" home." CRAIGIE then asked, "After he leaves Batavia, do you intend to
0QOtintt«' #ifiS»' negotiations in Tokyo wilii the NetherUuads Minister?" The Vice-Minister
answered, "Well, no, we have no such intention, but 1 suppose that depends on the course of
events, after all. As a matter of fact, the Foreign Ofhce boasts of its intention to establish peace
and order in eastern Asia. Now, if in the face erf that, it goea ahead and publicly announces
that the Netherlands officials have rejected a weak-kneed proposal, you can well imagine what
we would be up against. We tried to get them to accept it, but in spite of how easy we made it
for them they turned us down. Now, if we publicly annotmce that our businessmen have
accepted this sort of treatment, the pressure of public opinion would be severe. However,
rather than to cause trouble, 1 am glad to say that we have decided that it will not be deemed
necessary to publish all the facts. As revealed in the Japanese newspapers, popular resentment
in this case does not appear to be very strong. However, if our various political groups get hold
of the matter and play it up, it would be difhcult to prophet what trouble might result.
I have often told the Ne^erlands Minister about this. It was not that I was trying to bargain
with him, I was merely pointing out facts; I was talking to him personally as a friend. However,
I weuM appreciate it if you would not transmit this information to his home government."
idii^^IE replied, "Yes, I know that there are some li^atiamatefy elements h«c« whOi-WiiM
like to see the Netherlands Indies seized by force and that in the cabinet there are some auto-
crats with dangerous influence. We British can see no reason why you Japanese should not
get some rubber and tin, provided you dd'twi '^imnaahip it to Germany. Did you ever give the
Netherlands officials any assurance that ytjli fiK«9td not resell these articles to the Germans?"
The Vice-Minister replied, "Yes, we repeatedly them that Germany would get none of it."

A-253

June 14, 1941
#1286.

,^|0 this interview the Vice-Minister got the impresKion that Englat^i mmt havei'eached the
eaiiremity of her endurance and that she is greatly worried.

This message addressed to Washingtoii and Berlin. Relay message Stom Washington to
London.

'British Ambassador to Tokyo.
'Envoy Estraordiuary in Batavia.

Trans, 6-X7-41

No. ,'513

FROM; Tokyo (Toyoda) My 16, 1941

TO: Ottawa tl^t

Circular, ^ ~ *

Message to London (?) # 233.

On the 25th I asked the British Ambassador to call and informed him of the mutual agree-
ment, reached between Japan and FVance for the joint defense of French Indo-China. I told
him that this agreement came about as a result of alarming reports leading to fear that the
existence and safety of French Indo-China (sic). It was arrived at in a friendly atmosphere for the
purpose of guaranteeing the safety of French Indo-China, the maintenance of peace, and to
oppose any enveloping movement against Japan, I explained that it was ptirely a defensive-
arrangement against the attack of any third party and that the Imperial Japanese Government
will strictly observe its obligation to respect the territorial integrity of French Indo-China.

The British Ambassador replied that there was no foundation for the alarming reports
which I spoke of and that I? '^P^^S' Exceedingly regrettable matter that Japan should use
tSiem for an excuse to advance, in spite of the fact that the British Government had warned
h^ that such action might lead to serious consequences. He continued in the vein expressed
by EDEN in his address in Parliatnent on the same day, that Japan'^s steps '&pto^N^lael@M-
China could not but be considered by the Britisli Govemment as a potential threat to British
territory and rights and interests in Asia.

He then withdrew, but in another visit today, when I informed him of the contents d my
Circular # 1615°, prefacing his remarks by the statement that this was merely his own opinion,
he said that he thought surely some compromise could be reached by which the dispatch of
troops could be postponed until such time as the truth or falsity of the afOTem««tioned
"alarming report" could be determined. To this I responded that I regretted I was in no
position to accept his suggestion; however, England need have no fear as to the peacfiiful nat«ie
"ifcd purpose of Japan's present conduct. *' * ' ' • f

■Not available. — - '* — • ^

Trans. 8^-41

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 514

FROM; Ottawa LYoshizawa)
Cimilar.

July 26, 1941

#2L,

■^^sm^ to Tokyo #111.

After my interview recouated to you in my # 110°, the Premier gave me the official text
which I sent in my separate mie #112*. He said: "I have received a report from the English
Ambassador in Tokyo and though we regret it very much, the Canadian Government 'Will have
to take similar steps. Please coramunicate this immediately to your Government, Though
Canada has never done this before, under the present circumstances such direct retaliations
have to be made and in our opinion this makes impossible the conclusion of a Canadian-
Japanese commercial treaty. It is hoped that further sweeping measures will not have to be
taken." With regard to this communication, should there be anything that you might like to
a^toiay iM^owtedfment, please let me know at once.

'See n, 516 which tells of an interview With the Canadian Premier at the time t£ the teminsAm of the Canadian-
Japanese commercial tceH^i.

*Se« Q, 515 which gives HM) tkaA of the offidal note stmt the Japans Govenunant tenninating the T^ty of
ComineTce and Navigaficm.

The Government of Canada has had under consideration the operation, under present
conditions, of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation which was signed in London on April
IS, 1911. Pursuant to the provisions of Article 26, the notice of adhesion in respect to Canada
was given on May 1, 1913. The Government of Canada has reached the conclusion that this
treaty can no longer be regarded as fulfilling the objects which the Government of Canada had
in mind at the time of adhesion. I have the honor, therefore, to give notice, in accordance
with the provisions of Article 27 of the treaty, of the intention of His Majesty the King of
Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominioti:^ beyond the Seas, in respect of Canada, to
terminate the same. The treaty will cease to have effect upon the expiration of a period of twelve
months from this date, etc., etc.

Trans. 8-12-41

No. .515

FRO M : Ottawa CYoshizawa)
TO: Tokyo

July 27, 1941
#112.

Trans. 8-4-41

A-255

FROM: Ottawa (Xgi^i^w^
TO: Tokyo

To Vancouver as circular # 20,

Re my message # 106°-

( Three parts— complete).

On the 26th, I asked for an interview and went to call on the Premier. I said, "I wired last
night's statement direct to Tokyo, so in any event, I will receive some instnictions from my
country concerning the views of the Japanese Empire and the counter measures it proposes to
take. However, for the time being, I cannot help feeling a deep depression because you know
how hard I have worked to maintain relations between Japan and Canada. 1 just wanted to
te!l you frankly how hurt I am and to question you on two or three points. I also wish to com-
ment on these points myseh." Prefacing my talk thug, I continued. "First of all did Canada
do this, acting' as oiie Kate !« a comprehensive imperiM^aa^apan^ move?"

The Premier replied, "Canada saw that what has been happening in the Southern Pacific
a threat to h*r indg)endence. It was in order to forestall danger tliere that this step was taken."

I'^^^^^; «i^^)i^'eiflffin<k»^'li-f^^ and th6 safety

of Canada?"

The Premier retorted, "Let me revise my previous statement a little. Supposing for the
ttcment that th«^ will be no hnmediat*' ffiirticfc efEect on Canada. British tranitcaies M iliiA
aj-ea certfiinly do feel in imminent peril. Does not this have a direct relevancy to the security
of the British Empire taken as a whole? fiow can we feel safe when such things happen? Can-
ada merdy felt in the common interest it was np to hs^ to take some steps to cope with the
atuation. You katm tte Mejub^s c£ the Britisfa CoBMftoMwealA must act with some unity of
Sftirpoae."

* .f afts*etedv ^'Wfeli; m'fe^m^, tmrn f^ Wetle rapport between this meffliei® omi^e part of iSs»
l^itish Empire as a whole and the situation with which it is supposed to cope. Whether or n&t
ttie British Empire has been in any sort of contact with the United States of America I do not
know, but I do know that the United States sketched forth her hand and seized Greenland and
Ici'land, proclaiming that this was necessary in the interests of hemisphere defense. Well, now
our ideal is an East-Asian sphere d co-prosperity and by the same logic as was used by the
United States, say in Iceland, we occupied FVench Indo-China. We had even more reason to do
so. I cannot but feel that the measures you have taken are very inoppcatiine and designed to
preclude our peaceful penetration into areas necessary to oiu: existence,"

The Premier replied, "The case of Iceland is entirely different from this. If the United States
had not secured It, there was a very real danger of the Nazis getting a foothold there and strik-
ing at the Western Hemisphere. Now, on the question of whether England and the United
States would have att*^!6il trench Irii0.ttea If J'^aii had n6t ffcAfen there b^emshand there
is a great difference of opinion.

I replied, "Well, as to whether or not Hl^nd was threatening French Indo-Cliina, I, myself
am not in a position to say either "yea' or But we Japanese do fed wire that tee-

thing that has been thwarting our efforts to settle the China question has been Anglo-Ameri-
can aid to CHIANG KAI-SHEK. At last it is up to us to put an end to that. Do you think it too
to tall this assistance that I have been speaking of a sort of threat? I heard, too, that the
4£ GAULLIST's were up to mischief in French InHo-China. So, have it how you will. We
figiu-e that we have reason apl«nt^ to penetrate that country, We talked it over with Vichy,

July 26,®4tl
#110.

km''

I** BACKGROLFND OF PEAKL HARBOR

4i4n't we? Vichy saw onjs point and did not argue. Furthermore, we did it all peaceably and
fhen what happens? Along comes England and the United States, working out a joint blockade
preparatory to dppljring unendiura^le economic piestsure ag^^i^ m Japwese. So you s6b how
sf)rry and discouraged I feel , I cannot see how you all ht^e to secure the peace of the Pacific bgr
an encirclement policy like this."

The Premier replied, "In any event, despite seemingly logical arguments, it is not right to
resort to force."

I did not wish to go into the matter too deeply and get into a quarrel with him, so in conclu-
sion I asked what the phrase, "in accordance with the desires of CHIANG KAI-SHEK/' in the
statement meant and where it came from. The Premier replied that if he remembered r^htiy
CHIANG had recently made some requests through the London Government.

•Hot available.

Trans. 8-6-41

No. 517

FHOM: Rome (Horikiri)
l^t' Tokyo

* %Xim Ambassadcr OBHIMA."

After talking to Premier MUSSOLINI on the 12th, Foreign Minister CIANO requested an
interview with me (m the IHth. The gist of our convee8ati(m& on the occasrioxi of F<irei|?i Minister
VON RIBBENTROP's visit to Rome is as follows:

CIANO began by saying that the questions of most importance to Germany and Italy at tiie
present time were, first, the HRSS incident and, second, America's attitude.

"With regard to the HESS incident, Your Excellency too has heard all the details from
Foreign Mmister VON RIBBENTROP and th^re is nothing: which I can add to that except to
say that I helieve that Britain and the United Stales will make great use of this in their propa-
ganda; but within a few days it will have been forgotten.

"Regardless of what you might have to say about America's attitude, insofar as it affects
the carrying out of the attack against England, it is of vital importance. Nevertheless, it is our
hope that Japan, taking a strong position with regard to America's ultimate attitude regardless
cf whether she looks at it from the point trf view of the character of the Tripartite Alliance oar
from the consideration of her own future rights and interest, will no|.|^^it the po^iibiljit^ of
America's freedom of action in the Atlantic becoming an actuality."

I then replied: "I do not know whether there me currently any conversations in progress Be-
tween Japan and the United States; but inasmuch as the Tripartite Alliance is the foundation
of Japanese diplomacy and we have received the support of the entire country, I am confident
timt Japan will mtet into absolutely iK>thing which is contrary to the interests of Germany
and Italy."

Continuing my conversations by changing the subject, I inquired of German-Soviet rela-
tions. To which, CIANO replied; "Of course, I liave had absolutely no information from
many but, speaking for myself and myself alone, my impression, and it does not exceed that,
is that the relations between the two countries recently have taken an ever worsening trend.
Dcm't y«i tli6S|!iKtei%4|^ib#l^^ ^ cmtbresfc <jf war feetween

May 14, 1941
Nonumher.

Germany and the Soviet is virtually inevitable?" When he said that, I got the impre^on from
ClAN O's manner that Communism was the great danger.
Relayed to Germany.

"Japanese Ambassador to Geimany,

From Ambassador OSinMA.*

On the afternoon of the I3th Foreign Minister VON RIB&3®|TR0P visited Rome. This
morning, in order to pay my respects, I called upon him. He prefaced his remarks by saying
that he had come to Rome in view of the necessity of discussing with Premier MUSSOLINI
and Foreign Minister ClANO various questions relati^ to Tripartite Agreement, the Iraqi
question and the HESS incident. In this message, I anl wiring the details of his comments
with regard to the HESS incident in his own words.

"For the past few years HESS has been greatly troubled by a gall bladder ailment. In order
to forget the agony of that ailment he became as astrological faddist, frequently conjuring
castles in the air out of his fancies. Though he occupied a position of prominence tn the party
m acting FUEHRER, it is a fact that he knew little or nothing about pohtical questions. As a
ectnfideat of the Fuehrer for many years in whom much personal confidence was felt, he per-
aottally worked hard in not a little contribution in the present conflict and, with the view of
««)rking upon the Fascist element of Great Britain in order to bring about the conclusion of the
offensive against England with as little sacrifice and loss of life as possible, he has believed
that they should bring about the downfall of Prime Minister CHURCHILL. In order to carry
this out, he tried to get HITLER to look with favor upon his plan. This was to use a British sub-
ject, the Duke of Hamilton, with whom he had become acquainted, in matters dealing with
an aerial survey of Mount Everest, but this man is absolutely anti-German and is now an
aviator for the British Army.

"Recently HESS has shown absolutely no aptitude for foreign policy.

"This person, HAMILTON, originally was pro- Germ an but later became anti-German. At
the present time, I do not know but what he may be actually participating in the war. On the
other hand, should CHURCHILL welcome him, the Fascist faction of Great Britain, which
has long admired the name of RUDOLPH HESS, will, he had thought quickly rally around
him. Aware as we are that his mind is not normal, we do not consider the acta of this unhappy
official treasonable even to the slightest extent. Though in his sections he has strftyed from
t^e normal path, it is clear that he entertained but the best intentions.

"In spite of the fact that this has added fuel to British and American anti-G^man pr^^
ganda, the above facts will be made known within a few days."

Relayed to France and Russia, England, United States, Germany and .

'M$ie^ to England and France.

'Japanese Amb4iSiil^^Genna«y.

*rrans. 5-16-41

No. S18

FROM: Rome
TO: T<Ayo

May 14, 1941
#272.

Trans. 6-15-41

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEABL HARBQK

FROM: Berlin May 14, 1041

TO: Tokyo #S40.

(Parti of 2).

To be handled in Government Code.

A certain authoritative Ql^rpiiiO told me confidentially with regard to the KESS incident «b
follows:

"1. The recent incident has amazed the German people no end and there is no question
about it. It is cle« that it has truly had a great effect upon them. Regardless of how I might
explain it, it would bfr difficult to make one understand through a logical process. The way it
is being publicized, too, places the German citizens in an awkward position. Should we say
that HESS wag ill, then why has he been allowed to maintain the position of Acting Fuehrer?
And, if so, how was it possible for him of his own accord to take an airplane, fly it to its desti-
'I»tion in Great Britain, and make a landing within a short distance of tht; spot where he
wanted to land? And, though one were to try to explain it, there is nothing that one can say
except that it is an incident peculiar to a nation which is built upon a foundation of dictator-
ship, as this man was and is a wurm personal feiend of Chancellor HITLER, who is sole
authority in all Germany.

"2. It goes without saying that HESS was mentally ill just as it was reported and also that
he, duruig his early years, received a British schooling. It is believable, therefore, that he was
strongly pro- British in his leaning. Since the time, back in 1923, when he helped edit M^in
Kampf, his ideas have net cfeanged one whit and this only goes to show his GverzealiSttsneSB.
For, since that time, one cannot overlook the enormous changes in the world situation as far
as Germany's position is concerned. Since 1923 an era has passed, F^r tfa^ above reasons he,
aside from having Chancellor HITLER'S personal confidence, htfis ftsf ttiese isfiny years differed

401 his thinking and one cannot doubt but what he is anxious to leave Germany

_ Looking at it in the light of present-day developments, one cannot but say that it

was wrong to permit him to hold such an office as Acting Fuehrer b"ut, as for Chancellor
HITLER, his faithfulness to this man is well brought out in his attitude toward him. Further-
more, because HITLER will not change ui his attitude towarf HESS, at the present time we
cannot but regard him as a disillusioned individual,"

Trans. 5-20-41

No. 520

FROM: Berlin ' — - May 14, 1941

TO: Toky6 #540.

(Part 2 of 2).

To be handled in Govemment code.

"3. In HESS's letter which he left he said that, should this present war be allowed to
continue, it would mean not only the downfall of Great Britain but the destruction of the
whole European civilization. Sacrificing himseli, therefore, he said that he would strive for the
reconciliation of Germany and England. This, he said, inrsuld be possible through conversations
viii^lt eetliiKljQt^klilwa in tbat c<niBt^« (Ha went t^sm^V^ mtenti<Bi e£ ccmdotctii^ cm-

A-259

V«rsationH with iA?^|:1B^M0Ki^N who resided in the neighborhood of Glasgow. This person,
being a pro-GerijS«0 ®ffe^©, waa a man of eiOJiWtoiile fame and an old friend of HESS's.)
H«viiig' aehf*vei(i l»fepuirpose, h6 sitM^ftf iie Wttftt tefera; lefec., etc. It is certain that this man,
mentally ill, with t&te naive motive, undertook to do the impossible. Though he had absolutely
no intention of seHfng out his own country, for all that there is no doubt but that he did not
have control of all his faculties. Though this does not mean that he was crazy, one cannot help
but say that he was certainly not a normal man.

"4. In order that he, HESSv mijgiit bring to a conclusion this inevitable war against England,
he had not coomsed ovemmt^ with Chancellor HTTLER. Parthermore, it is actually true
that he had a gmAt pefsonal dislike for Foreign Minister VON RTBRENTROP who is very close
to Chancellor HTTLEEH. In summing this all up, not only was he extremely ignorant of

^trrent German diplomatic policy but io a sense he Th^*fe«t?.'Jli*1fe^iS|i&i^ the

etirrent incident, there is not a siagl© chance that »ne BtraW possibly expect any Mod «f change
feSJefman foreign policy .

fhis incideitt, in fi^^f'fl^S's posititm, M t profound ^fei^^m aB^e^
Especially the blow dealt to the Party was enormous and the influence of the Party in actual
p(^tica has again further diminished. However, Chancellor HITLER and GOERING, to-
gether with the brains of the military group, are of one mind. Tlbesfr&^ no doubt that in the
propess of the war today this incident is but a minor episode. Should England and America
dream that because of this incident there is a division within the ranks in Germany, they can only
be disappointed.^*

Trans.5-20-41

No. 521

FROM: Rome May J^^li^ •

TO: Tofcyq Nonujniifir.

T« he bai^l^ jBX^^mNmmt code.

fie my #272*.

I have already wired to you the views of the Italian GoveftttnesQt regarding the escape of HESS
to England. According to a radio broadcast from Ikigland, HBBS had landed near the estate
of HAMILTON and had spoken to the latter, after which HAMILTON met DUFF COOP^,
and DUFF COOPER in turn consulted CHURCHILL. However, that these people had thus
ected is hard for me to accept as entirely true- HITLER in his speech said that the war would be
ever this year. Despite this fact, the war seems to be shaping itself into a long drawn out affair.
The German Government baa recently completed all preparations for attacking Soviet Russia.
Tfeiy a^ taking more than ever about the impending war with that country. Furthermore,
ihis has been aroused by recent secret negotiations between the United States fltid Japan and
seems to have been impressed by the possibility of Japan's maintaining a neutral attitude in the
event the United States joins the war. On the other hand Germany now hold# A 4*^i^ting
position on the European continent and for this reason events iii the Ne^'^^eSTiiSfe W^»g% nlS!'
favor; as for instance in regards — Also, in Egypt the possibility of British, Ger-
man and Italian forces taking on further aggression, especially with regard to Suez, is evident.
It may be that the fate of Great Britain will be decided m that part of the world. Furtherm^

cooperation between Germany and France has of late rapidly become a reality. The

quefsiiaa m itko becemiiig mare favoraUe to Germany. AU this seems t» point to the poesfbil*

HiE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

ity of leading Great Britain to consider compromising with Germany, depending of course on
terms offered. In the light of these deveJoppente, the HESS incident ma^' be r^ard^d as &j^m4

The above is §ct^ikiation, Hot^^^ I hsvB set ^Ss down Sixr

YOUT reference.

'See n, in which Ambassador OSHIMA tells of his conversation with VON RiBBENTROP re HESS's escape to

FROM: Bffllin (Oshima)
TO: Tokyo

(Part 1 of 2).

1. The high Gerraan officials themselves are making many speculations concerning the HESS
affair. To me it appears that HESS did not take flight after breaking with the Germans or the
Naai Party. It may be that he did differ with their views, but it is clear that he did not act
out of fear hst Ms perootial safety. There is nothing in this case su^ative of the ROEHM incident
of 1934.

2. AH akms HESS has maintained an attitude of the strictest servility towards HITLER, and
in return HITLER has accorded him the utmost trust. This leads to rumors that possibly a secret
understanding exists between him and the Fuehrer and that his act may be the first step in a
<seai|Bti9Wrii6*1S<^een London and Berlin. In view of the fact that German-Soviet relations are
delicate and tJiat the chances for American participation in the war appear to be gradualljr
incre^ing, this view has come to be the one generally entertained by the newsmen of third coun-
tries. It seems that in spite of his position, HESS was not well up on Germany's high Govern-
mental policies of the present moment. It is clear that he had had no opportunity to talk with
HITLER lately. A responsible ofticial of the German Government said this to me: "What HESS
did he did in good faith, bat auffi* a» act constitutes insubordination ; it contravenes the principle
that a leader can act only witliialfe bounds of the authority invested in him. So, I can reveal to
you that it has been decided ttliat if he comes back he will be shot." Thus it can be seen that
HESS had no uiidterstanding with HITLER concerning his trip.

3. From the notes HESS left behind it can be seen how eager he was for peace negotiations
between London and Berlin. Even after the war broke out he was in touch with Lord HAMILTON,
Homestly and in perfectly good faith, he believed that peace talks were possible. Why, he
actually thought that in two days his negotiations would be a big success and that he would re-
turn home by airplane using benzine furnished by the English! (That is actually what he sajra
in his notes). So you see that he had lost all his common sense if he ever had any. German an-
nouncements picture HESS as a man completely divorced from realistic policies. They are partic-
ularly indulgent in their tone. I do not think, however, that this has any connection with high
German policy, I think merely that the German officials r^pect the man'? ^l^tsd^^^^M'tci^
good faith and that they do mA wwh mmecssaaril? to atir up moa-e tarouble.

May 18, 1941
#858.

■mm

No. 523

Berlin (CMi^il: May 18, 1941

Tok^p ' #558.

Revised Tramlation

(Part 2 of 2).

4. HESS, in his confidence in the possibility of Anglo- German peace talks, was at total variance
with the opinionB of other high German officials. He apparently believed that HITLER would
like to make peace with England and compromise, but that the Fuehrer's advisers, deciding
to give Britain a decisive blow, would not let the Fuehrer do what he wished to do. One high
German official said to me:"What HESS bag. done does not really make any difference to us,
It was purely and simply a personal act of his own. It had no background. There will, of coiurse, be
temporary shock and perhaps a severe one but no definite effect will be noted. It would be the
greatest sort of an error to regard this as an indication of dissention in high German Government
circles. Now, of course, we Germans cannot escape the effect of damaging propaganda circulated
by England and the United States on this occasion, but our course in this war is unswerving
and this event is only a ripple. But what about the case in which England might decide to talk
compromise terms with Germany? Well, then, I would not say that there is no possibility of
US usmg HESS, but he went over the heads of his superiors and I am not sure that it would be to
eur best interests to t3miMi%!v^

No. 524

FROM: Tokyo June4»
TO: Hsinking, Nanking, Shanghai, Tienaia and Peking # 1183,

Circular.

Message from Rome as # 334 on May 30th,

BORERI, the editor of the "Corriere della Sera", as a spy report, gave as a remark of CIANO's
that RIBBENTROP visited Italy lor the purpose of explaining the HESS incident. In regard to
this flight of HESS,Italian official circles are of the opinion that HESS must have been sent to
England as a result of instructions from GOEHING, Upon being informed, HITLER flew into a
rage. As regards lilBBENTROP, it was similar to the essence of my # 272°. Afterwards RIBBEN-
TROP (assured) that Italy would he allowed to dominate (?) Croatia, Dalmatia and the
Greek Islands and, at the same time, the Greek individuality is to be respected. An agreement
with Greece similar to the Bermuda agreement is being contemplated. Aa yet there have been
no conversations between Germany and Italy regarding the French question. RIBBENTROP
even made no reference to this question whatsoever. It is entirely a rumor that any request was
made to the eff'ect that Italy was to abandon her territorial demands regarding France and it is
seen that northern Italy is thoroughly dissatisfied. It is perceived that CIANO has spoken espe-
cially to BO' in the same tenor . Moreover, it is tiigj^soii among the German r^idents that

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Italy in exchange for her territorial demands against |^|l^>li^|b$.-|p$ilP^<^iiEi^ji^^
with making demands in the eastern Mediterranean.
Relay to — ,

° See n, 513 in which RIBBENTROP infonnB HORIKIBI, 1^ JajMnese Ambassador to Rome, tliat HESS is on ill and
abnormal man and flew to Britain on his own initiative to work «pM> the Fascist «leae«t thwe to laing about » igeoracil-
iation,

' Pwhapa SUBHAS CHANDRA BOSE^ Indian revokticmaiy now in Rtmie

FROM: Vienna {Yamaji)
TO: Tokyo

Part 1 of 2'.

Re part three of your Circular # U25 ( Rurope 4)"

June 4, 1941
#49.

The question of an Anglo- Nazi peace would now seem to warrant our constant attention. I
understand that yesterday the Russian ambassador to London wired his government a message
containing the following point, (1) Great Britain is outwardly boasting very much. However,
according to rehable reports HESS told LORD HAMILTON that HITLER, as ever, considers
Rossis and the Commtem as the real enemies of the whole world; (2) If the Soviet yields to the
German demands concerning the Near East and cooperates with the Reich, the fate of the British
Empire will be most gravely threatened. Therefore, the British Government and the King are
seriously considering making peace with Germany.

"Not available.

•Not available (Part 2 at 2).

Trans. 6-16-41

No. 526

FROM: Berlin May 18, 1941

TO: Tokyo #557.

•i(Partlof2).

To be handled in Govenun^t Code.

With regard to the chances of British-German reconciliation, too, they have always been
mindful of them, but with the added stimulus of the current HESS incident, not a few rumota
are circulating. With regard to this incident I have aheady expressed the opinions maintained
here in my separate message but along the following lines I am giving some of my observations:

1. Since the beginning of this war Germany has on numerous occasions, as you know, made
overtures with regard to conciliation. Should the aims of Mein Kampf be instituted as they stand,
there is no doubt but whe&Srtm a theoretical point of view reconciliation betwe&u Germany and
E^3^|I^n4 «ould-be iittained at almost time. However, tte>^9»f li«yi]ig ^(^esse^ ^alxsaflyl^

th^^int at which it now stands, the whole of England's influence on the European continent has
been eliminated. This is but one phase of the New World Order and the fi^hr will continue
in order that the new order can he established not only in Europe but also in Atrica. At the present
time Germany considers:

a. That she is no longer interested meiely in lemoving Eiigl8j?it41§.jp«>Mtic?kl infl«^iw.fif^ the.
European continent; - ~ . .

b. That she must incorpor^ ^ttun th& Asm AMm (ipcljidjs^ ^ Medltmanesn area) ftM
the Near East.

c. That, having developed to that point, she will consolidate; then prepare ibr the great struggle
of the future between Germany and the United States.

It is thought too, that she is even considering taking over the British fleet.

2. However, should this materialize, Germany's war aims, in comparison with her current
demands, will change radically with the developments of the war. The political and economic
situation within Germany is considered sound. Under the present circumstances I do not be-
lieve that it is necessary for Germany to, of her own volition, take a backward step and bring
about conciliation. The greatest queetioB is wl^ttto^ J£^^,-1^iS/jS||£ed Stgt^ i^md the Soviet,
too, will be drawn directly into the wM-

Trsna, 5-21-41

No. 527

PROM: Berlin (Oshima)
TO: U\.kyo

(Part 2 of 2).

3a. It is Germany's strong determination that the first premise in the overthrow of England is
to perpetifM^e the predominant position of the Tripartfta Alliance. Regardless of to what extent
the United States steps up her aid to England, the reason that she would not be overly perturbed,
eve© ?f the United States were to participate in the war, is that she feels Japan will exercise a
festralmiig Mliieilce on the United States in the Pacific. Certainly, utilizing her entire strength,
Japan will preclude movement Into the Atlantic. Therefore, though in spite of the existence
of the Tripartite Agreement and through conversations between Japan and the United States,
the United States in actuality can without atty fear fi-om the rear concentrate her fleet into the
Atlantic, and should such a situation develop such as effective convoying and an expansion of
merchant marine warfare, then Germany to that extent could lighten her terms and sue for peace.

3b. G^many's self confidence with regard to the Soviet is much more than imagination. In
spite of the fact that at the present time there exists a danger of war between Germany and the
Soviet, should that war materialize and should there be such a development as would result
■ftbtfi 'SOii^'kind of hitch in Germany's war plans and that so develop into a long-time exhaustive
one, it will have, as a matter of course, great effect upon Germany's attack against Britain. In
such an event, or depending upon America's attitude or again upon Japan's futaire course, she
will he in a position to offer conciliation to England.

4. In summing this all Up, in the light of the situation as it stands today, as long as Eng-
land will not submit to reconciliation which would be tantamount to unconditional surrender, I
do not see Germany has anything to gain by entering into any conversations. At the same time,
I am convinced that Japan's attitude will wield d tremendwiB effetst fflttd that )!©j«iliTOlt; mv&a.
careful co^deration must be given to it.

Trans. 5-^21-41

May 18, 1941
#557.

THE 'MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

BHOM: Hsinking June 27, 1941

TO: Tokyo #379.

(Part 1 of 2; Part 2 not available) .

It is quite possible that the reaction of the anti-communism groups and others in the United
States t-o the recent German attack on the U.S.S.R. will have the salutary effect of dampening
the war sentiment in the United States. (Since it has been reported that Hess informed the
heads of the British government that Hitler's real objective is to crush Russia and stamp out
communism, also that Hitler considers Germ an -American war as mutually suicidal and accord-
ingly made peace overtures to England, it can be assumed that tJifi present German attack on
the U.S.S.R. is directly connected with Hess's mission).

Even if Germany fails in seeking British collaboration, as a result of her campaign against
Russia, she will be able 1 o secure sufficient materials to put her in a better position to wage a
long drawn out war with Knglanti. In order to realize this, Germany took the offensive before
Russia could complete her military preparations and at the same time is seeking British and
American conciliation. It ift (Hi the basis of these advantages tliu^;. Oesffflaa^teas caraied hifir war
against Russia.

TVans. 6-30-41

No. 529

FROM: Tokyo May 17, 1941

TO : Berlin Unnumbered.

Re: The Chief of Mission code message from Rome dated the 15th. °

This matter is being handled in the United States also as a strictly secret matter. Only the
PWUMfeati the Secretary of State and one other Cabinet official have any ksm^MB^ cpnoeriMng
it. Not a single word of it has been sent even to the U.S. Ambassador in Japan,

Under these circumstances, I feel duty bound to act in the same manner. In the past, such
mAUets have frequently been handled in this manner. My not taking you into complete
confidence in this instance, does not in any way carry an implication that I do not trust you.
I sincerely hope that there will be no misunderstandings on this point. I shall advise you of the

"Not available.

See n, 34, in which Tokyo advises Washington that the Japanese Ambassadors in Geimany and Italy have been

Trans. &-10-41

A-265

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

May la, 1941

(Chief of Office Routing) .

I had heard various rumors of Japanese- U.S. negotiations in connection with rumors of
your going to the United States. I learned for the first time on 5 May, from Foreign Minister
Ribbentrop, that the above was not mere idle rumor. However, guessing at your intentions, I
told myself that this matter should be allowed to progress without my taking part in it,

At the same time, I could not but feel considerable anxiety when I took into (Kmsidefation the
future of our country, and the effect that the proposal may have on the Tripartite Pact. More-
over, I feel that it is my duty as your representative, to report to you the attitude of the official
circles in Germany as well as my humble opinions. I am, therefore, dispatching them to yua
in supplementary cables numbered 568* and 569.'

Another matter I would like to mention here concerns your reasons for not reporting this
Understanding proposal to the Ambassadors in Germany and in Italy. I would like to take this
opportunity to express my opinion in this connection.

Please be assured of one thing: In critical times such as these, my first consideration is for
the welfare of my country. 1 do not for even one second think about such things as personal
imst or one's personal duties to another individual.

Such matters as the formulation of foreign policy and the ways and means of carrying them
out are entirely up to the Foreign Minister, The only point that I wonder at is your apparent
disinterest in obtaining reports on the-atliterdeft ef tli&*iffleifli «fele» rflla^*at8 <@ePmaJiy wMt
regard to such a matter as a U.S. -Japanese agreement which, after all, would have considerable
effect on the Tripartite Pact. I am sending the two supplementary messages so that you may
be better acquainted with the reactions here, I feel that as long as I am the Ambassador to
Germany, it is my duty to derthi^.

(In 6 parts — complete).

Pari 1. Chief of Office Routing.

Oo May 3rd, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop asked me to see him. At our interview he said,
'Today I received a telegram from Ambassador Ott resJ*ii«f fitiiai^e-tei«3&afi rl^o^ft-
tions. As I understand that neither you nor the Japanese Ambassador at Rome is supposed to
know about these negotiations, I suppose I should not mention it to you but because of the
seriousness of this subject and our mutual friendship, I am unable to withhold the information
fiom you any longer. I trust that you will fully understand the circumstances." So saying, he
showed me a telegram from Ott, giving the main points of the four articles of the agreement
proposed liy the United States on April 16tii. He then said, "Information regarding such a pro-

"Seen, 531.
•See H. 632.

Tram. 5-21-41

FROM: Berlin (Osima)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

May 19, 1941
#568.

A-266

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

pDsal coming out <rf a etear sky makes it mty difficult for me to undofstand the motive- of tli©

Japanese government."

Thereupon I avoided this subject by explaining that when Foreign Minister Matsuoiia visited
Germany he made it very clear 4^"! the Tripartite Pact will be the basis of Japan's foreign
polity. Therefore there ft!»B Uto {K|i»l in promi««« tijat we wll B# do aags^I^ will be in-
consistent with the Pact.

Again on the 9t3l BibbentrOp had me call on him. He showed me telegrams from Ambassador
Ott giving Japan's provisional reply to the American proposal and also the conversation be-
tween Matsuoka and Ott held on May 6th. Ribbentrop then said, "It is now clear from other
similar telegrams feom Ambassador Ott, but it appears from Japan's provisional reply that
Japan has already gone into these negotiations quite deeply. Speaking frankly, among infor-
mation obtained from various sources, some indicate that these negotiations were originally
proposed by Japan. Also the conversation between foreign Minister M&tsuoka and Ambassa-
dor Ott seems to show that the Foreign Minister was driven to agree to this course by a certain
group in Japan. Another thing, the Foreign Minister is reported to have said during this con-
versation tliat in the event of German-Soviet war Japan will also fight, but it now appears that
Mr> Matsuoka has changed his mind regarding what he told me^ as hia ^vate view, oa the
occasion of his visit here, that Japan is about to attack Singapore.

Part 2. "I doubt the sincerity of Roosevelt and it might be that Japan may be taken in by his
ponp, or she might use this agreement to circumvent her obligaticn (undear the Tripartite
P^ict) to fight when the moment arrives. It is true that many technical loop holes can be found
|p justify Japan's position but actually a thing like this will weaken the structure of the Tri-
partite Pact. Furthermore, it might cause Japan to loose the opportunity of gaininf supremacy
m East Asia. After giving this matter a considerable thought I have arrived et W6 iMfiippS^.
which may be considered as those of Germany. They are:
"(a) Prbposal to turn down the United States proposal.

"{b) Proposal to agree to a Japanese-American agreement on the condition that the Unit^
States abandon her plan for convoy and patrol services and maintain an absolute neutrality.

"1 personally am in lavor of the first proposal and I would like to promote its acc6:^tance, bilfc
what is your opinion regarding these proposals?

I, therefore, told him that common sense indicates to me that our government would be
more favorably disposed toward the second proposal, because if such an agreement were
reached, Britain will have to fight Germany singlehanded and For that reason will hasten the
termination of the war. Also, although this might sound a bit too optimistic, Roosevelt and his
group, ii^l^f^liiiEr iSiriiif''®i5l^fi iftlaalfeotive, may jump at this opportunity to retreat
fifom their present polic^p dl'^BEving aid to Britain. Then again, it might prove useful in deter-
mining at leastj Roosev^j^ilipcerity regarding aid to Britain, and at the same time may help
tj|^0@j^^l^!B^«iami»#i^ the imiM^il^iUty of Jagianese- American eooperati^^

Part 3. Ribbentrop then replied that so long as these negotiations continue, there is the dai^er
of the United States trying to draw Japan away from Germany, {opinion already expressed in
my message # 545, to Turkey # 11, and that it might also be used within the United States to
silence the peace advocates by indicating that an understanding such as this will give the
United States a fr6#!^a^;^'^# ^« ^^'^

^ffen he explained that as tiiese proposals have not yet been submitted to Hitler for his ap-
proval, he will telegraph my opinijm with the ^troposals to Hitler ttmight. (IBtler is now living
outside Berlin.)

A-267

Wben [ asked him whether this matter has been taken lip ndth the Italian government, hs
replied that the Italian Ambassador has already reported it to his home government but no
direct conversations between the two governments have yet taken place, but as soon as
Hitlea^s &]>|xrdval is obtained the German gov^nraent tip mstructiQ^/i;i$''i;ilit^dS{^

dg^ Ott and at that time l^ematter will betakennp direct, by both governments.

Part 4. As I had made arrangements to see Mussolini early this month, I left for Rome on the
10th. The German Ambassador, Bismarck, called on me on the 12th and stating that he was
^der instructions from Ribbentrop, he showed me the German government's instructions to
Ott and explained that Italy also was in accord. Upon reading the text I ^und that Hitler*ja
approval was given to the proposal which was not supported by Ribbentrop.

On the 13th Ribbentrop suddenly arrived in Rome by air to conf^ with Mussolini and
Ciano. On the morning of the 14th he asked me to call on him. He showed me Ott's telegram
describing the talk with you and he expressed a great dissatisfaction with your statement that
«Sm to the international situation the negotiations had to be started without awaiting the Ita<
lian and German views. Stal ing that if you had waited only a few htiijrs ItKOgeryon would have
received them, he asked why it was that you were unable to wait.

I th^fore explained te him that while I do not know the facts of the situation and therefore
can not make any positive statement, I thought that it might have been due to the necessity of
assuring absolute secrecy and also because these matters had first to be submitted for Imperial
approval.' ! aasuxdi^ite l^tso diarefipect woe Intended eithei for Italy oc Gennasy ,

Pari S. Nevertheless, Ribbentrop would not be appeased, and he saidj "During Foreign Minis-
ter Matsuoka's visit to Germany, I had talked with him on several occasions, but never once
did he mention the Japanese-American negotiations, which certainly have a great bearing on
the Tripartite Pact. It is very strange that no sooner than he arrives home, we are confronted
with reports on these negotiations. To speak bluntly, I personally think that these negotiations
will greatly weaken the Pact, and just as I have mentioned before, from the very beginning, I
^trusted Roosevelt, and I had intended to suggest to Japan to abandon the negotiations
with the United States, but it so tWBS out ttCW tt*at the iiaattuct^^ |i^^>]p^^Wi;^g|rt. pao-
posal which was not of my choice".

I therefore told him that no misundeirstanding should arise over this question between the
German and -lapanese governments and suggested that he let Ott kiyly itjli' ^SjS^^^l^S4^, WX
this question and also look into the whole thing very carefully.

The same evening I called on Foreign Minister Ciano, but as Ribbentrop had already con-
ferred with Mussolini and jSi^^j^g^jpial^t wliat He hsii So «ay was no diS)er«^ ftdin that
of Ribbentrop's views.

Part 6. I called on Vice Minister Weizsacker, at his request, as soon as I returned to Berlin on
May 17th. He said he was under telegraphic instruction from Ribbentrop, who ia now at FUS-
SHURU, and he showed me a telegram from Ott, dated the 14th, which d^t with Japan's
reply to the United States proposal and another telegram, to Ott, giving the German govern-
ment's instructions regarding the above.

He then said that as he had been instructed only to show you these telegrams he does not
intend to express his views but in view of the present war eituation the German government
is greatly concerned with the outcome of this question and that Germany also views with great
interest Foreign Minister Matsuoka's statement to Ambassador Qti(, to th& e#ect that Japan
will aid Germany in case of German-Soviet war.

He then asked me whether the Foreign Minister was able to acquaint himself fully with the
Ge»na^>^i9v|^ r^tioiu, beft^ tetmmSi^.p&'Ss^ait I i^^Ued that whild I do not kno^ w^at ^

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARB<»6

'^^ip^^ln MiniKter said about Japji@^jSS|^i^ife|'i^»ES'<aijt^e^^ war, as all im-

pO^ailt questions today must avalt tmt)€^i decision, wliatever he said must have been
simply his personal opinion. As for his und^standing of the German-Soviet Telatums, I am
sure that there is tittle to worry about on this score, as he has had many opportunitit^i to talk
over this subject with Foreign Minister KibJ^entrop during his visit to Germany.

Trans. 5~22hH

No. 532

FROM: Berlin (Osima)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

(In 3 parts — complete)

Chief of Office Routing,

1. I reported in my separate cable" the fact that Germany is showing considerable dissatis-
faction with regard to the proposed IJ.S.^tLpiemm^^s^^SbisBle^tk '^^ show modS c^
cern over the future of the Tripartite Pact.

From a practical viewpoint, the United States is involved in the war today. Should we
]!emdin silent with regard to the words and acts of the United States and enter into a Japanesc-
U.S. agreement, it would amount to the same thing in the eyes of many, as our giving approval
to the violent anti-Axis expressions and actions of the United States. From the viewpoint of
international law, such an act would mean the prevention of U.S. entrance into Hie European
war, but at the same time, it would indicate that Japan was evading her duty to enter the war.
It would be impossible to dispel this doubt from the minds of the German people.

At the time of your visit to Germany recently, the people outdid themselves in ^Sr-
pression of welcome to you. They pufeJiej^e4 ^i"* fact that jitour visit was ^«w)f of stresygthaned
ties among the Axis countries.

Since this other matter came up immediately after this, there is considerable feeling here
that they have been double-crossed.

2. 1 am perfectly aware of the fact that there is a need for us to get a political and economic
breathing spell by bringing about an immediate settlement of the China Affair. At the same
time, the fortunes of the European war are constantly favoring Germany and Italy in an ever
increasing degree. We can even forsee some very important developments within the next few

Under such circumstances, wouJ^'it b@ wiss for us, for some immediate gains, to invite the
animosity of Germany and Italy ■wfeo hfi^Ve the power over Europe? I have considerable
doubts, c&^mM. M {}feh^ m«d&, I si^^^ tl^jjiii^pgiiil im^ 1^ ifi# IMited Stat^ was
motivated only by that country's desire t&i. ifFp^fllfce TiS iHa^ and is purely a

temporary stop-gap effort on their part.

1 am afraid that if we pursue such a "middle of the road" diplomacy, we will be left 8tatl^«
ing alone on the international stage, at the critical period immediately following the war.

3. I shall not go into the fact at this moment that we will constantly be bearing a telltale
scar ift the fiituTe if settlement of the China Affair is brought through the lip-service of the
United States.

However, if we were to abandon at this most opportune time all of our dreams with regard
to the foathward expamion and at the same time abandon our position as a threat to Singapore,

#S69.

A-269

I fear that we would be looked upon cofitemptiifMiBl^ A&t tmly by Brit^EUti and the lM^ed)Sgttfilii
but by Germany and Italy as well.

It is all very well from the U.S. standpoint to have a situation in which she need not be
concerned of the future on the Pacific. She could then concentrate on her assistance t& Britain,
avoiding, all the time, openly declaring that she was in the war. Such a development could
affect the war situation in Europe considerably, and it would be difficult for any to guarantee
that nothing unfortunate would happen to Japan.

Should we promise to the United States that we would abandon our claims for leadership
in Greater East Asia, which naturally includes the territories in the southwest, it is clear that
we could not insist upon the right of leadership to Germany and Italy. Hence, we would have
to admit that we had abandoned our project of establishing a new order in Greater E^t Asia-

4. By the signing of the Tripartite Pact last fall, our nationals were given a clear goal to
strive for. Should we, at this time, enter into an agreement with the United States, our people
would become confused and be at a loss as to know what the ultimate goal is. In our interna-
tional relations, such a step would invite suspicion and contempt of our friends. I fear that in
reality this would mean that Japan would have to stand alone in the international scene.

However, in the event that the government of Japan feels that it is absolutely necessary
to enter into an agreement, it is highly desirous that the following two points be put into effect:

(a) Clearly establish the fact that Japan is entering into the U.S. -Japanese agreement
so that Japan can make use of the position held by the United States to further bolster the
spirit of the Tripartite Pact and at the same time make things easier for Germany and Italy in
their war against England. I further believe that it is absolutely necessary that we demand of
the United States that she change her policy with regard to the European war, to one of strict
neutrality, and at the same time clearly establish the conditions of the IVipartite Pact under
^R^iK^ it is our duty to enter the war.

Should the United States r^use to accept these conditions, ths agreaaent would not
be entered into.

(b) It would be tQ offlr^i|^pstCt cfisadvantage if we allow the Germans and Italians to get
the impression that the advocates of the status quo in our country (those who advocate the
maintenance of the status quo in the Orient) have gained so much power that entering into
this agreement was unavoidable. This would give the Germans and Italians the idea that we
entered into agreement so as to evade entering into the war.

Hence, I believe that it is necessary for us to exchange opinions with Germany and
Italy, and have them clearly understand the points hmught out in (a).

'See 11, 531.

Trans, S-22-41

No, 533

FEOM: Berlin May2l.i94X
TO: Tokyo .

The Japanese- American negotiations now under consideration indicate an important change
in our national policy and affects the work of our military attaches in Germany consideraJbly,

A-270

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROtim W PEAIU. HARBOR

Therefore, it is necessary to inform our attache regarding this. I have submitted to their
exclusive perusal my messages #567°, #568', and #569*. Ple^e show these messages to
the Ministers of Navy and Army, Chief <jf Staff, and Chief of Military Affairs Burieau.

•Seen, 630.
*See n, 531.
'See n, 632.

Trans. 6-22-41

No. 534

FROM; Tokyo ( Matsuoka)
TO: Berlin

Strict^ Secret

Re your #567^

I have carefully read and considered what you have brought to my attention. The fact that
Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP has gone ahead and talked these circumstances over with
you confidentially proves that lie has superlative trust in you which is a matter of deep
Ratification to me. I am wiring you the reasons why we have so far released no intelligences on
this subject. We have no ulterior motives. Of course I can understand why Your Honor is upset
over these negotiations, but I want you to know once and for aU the Tri- Partite Alliance is the
^jraerstone of our Imperial Policy and that we are going to adhere stricily thereto; and,
furthermore, that our government is going to do absolutely nothing to contravene the spirit
of this Pact. Please put your mind at rest and believe in your Foreign Minister. When you have
suflBciently comprehended what I say in my #439*, go and tell Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP
and the other German Officials that under no circumstances are they to have any anxiety or
misunderstanding concerning any possible acts of ours, and that they must have complete

'iKmh. Ositna expresses anxiety over the effect of Japanese -American negoliationsi on Tripartite Pact and says be
is reporting attitude of German official circles, along with his own opinions, in supplementary telegrams. See II, 531.

TVans, S-g^t

No. 535

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Berlin ■lv .

(Part 1 of 4) . Re your # 568° and # 569^

1. So Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP, having received information concerning the proposal
for an understanding between Japan and the United States, is surprised and entertains
resentment because I did not hold some definite conversations with him on this subject while

May 24, 1941
#438.

May 24, 1941
#439.

(ireheDsive opinions with the Foreign Minister on the Japanese-American question. It goes
witiiout saying that the whole crux of the Tri-Partite Pact is to prevent the United States'
from entering the war and that, therefore, it is to the mutual interests of the three powers
concerned to take whatever diplomatic measures are necessary to achieve fliat aim. As I told
3?ou in my #396', on my return to Moscow I informed the American Ambassador that with
irespect to (1) not entering the war; and (2) advising CHIANG KAI SHBK. to make peace;
(3) at the same time we could not by any means permit this understanding to have any effect
upon the Three-Power Pact. I went so far as to specifically state that if the llnited States
fights, so will Japan. I had him wire this to President ROOSEVELT as a personal message
from me, but upon my return to Japan, I found that prior thereto the United States had
already put forth a proposal for a comprehensive pact to adjust relations between the two
countries. I knew absolutely nothing about this until I returned to Tokyo and the United
Steteg bad absolute)^. ti^%S$i$^lii]p|^(

i(Fart2of4).

In view of this fact, I cannot see where the Germans have any reasons to be alarmed. It is the
policy of the Imperial Government in the future to stick resolutely to the above-mentioned
three points, and as for Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP worrying about us damaging the Tri-
Partite Pact by taking any sort of measiiires, so far as we are concerned, there is absolutely
nothing to it. Furthermore, in view of the measures I have taken since I returned home, and
from the statements made by Ambassador Nomura to Secretary HULL, the United States
knows perfectly well what our attitude is and will be.

2. I do not know what is in the back of ROOSEVELT'S mind, nor for that matter does
anyone else. In general I agree with the guesses of Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP, hut after
all if we mutually make the Tri-Partite Pact the immovable base of our National Policy, it
follows that we would by no means fail in with any schemes of the United States to divorce
Tokyo mi fierlift. "

Hereafter, schemes on the part of London and Washington to divorce us will become mijS^-
and more active and it is thfetefore all the more necessary for the officials of Tokyo, Berl&
and Rome to be on the aleart and stand even closer together. Why, if Grermany and Italy begin
to doubt us in the least over this matter, by this mere fact owt memi^ would bave already
djriven a wedge between uahy their nefarious schemes.

I hope without remission that ChanceUor HTFLER and Foreign Minister RCBBENTROiF
iR^saf^ if fe«3f& eug^t to know ti^t^JB^^^

See n, 531 and 532.

!M»tsuoka tells Ambassador Osima that he has asked American AmbaBsador in Mo3c«w to advise Roosevelt that
if Ataerica fights so will Ja|t«ii, «nd that he would like to have CUang Kai Shek advised to make peace. Matanoka
■eaetinues that a proposal fi« li^gustiag J&panese^Amedeaii relatioBB k ibeiog worked but that until further
iiptusei^o^iiitg is to be revealed to the Gormaas.

(Part ,T of 4).

3. Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP is very unhappy over the fact that we be^an these
m^otiations before receiving any views from Germany, but I reserved my reply to the United
Stat^ fer a wtH^?«p|(^ (As a mutfcer e# fact, the reply wa»:,»^(^ld fer more than four mp^

A-272

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND Of FEARL HARBOR

from the time the United States put forth its original propoaaL) This ought to convince him of
my trustworthiness. At that time conditions in the United States seemed to be quite
serious and we were anxious at least to postpone a reply for several more days. (On the 8th
we received a confidential report that the American Congress had approved the convoy policy
and that on the 14th the President was due to approve it.) However, we were most anxious by
all means to prevent the United States from sanctioning convoys and to eliminate the danger
of her participation in the War. Therefore, at last and sotoier than we expected, oti the 12th
we suddenly put forth our counter-proposal. Now for anyone to say that I was pressed by a
certain group and had to fall in line reveals a gross misunderstanding of my character and
intentions and it hurts my feelingfs very much. My reasons for not infoimii^ the Germans
before is as I have said and I W8S ^^i^^gMg do tJae right tk^^^^^^J^^^^^^jf^^it^
something uncertain.

(Part 4 of 4).

From beginning to end I have always bwn interested in maintaining the iat^Hjr ^ tee;
IVi- Partite Pact and, therefore^ although I did tell a few people what was going on, I refrained
firom giving the Military or any othegr group any information. (This had nothing to do with the
influence of the gmup who wishes to maintain the so-caUed status quo mentioned in your
#569°. It is rather the Army and Navy who are zealous.) Yes, I waited a whole week before I
s€ait in a reply and the fact that our counter-proposal was made at the psychological moment
is proven by the fact that the President postponed his address scheduled on the 14th. In any
event, hereafter 1 will continue as 1 have always done in endeavoring to keep in touch with the
Germans and Italians, but on the other hand we are a free country, aren't we? When it comes
to the exercise of our policy, we do not have on every occasion to run to Germany and Italy
and ask their advice, do we? It is not as if we were scheming to renounce the Tri-Partite Pact
in the slightest. There is not a single one in the whole Government who would think of such
a thing. Let your mind be at peace on that score. I suppose that by now Germany <and Italy)
are convinced that we are on the right side. In any case, they have no reason to fear. Further-
more, I have on several occasions subsequently endeavored to satisfy OTT' that everything
is satisfactory and I suppose he has so advised his Government; however, I want to trouble

*Seen,S32.

'iSemKb Ambassadnr in Tukjro.

Trans. {Not dated)

No. .536

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa) May 27, 1941

TO: #631.

About two weeks ago, the American Ambassador menM^aed that conversatiosm have started'

between the Foreign Minister and Ambassador Grew. Therefore, I called on him today to
inquire how the conversations were progressing. He said that although he has not received auiy
ii^ormation firom his government, he feels that discussions on far^reacKkt)^ fH>^8SaS;
including the questifon of the United State's aid to China, are taking place.

He suggested that I renew my inquiry in due time as he expects to get in touch with Ml
govetnmettt regarding this matter shortly.

A-273

I agreed to this, but as he reiterated the impc^sibility of Japanese-American war, I explained
to him that our country is definitely opposed to fighting America and that from what little
knowledge I have of military science, an out and out battle engagement between the two forces
would be impossible but if a war between America and Germany is provoked by the American
fleet, Japan is obligated by the terms of the treaty to fight agaijCLst America, This, I said,
has been declared time and again by our Premier.

Thereupon, he replied that there is very little likelihood of the American fleet taking the
initiative in provoking war with Germany. On the contrary, Germany would be the one to
take the initiative.

I then told him that in the event Of this kind it would be very difficult to decide which party
is the aggressor and Japan is very anxious that American fleet &rces re&ain from taking action
which might provoke a German-American war.

Our opinions concurred on the present German- Soviet relations, namely that the much
talked about German attack on U.S.S.R. will not materialize, unless the present war extends
into next year and the German supply of materials becomes exhausted. 1 also told him that
according to newspapers, the .American -Soviet relations appear to be gradually becoming

worse and It there is no objection, please let me know the gist of conversations between

you and Ambassador Grew,

Trans. 6-5-41

No. ,^>,17

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) May 27, 1941

TO: Berlin (Koahi) #446.

You mention isl.^@^ message # 568° that during my conversations with Ambassador Ott,
I told him that Japan would enter the w;ir in the event that a Soviet-German war broke out.

The truth of the matter is that during the above mentioned conversation I said that it would
be practically impossible to fc^etell what the attitude the government of Japan would take
at the time of such an eventuality would be. 1 did, however, say that as my personal opinion
I could not visualize Japan not striking at the Soviet Union from the (Manchukuo?) area if
iim waa declared between Germany and the Soviet Union. I added that this would be the case
if no Tripartite Pact exi.sted. This was the extent of my statement to the Ambassador.

1 need not here add that this statement in no way differed from the meat of my conversa-
tions with Dictator Hitler and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop when I m^n^^them recently.

When the opportunity arises, will you please clarify this matter to For^^p .JJdlnist^
Ribbentrop? 1 have had the Vice Minister explain this point to Ambassador Ott.

'8*811,631.

Tram, 5-29'-41

A-274

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 588 * ' —

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) May 28, 1941

TO: Berlin _ . i>m. ,

Sttictly secret,

I would like to have you immediately communicate the following as thia Minister's
personal message to Foreign Minister VON RIBBENTROP:

"In view of the current international situation which so deeply involves my country, and o[
the internal situation within Japan, this Minister sincerely hopes th^ tiw-^^lPpaii ^WftfiS-
ment, insofar as is possible, will avoid a military clash with the Soviet."

The above you can tell him outspokenly as a &iend, but further in thia connection, should
you have any additiQtti4M«*%1^S# teJw Wtb ewidor.

Trane. 5-29-41

No. 539

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) dune 4, 1941

TO: Mwi- . #481.

Reyour #58r.

I suppose you can just about understand what I meant in my #458'. As a matter or principle,
it is a foregone conclusion that for the government of any country to regulate within its own
circles the discussion of matters of grave importance to the state is within the realm of im-
possibility. Furthermore, if this leaks out to the public, there is the danger that it might use-
lessly cause hectic speculation. What you say is, in general, correct, but on the basis of what
riiave just said, my intention is to slowly watch this trend of evea^ I taw no longer

hold my peace, to refrain from bringing up the matter you mention for gWpwWiflit discussion.
I want you, also, to keep this in mind and keep me posted constantly witfi &dtelSgence reveal-
ing the course of Russo-Ge3^9K£ittf^sl^i£».

'Not available.
'MATSUOKA advises OSl
Sn^m wtnilcl not, st pres^it, ft

^■ieJi igpjBEJiTRpF have any trouble with Russiit because conditions in

Tram. 6-11-41

No. 540

FROM: Tokyo June 20, 1941

TO: Moscow #625-

Re your #666°.

Referring to your report of 7 June, rgpsiameiidiBg ih&t Japan take steps to settle the Russo-
Gia!«i«ndjffls*!^Ws*i#*^jll^i - c — - -

A-276

As I have advised you, twice and thrice have I advised Germany to endeavor to win the
cooperation ol' the Soviet, but I fear that things have already gone too fat and that there is scant
hope of such a possibility. However, if you see any chance of this, will you please let me know

"See I!, r>10A in which Ambassador TATEKAWA he fel* ft ie iiicttmbeiat oil Sapm io eSeet a delay in the
Germ an- Russian crisis and asks foi instructions.

Trans. 6-24-41

No. 540A ,

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa) 7 June 1941

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #666,

In summing up the various information at hand, Germany is preparing to make certain
important demands on Russia, which will be backed up by threat of resorting to force.

In view of Japan's relation to Germany through the Tripartite Pact and also her relation to
Russia through the Neutrality Pact, I feel that it is incumbent on Japan to effect a delay in
the crisis by intervention, and to urge Ru^ia to eith^ |a£a #ia tsl^n^
with the anti-British, an ti- United States groups.

However, in the event that Germany submits her demands to Russia, Jspsh should warn
Russia in a friendly manner to accept the demands, in order to avoid war.

That this course is consistent can be seen from the talks you have had with Stalin.

Please send me instructions as soon as you have prepared the details for the warning note
mentioned above.

No. 541

FROM: Tokyo May 27, 1941

TO: Moscow #533.

ift.i^Ml^aiNiite "il^ sevis^ the leel&timss between the United States and Japan, unofficial
ii^tV^rsations were being conducted between Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull for
Sttefe time. On the 16th of last month (before this Minister's arrival home) the U.S. govern-
ment presented a broad secret "ua&m^BaoMag' mfvmm^ it ^#9tef 4pe
relationship between the two countries.

We studies their proposed plans from the viewpoints of;

(1) The absolute impermissability of j^ affiksWlJ® fe'^firfpa*^
latter i.s the basis of our national policy.

(2) The prevention of the United States from convoying ships to England and also of the
United States from entering the umce that would bring about a chaotic world which "i^^n^
probably develop into the complete destruction of human civilization.

(3) Having the United States cease her aid to the Chiang regime.

As a restilt of studying the matt^' car^ully from these various angles, we had Ambassador
Nomura submit out pmuiW pecipp^ <^fw£ of, which follow:

A-276

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

1. Clarification of the fact that the Tripartite Pact is an instrument for defense. Its ains are
to prevent the spreading of the war and to guarantee the safety and the well being of our own
country. We should now cooperate in the matter of avoidance of taking belligerent steps, but
ttiatead, remain strictly neutral. We agree not to aid one &£ the belllg^rttaAs while hindering
the other, which constitutes, in actuality, an act of war.

2. Japan asks the United States to recognize the three basic principles promulgated
iConoye, the Nanking Treaty, and tM imfj^^m^^ between Japan, Mas#!#^. aad CJaxBA,
At the same time, we ask that the United States urge the Chiang repme to tsase hostilities^
and refuse Chiang aid in the event that it is refused.

3. Ccmnter way» and means of mtitua% guarante^iiig «cQiip%^ of matmak needfiil %
the ot^er. Moreover, the l.Jnited States shaH cooperate with Japan in the latter's peaceful es-
)^lditation of the southwest Pacific area.

4. Cooperation between the two countries to prevent countries which are nentS^ M^ t&l
present (from entering the war), and guarantee their independence.

We have not, as yet, received the official reaction to our proposals.

There are only a very few persons in both countries who have knowledge of these proceedings.
It is being kept a strict secret to all other persons. Please bear this in mind and keep thia in-
formation to yourself. Under no circumstances, permit this information to leak out.

RMay to Eagland, Ffance, Italy.

Trans. 5-^1-41

No. 542

FROM: Tokyo (Matel«Hfeti Mayl2,lS4i
TO: Berlin #399,

Re my # 395°.

Regarding the present shortage of bottoms, according to the communications officials:

a. There has been an increased amount of maritime shipping because of the "New Order in
^^siAsi**' policy.

b. Because of the use of v easels fO' tnilitmy purposes and oth&f ^pi^^ needs, any increase
in bottoms is extremely difficult.

c. The situation is very dark because of changes in Europe, making it difficult to purchase
or lease ships. We are able to take care of not more than 60 per cent of our maritime shipments.
Because of the lack of transportation for the necessary materials purchased by Japan from
South America and other overseas points, it i» extremely detrimental to make any mcxe&m
(from April to June it would amount to 20,000 tons), // we should take over ■
it would be an extremely great sacrifice to pay. This is for your information only.

'Not available.

ttam. 5-15-41

No. 54a

PEOM: Tokyo
tO: Berlm

May 17, 1941
#415,

On the 16t,h I prGsDnted to Ambassador Ott the figures given by the Director of the Bureau of
Commercial Atfairs regarding the supply of rubber for Germany from French Indo-China,
NetherlandB Eas^ Indies, and Thailand, and spoke to him as follows, but W^.^M that he had
asked his government for instructions and would have to await the result before answering.

Japan's yearly imports of rubber are as follows: raw rubber, about 50,000 tons; scrap rubber,
about 30,000 tons; and other than this about 10,000 tore of raw rubber for Manchuria. Howei^i
at present, importation from Malaya is cut off. The importation of the 30,000 tons of scfsp
rubber from America is now prohibited. And of the amount agreed upon from Netherlands
East Indies, about half has been purchased during the Sust half of the year, or about 9,000 tons.
(However, of this amount about 6,000 tons has gone to Germany and Italy,) Hence, we can
expect nothing Irom these before July, and according to the above source of information, i.e.,
the Commerce Bureau, we can not be certain about imports after July. Again in Thailand at
present the German merchants are cornering the market without regard to price so til now, we
have made absolutely no purchases in F.I.C, and have done our best to expedite the supply to
Germany. As is clear from the above, Japan has sacrificed her own interests for Germany as a
result of which the rubber situation has become acute in Japan and some factories have had
to close down. Therefore we request that of the 6,250 tons oi rubber from French Indo-Cbina,
tseheduled to airive in Japan soon}, Japan be allowed to appropriate foi her ovm tise 3,500
|^,,The amouia^t^ Jllfiteplaced atfQ|^«| §i^dil^^^^^!%.

Secret outside the Department

Re my - 415°.

On the 22d the Chief of the Commerce Bureau called on TISSHU* in order to urge him anew
to agree to our appropriation of 3,500 tons. According to a wire from Saigon, it is underetood
that they are prepared to send 5,375 tons bound for Germany as the June allotment, in addi-
tion to which it is understood that it is going to be possible for them to supply Japan by the
middle of July. Therefore, it is understood that he proposed a postscript to the effect that we
'Will, as a mat^r of CQiu|s%.13t|dl® IP^ef^3tm gi^

Trans. 5-19-41

No. S44

EROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

May 22, 1941
#435.

A-278

THE "MAGIC BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

In view of the fact that the War, Naval and Foreign Offices are in accord in this matter, we
would like to have you, too, negotiate with the German Govermaffilt m order that they m%y, m
so far as possible, accept this plan. Please wire me the results.

°MATSUOKA telU BerUn of presenting to German Ambassador OTT the figures regarding supply of rubber for
Gi|r|li|K»y from French Indo-ChinSi NethMlsnds East liidies abd T^ailaild and also Bt&temeitt of Japan's yewly im-
pdets cf rubber. See U, 543.

'Kan a spelling

This is a request message in wbich Tokyo tells Berlin: "In <Mder to facilitate the whole problem of Germp^^m^]^
needs, we ar« negoti«^1iAitl%^THAT. PlefiW$(m«ti»U^lte'«^!%twS,|to^l^
tbei^ul^."

Trans. 6-4-41

No. .'545

FROM: Tokyo Jwne3, 1941

TO: Rome

Re your #291' and #320".

Our subsequent negotiations with Germany regarding tin have not made much progress.
We are trjdng to acquire an increase in the allotment for ourselves. However, as a result of
separate negotiations with Italy we have arranged for this time eiUy to purchase 150 tons of tin
ore which we will refine and then sell to Italy.
■ This is far your itifarmation only.

•Not Available,

TYans. 6-1&-41

No. 546

FROM: Berlin (Japanese Ambassa^itjl, .. June 0,. 1941 ,

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #668.

The German newspapers are manifesting great interest in the Dutch-Japanese trade nego-
tiations as well as in various problems concerning collaboration and rights in Greater Eaat
Asia. It will be necessary to explain these matters to Germany eventually, so I wOuId appre-
ciate an early teli^am regarding the Dutch reply and the trend of the negotiation.

Regarding the matter in your #475" of Judlf fe^'toaied jyl^ indicated in my #472*. Is
yeur # 442* to be Chief of Office Routing? :

"Dated 3 June: Inquity by Tokyo refartUng zeeeomtvx imptova^SQie^^m aiz ixmmm^Blt^i^^^fS^l0^i
*Not available,

Berlin gives a <!oai{^!^«xplaimtioii of tiiia^^ #f9&#jna6 l&it.

Trans. 6-11-41

A-279

mm*-'

June 16, 1941
#693,

TO: Tokyo

Re your #511'.

Will you please reply by wire at once regarding the following points:

1. Do we have the contidence oi being able to purchase the quantity included in the sched-
ule for June 1 and thereafter, and are you of the intention of Germany selling us the same?

3. Comparative figures on past purchases hy Japan and Germany of rubber produced in

(Urgent).

(Re your #511°, our #512'.

On the 20th JVIATSUSHIMA', in accordance with your instructions, made representations to
the Chief of the Commerce Bureau, WISHL. WIEHL said (1) that although he would acecm-
modate the Japanese by lending thera 2500 tons in accordance with our desires, the Japanese
were to accept the previous second propc^al, and today or tomorrow this proposal will be tele-
graphed to the Ambassador in Tokyo; (a) there will be no hindrances to the Japanese purchase
of rubber from French Indo-China and Thailand. The inability of Germany to make purchases
would be suitably adjusted. Today or tomorrow a new plan will be presented to us regarding
the policy of Thailand rubber. It is intewled to telegraph this proposal directly to TtilE^i fS)
The amount of rubber left over after shipments have been made to the United States and
France proper will be divided between Japan and Germany. As yet, no information has been
received, but I understand that he answCTed that proper study of this must be made.

MATSUSHIMA asked regarding the contents of this new proposal, but as yet no definite
decision has been reached. 1 believe that this will bring about a noticeable change in the Ger-
man and Japanese imports from French Jndo-CMna and Thailand.

"Hot avmlable.

Trans. 6-18-41

No. .148

FROM: Berlin (Osima)
TO: Tokyo

June 20, 1941
#733.

'Plaintext

M4i

A-280

No. 549

FRO M : Tokyo ( Ma^KtliJ^I.
TO: Mexico

{Courtesy Message — To be kept secret within the Department)

The German Ambassador in Tokyo has asked us a favor. When the German Minister in
Mexico haaids me^ to yon 200,000 Ameriean doilara belonging to Qma&ny, which has been
^pt in Mexico, will you please be very careful to handle this in such a way that it is not dis-
covered by anyone. Address it to this office as personal property of yours and send it oB va
Japanese ^tfi, * ■ • '

Trans, 7-7-41

May 26,1941 '
#90.

fBDM: TEkyo (Matsuoka} June 9, ^Mt

TO: Berlin (Koahi) #490.

The Army has suggested that in order to increase the usefulness of Major General Takuma
Shimoyama, who is leaving for Germany shortly, they would like to give him the title of Mili-
tary Attache for Aviation, attaclied to your office, and limited to service there. As we do not
have a separate air force in Japan, to appoint a military air attache in addition to the present
military attach^ might seem a bit irregular, but if the country concerned consents to it, it

^t^ti to be ftll fight, and nnleas please have the military attach^ briefly inform them ^

the plan. According to the Army authorities, Lieut-General Banzai was accredited in the capa-
city of military attache with additional duty of air attache"; but we were unaware of this.

If h tme, it wouW be sufficient meteiy to inform the Germans that Lieut- General Ban-
zai has been relieved of his additional duties, and that Major General Shimoyama is assum-
ing those duties. If this will not do, we will have to give study to the matter of the division of
#»ti^ of the pireaent assistant attache, and the avi«ti£»i officer.

Please give us your opinion by return dispatch.

The Naval authorities also (garbled out).

^0.551

fltOM: Berlin (Jap Ambassador) June 21, 1941

TO: Tokyo (Gaiaaudaijin) #741.

Hoarding ycradr #^(f aaad #S25*:

Tbe local military attifl^^ at present submitting his opinions to the (jeneral Staff Head-
quarters. As soon as a give it fucther considerations, and send you a
reply dispatch.

'Re-title ior Maj. Gen, Shimoyama as Military Air Attache. See 11, 550.

mUOM: Rome JuiiS2,l&*l

TO: Tokyo

Re my last year's #323°.

Well, semi-official KANAKURA has taken office and, from the point of view of the work
involved in our cultural plans, 1 think it quite feasible to place here in Rome a correspondent
of the International Cultural Advancement Society, particularly considering the importance
of the work and the part we play in it here. In order to unify our cultural plana, I think that one
of the terms should be that this work should be directed by myself and I would like for you to
^ippoint Mr. SOICHI NOGAMI as the eorreapondent. WiJJ fetf^^teltal Ptsaj^ WiWd on to
B&^s^ W^^I&csmd and help tbem ce^Uze our plans?

Tram- 6-6-41

No.

FROM; Rome (Horikiri)
TO: Tokyo

Re your circular # 1148°.

The printed materials which we have received have been highly suitable and have been dis-
tributed. In order that we may awaken a great deal of interest in Japan, other newspapers,
magazines and articles could be given to the writers here as basic materials and would achieve
a very beneficial result. Recently there has been a great increase in f hie fed of studying things
concerning Japan. As I believe that more and more effort will be devoted to increasing the
printing of matter along this line, please continue to send copies, especially of the Pictorial
Orient, Contemporary Japan, Oriental Affairs, East Asia Economic Intelligence Series and
Nippon Japan Yearbook. These are especially commented upon, and please inquire in order
that increaaing amounts of these may be sent every twenty days or so.

'Not available.

Traos, 6-25-41

No. 554

FROM: Rome (Horiltiri)
TO: Tokyo

To the Personnel Chief;

TOYAMA" has a bad reputation among the Japanese here. There is no place here for anyone
li^^letJiPlNr trade at presents I kmm tmhm$-^ Ms me mbsihm he would mlmit

June 22, 1941
#393.

June 30, 1941
No number.

A-282

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

to the discipline of the Foreign Office. I have talked this over with some (rf my people and we
don't tbiak he would be suitable as a Commercial Attache here.

° Bead of a trsile pHmtotion «ffiee in Bnnie.

Trans. 7-12-41

No. 555

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

Strictly Secret,

JlPhe i^Htefe'^^ttlWaft «Aow 1 quoted teifi^^^S^ i^lcl me coiifl^i«^«tty the following with
jf^ard to the general European question:

"1. CHANCELLOR HITLER had conversations with DARLAN in Berchtesgaden which
wesre conducted in a most amiable atmosphere. HITLER was wftU impite&sed by DARLAN.
I do not know but what in the future policies with regard to France will center around DARLAN
rather than LAVAL. The Franco-German talks covered the use of French colonies as German
military bases and the use of the French Navy for convoying French shipping. Syria is a great
ptoblem but in the event of American participation in the war Dakar will assume a much
greater importance. (According to a special report, it is rumored that already German troops
have landed even in Algeria.) WEYGAND', too, is awaJe of iMfe'fMfe, of course, is an unoffi-
cial report but on the surface at least there is nothing to contradict it.

"2, Tfee Soviet unchangingly has been faithfully carrying out her supply of goods. Further-
mdiWsT^ certain qua*C^ ^rftSA^li^aWft'l^^tfi^^MWlEte but whether this m in

anticipation of war or with the intention of avoiding war, is not clear. The preparations of the
German authorities are progressing on schedule but in truth the decision as to whether war
will arise rests entirely with no man other than CHANCELLOR HTTLER. H<iweVear, it is a faqt
that it is being said that the German Army is cfmfident that within a few weeks it would be able
to carry European Russia before it.

"3. The transportation of arms and munitions to Iraq is scheduled to begin soon with the
tacit consent of Turkey. It is thought that the air arm, top, will within a very few days arrive
on the spot. In the event that Turkey's attitude becomes none too pleasing, 1 do not know but
what Syria might be offered to her.

"4. Germany has decided that Italy shall have domination over the eastern Mediterranean,

Furthermore, the is as I have told you previously and in the future Egypt too will come

under the Italian sphere of influence. At the same time thtt iftei*raafiy iMi tit hand grants
Italy a sphere of influence over the eastern Mediterranean, on the other hand.ahe'is restraining
d^antl^ .upon the French which ahready are making for joint German-French tfoHaboration."

'Thft petwn to whom this message refers is spoken of in measage #640 as "a certain authoritative German."

Trans. 5-17-41

l«ayl4.1941

A-283

No. 556

FROM: Tokyo June 3, 1941

TO: Nanking, Shanghai, Tientsin, Peking and Hsinking No, 1175,

(Circular). Message from Berlin # 619 on May 30th.

(Fart 1 of 4)^

Airplanes and mechanized forces are utilized to the maximum in the present large war. Aur
power especially is of great impf^siif^. It is the natural thing that large scale wars in Europe
take place during the latter part of spring. Germany has been making intense preparations
since the war against France. As the advent of good weather has been delayed more than a
month in compt^!»m tt^ Usual years, it mi^i i>#«gM asr^ l^ .^i:^ i^Se^Ki^
ditions have not occurred. You were able to confirm all of this during yAttf visit to Germany
and you also know that Chancellor HITLER is resolved to bring about, an imd to this war as

soon as possible. Tniw^3»'m.tmm£m^$mMi^iWm^lif&0mim

place. This could take any of the following forms:

a. A direct attack and occupation of England prope^

b. A i»}mplete sweeping away QfEiiglifib1^w^^&tMas-ili&^^ «

c. A war embracing Iraq ;

d. A North African battle taking in Egypt and the Suez;

e. The taking of Gibraltar;

f . A war in the territory surrounding Dakar;

g. And, finally, a war against the Soviet.

l!b& manner of carrying this out and ld^.jte^>##tMelte^fiMlXft#E^
Chancellor HITLER's. As yet it is still too early to know «S4etl3f the ecrura* td events but
pofeviously mentioned points are clearly indicated.

1. The Germans' chief object is the destruction and over-throw of England, but M 3*it ft
too early to understand the trend of developments. Although submarines and air bcwbardf
ia«nt are worldwide in scope and are important, it is believed that if this struggle is coittinttitd
to tim jgnd, tenestddl war mov^n^ts wiU be tbe decisive fiietor.

° Part 2 and 3 of 4, which say that in an epoch-making effort, HITLER is destroying the power of Britain. Now she
has to adjust her relations with the Soviet. Perhaps she could defeat the Soviet and England at the same time but she
migiA hmt to make up with Bngtand. See % 567, ^ 56a

No. 557

FROM: Tokyo June 3, 1941

TO: Nanking, Shanghai, Tienstin, Peking and Hsinking # 1175.

(Circular). Message ftom Berlin # 619 on May 30th.

(Part 2 of 4)°.

2, Prom the German viewpoint, it is necessary to pulverize the power of the British Empire,
This has already been started. At a glance, it seems necessary that the Germans concentrate
all th^ war x^mt^ to obtain thm pjy«$^v|i {if .de^Uoying thi^ Althou£k.i4

W^'^^W^^ filiCKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOE

that this is a problem of proper placement, the German war effort of defending their eountry
to the maximum extent as they state they are doing is an epoch-making achievement.
HITLER, in the us* -df 'this IfflfiBeiense war power, feiidt liraiteS to-^ locality, but it is judged
ifliat a shifting form of warfare is at his disposal.

3. Reference is made to my series of telegrams regarding German-Soviet relations (espe-
cially #413*). The adjustment of difficulties between the two countries is seen to be an in-
evitable development. It need not be said that this forras an indispensable element in the new
order in Europe, In respect to Germany's war with England, it would be possible for her at the
same time to prepare and cany out an annihilating movement against the Russian Army
within a short period. Taking into consideration the oft repeated loyalty of the Germans and
all other factors and HJTLER's attitude, would a favorable result be brought in time (if the
indicated development continues?)? The only other altertxative would be rapprochement with
England. Not a few calculations point out that no matter what ttsm.O^man' war effort tak^>,
the important point (climax?) wUl begin within this year.

"Parti of 4. Seen, 556.

Trans. 6-6-41

FROM; Tokyo June 3, 1941

TO: Nanking, Shanghai, Tientsin, Peking and Hsinking #1175.

(Circular). Message from Berlin # 619 on May 30th.

(Part 3 of 4).

4, At the present time, the German Naval, Air and Army forces amount to 10,(X)0,000 men
(another source indicates 12,(KX),(KKI). First-class fighting planes number from 10,000 to 15,000;
aecond -class fighting planes (planes which could be converted into superior first-class planes)
amnber 20,000; and third-class lighting planes (training ships and civil aircraft) number
30,000, The monthly production is 2,000 planes. It is clearly evident that all this constitutes a
variable reserve of power for tlie Germans. It appears that the number of submarines exceeds
200. For the short period just ended from the Polish war until the end of the Balkan campaign
there has been almost no manufacture of arms and munitions because a surplus had been
accumulated. All attention has been focused upon the construction of airplanes and sub-
marines. It is seen that since the beginning of the war, as a result of all the battles, a small
number, exceeding ^,000 men, has been killed. As a reflection of the great war result achieved,
1 believe that the German Army forms an irresistable force EBid is capable ^ c^pry&lg Out 4
type of fearless and audacious warfare never before conceived*

Trans. 6-6-41

N0.SS9

FROM: Berlin June 17, 1941

TO: Tokyo #696.

Re my #637°.

Subject: A summary of the war reports from June 1st to the 15th. (However, for the mihta^
operations in Crete see the first part of my message.)

1. Although both sides continue the aerial warfare, there ^ no intensity of it.

2. Tonnage of English shipping losses are as follows:
By aerial attack: 17,400 tons

By submarine attack: 128,800 tons.

3. In the eastern Mediterranean, having obtained the surrender of Crete, the Luftwaflfe has
taken up the bombirig of Alexandria, Haifa (Joppa) and Cyprus.

'Not available.

FROM: Tokyo June 3, 1941.

TO; Nanking, Shanghai, Tientsin, Peking and Hsinking # 1175.

(Cir(;ular) . Message from Berlin # 619 on May 30th.

(Part 4 of 4).

5. The German people in general desire that peace be established. Although this is natural,
their confidence in Chancellor HITLER's plan of achieving victory is growing more and more.
They are firm in not slackening up in their (war effort?). It has come about that in their effort
to protect their country, the over 10 million men in the regular army and the leaders md
members of the Party have become fused into one solid unit.

it is seen that at present the Germans are utilizing in this way their excess power. The
time and manner of utilizing this and its potentiahty is based upon the inclinations of Berlin.
The explanation is that Grermany is in a much more favorable position now than she was dur-
ing the last ^eat war when her only allies were Austria and Hungary, at which time she was
fighting on all fronts against England, Imperialistic Russia, Italy, the Balkan States, Japan
and the United States. If in the event that the United States should enter the war, it is seen
that the Atlantic would form an obstacle, if Germany should take England, she would begin
the establishment of a New Order in Europe and would ^gnify that this battle of military
power would not last long.

The Economic and Military Attaches have assisted in the prejj^r^^iiiiQf 'IQtis report,

Trami*-:^-41

A-286

THE 'MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

FEOMt Beilin
TO: Tokyo

#639.

Very urgent.

lf$a^ lei 2} Pait I mi^ sm^^}^ .

There follows the gist of a conversation I have had with Chancellor HITLER:
1. First of ail, the Chancellor expressed confidence in a complete victory in this war and then
Wtafetfti to state with comvie*i«Jtt the BtMetow^ hm gradtially made many improvements
in organization, preparations, artillery and ordnance through experience and instruction since
the beginning of the war, and since the war in western Yugoslavia ended two months ago,
preparations have been completely finished. He was particular to say that he had the
greatest confidence in the power of leadership of all his leaders from the highest to the lowest
as well as in the bravery of his troops, and then declared that the losses of the German Army
so far have been surprisingly small, death casualties not exceeding in general 10 % of (3i6iJi9Xy
mortality figures within the Pleich itself. He said, "For the dead and for their bereaved famiUeSi
I have the deepest Jay|B^pathy, but at last the time had come when Germany had no alternative
but to move, ancl B«t©at ^ sacrifice was inevitable. After all, our sacrifices now are rela-
tively small, but I am absolutely certain that had we waited 5 or 10 yeiaiSy the sacrifice would
have been infinitely greater."

'2i HITLBR said, "The seizure of Crete was accomplished entirely by aerial tactics, which
is a new strategy. In this struggle we sunk 8 battleships and took 12,000 prisoners. Now we have
come to the point where we can and will bomb Alexandria. Well, I can tell you one thing for
sure. I am absolutely determined to bring England to absolute annihilation. Look at the way
England acts! She is devilishly cunning at heart. She is first, last, and always a schemer
thinking only of her own good. In 19ii5, during the Ethiopian war, the British Government
m'C^ted me to join them in clamping ^dbwB flat Ita^j but I knew perfectly well that as soon as
Italy was overthrown we Germans would be next, so 1 immediately joined up with the Italians.
Now the thing for us Japanese, Germans and Italians to do is to continue more and inore to
stf@!igthen the 1^ whieh bind us because in my heart t know that it will be to «fijr t^^aal
advantage. Yesterday MUSSOLINI told me exactly the same thing."

Note: OSIMA tells of conversations with HITLER and EIBB®*TjBiOP «tS^^^^;®J iym
3rd and 4th, saying details will be sent in separate wire.

When I talked with Foreign Minister Itibbentrop on the 4th, he stated that there were not a

few editorials and articles appearing in Japanese newspapers reflecting moves to divorce
Japan and Germany. He showed me the article contained in my #520° and other editorials
and articles and asked me to see that more attention was paid to this sort of thing. I re|)l^d
that we diSec &am Germany in this respect,, and do not exerMe ceaittQl over tlw ptrese, and

No. 562

FROM: Berlin (Omma)
TO: Tokyo

June 6, 1941
#643.

A-287

that although I did not think the Imperial ^S0|f(SEfeBiMi6t *^|d lie «05^ii^ Iri^t it* Ifi^dy^
txansmit his statement tXe?fito.

"See n, 562A in which Germany complains about unfriendly articles appearing in Japanese newspapers.

Trans. 6-7-41

No. .562.\

FROM: Berlin (Osima)
W: Tokyo

May 12, 1941
#630.

1, DNA and other agencies, without giving details, send in articles and editorials app^hig^
in our newspapers and the German authorities are becoming rather alarmed. Every time they
receive something which displeases them because they consider it disadvantageous or
delicate, referring to German-Soviet relations (for example, the article published by tfte-
Neoshi on May 5th and the article about Iraq in the Ijakrumin of the 3rd), they come to me and
Q01P|}Iain, Well, all I can do is explain to them the difference between our way of dping things
IM'ttieGerman way of doingthin^aS^li''tfil^^riSl^^ '

2, Through a most rigorous control of the press, Germany su presses all reports unfavorable
to Japan. Not only that but she follows a policy of treating everything concerning Russia
with silent contempt and the tendency is to make as little refeteace the^to as possible^
When STALIN assumed the Premiership of the Soviet, you would be surprised at what tiny
reports appeared in the German papers concerning this.

3, Please take note of the above facts and see that the press is given better guidance here-
0mt.

(Part 2 of
Strictly Secret.

3. I: "Well, it seems to me that it is necessary to divest Syria and Iraq of British influence
and for Germany and Italy to get the oil and raw materials in those areas in their own hands. It
is beiiig said that Bagdad has been occupied by the British Army. Da Germany and Italy mtend
to let things drift along in that area for the time being?"

CIANO: "No reports concerning the war in those quarters haVe come to my hands, so right
now 1 can make you no answer."

4. I: "You know I have been hearing lately that relations betweMi Berlin and Moscow are
not so good. What do you know about it?"

CIANO: "Well, I know for a fact that they are not quite so friendly as they once were, but the
actual strength of the Soviet is by far less than that of Germany, STALIN knows that well
enough, and consequently he will in all probability compromise and there is not likely to be
any fighting,"

Tcaas. 5-21-41

Na.S63

FROM: Rome
TO: Tokyo

June 6, 1941
#356-

A-288

5. I: "What do you think of ROOSEVELT's recent speech?"

CIANO: "MUSSOLINI has been studying it very closely. We cannot tell Ijow this ;^eeeh
will be put into practice from now on. All we can do is wait and see." " "

6. I: "What was said at the BRENNER conference?"

CIANO: "Well, it concerned political and military generalities. Really there is not much
1 can tell you about it. You know, Croatia is about miter the Tripartite Pact, and I un(i^'
stand the Protocol will be signed in Venite oalfht 14^,"

Relayed to Berlin and Moscow.

*^ 0.568 to Pmfl.

TVans. 6-7-41

No. 564

FROM: Rome June 6, 1941

TO: Tokyo No number.

^'oday, the 4tb, ANDO" had an interview wi^ PRUNAS* and asked with what obji^
BOSU^ wss lap^ itt 'mm», iPftlSSfAS f«*iflea, *1iO§U •wisllea stir up a revolutiOtt itt finftltt
with the ass^^tiq# of Germany, Italy and Japan, and he wishes to make Europe the head-
quarters for this iwolution. He wishes to talk to various ofEcials of ours. That is why he is
here. As yet, however, he has not conferred with Preniiei' MUSSOLINI or Foreign NKii^rlef
CIANO. In the meantime, he is interviewing our high officials and before long the attitude of
the Italian Government should become clear. This fellow, BOSU, is quite a character.
However, we are not quite sure whether he could be used as the central figure in a revolution 1®
India." ANDO then replied, "Well, I would like to meet the man and talk personally with him.
What do you say?" PRUNAS replied, "Why, certainly! Go ahead[^", thereupon giviag ANDO
his assumed name and his address. W&sft ^^^^

concerning any Hindu revolutionaries itt japan which he should have in mind and dis^m,
please wire me back immediately.

"Coanii.elor at Jap Embassy, Rome.

'Director GeneraJ olTransoceania Bureau of Italian Foreign OfBce.

Trans- 6-7^1

Na. 565

FROM: Tokyo Jime9»lWl
TO: Rome #150.

Regarding the last part of your message of June 6th.''

(1) The FUOAUADO BUROKU', which is led by BOSU', has, recently, completely broken
away from the Congress Party. Its stronghold is in "BO's"*** native papovince of BeBgal and is
said to have a membership of 1.000,000.

Since the Congress Party under Gandhi is taking the illogical and unrealistic stand of
opposing the active participation in the met EJast Ibjdians, F.B.* csan be considered the
only trt% £pjti^S)itji8i..l7«^Pe

(2) Although OieTe is a Japanese branch of the CoMgEess Party organized by resident Indians,
it IS doubtful whether it has any dhect deiJttig.wifeil^.tniiin party in India. Others, here, are
the type that go tto tether than to talk ^afe^ -lifiiil^ma aia^ thirt is no one that will be ft*
fluential in India.

(3) "BO"" got in touch with our Ambassador in Berlin during his stay in Germany, and in
accordance with his wish we have agreed to handle the liaison b^ween lam and his party in
India, Therefore, when you meet "BO"*, ]pleas© h^ the mhove in mind a»d do not^shitg more
than listen to what he has to say.

°Subhas Bose is in Rome arranging with Axis leaders tii set up h«A^pW|!lm f or caMyiii« out his plana far
in India. The Jap Counselldr is to interview him shortly. See IT, 564,
Tc)rwardBloc(?).

"Subhas Bose, Indian independence advocate. Deported from India. Has been living in Berlin^

Trans.

No. 566

|!BOM: Lisbon Jijzie 4) 1041

(Mevimd Translation)

Bfviewed the German Acting Minister, I inquired as to Germany's attitude towi^
; the event of Spain's participation in the Tripartite Alliance. He made the statement
that though the entire decision rested with HITLER, he tUd not believe that Germany would
insist upon her participation. '
Eelayed t6 Germany and Italy. Have forwarded by mail in code form to Spain,

FROM: Berlin {Jasa«««e;^to888adpr) May 22, 1941

TO: Tokyo #§85.

(Parti of 3.)

The following is information given on the 21st to a member of this office by a reliable German;
however, inasmuch as it contains not a few points having to do with future plans of Germany,
please handle the information with precaution,

1. The German landing of troops on the island of Cre^e hgs not yet been made public since it
is the custom of the German Government not to puMfeh' anything until a certain degree of
success has been achieved. Nevertheless, the strategy is being carried out as planned.
Although the British forces are at present putting up a stiff resistance, German victory is
expected to be announced in two or three days.

2. Although outwardly Turkey gives a different impression, she is in fact getting closer and
closer to the Axis. Shipments of arms and ammunition to Iraq have already been carried out
through Turkish territory and troops are being sent by air by way of Syria. The air forces
•ellspatched to Syria are of considerable strength. These forces are being used not only for the
purpose of giving assistance to Iraq but with the control of the entifp, ^ear East in view. It is

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

also with a view of ma}Einf tin^iA instfUtQent^I 1^ pi^^mil^^ Uti tilt future of a politic^
policy toward India.

3. Since the conclusion of the agreement between Germany and fVance, both tti'k 'SBfenhfttt
and Italian expeditionary forces to Africa are to land at Tunis. Because of thia understanding,
dispatching of troops has become considerably easier and an attack on the Suez is e^p^ted
to be carried out from this point through Egypt.

4, Cooperation between Germany and France is being furthered by negotiations being carried
on in Paris between ABETZ° and DARLAN, on the basis of the conference previously held
between HITLER and DARLAN. Discussions have already been completed in regard to freeing
of war prisoners, alleviation of French responsibilities in the occupied territories, and the
lessening of distinction between the occupied and unoccupied territoiries. It is expected that in
the future questions will be dealt with in such a manner as they would be more favorable to
the French. On the agenda have been placed such questions as the return of the Vichy Govern-
ment to Paris (date indefinite) and supplying food to FrapRe (in CiSSf France is powpletely
blockaded by Britain and the United States.)

"German Amhassador to Vichy.

(Parti of 2.)°
Strictly secret.

On the 6th, I called on CIANO and con^atulated him on the conquest of Crete, after wW^
our conversation ran as follows:

1. I: "If you launch a real offensive on a major scale, I certainly do not believe it would bff
very difficult to defeat the British Isles. At least, theoretically speaking, the comM^^^lE^VilN'
of Germany and Italy ought to make possible a successful land invasion. Judging &t34ii events sO
far, it looks at least this should be possible. What do you think about it?"

CIANO: "To be sure, theoretically it is as you say perhaps, but when it. comes tofeetS, UM
not quite as simple as you seem to think. Judging from the fleet protecting the British MeSt her
Island defenses and her air arm, such as invasion would not be so easy."

2. I: "The fall of Crete must certainly have made a deep impression on the various people in
the Near East. I do not think that any time ought to be lost in continuing the fight on to
Alexandria and Suez, Do you not think that this is an excellent opportunity?"

CIANO: "It is as you say, and we are now gradually preparing to do that; still, when it begins
t6 get hot, I fear that we are going to find it tough going ia the torrid zones of the adutb."

Trans. 6-12-41

No. 568

FROM: Rome
TO: Moscow

June 6, 1941
#356,

Trans. 6-7^1

A-291

No. 569

FROM: Vichy (Hariide) May 10. 1941

TO: Washinfrton No number.

Message to Tokyo s 230.

For yoyj reference the following is given of the conversations held with the German officials
on the 9th;

1 . DARLAN went to Paris twice on the 9th. This is in connection with the negotiations which
are going on at this time regarding the economical collaboration. The French-Gesrman political
relations have become much smoother.

2. The Germans have been sufficiently satisfied with the progress of the negotiations regarding
closer economic collaboration. The question of the manufacture of military trucks has been
satisfactorily compromised.

3. It is believed that the Germans do not have any defiiii|& demands in regard to the improve-
ment of ^affic between occupied and unoccupied territories or regarding the amount of the
reduction in fhie payment by France to Germany. It is not known but what the strict neutrality
of French North Afrlea liiasJtetiBifi^p^ilecl In Yies^^eet ta^te4^id^«aent of war condMe^.
coMftcaing Gibraltar.

4. The Germans would receive no benefit from the worsening of Iran's position, who is ,

the French Navy. It is thought that in respect to the two points of German negotiations with
DARLAN and at the same time the in connection with LAVAL, are progressing,

'S. With the closer economic collaboration between Germany and France, the position ol the
United States has been worsened. In spite of his belonging to the naval fleet, LEAHY's smooth
relations with DARLAN have been hmited. It is mm liare at this time that this i^bfissador
has be^ unable to carry out his mission.

Relayed to Merlin, ISnms, LcmdcHK^ ^Pl^^gton, mAW^^*

■f;^?. 5-17-41

FROM: Vichy ^Mk^ May 14, 1941

TO: Tokyo #256>

Re: My .^^255^

According to a member of the German Foreign Ofhce Staif in Vichy on the i4th, the meeting
of Vice Premier Darlan SWli'iQiancellor HI'Ki^t.will be the basis for the German-French
collaboration not only in a political sense but also will include military cooperation; for
example, the transport of troop supplies acorss Syria and the offering of sea and air bases in the
French cdonies in North Africa, as well as the preservation of the French Empire and its
colonies, together wil h the use of the French Navy, are the main points on this collaboration.
According to this same official, he believes that the Vichy Government will agree to this at

'.Agreement that Germany wiU fuarantee the teeritori^ integitity of France wttb exertion of Akac^ Lioraiiie in

ftms. 5-21-41

'W&$''^Wi-0l&' BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 571

FROM: Vichy (Kato)
TO: Washington

Ma^ 20, 1941

Message to'l'okyoas #264.
Re ray U 250°.

Since then French Government sources have avoided committing themselves concerning
definite terms for further collaboration with Germany. However, my caption message is quite
well hacked up by the course of events. BASSK confidentially told me that Germany is
.supporting Italy's penetration into the Balkans but is denying Rome's demands on Nice,
©^J^fet, md ^voy. On her side, France has quickly obtained the release of 100,000 prisoners
(published on the 19th). Furthermore, it would appear that through negotiations Germany is
about to reduce the maintenance cost for her army of occupation still furthei to 240,000,000
ftanca payday.

The details (tf the ptesent negotiations have not yet been published but the communique of
the 23rd and PETAIN'S radio address of the 15th were designed to sway public favor further
toward Germany and in the end the populace will inevitably ibllow their leaders* DARLAN
returned to Paris on the 19th And it appears that Ms n^otiations with the GeOTiailg wH in all
probabiUty go along nicely.

In connection with these negotiations, the United States has taken certain unfavorable steps.
ROOSEVELT has made a speech and the American officials have held up French ships. There-
fore, casting aside hia wonted politene^ toward the United States, PETAIN pointed out to
Ambassador LEAHY that the assistance afforded France by the United States is not enough.
Furthermore, the newspapers are more and more reflecting diss^timent. (sic)

Belied to Berlin, Rome, London, Washiugton, Moscow and Angara,

"See II, 569 in which Vichy reports to Tokyo negotiations being carried on between DABLAN and Geriuan authorities

According to information received on the 7th, there is a possibility of the Vichy government
concluding a peace treaty with Germany and Italy. This question is said to have been dis-
cussed at the recent meeting of Hitler and Mussolini. In conjunction with the above treaty,
t he questions of Croatia and Nice are expected to be settled.

France is said to be agreeable to joining the Tripartite Pact in order to take part in the
establishment of a new order in Europe, and this point also was said to have been discus»iNi
by Hitler and Mussolini,

The fact that France is leaning more and more towards the Axis might be a point to bear
in mind in connection witii Japanese-French Indo China economic agreement.

Tram.

No. 572

FROM: Rome
TO: Tokyo

^me 7, 1941

#363.

TEafl*.

■mm-

FROM: London (Japanaje AmhsmB^)^
TO; Washington

June 10, 1941

Message to Tokyo # 417, June 6, 1941.
Part 2 of 2".

3. I said, "Well, the British Government is treating Prance as though she were an enemy.
Only yesteryear she was an ally. Is this not strange and sad? I read in the newspapers reports
that German influence is filtering into not only Syria, but also Morocco and Dakar, and the
French fleet is still afloat. Will not this have a serious effect upon Great Britain's prosecution
of the war?" The Foreign Minister replied, "The attitude that Vichy is taking is proving a
source of consternation to both London and Washington, but still we are endeavoring to the
last to keep France out of the category of our enemies. It cannot yet be said correctly that the
attitude of Vichy is deliberately and flagrantly hostile, only we are watching the movements
of its fleet and what takes place in its colonies, trying always to prevent the worse comi^ to
the worst, but still if and when the time comes, we are ready to shoot. When Prance fell last
year, I made a number of trips there with Prime Minister CHURCHILL. LAVAL, DARLAN and,
of course, MARSHALL PETAIN have wished most ardently that we British would take the
same attitide as Vichy and bring a speedy conclusion to this war. But, we British are deter-
mined independently to prosecute it to the end. This angers them to the extreme. Then,
too, the question of traditional Anglo-French feelings is a painfiol tme. To tell tiie tratih^ the
bigp^t iwlf of the French populace are not with Vichy in spirit.

*Pmt 1 iwt Aydlabte.

Message to Tokyo # 296.

On the 10th, I called on the Minister of War, General HUNTZIGER. General HUNTZIGER
told me the following: "The British troops invading Syria consist of at least three divisions
which are made up of British, Australian, and Indian troops. They have lipjjroximately 300
tanks and their air force is exceptionally strong, In view of the fact that the French demobilized
some time ago, our forces, including native troops, are inferior to the British armed forces
on a ratio of two to one. Having practically no tanks, defensive warfare for ua will be very difficult
and we maintain great fears in the situation. However, our air force in comparison with the
British air arm is on a par, if not superior to theirs. Up to today the British have lost 5 planes
while we have lost 2. At the present time, the advanced forces of the French Army are
maintaining contact with the British attacking units. Though doubtless they will make
successive retteats, we believe that we can hold up the British advance in this defensive
area. However, the outcome of the war cannot be foretold, especially in view of the fact that one
portion of French troops must be maintained close to the Turkish border, in addition to which,
tl^OUgh it is most regrettable, we must maintain a considerable force in the rear to preserve

FROM: Vichy (Kat«J
TO: Washington

Jtine 10, 1941
No number.

THE "MAGIC" BACKGliUL.ND Ub i'EARL HARBOE

"Furthermore, there are approximately 1,000 Frenchmen in the DeGaullist detachments
approximately 2,000 negroid Abyssinian recruits with the British Army. Though there
1Siay possibly be dthei motivating factors in the British mind behind the eurteUt incident, ik
would seem that the DeGauUist faction figured the invasion would be very easy. However, th&
Arabian native population, being given to discord and lacking in restraint, will be very
difficult to control should the war spread because looting and internal strife will develop among
them. The British forces will burn their hands on this situation."

Relied to London, Washington, Eome and Moscow.

Trans. 6-U-41

FROM; Ankara
TO: Tokyo

The situation in Syria,

1. In spite of the fact that the French Government is doing its very utmost in order to render
all assistance to Syria, negotiations with Turkey for the transport of arms has come to naught.
Not only is transportation by sea subject to attack by British armed forces, but according to a
local French attache, their shortage of ammunition is creating a tremendous problem. This
makes the waging of this war practically impossible. Though it he said ik&t fitom considerations
of honor and their relations with the DE GAULLISTS they have already rejected the British
proposals, the French realize that the fate of Syria is sealed. Regardless of "(^atefver path they
follow, Syria will come under the sway of British occupying forces.

2. Tiu-key, since the British Army invaded Syria, has strengthened her border troops. At
the present time, it seems that she has more than five divisions there^ This indicates nothing
more or less than that she is prepared for all §^$jap[«^ 'Jlsi.^'t^^

have no Mention

Trans. 7-17^

No. 576

FROM: Ankara (Knrihara)
TO; Moscow

(Parti of 2.)

June 4th: The local Iraqi ministerial authorities told me:

"1. Prior to the outbreak of the recent incident, Iraqi troops were stationed in Bagdad,
-Jibunie", and in the Kirkuk- Mosul' area. Bagdad, having fallen into the hands of the pro-
l'?ritish wing, and the Jibunie division's strength dependent upon its geographical location, is

limited to nothing more than guerrilla warfare; consequently, henceforth Iraqi

depends entirely upon the Kirkuk-Mosul troops under the leadership of General

MAS UK U'lt DO'. But two days ago when this General was questioned in regard to his views by
the German military representative in Mosul, no answer was forthcoming and it seems that his
attitude wasJUSlsiiSE^Ieci."

*Kana spelling,
"Town in Iraq.

July 12, 1941
#137.

June 4, 1941
#100.

Ar-295

No. 577

fUOM: Ankara {Kataamjf- June 4, 1941

TO: Moscow #10Q.

(Part 2 of 2.)

"2. The shortage of gasoline has a major importance in the current incident. The French
have purchased gasoline from Turkey which was to have been shipped from Constantinople
tbipugh Turkey on the Ist to Allepo' but, because of the shortage of raiboad cars, it has been
delayed for days in Comtantitiople. This is indeed regrettable.

"3. At the present time, 900,000 tons of British and American goods bound for Turkey have
accumulated in Basra.^

"4. The Premier, the Minister of War and the Minister of the Interior in the new Iraqi
cabinet are thoroughly pro-British but, on the other hand, the fact that MURIASAIDO',
considered to be opportunistic (1), was not put into the Cabinet, has divided the pro-British
faction into two camps. The assumption of political pQwes henceforth would aeem to be m line
with Britain's policy."

Tflwn in northern Syria,

'On the Culf()rPeraiia,e*«Sip(irtof Iraq.

'Kana spelling.

Trans. 6-13-41

FROM: Ankara JnttB 14, ati!.!

TO: Rome |<|i»^mber,

Message from Geneva to Tokyo # 133.

According to paragraph 22 of the Constiuiticm of this country, in case the King has not yet
reached his manhood, the former King appoints a regent, but until the regency is recognized by
the Parliament, the appointee is not accorded treatment due to a regent, nor allowed to
exercise his authority in national affairs. In case the previous King fails to appoint a regent,
the Parliament makes the appointment. For this reason, as I have said in my #128°, on legal
grounds we are not in a position to recognize ABUDORUIRA," who is said to be the regent
favored by Great Britain. Under the circumstances, the Cabinet which has been organized
under "A"'s influence is an illegitimate body. The German Government, on this account, is
maintaining a strong attitude against recognizing the present government. However, in
view of the fact that "A" and his Cabinet probably would be in existence no longer than two
or three months more, and of the fact that considerable inconvenience would be felt in planning
the future of the Axis Powers if we should too strongly adhere to the legal requirements given
above, I am of the intention of overlooking the legal aspects of the question and of not avoid-
ing making necessary contacts with the present government, i would like to have your
approval of this.

I have already consulted with the Italian Minister on this matter, and so will you ple^i9>
explain it to the German authorities if you think it is necessary to do so.

A-296

THE "MAGIC" BACKGKUb.NlJ Ul- FEAiiL HARBOR

The mattCT has been taken up with the Military Attach OTA» also*

Please to the Military authorities.

Relayed to Turkey. Relay mesaage from Turkey to — — and Persia.

°Not available.

'Katta spelling, Emw Abdul Qah— jnatentaL uncle of King named legent.

Tram. 6-24-41

m.m9

FROM: Ankara (Kurihara) Juiie4,
TO; Tokyo NoBumbK.

Message from Geneva # 27, June 2, 1941.

Unless Sonne direct and summary miE^astlrt^ arts fist1ten % &erm93g^ astdl ttaty fti'liJ^fiowing up
this recent incident, it is feared that the whole Arabian movement severely hampered in

its development. At this time, when it is thought that the Iraqi oil field pipe line and the rail-
read Mne connecting this city with Basra has heen destroyed, British interests chiefly lie in
the Habaniyah base which Ker\'es as a point in air and land transport from Trans-Jorden.
Inasmuch as there are large oil reserves maintained in underground reservoirs and other
subterranean facilities, pleas^iSl^^^f^Ver^ utmost to have the German and Italian authorities
bomb this base immediately.
I have already discussed this matter with Military Attache' OTA. Please transmit this infor-
i the military authorities.

No. o80

FROM; Bagdad (Miyazaki) June 4, 1941

TO: Tokyo #30.

4.' As a result of Ei^land having recently set up-^'^^psl government here, if at some future

time the German -Italian forces march into this country, there is the danger that England will
organize the troops of this country for defense, and call the Germans and Italians invaders; and
in carrying on an intense propaganda «ampti^ inciting the native tribeft. To put it briefly^
speedy German-Italain support is indispensable.

With respect to this, please_do all you can to arouse the attention of the Germans and Italians.
I have conferred with Consul Ota in this matter. Please relay this to the army.

Relayed to Turkey.

Please relay message from Turkey, to Persia, Germany and Italy.

Trans. 6-25-41

No. mi

PROM; Bagdad {Miyajs*^ June 4, 1941

TO; Tokyo #137.

My # 136" gave the results of the rupture of relations between this country and Italy. The
Fia'eign Officse in t^is country has made the follttwing request to me: "Though the Iraqi Govem-

A-297

ment has ordered the recall of Minister PACHA, now residing in Roni6, please arrange it so
that your Embassy in Rome will pay the above-mentioned Minister an estimated "H200, as
well as such other money as he may require in view of the impossibility of sending him money
for his return." In view of the extraordinary urgency, I would like to hsm go to the trouble
of making these arrangements at as early a date as possible. As awjij es a decision has been
reached, please instruct the Embassy in Rome and advise me.

"Not available.

Trans. 6-16-41

No. 582

l-'ROM; Tokyo «Iinie21, 1941

Action Ankara as # 52:

On the 20th, the Turkish Ambassador resident in Tokyo- called on me, saying that he had
been instructed by his government to report to the Japanese Government the formation of the
PfUrt with Germany and its contents. He said that the contents of the pact were just as had
&een officially announced ali^ady in the newspapers. After telling him that 1 desired him to
convey my appreciation of this information, 1 went on to say that 1 thought Turkey was very
fortunate to have concluded a pact with Germany; that, as a matter of fact, Turkey occupied
a v«y difficult p08iti<»i relations between England, Germany, and the Soviet. As a

fellow Asiatic, I had felt secret misgivings for her future, h^ ifcfeSt »PW I gr^ftWy telievfid by
the formation of this pact.

I toM him that I had studied Hitl)» for many years, and that I had come to realize that,
while Hitler on the one hand, in matters of national policy, etc, seemed to be very cruel and
heartless, on the other hand, he was a man who had a very warm heart and high ideals, and
that as a result of my recent visit to Berlin this impression had been strei^hened. I have
utmost confidence in Hitler, and it is my desire that your government, also, will put your
whole-hearted trust in Germany and Hitler. On the dawn of the New Era, you need have no
fmt that 0«maay will tread $»»^^ie^lKi!t» but you tmi'^^'t^siSii^mm^^iB^^^meem^
of course, do the right thing.

1 offer the above as the impressions and opinions of this Minister at this time, for the infor-
mation of your governments, and I do not believe that this will be entirely valueless. —

The Turkish Minister said he would, wire the details immediately, and withdrew.

No. 583

FKOM; Berlin July 4, 1941

TO: Tokyo #843.

(Tokyo Chcular # 1483, 7^-41) ,

On the 3rd Ambassador STAHMER, who had gone to Italy for a change of air, returned and

I went to see him for a little talk. 1 said: "In German consulates and other diplomatic estab-
lishments throughout China there are many stubborn pro-Chinese ofhcials who have recognized
^'W^tKO regiiiie nmr and this situation does not coincide with what ia to be estpected- 1 want

A-298

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

you now to discharge all these superannuated officials and ireplaeie with new blood which
is more imbued with the spirit of National Socialism." STAMMER replied: "I go the limit
in agreeing with the feeling you express. I shall submit this matter to Foreign Minister FlIB-
BENTROP and endeavor to remedy this situation as soon as possible." Will yew- please wirfe
me back immediately the narries of the German officials in the consulates and other diplo-
matic establishments in China which are not in harmony with the policy of the Japanese
Imperial G<wemmeiit.

IVans. 7-17-41

No. 584

FROM: Tokyo July 22, 1941

TO: Berlin #674.

Refer to your message #843".

The substance of your message was immediately transmitted to all offices in Chma and to
the Embassy m Manehukuo. Full names and personal records (were requested to be present?),
but it appears that there are no suitable persons. In view of this, the opinions expressed in
Message # 1283* from Shanghai to this office are very appropriate. Please endeavor to carry it
out that way.

"See n, 583 in which Berlin is adviaed that in the GemJaan consulates and other diplomat ic Ks(:ih!ishriifitils through-
mt C%^tet ttote are tiuii^ ttubbom pro-Chineae offidals, and it was requested that they be replaced with others who
m ^6p«^t«$i^«<!^ 1^ irpiri^ of "National Sdeial&mB." STAHMEK nsii that be g^i&sA with 1cbm aad requeata^.
the nainee of the abave^ittml^otied officials,

* Not available.

No. 585 .

PROM: Tokyo July 12, 1941

TO: Net

Received from Berlin as # 876, 9 July.

1. As I reported earlier, the German Economic Minister issued secret orders to merchants
in the Far East to transact Germany's business with only German merchants. This was done
towards the end of giving German merchants the control of German trade in the Far East. This,
of course, would have exceedingly far reaching effects.

Therefore, please point to this fact in the trade negotiations being conducted at the present
time between Germany and Japan- Manchukuo and urge that these secret orders be retracted.

Moreover, at the Germ an -Chinese trade negotiations which are scheduled to be held shortly

{two lines missed) — try to arrange to have this included as one of the

terms, and by these means have it abolished, 1 firmly believe that it is of utmost importance
to place, at the present time, Japanese and German merchants on an equal basis -each to
have equal opportunities— in so far as trade between Japan-Manchukuo- China and Germany
is concerned.

2. As long as Germany continues to insist upon doing all Germany's business in the Far
East through German merchants, I believe that we should insist that all of Japan's business
with Germany be conducted through Japanese merchants.

A-299

3, Since all of our merchants here are anxious to have the German ruling abolished as soon
as possible, please give this matter your immediate attention. Please advise me of your deci-
ftiimfoi' my personal informatioHi.

(Shanghai to Tokyo' # 3^)

If one should try to classify or group the German diplomatic officials (mostly consular offi-
cials) in China, there would be two kinds. (I) Those who place emphasis upon political concert
between Japan, Germany and Manchuria from the viewpoint of its larger aspects, and are
trying to handle the various matters that arise in China with due regard to this viewpoint.
(2) Those who are inclined to place the emphasis upon the protection of their own immediate
financial and commercial interests, and therefore in the handling of matters do not necessarily
takb am attitude that is in harmony with our plans. The former group is limited to a small
number of Nazi trained men, whereas the majority who have served in China for many years
belong to the second group. However, it would not be right to think of all the latter as being
auiMa|ra0a^>£dke«lteitt ttke fi^^ to be a tendency, as they stay on in

China and experience friction with us over restrictions on the shipping in or out of commod-
ities, and restrictions in matters of residence and transit, for them to reach the place where
iS^f doaotl^tilsiattmAS^^eittfdiiltaf^ feelings toward us.

The problem from now on, since the German officials have secured the right of direct ap-
proach to the Nanking Government, by virtue of the recognition of that government, will lie in
"delicate" relations that will arise betweea time officials and us, and the Nanking Govern-
ment officials. Looking at it from the standpoint of these officials, those of which we will need
to be most cautious, are those of the first group rather than those of the second group.

All the German diplomatic officials here, with the exception of Acting Consul General
TTNSAA (the one of whom the Ecuador government took exception because of his being such
an extreme Nazi, who recently was transferred here, and, when Fischer was transferred to
Nanking, became Acting Consul General) would be placed in the above mentioned second
group, and rather than for us here to try to handle the German officials personally I think it
would be proper to have Berlin send instructions, now that Germany has recognized the Nan-
king Government, for aU the German diplomatic officials and for the German businessmen
who are back of them to be careful of any anti -Japanese and pro- Chungking conduct. (As for
example, the disguising (?) and registry-transfer of enemy ships, the violation of rules concern-
ing the shipping in and out of commodities, and # j^ii^Jte been a g^^i'dldl vi
by the

'Not avmla^i

*-*^ftans. 7-X5-41

No. 586

FROM: Tokyo

July 31, 1941
#707.

Trans, 8-20-41

A-^00

THE "MAok: BACKGHOUiND OF FEAKL HARBOR

FEOM: Tokyo My 18, 1941

TO: Berlin #1549,

Circular.

Message to NaiJsagg. # 300,
{Parti of 2).

1. We may expect that it would be necessary, after thtg ^fcaMIiiaiient pf a new order in the
Far East as well as in Europe, to arrange a new economic tlr^atf betWfe^tt Q^msfty^Si^Pto^
based Qn the recE^ition of the leading position of Japan and Germany in that new oM^il^^l^
ever, inasmuch as a large scale war is still being fought in China, even if at this time a coiii-

prehenaive and agreement is concluded, we cannot expect it to be satisfactorily applied.

It ssm&s to me that it would be best if, as individual questions come up, their friendly settle-
ments could be effected in a realistic manner under a close agreement and contact maintained
between Japan, Germany and China. If it is the desire of the German Government to come
to an agreement with China because of the existence of a "pro memoria" and because of the
various circumstances, it might be well to arrange a provisional agreement between Germany
and China which will include tw& or three clauses (for example, relative to internal ta*«*,
Ste-.il In addition to those clauses contained in the present German- Chinese treaty and agree-
ment; namely, those having to do with manufacturing and commercial enterprise^ ^d ex-
porting and importing. Then, for Japan and Germany to arrive at a compromise by<^^iidfe^
.iStt &$teement including such principles as German cooperation during the war with our plai^
iti$iS$VSk iot the special relations obtaining between Japan, Manchukuo and China; and the
giaittfi^g of advantages over those granted to any third power in the sphere in which the respec-
tive signatories enjoy leadersh^* & aay caae, i»y Cfstiicm is that the time is not ripe for con-
c^Uidfag a very comjwebensive agreement.

Trans. 7-22-41

No. 588 ^

FROM: Tokyo July 18, 1941

TO: Peking, and Shanghai # 1549.

Circular.

Message to Nanking # 300,
(Part 2 of 2).

2. The Imperial Government has definitely promised to abolish extra territorial rights as
soon as the relations between Japan and China improve to a sufficient degree. Advancing as
she is along with Germany toward the establishment of a new order, it goes with{)ut saying that
in guiding the new People's Government, Japan must so influence the Government, during the
intermediary period leading up to the abolition of the extra territorial rights, that it will accord
as favorable a treatment as possible to the Germans with a view of improving the latter's posi-
tion. Therefore, I would like to have definite measures instituted after consulting the German
authorities on individual cases, (I have in the past received various eomplainta firom FISCHER"
relative jte^^d©* fe^«^^ciBa iigr tfe©f6^^w« te^^^ Germaite.

A-301'

It is not clear to me what concrete instances he refers to, nor do t fe«jf^. %nr close a contact k
being maintained between FISCHElRflad hia ow» mmtX^.,-
Relayed to and Berlin .

'Gennan Consul General in Shanghai.

Trails. 7-21-41

FROM: Peking July 22, 1941

TO : Nanking and Shai^ai # 324,

Circular,

(Message to Tokyo #465).

I gather that in your opinion it would be feasible to permit the Germans to conclude with
China some very simple agreement stipulating the principle of most-favored nation treatment
iB case Berlin must and will have it so. As you know, the North China-Mongolian border oc-
cupies a special position as an area of joint Japanese-Chinese policy. Nothing at all howevw
evanescent, must be done which would have a grave effect upon this area's status. I know that
you are sufficiently shrewd to handle the raatter adroitly, but please be guided by this con-
ception, , ,

Sent to NANDAI and to SHANGHAI.

l^ans. 7-29-41'

No. 590

FROM; Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Berlin

Reyocff #898':

With regard to the Japan-U.S. negotiations, we have not been pressing the United States for
an understanding. As a matter of fact, no concrete steps had been taken by us since the latter
part of June when we received the hnal proposal issued by the United States, until very recent-
ly. Finally, however, the liaison conference was able to come to a preliminary agreement, and
our revised proposal will be submitted, probably within the next day or two.

During this period, both the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo have been ui^ing
me to give them a hint as to the contents of the United States proposal. As was the case previ-
ously, it was obvious that Japan would not accept the extremely slip-shod proposals made by
the United States. We were afraid that if we released the U.S. proposal in confidence to
Germany and Italy, it may have given rise to misunderstandings. Therefore, we advised the
Grerman and Italian Ambassadors that, as had been done before, we wished to discuss the matter
ourselves first, and as soon as we had made a decision, we would inform them without delay. We
will advise you and the Ambassador in Italy, in the same manner.

The negotiations referred to here have considerable bearing on our domestic as well as for-
^ipa^.p^cij^ a^cl^ tb§ret'ore, we cannot discontinue them abruptly. On the other hand, there

July 17, 1941
#657.

A-302

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

are still considerable diflFerences of opinion between the United States and Japan. Since we
insist that any agreement with the United States must be b^ed m.^ Ij?i|«tltite Pact, tbere ia
very little chance of successfully concluding an agreement.
The aboveisilarMy ^«^1Ui^£tti^.

mm-

FROM: Tokyo July 24, 1941

TO: BerUn #687.

During the conversation between Vice- Minister OH AS HI and Ambassador OTT on the 22nd,
the Ambassador referred to the Japanese- American negotiations and said, "Germany, I am
afraid, will not be favorably impressed by these negotiations. In view of the fact that of late the
Russo-German war is becoming increasingly favorable to Germany, it would be well for the
sake of our common interest for Japan to decide now where she stands." In reply the Vice-
Minister said, "As regards the first question, it will probably fade into the background within
the next few days when Japan will have occupied southern French Indo- China. And as to th.e
second question, do you not understand what Japan is at present so intensely preparing for?*'
He added, "I would like for you to consider the fact that for Germany to be so insistent on
Japan's national policy, might possibly have an adverse elFect -OO tbf. Asis p?liey," I und^'
stand that the Ambassador appeared to see what was meant.

Trans.

No. 592

FROM: Tokyo (MatSuoka)
TO: Berlin

Re your #888".

All your life, Your Honor has been a man of deep thought, able to discern the inner mean-
ings of things, so I believe that the unheard of predicament that our country now faces and the
horrible situation existing here can almost be guessed by you. When I took office here as For-
eign Minister, the situation looked hopeless. I, myself, thought at one time that there was
nothing upon this earth that could save us from the abyss, but I am a man who never says
"can't." From the time I was a mere boy that has been my philosophy, and I still stick to it
today. I know that Your Honor is very far away, and I fear that you cannot in your own mind
picture the tribulations we are enduring these days, but come what may, let us two continue
our patience, follow the light of our Empire which leads ua, and never lose faith by listening
to dissuading argumentB. - ^ . ^ -

"NotsfvsBahle,

July 16, 1941
#656.

Mo. $9$

Tokyo July 19, 1941

TO: Berlin #669.

(Abstract).

The Cabinet shake up was necessary to expedite matters in connection with National affairs
and has no further significance. Japan's foreign policy will not be changed and she will remain
faithful to the principles of theTri»BiliS«lP^

Relayed to Boiae, Nanking.

Tram. 7-21-41

Mo.S34

mOU: Rome (Horikiri) Julyl^*^*
TO: Tofeyd #469.

Strictly Secret. _ ^

Re your # 646^ to Germany.

I had ANDO', for tht; sake of secrecy, make representations to CIANO through PRUNAS^
PRUNAS expressed his regret and hoped for success in this matter, along with the American
and British counter propaganda. He said that America's position was being watched closely
and that there would be no great reaction, ANDO said this matter was nothing more than pub-
lic opinion and nothing need be done in respect to American and British counter movements,
and answered it w«fe aeedless to iMt fhM wduld if«&*fiet iMnw fevor of Germany aftiS
Italy. Again at that time, reference was made to our political change. As yet no information
has been received from INDELLl''. Although there have been various reports in the press re-
garding just how coH^Meas fifftr tfefflpe is eywipAthy fbr MA^tfOKA, as he had brought about
the uniting of the three countries, but there is not a little tendency to think the withdrawal of
the Foreign Minister means a change in the tri-party policy. When asked about his opinion,
ANDO Ktplained that this present political change meant the strengthening of popular unity
and that it does not signify the change in the fundamental political policy of Japan. This
development is rather the strengthening of the tri-party union. As instructed in the caption
message, he explained that from the viewpoint of the Japanese government the retirement
of MATSUOKA could clearly be seen not to be a change of tri-party policy. Again PRUNAS
asked if MATSUOKA should resign, would not the making of the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality
Treaty be a reason for such action. He (ANDO) answered that the Japanese- Soviet agreement
was a natural outgrowth of the tri-party pact. Although this was the case, because of the out-
break of the German- Soviet conflict so soon after its conslusion, the impression is that the
Japanssa puhUc is a bit confused, hut the fact is that their patroitisra is ei^tremely deter-

A-304

THE "JVlAaiG" BACKGROUND OF PE4RL HARBOR

viewing the unity of the peopit', I|b answered that he thought the siting of the Japanese-Eoviet
Neutrality Treaty has nothing to do wj||i#*f^a^Mt «€l^lSU0KAi

• ^'^Sljg II, ;")94A, in which Tokyo says that Ihe negotiations which have been commenced with France mark the first
step in Japan's southward advance, and asks the cooperation of Germany and Italy, in helpii^ to persuade France to
accede to their request,

'Japanese counselor at Embassy m Bome.

'IWliatt* Director of Transoceanisfiiftisii*

ItaBam Ambeasador in Tokyo.

Ttms. 7-23-41

No. 594A

FROM: Tokyo 15 July 1941

TO: Berlin #646.

As the Ambassador in France has already notified you we have at last comment;ed negotiations
with l^ance with a firm detennination. This marks the Hrst step in our soutliward advante: at
the same time it signifies a very grave life and death step in our relati(ms with Hln gland and
America. We have thrown in our lot with Germany and Italy in harmony with the 1 ripartite
Pact and intend to cooperate with them. Under the form of m^^St^tions a req[u%t haa>
from the French government to the government to which you are accredited to get them tO
mediate a refusel or an amelioration of our demands, hi case they dodge the issue please ask
them to help us from the flank and persuade France to accede to our requests,

Please relay this as instructioM tojtal^rf.

Please relay this to France.

*ftrans. 7-18-41

No. 595

FROM: Rome (Horikiri) July 22, 1941

TO: Tokyo #483.

The authorities of this country are maintaining a circumspect attitude toward our recent
Cabinet change and are avoiding comment. However, the fact that Premier KONOYE re-
ceived the Imperial Commission for the second time and also the statement of Your Excel-
lency to the newspapers to the effect that Japan's foreign policy remained the same made a
generally favoraWe impression. The newspapers here are commenting upon Japan's unshake-
able determinatitm. The authorities are paying a great deal of attention to Japan's immediate
actions.

Trans. 7-29-41

IfKOM: 'tokyo JuIy25,lMl
TDi Home #204.

Please convey the following to Foreign Minister Ciano from ex-Foreign Minister Matsuoka.

I take this occasion as I am leaving office to express my thanks to you who still hold office
for your kindness to me. I fully believe that there will be no change in this country's foreign
policy. Please convey my greetings to Kse)«i#Mtii^BM*

Ttaaa. 7-30^1

No. m

WMU: Tokyo July 24, 1941

•5*0: Berlin #688.

Will you please transmit the following message from former Minister MATSUOKA to Fof-
Ugn Mmister RIBBENTROP;

"Now that I have resigned, I wish to thank Your Excellency for the encouragement you gave
me while I was still in office. I assure you that you will see no change in the Imperial Govern-
ment's foreign policy because of my resignation. Will you please so inform Chancellor HITLEK
aii^i?e him my best regi^fev^* "

Trans. 7-26-41

No.m

FROM: Tokyo .^m^TMS.
TO: Beriin #700.

Strictly Secret-

(Request Message).

From the Chief of the Exchange Bureau to Finance Official YUMOTO.

On the 27th the following decision was reached in a Cabinet meeting concerning retaliatory
measures against the United States for bringing into play an order freezing Japanese money.
The measures which will be taken on the basis thereof will be to freeze the financial assets of
Americans and to limit their dealings. The ordinance upon which the Treasury Department
will rely, based on the law governing the control of foreign exchange, is outlined in my sepa-
rate ft 701°. This ordinance was promulgated todfliy, the 28th, to meet the action of the United
States in freezing Japanese assets. Be it noted:

In case the United States actuates an order freezing Japanese assets, Japan likewise in
answer thereto will take measures of revenge, based upon the law inr the control of foreign ex-
change and will curtail all the dealings of citizens of the United States. However, if in applying
the order the United States chooses to deal leniently with us, we will answer in kisd. We isS^
have Manchukuo«(i^ CUusa the samem^astites £us«i« t»^i& Snfm,

Trans. 7-30-41

A-306

THE "Mj^GIC" background OF PEAM, HAReOiJ

No. 599

PROM: BeiUn
TO: Tokyo

July 17, 1941

Re your message # 661". The following Is a retranamission.

# 90i. At Koenigsburg, on the night of the 14*^. _

This morning I flew to the general headquarters and vrss Jffecesived first by Foreign Minister
IMbbentrop and then by Dictator Hitler. We conversed for a period of over five hours, durinf
which time we exchanged opinions in a straightforward manner.

As you are aware, Hitler iw a wry idealistic person. When he urged Japanese cooperation
with Germany, he showed no indications of asking for it for the purpose of benefiting Germany
alone. Instead, he pointed out that in the long run, the United States and the Soviet Union
are the foes of Germany and Japan jointly. With this consideration, he urged that Japan clear-
ly express its attitude with the Tripartite Pact as its basis. I could cleanly see that the Fuehrer
was not at all satisfied With Japan's attitude, particularly with regard %e continuation of
the Japanese- U.S. negotiations.

I am convinced that he made his suggestions in the interests of Japan, because, as I men-
t!cM4ed^lBiBfe]?# ; "hfe is a highly idealistic person. If we proceed in the present manner, I feel cer-
tain that it would be the equivalent of removing the back bone from the Tripartite Pact. Under
such circumstances, regardless of how strongly we try to tnake use gi the Tri|iartite Pact at the
conclusion of the present European war, it would be nTltii yitiiii.

1 do not believe that I am cowering under German intimidations. It is one thing if we do not
intend to look upon the Tripartite Pact with any importance. However, if we intend to make
the Tripartite Pact the foundation of all of our foreign policy I feel that there is considerable
room for reflection. 1 am convinced that I neither lie nor exaggerate aA^I^Ife willing to assume
full rssponsibiiity for my conviction. Please believe me and trust me.

Re your Circular # 1642.*

1. I fear that your opinion regarding Germany's plans and objectives in the Russo-German

war does not touch on the real motives and that there is danger of mtsunderst anding in rej^ard
to these. Please make special reference to my telegrans #413", 418", 456", 619", 638°, 639", 669",
716", etc.

2. As I imderstand it, in your opinion, Germany recognizes that eil'ecting a landing in Eng-
land would be difficult and so is preparing for a long war. But according to my opinion, while
it is true'lli^ Oermany is making preparations for a long war, still I believe that Germany tm
heretofore is planning to bring maffepi te ,^ ctm<:lusioitt in a shoH War. Please inform me aa te
the basis for your opinion.

"Kot available.

Trans. 7-18-41

FROM: Berlin
TO; Tokyo

July 31, 1941
#969.

3- That the Soviet should plan a guerrilla war was on^ natwid, however I think that it wiU
hfi very diHicuIt for Russia to exhaust the Germmi -flaaaSj. wJiielii^-BB ^^1^ frf mechanized
divisions aiid_aerial st^a^h, by auch tactics.

4« .Hfit i& t&^ls^ fh^' immediate collapse of the Stalin regime is to reach a hasty condWiaJfea.
■]S5%i"8uring the existence of the Stalin regime the amount of actual administrative power
e^eis^ by it is a problem deserving close study. CThia is closely related to investigations beiijf
canfied on by the Japanese govef liBtttilt in the Orient*) I wish to be informed of your expecta-
tions regarding t%@;j(b«i)le fiouTse sf the Btaliu te&me lafter the destajction of the Soviet army

■5. *th&t Aiafeiiet will go to war one day is axiomatic. The problem is not whether or not
America will go to war on the basis of international law. but just to what extent America has
the power and facilities to extend aid to Britain. I would like to know concretely just what your
prognostications in regard to this are.

•1643; dated S9 July; 413: Mot ovaUable; 418, 456, 4g7, 619, 638, 639, 669j 716, iifit trsuelated.

No. 601

Berlin
TO: Tokyo

Strictly Secret.

The same gentleman whom I quoted in my #540° told-IRi the iollowill§ with

regard to the general European question:

"1. CHANCELLOB .HBErLER had convmiations with DARLAN ia l^tesgaden which
were conducted in a most amiable atmosphere, HITLER was well impressed by DARLAN.
1 do not linow but what in the future policies with regard to France will center around DARLAN
rather than LAVAL. The France -German talks cO«®fed;4he use of French colonies as German
military bases and the use ol the French Navy for convoying French shipping. Syria is a great
j^blem but in the event of American participation in the war Dakar will assume a much
•gieater importance. {According to a special report, it is rumored that already German troops
have landed even in Algeria.) WEYG.4N1^, too, is aware of this. This, of coiirse^ is an unofficial
report but on the surface at least there is nothing to contradict it.

"2. The Soviet michangingly has been faithfully carrying out her supply of goods. Further-
more, in certain quarters she has withdrawn her troops from the border but whether this is in
anticipation of war or with the intention of avoiding war, is not clear. The preparations of the
German authorities are progressing on schedule but in truth the decision as to whether war
will arise rests entirely with no man other than CHANCELLOR HITLER. However, it is a fact
that it is being said that the Grerman Army is confident that within a few weeks it would be
Able to carry European Russia before it .

"3. The transportation of arms and munitions to Iraq is scheduled to begin soon with the
tacit consent of Turkey. It is thought that the air arm, too, will within a very few days arrive
on the spot. In the event that Turkey's sattitudfe becomes none too pleasing, I do not know but
what Syria might be offered to her.

*'4. Germany has decided that Italy shaU have domination over the eastern Mediterranean.

faaftfe«eiaSi»4 tte ia^sltel^tetoysw pswJatfipte and to^eJjtt«li*^*&!jif^'p^

May 14,
#54L

A-308

THE 'MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

under the Italian sphere of influence. At the same time that Germany Off tfee one hand. grants

Italy a sphere of influence over the eastern Mediterranean, on the other hand she is restraining
demands upon the French which already are making for joint German -French collaboration."

"The person to whom this message refers is spoken of in message #540 as "'a certain authoritative German."
See 11,519.

Trana. 5-14-41

IROM: Tokyo May 20, 1941

TO: Berne 4

With reference to your regular communication #48°, please report if there is any activity
concerning the exehsi^ #iaal^ifeiii®o#l Bt^M^^B^ to ^Semaii commerce.

'Nut available.

No. 603

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa) May 13, 1941

TO: Tokyo ( Gaimudaijin) # 76 CommeEce;

Regai5^&^3Mii<^mffii«rcev^«^]w # , ^ , ,

Hiruga stated confidentially to Miyakawa as follows:

"When the Economic Agreement (with Germany) was entered into on Septemher 28, 1939,
U.S.S.R. invMsi' Gt^^^ % trahspoet goods through U,B.S-R. as much as she please and
made absolutely no other commitments. At that time, there was no talk about what should be
done about war materials, which indeed was very unfortunate. We have in previous times
prohibited the importation and transportation of war materiSft, hut regarding the present
restrictions we have received inquiries from Berlin, However, excepting the item list 4,
we have done nothing more than to draw up more detailed hst. The item list 4 is a new list,
and because of its importance I have asked MIKOYAN about it. According to him, all the
machine tools and other machinery on the prohibition list are of special type which can be used
for making arms, bombs and planes. Therefore, we informed Berlin to that eil'ecT and are
awaiting instructions."

When Miyakawa asked whether an exception can't be made in this particular case, Hiruga
replied that he had nothing to say on thai point.

Trans. 5-19-41

A-309

FROM: Tokyo May 19, 1941

TO: Berlin i^419.

Re your #535".

Obtain German opinion of the following points:

{1) Since U.S.S.R, will not accept transit goods consigned to destinations other than those
countries which have a transit agreei^^l^ Ru^a; 'il0V(^^^fl^T0^e^S^I^ 0^^^ 88 if
to Germany which will then forward.

(2) Pay freight in free German marks for goods shipped thnftU^'^cUpied territory.

'Not available.

Trans. 6-20-41

No.eos ■

WmU *fi^ May 22.1941

•^:.» Berne #47.

On March 17th, there was published a Soviet- Swiss commercial pact and it would appear
that there was appended thereto a clause concerning the transit of Swiss goods through the
Soviet. On March 12th, the Soviet issued an order to forestall the transit through Russia of the
goods mentioned in my #48° and #49°. It looks as though this was designed to keep us from
getting military machines and pertinent manufacturing tools. We are ,iip^ conferring about this
and would like to know whether m tiitt it is true that the Sovi«t e^tcMia^ keep us from
procuring arms and machinery from Switzerland by land routes. Please conduct a fwiva^
investigation and wire me back as soon as possible.

"Not available.

Trans. 5-24-41

FROM: Berlin June 7, 1941

TO: Tokyo #654.

To Chief of Commerce Bureau from Matusima.

With German and Soviet relations becoming increasingly bad, it will soon be impossible to
impoirt goods from Germany via Siberia.

Trans. ##41

A-310

THE "MAGIC BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. fi07

FROM: Berlin June 18, 1941

TO: Tokyo #712.

I have been for some time informing the German Government of our desire that trade be
opened between the unoccupied territories and Japan. To this, that government has replied
by inquiring what- we think of its suggestion that we add to the terms of the recently concluded
Japan-Soviet Trade Pact others which would make possible transit of goods through Soviet
territories to and from Third-Power countries (including the unoccupied territories) in addition
to Germany.

Will ^ou pleas^rj^scua me whether such terms have been included?

' Trans. 6-20-41

No. 608

FROM: Hsinking June 17, 1941

TO: Moscow #64.

Action Tokyo as #339.

Regarding my #236, Paragraph {2):'

No formal arrangement with the Soviet is necessary to reopen courier service between
Manchukuo and Europe except the requirement of visas. Hereafter, we wish to send couriers,
on the average of once in two months. Komura and Oki will be sent according to th^ following
schedule: ' . •

23 June, leave Manchuli; 29 June, Moscow; 1 July, arrive Berlin; 7 July, arrive Rome.

On return trip they will Stay one or two days in Moscow.

"Not available.

Trans. 6-19-41

No. f)09

FROM: Moscow May 15, 1941

TO; Tokyo

(Abstract)

Japanese Ambassador requested Molotov to explain the rumor that war threatens between
the U.S.S.R. and Germany, as should such a war take place, Japan will be placed in an
embarrassing situation as she is a party to the Tripartite Pact and at the same time is a party
to the Soviet- Japanese Neutrality Pact, The only course for her, in such an eventuality, would
be to act as a mediator. Molotov assured the Japanese Ambassiader tliat the Snxaor is wit&op.t
foundation and it was designed to discredit the Tripartite Pact.

Trans, 6-20-41

FROM: Tokyo May 17, 1941

TO] Washington #1058.

{Circular.} Message from Moscow #596 on May 16th,

{Parti of 2.)

That within the near iuture Germany will wage war upon the Soviet is not more than a
groundless rumor. Because the German officialdom, particularly the mihtary group, is
indulging in strong and sensationalistic propaganda, the situation has taken an exceedingly
critical turn. Though it would seem on the one hand that the Soviet was making great defensive
preparations along the western border, in view of their unprecedented calm, I cannot view these
indications as pointing toward the German contention, but whichever is true, as there are some
perplexing developments, I called upcai MOLOTOV the day aad ^^low Imn expressing
my opinion with regard to them:

1. Germany has some 140 t# 1^0 divisions and the So^^ iiiifjyi$%':MS'eUvision5 concentrated
«ai the western border. However, should it become necessary, Germany could still further
jfeinforce these troops with picked mobile troops which, compared with the Russian forces,
are much superior. Over and above that, Soviet forces traditionally have feared the German
army and, though they feel that they could carry on a defensive war, with considerable
strength, they do not consider that they have much chance of winning.

2. Therefore, though the Soviet will sacrifice much, she ia following a policy I imagine which
has for its aim the avoidance of a frontal clash with Germany. At the same time, in order to over-
come this disparity in military strength, she is concentrating her total strength in order to
build up large quantities and improve her military equipment and is therefore, hurriedly
attempting to secure essential military resources. Then, too, in spite of the fact that recent
Balkan developments were not to the isvm sf Soviet policy and her railroad facilities are

Tjans, 5-19-41

FROM: Tokyo May 17, 1941

TO: Washington # 1Q58.

(Circular.) Meaasfe %oin Moscow #506 on May 16th.

(Part 2 of 2.)

3. The German Army is well able to overthrow the Soviet Army. However, it is hard to be-
lieve that she could conclude operations against Russia within a period of two months as is
being reported frequently these days. Doubtless within two months she could break through the
first line and possibly might be able to occupy the Ukraine within that time, but I do not
believe that she can within this period completely annihilate the whole army. Not only would
this be difficult from a point of view of military geography, hut the Soviet Army would avoid
fighting a decisive battle and would rather follow an evasive stratef(y. Should this be done,
however, there is no escaping the fact that Germany will deal a terrific blow, and in any case
situations within occupied areas being so confused would make it vei^ diificult for Germany
to s@cu£t jiroducts of that land. Ther^ore, I psnnot s^e the «(iVAQ$^ £bf Gi^Epai^ t» do

A-312

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL tiAiibOR

this, inasmuch as at the present time through peaceful negdtiationB ahe is securing the natural

resources she wants.

4. Germany, already having concluded her Balkan campaign, is continuing her military
efforts in the Near East and, therefore, it is necessary that she prevent the Soviet from inter-
fering. Then again, in the event that war developed on an ever -expanding basis and she were
forced to hold out against England and the United States, there would be no other way but that
she depend more than ever upon the essential military and food resources of the Soviet, as
well as those tropical military resources from the Far East. Her success or failure in this event
would be a question of life and death; therefore, the essential course of the future will be for
her to demand more not only of Russian petroleum and grains but also iron ore and other heavy
industry raw materials. In such an event, should the Soviet not comply, as a final resort she
might wage war, but for the time being she is following a policy which has for its aim a show of
po^er and for that reason she has large concentrations of German troops on the Soviet border.
That is why, too, I believe that she, regardless of the attitude the Soviet takes, is loudly pro-
claiming in propaganda that she will fight the Soviet at the drop of a hat.

5. In summing this all up, as long as the Soviet does not radically change her attitude toward
Geraoany* I do not think that there will be a frontal clash between the armed forces of the two
CotWtifies, On the one hand, though STALIN will follow a course of cooperation, and because
he is being more or less forced to do so, 1 do not see any chance in the near Jtoture of a m&jm
war developing between Germany and the Soviet.

6. In the event of a world conflagration, a German-Soviet clash will occur when the Soviet
lines up with England and America. Because such a situation would be most diBadvahtag^tius
to OTur country, we must do our best to take measures to prevent it.

Relayed to Berlin, Rome, London, Vichy and Ankara. Relay to Washington, Manchukto
and Nanking.

Trans.

No. 612

FROM: Rome (HoriteW) May 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo #314.

1 have received an intelligence from a Vatican source that the Pope not long ago instructed
the Apostolie Delates in tM: *«rilS08 to gather information of the attitude of the

Soviet. Summing up the reports which came in, it appears that just as when Germany
succeeded in the Balkans, Moscow renounced the special rights of the diplomatic envoys of
lilj^a^t ¥ap«te^%sfti) E^te«rie, she is now still being carried along on the wave of German
successes and her relations with London and Washington are getting worse and worse. Tokyo's
neutrality treaty with Moscow angered the United States and Germany's superior position
in thfi Balkans was a threat to STg^MSfi^lTherefore, Moscow had, as she saw it, no alternative but
to tie up with Japan and Germany, as well as establish relations with the pro-Nazis govern-
ment of Iraq. In connection with the latter point, it appears that the question of the Soviet's
ti^ t©esjstiinCei^4%|l i|6ii^ by Japan mA Wm&w.

'Traas. 5-28-41

A-313

No. 613

FROM: Berlin (Osima) June 18, 1941

TO: Tokyo #717,

Re your 4 1260".

I don't know how the German authorities view tlte matter, but I am giving below mf fl^l^
opimoti. . • • • .

1. In hopes of not giving Germany any excuse for attacking her. Soviet Russia is at present
Pelraining even from general mobilization. Therefore, I believe that she would not attempt to
influence Great Bfitairi and the United States before she enters the war, '

2. The coming German-Soviet War, I believe, will end in a short time and, therefore, there
would be no time for Great Britain and the United States to give her any concrete aid, nor
would there be any time for concluding a political agreement, -• • -

3. Great Britain would, no doubt, endeavor to get more aid from the United States and to
influence Japan to withdraw from the three-power alliance by taking this opportunity of point-
ing out in her propaganda how untrustworthy Germany is for having violated the German-
Soviet non-aggression pact. She, however, would give Soviet Russia no more than lip service.

4. As to the United States, she will at first wait to see what would happen, and if in the
meantime it becomes evident that Soviet Russia is being defeated, she will not give Russia
any aid. The question then would be the increaite 6f aid to Britain aloAg iii'^i^iflCfilidA &
anti-German public opinion. However, with the defeat of Soviet Russia, this would probab%
pass as a mere temporary phenomenom, and this would lead her to forego her plans of joiniii^
the war.

"Jn whiet "Bakyo asks tor information regarding the thrtatened Oeiman-Soviet rupture and the possibility iil Kvents
foUowing tib^ i^OUl^ o£ German- Soviet war, Soviet-British allisito% Ainerican-Soviet rapprochement and finally the

fHOM: Rome May 30, 1941

TO: Moscow Nonumbear.

To Tokyo as # 332.

According to information which we have at hand, NWGURO", eminent in CathoUc press
circles, told our source confidentially: "German-Soviet relations have reached a pass of ex-
treme tension. Though the Soviet is maintaining a tranquil attitude, Germany is not at all
satisfied and will shortly wage war against the Soviet. Germany in her war against the Soviet
will win great successive battles. The focal questions of the current European war will become
an offensive against the Soviet. I expect a compromising atmosphere will be taken by Ger-
many toward England and America."

Furthermore, an exceptionally well-informed newspaperman in Germany is understood tft
bave said that hostilities with the Soviet will start about June 15th.

A-314

THE "MAaiC" BACKGROUND OF PEAEL HARBCgi'

Most especially here there are many who helieve that Germatiy will hold off her war against
England and immediately enter into hostilities against the Saviet, They further expect that
the gctt^tViU take, ti^»|«iX3«ii adt^KiiKat^

Tram. 6-2-41

No.fi 15

FROM: Rome ' June 3, 1941

TO: Tokyo #346.

A special correspondent of the Gionnale dTtalia, resident in Belgrade, Tomaywi by name
returned from a trip to Sofia and reported to Ando" as follows:

1. On the surface it appears that Russian influence has been completely swept out in the
sefctlement of the Yugoslavian question. However, actually the sympathies of the Serbs and the
Croats for the Slavs is as strong as ever and while they have had to submit outwardly to Ger-
man and Italian domination, their inward antipathy is as fierce as ever. Under the German
army's direction the major industries such as mining are being steadily revived, but the
economic situation is in chaos, prices are soaring, and poverty is the order of the day.

2. In the Balkans, there are persistent rumors of an impending Russo-German war. On a
BOTtb bound German armored car, I saw tmbbled the vmde "NACHO Moscow" {Oa to Mos-
cow?).

In the Soviet diplomatic circles in Sofia, the outbreak of a war between Germany and Russia
would be welcomed, and it would be regarded as very fortunate indeed if such a conflict would

lead to the overthrow of the political strength of the Communist Party ' Cmessi^ ^j^-

finished).

'Of the Japanese diplomatic statt.

No. fil6

FROM; Moscow (Tatekawa)
TO: Tal^©iaaiaM##^

(Abstract).

U.S.S.R. demanding more than they expect to get out of the negotiations for trade and
fishery agreements, fearing that the North Sakhalin question may come to naught when the
above agreements are concluded. Japanese Ambassador suggest to home government that
assurance be gi^?!^ ffttfe^eii^' i^isBte. handled separately teller than

next August.

Trans. 5-31-41

May 15, 1941

A-315

No. filT

,1

FROM: Tokyo May 28, 1941

TO: Moscow #537.

Strictly Secret.

Re your #625".

1. Will you please impart this as a personal message from this Foreign Minister to MOLO-
TOV or, if needs be, to STALIN?

a. As stated some time ago in Moscow, although the question of rights and interests in
northern Sakhalin' has been long pending, at latest I intend definitely to settle it this year and
I wish them to put their trust in me.

b. I must make my position of leadership in my country easier because in conducting the
commercial negotiations and the fishing negotiations satisfactorily we will run into some
iftiB^il^fetenial conditions tsoft<SeJiiing rights fi:^<l feterest. I would like as soon as possible to
negotiate along both lines.

2. We have decided to maintain as usual our defenses in the North Seas but I have issued
special instructions for our subjects there to be very careful not to trespass within the terri-
torial waters of the iSoviet nor commit any other act such as those the Soviet has been pro-
testing.

"Not available,

^&Al«i(it#pied jmtitiiy by Russia sod Japan in S.WltHi^Q^SiMti

Trans. 6-4-41

^EekS© June 13, 1941

lie my #560*.

Please advise by return dispatch as to the intentions of the Soviet. Also - that regardless
of whether or not the Soviet approves, the Kaiyo Maru will leave Tokyo on the 15th of June for
the RIYAHOKUSRKII Islands. (If ^1* t»#atfe«f is favorable and conditions permit, we will
have her proceed as im as the SEEBIRtMAYA'' Islands.)

"May be Serbmm33% «i SBttaJbi IfllfllJ^ ©.Ncf. 122, I'm,

p. 271.

'Notaveikble.

Trans. &-IQ-41

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

FROM: Moscow
TO: Tokyo

June 1, 1941
#641,

{In 2 parts — coniptete.)
Secret.

Pursuant to the instruction in your message 537°, I saw Molotov on the 31st. He said that he
had instructed Smetanin on the 28th to see if the trade agreement and fishing rights treaty
could not be completed without further delay. But it has been almost tour months since the
neutrality pact was concluded, and the negotiations should be speeded up. As instructed in the
Foareign Minister's telegram, I asked if there was any reason for not concluding the fisheries
and trade agreements within six months.

There are several reasons for opening the fisheries conference soon. Although the conclusion
tif the neutrality pact was generally welcomed in Japan, the prompt settlement of the trade
and fisheries issues would effectively answ#'litee in Japan who opposed the neutraUtjfl^^it^.
Consequently, I believe it necessary to demonstrate sincerity in those negotiations.

The fisheries question should be settled at once, for the reasons stated above, and especially
for reasons concerning you personally. A recent published statement here blames you for the
delay in negotiations and states that there must be some idtemal conditions in Japan which
are proving troublesome.

The statement continued that usually the first moves in fisheries negotiations are made by
thfi Soviet government, and that you had stated to Smetanin that you wished to end the delay.

Tk stated that TUARAPUKIN and Miyakawa had talked for two and a haU' hours, and that
the same evening Molotov drew up and delivered on May 15th the Soviet government's state-
ment regarding the fisheries question, and tyh#-ttifi^.Ji^nese reply was transaiitted to Foreign
Minister Molotov on May 31st.

More than six months have passed since Foreign Minister Matsuoka's promises regarding
the Sakhalin fisheries question, and it is hoped that compromise can be reached as promptly
as possible, so that the question of our other rights can be taken up.

•In a personal message to Molotov (or Stalin) Matsuoka expresses his desire to deliiiitely settle the question of
rights aad mtet«$ts in Nort&eMi iSafchaJm, See B, ei7.

Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka's personal message:

(1) This Minister reafiirms his desire, previously expressed by him at Moscow, that the
question of negotiations fot mr rights in North Sakhalin be settled within six months flfom the

date of agreement.

(2) As satisfactory conclusion of negotiations for the settlement of the trade treaty and the
fisheries g^eement bears intimate relation to the settlement of the negoUations relative to
lapr afij^J^ |i» .N(«Ftb Sakhalin) which will ia 4j®!a..«u.^^«itia*e ti^ position i»

Tram-6-41^1

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

June 1, 1941
#642.

A-317

liandling delicate domestic problems, he dcKires that (hose negotiations be brought ^0'S^i^»
fjSi&t^ conclusion at once, in accordance with the following:

faj fii connection with the trade o^iStlatl^ns^ ^ 4^^der the Soviet proposal calling for
post payment of freight differentials for goods c&^i^'m land and sea, as totally unsatisfac-
tory. Therefore, the Soviet proposal should be dffieiitrded in favor of the Japanese proposal
which calls for "whenever possible, spot payments shall be made", and the negotiations
should he brought to a speedy end in order to hasten the conclusion of the treaty.

(b ) Itegaiding the fisheries agreement, our proposal of May 14th should be taken as the basis
of negotiations, which should be brought to a satisfactory termination during June in order that
the agreement may be reached and gign^d in the month of August.

Note: SmU,BTI.

Ttans. 6-6-41

No. 621

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa) _ June 1, 1941

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) * #643.

According to Molotov's most recent statement concerning the Russo-Japanese trade nego-
tiations, there ia only one problem to be dealt with which stands in the way of a final settle-
ment, which might be reached next week; I, myself, have in addition to this problem two or
three other points to take up; however, I believe we can reach a solution without any great
Acuity.

The greatest hurdle is the Russian demand that we make up the differential between land
and sea shipping expenses by delivery of commodities; I have given this Soviet request most
careful consideration, and have examined the problem from every angle, but I could not give
a definite promise, due to hesitance on my part to believe that, our government would make
up the whole differential by payment in merchandise as the Soviets wish. 1 explained in detail
that we want to comply with the Russian demand, if we are able to proirure the articles the
Russians want, and on learning this, Molotov announced that if that was thMS^if i^hAiB^wA
it would be possible to find a formula fotf mutual agreement on this matter.

I have furwsifded the revised proposal to Mikoyan already, and I now believe that next week
I can conclude the entire business with the two officials mentioned above.

No. 622

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa) June 5, 1941

TO; NoBumbef.
Negotiations #96 (Part 6 of 6)*,

( ) The exchaiif«^^-tii8«*^i^' t»fii^Jfl!fifii^ of a mutual exchange of

identical documents.

( )■ We accept the Soviet proposals given in my letter dated 16 May 1941, consisting of the
several items after "following understanding". ■ . - .

( ) In regard to subsection (i>, modify my Negotiations ffl#t6^f^-

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOK

Delete "above-mentioned"; and then foHowing "Agreement", insert "concerning exchange
of goods all payments of this date". The Soviet negotiators have strongly advocated the elimi-
nation of "or seem to cease", and we have consented to this elimination, although we gave
several examples showing the necessity for retaioiag it-

( ) ^garding subsection (2) on., the siubject of bank accounts, the Soviet want the following
amendments incorporated: . ^ ^. ..

Before "Agreement," in the middle of the paragraph, add "above-m&igtiM^Ms*«*b*
"concerning" delete everything down to "this date"; delete "foreign" from the phrase "free
foreign cuifencies" appearing in two places; and change "through a Japanese bank", to read
"through the Yoltohama Specie Bank" and at the end change to read "accounts with the ssM-
b§nk".

We strongly urged the substitution of "including" for ''regarding", but they refused to agree
even after we explained fully our reasons and vie-MTJoint. It will, therefore, remain aa it is.

5, List of Trade Goods

The list of articles is to be covered by a new supplement to a Trade Treaty. This list will be
formally signed as a part of the treaty, as I indicated in my separate telegram to Negotiations
message i^97' . The articles are the same as given in my eaaflkr letter #125, except thai p al!-
the end of "List 1" should read "other goods".

Correct the figures to correspond with 4 of my Negotiations message # SI''.

6. The Tables of Trade Goods in the treaty supplement, prepared by the OflSce of Trade
Representatives, will be formally signed in the same manner as the treaty itself.

Furthermore, I shall use my full title as Ambassador in signing*

Note: Quoted parts are English t^t.

•Parts 1 to 5 not available.
'Not available.
'Not available.
*Not available.

Negotiations # 100.

Remyin^otiatiofig #94* and

Please make the following additions and corrections:
1, Trade Agreemcmt
( ) (6) Capitalize the "A" in "the said annex".

( ) (8) Do not \ise "hyphens" between the word "most-favoured-natiott". (Similarly,
eliminate the hyphens where this expression appears in other paragraphs.)

t ) At the end, change capital "U" to small "u" in the word "Undersigned"; change "s"
to "z" in the word "authorised". {Also tnake simile changes where these wfl(rt#l«lfiSl^^^
where).

No. fi23

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa)
•10: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

June 7, 1B41
Nanuiaiber.

A-319

2. Organs to be associated with the Office of Trade Representative.

i ) Capitalize "s" in the expression "Lt'sal StaluH" in the heading.

( ) (3) Remove the comma atter the first parenthetical item beginning with Trade
Representative, and eliminate the remainder (of this sentence). (?)'

In the middle of the second section of this as^W WS^i^ett^hiph ( ) (3), eliminate the
eomma following "the location of the othce",

3. Jurisdiction over assets (md property of the Trade Representative and of temporary
organs.

i ) In the first section correct the expression "and Aqr9X to tUs Aj^eement", to read
'%ndtheAnrifext&?ffife'-i(iBaipeement''. "^^^ - r-i-f - ^ - . • .

( ) "accept, MonsMHiP- — . " should read "I beg you. Monsieur , to accept". (Use

this latter expression in the other correspondence on this subject.)

4. Currency Exchange Arrangements. - -. >^ ■

{ ) (3) Eliminate the commas just t^fioare and after "stipulated in the present Article".
( ) (5) Before the "etc" at the end, ^bWbate the comma,

5. Commerdianhinspoftation. ' •
( ) (1) (HI) Before "the carrying" (garbled).

( ) (2) In the middle of this paragraph eliminate the comma between "the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics" and "and such".

In this same subparagraph capitalize the "g" in "group"* (Make similar changes in
ensuing paragraphs and tables of trade goods.)

( ) (5) (H) Drop "IS^&bm the phrase "tU WmttA) at (B)".

(III l Eliminate the wrad "Group" before "(B)".
( ) (7) (I) After "remain in force", add the word "for".

Note: Quoted items above are in English language.

'Not available.

^Only part 6 of 6 available; See R, 622.
*lWtjteMtincftiii8a«a^i|Le« doubtful; badly garbled.

mm

FBJOU: Hsmkii^ JuneS^mi
TO: #302.

Re your #313".

Agreement reached not to announce anything outside of regarding the duties of the commit-
tee established as a result of the Togo-Moiotov agreement except the material contained in the
joint comunxsl^e.

'Not available.

- (, "IciUBS. 7-1-41

THE "MAGIC ' BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

FROM: H sinking (Umeza) May 20, 1941'

TO: Moscow #36.

Message to Tokyo # 262.

There is going to be a conference opening at Chita on the 27th of May aiid until some under-
standing is reached therein the Army is of the opinion that the wlidl* Tiiiitter lihoUM lire kept
absolutely secret. However, since the Japanese-Sovier Neutrality Pact was concluded already
a month has passed and no definite results from this agreement are apparent, I feel that there
is a tendency throughout the world to make light of 6ur arrangemamt *ith the Soviet, m ftir*
haps it would be a good gesture so far as the United States is concerned for us to briefly publil^
the mere fact that such a conference is to be opened. In any case, if it is your intention to keels
this matter totally secret let me know by return wire because I will have to let Moscow know
about our desires in this connection.

Belayed to Russia,

Trans, 6-4-41

No. fi26

FROM: Hsinking May 22, 1941

TO: Tokyo #268.

The preparations for carrying out the settlement of the Manchurian-Soviet border iMiifle^
ation have been started. Reference is made to my #267°. The protocol of the Manchurian-
Soviet war zone agreement made by the Foreign Office during April of last year should be sent
to the Ambassador in Russia. Please wire if this has been done.

'Not available.

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) JmfB. mi

TO: Vichy *230.

(Part a of 2) (Rteisage froniJ^|il%

The ■■ for the settlement of the border dispute between Manchukuo and Mongolia,

which had been going on in Chita finally resulted in an agreement. It has been decided to

(make public ?) a statement concerning it on the as given in the separate telegram. That

this agreement was so swiftly concluded was due partly to the fact that the relations between
the two countries had tinned for the better because of the conclusion of the Japan-Soviet
neutrality treaty and partly to the fact that the representatives on both sides had endeavored
to compromise in a peaceful spirit. This is for your information. Fo* your reference, I am,
furthermore, sending you the following with regard to this question.

A-321

The work of border demarcation which has been carried on since the Nomohan armistice

( ) by and Outer Mongolia until was disrupted when a certain

technical difficulty was met with (with both Ambassador TOGO and MOLOTOV agreeing,
the border line was drawn upon the map, but their views conflicted when it came to applying
tfceliset^fjie actual situation), and th^ pastier has been allof^f^tojibilidliinaettled.

Trans. fr-gSHtl

No. 628

FROM: Tokyo (MatSUqka)
TO: Vichy

fPart2of2).

Message from Hinking # 328. Message to Washington and Peking as Circular # 103.

More recently, following the conclusion of the Japan- Soviet neutrality treaty between
Ambassador TATEKAWA and MOLOTOV, a conversation was held between these men,
resulting in a decision to resume the negotiations between Manchukuo and Mongolia. On

May representatives of Manchukuo and Mongolia met in Cbita and discussed the details,

technical and , relative to the area in question. On June 10th, both parties came to an

ly^eement, and on the formally signed the agreement. On the coming — - — , the repre-
sentatives will meet again in the area concerned and resume their work of actual demarcation.
When the preliminary work of demarcation shall have been completed (it is expected that it
will be completed by the end of this summer at the latest), the representatis^SMl <9iUi#atl^
again at and will endeavor to arrange a final agreement defining the border.

Will you please transmit this telegram together with the separate message?

Trans. 8-25^1

June 15,1941
#230.

No. 629

FROM; Moscow June 22, 1941

to? Tokyo gimi

Translator Takahashi's observations onliis way to his post were as follows:

A. Trip west.

1. In the following ten stations DARASIJN, Kumasskaya, Chita, PETOROFUSUKIl-
ZARCDO, Ulan Ude, MUlSOWAYA, TANHOI, Nizhnii, Udinsk, YURUGA, UERESIT-
lYAAGINO, a total of ten militaj^ Wmmm^ilitm0fi&il ltmSMt'i»S^M tal^
and water supply trucks and canteens, etc.

2. In the vicinity of PERUMU there was one train loaded with field pieces and ten anti-
aircraft guns.

3. In the vicinity of KUBOfU there was One traun loaded with a few armoured tru^
and amphibian tanks,

B. Trip east,

1» hk.^B^^vkig^ M Nizhnii Udinsk there was one train loaded with about 12,200 ton.

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

2. In the vicinity o|i§yi}|^TlYA th^e were two trains loaded with about 10 howitiiers
and military trucks, efce^

Trans. 7-7-41-

No.(t30

FROM: Hsinking June 10, 1941

TO: Moscow #54.

(To Tokyo as #320.)

Re my # 309.

I understand that while Vice Consul AGATA was traveUng from Chita to ManchuU he saw
27 armored trains cariying in all 800 trucks. This is too large a number of trucks to be trans-
ported even in time of nianeuvers. In view of the present intmjaticmal situation 1^ if a
phenomenon which deserves our close attention.

'Not available.

- • Trans. 6-13-41

No. *i31

FROM: Tokyo June 16, 1941

TCh • ' ' iyf6»g0W No Number.

Commerce #151.

Secret outside the Department.

Will you get an'i^ement from the Soviet Government to the effect that they also would
not publish the following three diplomatic notes:

1. Letters pertaining to temporary attachment of property and to property.

2. Letters concerning mutual establishment of trade representatives.

3. Letters pertaining to the first paragraph of the agreement.

(The contents of these three lettfflfS will be known only to the Foreign Office of our govern-
ment and wUl n^&tf»itei^|©1fc#JMi^<So6i»ca^

Trans. 0-19-41

No. 632

FROM: Moscow June 17, 1941

TO: Tokyo No Numbw.

1. We have mentioned the matter of revising your Commercial # 148" and # 149°, paragraph
2, (paragraph 1 has aheady been revised), to the other party. They are of the same opmion and we
desire to have the revision which they htt^ agreed, signed.

A-323

• • *

I

2. Re your Commercial # 151*. It has been agreed not to make official annouQcement
regarding any of the "confidential" documents (connected with these negotiations) .

"Not available,
'Seell,6ai.

Trans. 6-2-41

FROM, Tokyo June 9,1341

TO: Moscow ^^^^

Re your #668°.

While recognizing that this is a special occasion, we are rather reluctant regarding the
matter of a Soviet aeroplane entering Japan. Therefore, we will have a civilian plane fly to
Vladivostok to meet it on the morning of the 9th. The Russian Ambassador concurred in this.
So during the day (the 9th) we will have a plane of the Manchurian Company fly to Vladivostok
and bring the two Soviet doctors and their attendant. They will travel without visas.

Please relay tliis i(4lit jfe^ ja^age to Manchuria and Vladivostok.

•Notftvailabfe.

FROM: Rome May 27, 1941

TO: Tokyo #317.

On the 27th, ANDO dined with the First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, KURAJENKOKJ.
On that occasion, ANDO asked whether there was any truth to the rumor that Germany has
iCsoncluded an agreement with the U.S.S.R. for joint exploitation of the Ukraine. The First
Secretary categorically denied the existence of such an agreement and said that, in his
Germany a]:^lfae%:Fia;aR;.wiU ii^^ <»

Trans. 5-28-^

No. 835

FROM: Rome(Giappone) June 5, 1941

TO: Moscow (Koshi) No Number.

Action Tokyo as # 355.

(Abstract)

According to reliable sources in Italian diplomatic cu-cles, Italy f^iees to conclude a trade
a^eement with l^isia ■wKeft^y ffeHtea ^t^iaic a|*f^tafie^ nHraM fee ©scfibanged "bartered" for

Russian raw mati;rijilB.

As soon as the Italians have a definite proposal they plan to send a mission to Moscow headed

Trans. 6-21-41

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

WOU: Sofia (feumi) June 6, 1941

TO: Tokyo #89,

(Part 1 of 3)

Kepattst.

1. the following are the demands made by Germany on Soviet Russia about the — :

(1) To return to Rumania a section of Bukovina which includes Tie nouibu" and which is

situated in the interior of Bessarabia inhabited now by Rumanians: (2) To reconsider the
Gerin an -Russian borderline in Galicia (to return to the Gcrmtm sphere of influence two-thirds
of this region, including Dorohouiti' and Ru — fu"): (3) To allow German experts to enter the
Ukraine so that Germany may be sure of securing raw materials: {4) To grant Germany the
right to pass throufjh B — mu'', Caucasus and, if necessary, Rikaihi", so that Germany may
send her troops by way ol the Black Sea into Arabia and Iraq.

2. That Qmmsm ^ not refefred to etiii^'1i^i^i^^%^ deMatids may be Int^'^f^^ti^ to
be more or less a compromise on her part. The second demand may be interpreted thusi
a. The abolition ot the natural boundary; 6. Transference to the Ukraine after the war .1^;
^tsania oflii^fSeTOreigntr^?) of thatMg^iiai^^

The third demand means rhe infiltration of fifth columnists into the Ukraine.

The fourth demand signified forcing Russia to forego her ambitions in Central Asia.

' ' 'Kana spellings ('Probably Doiohoi in northern Rumania)

Trans. 6-14-41

No. fi37

FROM: Sofia (Izumi) Jwe, 19*1

TO; Tokyo #89.

(Part 2 of 3.)

3. If Russia accepts this, the prestige of the Red Array will be shattered: STALIN'S
position may totter; and the present regime may break up. But even if it does not, the
I>08sibility is quite great that the anti-STALIN win&of the Red Army may stage a coup d'etat.
On the other hand, it appears that it is fte^l^B^ or fight, so ycxi tiii see how Russia is
menaced both from within and from without by an u^ent crisis.

4. (1) If Germany fights, I believe that she can defeat Russia in two or three weeks, but I do
not believe that after all Germany has any territorial designs. All she wants is to overthrow the
present government and substitute a pro-German regime.

(2) German diplomatic quarters are now apparently considering that the prospects are
not bad for peace. However, the army is bringing pressure to bear upon RIBBENTROP and
his associates demanding a showdown between Germany and Russia, and demanding to
know whether or not Russian Bolshevism, ao hostile to everything German, can co-exist with
theBeich.

Trans. 6-19-41

A~325

No. 638

TO: Tdk^' #89.
(Part 3 of 3.)

(3) Some say that all HITLER is doing is trying, even at the risk of war, to bring Russia
fipally into the Tripartite Alliance. Well, we shall know what is what within two weeks as a result
^theiiegotiations between the two countries.

5. (1) On May ^^Ist, the German Army demanded the mobilization of the (Bulgarian) forces.

(2) The Russian Minister in Belgrade recently warned Russian families in Central
Europe to go back home (the Minister in Sofia sent his family home the last of April.)

(3) Among the five places on the German-Soviet border, there J^e^fs^ two which are
a^acting much attention; namely, Pusiemisuru" and Marukinka".

t #£ak that you already know about these demands of Germany on the Soviet. However, I
thought I had better let you know hqw it Iwdss Smm haft;. , ,

*Kana spelling.

No. 639

IftOlilfc Mmm-i^tixkm^ June7,X94l
TO: TcfejfSiliSBimudaijin)

In mmmmg up the various information at hand, Germany is preparing to ma^ -^tshi
iaaportant demands on Russia, which will be backed up by threat of resorting to force.

In view of Japan's relation to Germany through the Tripartite Pact and also her relation to
Russia through the Neutrality Pact, I feel that it is incumbent on Japan to effect a delay in the
crisis by intervention, and to urge Russia to either join the Axis or collaborate closely with the
anti-British, anti-United States groups.

However, in the event that Germany submits her demands to Russi||x4lQ^&SPL.||^I(}'1i?£Q^'
Russia in a friendly manner to accept the demands, in order to avoid war.

That this course is consistent «aa %e walfe«fa it{ii i^|8ft»tW^ had with Stalin.

Please send me instnw^<ais as, S0On p feeW*,R^f^»«4 cte^i^ fc? •warning
note mentioned above.

Trans. 6-10-41

No. (>40

FROM: Rome June 14, 1941

TO; Ankara No Number.

Message to Tokyo as #373.

(Part 2 of 2.)

Afi long as Germany's military superiority over the Soviet is undisputed, we should main-
'l^)^.f@r«,JE^ii0 jE^t: least, a neutral attitude. Waiting vgM^ %f^ mmm Mt ^

A-326

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

ttoops into the west, in order that the peace of East Asia might be guaranteed, we then should
present the Soviet with demands for the removal of her Far Eastern territorial troops as well
as other pertinent requests. In the event she does not comply, we should then by force of
arms proceed to occupy strategic cosstal points in northern Karafuto*. It would be wise
for us to prevent this area from becoming a base of operations for Britain and America in their
aiding the Soviet, In the prosecution of this. Far Eastern Soviet should be granted its in-
dependence under the sovereignty of the empire and in the capacity of an independent
nation it shrmld function, as a matter of course, as hut one mng of the great East Asian
co-prosperity sphere of influence.

5, Germany's attack against the Soviet inevitably will throw the Soviet into active coopera-
tion with England and America. Britain and the United States' aid to the Soviet is but a
matter of course. Should we at too early a date, take the offensive against the Soviet, then at
the same time that the United States joins in the war against the Axis, we would find ourselves
drawn into a war with the United States. In this connection, if the empire, from the point of
view of economy as well as militarily speaking, has made sufhcient preparations, there is no
reason why we should avoid, in the final analysis, waging a war on two fronts. However, if our
preparation has been insufficient, we must take measures so that we will not be snared into
such a trap. Therefore, as a matter of expediency, we should do our utmost to lead the Soviet
and Germany into cooperation in the Tripartite alliance, and it is my firm belief that our best
plan would be to endeavor to bring about victory in the China .incident to put ^t|>lam for
the south seas on a more practical and stronger basis.

"Part 1 of 2 not available.

'^Sis^i^^i^m^fi&^fi^Mm^m^^mA i«t Okkitsk Sea.

TratiB. 6-17-41

N«.fi41

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa) June?, 1^41

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #667.

The German Ambassador called on me on the 7th and said there were rumors afloat to the
effect that Molotov was to visit Tokyo. He inquired as to whether there was any truth in these
rumors. I told him that I remembered that on the occasion of Matsuoka's visit here, Matsmka.
had said to Molotov: "If you come to Tokyo, we will give you a great welcome.**

However, Matsuoka said this merely as a matter of form, but that recently a Tokyo newspaper
had printed this as though there might be some truth in it, and that the above-mentioned rumor
had perhaps grown out of that incident.

I took tjie Occasion to tell him that Russo- German relations looked father "alaimiag", and
asked him about the state of affairs. His reply is in general aa follows:

1. He has heard nothing directly from his government.

2. Opinion among the many Germans coming from Germany seemed about ev&nly divided
between an outbreak of hostilities this year and the opinion that such a thing could not happen.

3. Should not the Soviet authorities know more about such things than we do, and yet there
do not appear to be any ii3i^i^£!i^#lm

A-327

4,' thought that in the main, the Soviet had acceded to Germany's requests, and that their
accompUsten^nt was proceeding smoothly; hence, there was no reason for Germany's
attacking Btsi^. ' • - - '

.No. M2

FROM: Ankara June 18, 1941

T0i Moscow # 113.

On the 17th a member of the German Embassy here spoke confidentially to KINOSITA" to
the effect that Germany was at present pressing extensive demands upon Soviet Russia and that
if Soviet Russia compHes with most of the demands, all will be well, but if she does not,
there will be war. This question is expected to be settled within the next ten days. I am sending

No. US

FROM: Berlin June 5, 1941

TO: Tokyo #635.

In response to a request from Foreign Minister RiBBENTROP, 1 went to Salzburg on the 3rd
and had an interview with him from 4 to 5:30 p.m. in FUSIRU, and from 7 to 8 p.m., both
had a conversation with HITLER". Again on the 4th from 11 a.m. on, I had an m^iCy^lf.
RIBBENTROP for more than an hour.* Details in a separate telegram.

'Available.

'Available, Seen, 646.

Trans.

No. 644

FROM: Berlin (Osima) June 4, 1941

TO: Tokyo #635.

At the request of Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP I flew to Salzburg on the 3rd and had an
interview with him from 4:00 p.m. until 5:30 at Fugiru. From 7:00 until 8:00 in the evening
he and I had a meeting with HITLER. I again had an interview which lasted more than s^ligsufj
with RIBBENTROP on the 4th from 11:00 a.m. Details are sent by telegram separately.

Trans. 6~7-4X

A-328

THE "3VIAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. (US

FROM: Berlin (Osima)
TO: Tokyo

June 4, 1941
#636.

Re my #635".

1. Both mea teU me t,hat in every probability war with Russia cannot be avoided*

2. I -mm «Mfti'^'*ii^^^e^saiir ^'*gif «t8«m«M^; MSsiB^ srf^ gravest seei^,
so please keep the ctaitetits of thetefegtam absolutely to yoBrsfelf.

•OSIMA wires MATSUOKA that he intecviewed HTTLBB and MBBErFTBOP (m the $rd aod is wkiae the details

separatelv. See II, 643.

See II bei ^Se^.j^^i»Jii^{^|£^ Miie^ the d^taib ot hia taterview witb mn£R and JOB-

BENTROP.

(Part 1 of ?} Part 1 only available.

The following are the salient points brought up by Foreign Minister Ribbentrop:

1. Soviet-German rclationK have becoine exceedingly bad of late, considerably increasing
the possibility of war between them. However, it cannot be said that war is a certainty. As
was stated earlier, if war &ism l»eak mi, Q^tmmy fe odajfideftt that the campaa^ wSOt b«
completed wihtin a period of two to three months. Ribbentrop asked that I place complete
confidence in his words, pointing out the fact that since the beginning of the Polish campaign,
everything he said would happen did, in actuality, come to pass.

I asked him when the war would begin, if it were to take place. He repHed that the time for the
outbreak was as yet undecided. However, he added that if we had to make any preparations
for that occasion, he urges us to complete them as soon as po^ible.

2. Although there are many rumors to the effect that negotiations are being conducted be-
tween the Soviet Union and Germany, Ribbentrop says that such rumors are absolutely
groundless. Gerriiati^.& i^ii^fettlitSllif Moreover, Germany has completed afl-Of
her preparations an^l'ISO^.^^centrations along her e^t«m bordra. The Soviet lirnon has also
massed troops along h^:^4fe til the border, he said.

3. While we wete on this subject, I said that on the surface it would seem (not?) wise to take
on the Soviet Union as an enemy, too, in view of the fact that the main German objective
is to attack England. 1 asked if there were some circumstances which made this war unavoid-
able.

Ribbentrop replied that the attitude of the Soviet Union of late was becoming increasingly
unfriendly toward Germany. Very recently, he added, there was even an armed border clash
between the two forces at the mouth of the Danube. It is evident that the Soviet Unioti is
waiting for Germany to fail.

As far as Germany is concerned, the Foreign Minister continued, she has ample confidence
in the war against Engl^efd* Bfowefpe** Sl)i6 ipannot overlook an outside possibility of an unlotA^
for revieiBal. ShoaM B^net Uhien he fougfat jiow, Gfarmai^r ^vss comptete and

Trans. 6-11-41

No. B46

FROM: Berlm
TO: ToJ^o

June 4, 1941
#638.

undisputable control of the entire European continent. Under those circumstances, it will bg
absolutely impossible for Great Britain and the United States, regardless of what they may
attempt, to lay a hand on Germany. In other words, even from the viewpoint of her war
against England, it is imperative that the Soviet Union be beaten down now,

4. I inquired what would have become of the Stalin regime if Germany did smash the Soviet
army. Ribbentrop replied that frankly, he could not say. However, one could be assured
ctf the fact that under those citcumstances the Soviet Union could not long wield any weight
politically. It is Germany's intention to bring about splits in the Soviet Union itself. He
further said that he does not doubt for a moment that such a condition in the Soviet Union
would considerably raihance Japan's position in the Far East. •

Trans. 6-6-41

No. 647

F^M: Berlui (Osima)
TO: a?f»l^

To Vice Minister OHASHI:

For the time being, I think it would be a good idea for you, in some inconspicuous manner,
to postpone the departure of Japanese citizens for Europe via Siberia. You will understand
why. ■■ I .•

Trans. 6-11-41

Jui«6.lS4f
#646.

No. (548

FROM: Berlin (Osima) Jun^ 12, 1941

TO: Tokyo , Mi*..

RIBBENTROP' S man has brought me a reliable report to the effect that three or four days
ago the German Ambassador in Tokyo was ordered to atop Germans froas rtturntiig to Germany
by way of Siberia because of a grave situation. ^ - - - - -

Trans, 6-14-41

No. 649

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 14, 1941

TO: Berlin #517.

We have several reports that Berlin has demanded of Moscow certain agricultural and mineral
rights at least in the Ukraine. Now I want you to go to VON RIBBENTROP and report the
following in my own words:

"If any diplomatic negotiations have already begun between Germany and the Soviet,
we have as yet not heard what the nature of these negotiations is. If Germany is already
carrying on any such negotiations or intends to do so, could you npt let me know what it is

A-330

1^**li*GIC" BACKGROL sD uir 1 tAKL HARBOR

I even understand that Germany and the Soviet are already negotiating, and that the
Soviet is making some counter-demands of Germany, H you can fifld out anything about this,
please wire me back imm^dia^b^l^.

Trans. 6-16-41

No, 650

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 14, 1941

TO: Rome #156.

We have several reports to the effect that it appears that the German Government has
probably already presented the Kremlin with some demands on the Ukraine, etc. We also hear
that the Soviet has also presented Germany with some demands and that negotiations have
been opened. Please try to find out anything you can about this and wire me back immediately.

*-..». » . - . . Trans- 6-'16~41

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 20, 1941

TO: Berlin #539.

Today Domei reports from Berlin that Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP has just had an
important conversation with the Russian Ambassador, and we are inclined to believe that thii
is so. WiU yim pl]»|0tl^,#&ii^^

'^mi' 6-23-41

No. 652

FROM: Berlin (©fiilBt) June2Q,^gl^

TO: Tokyo f 1E3§^

Re your #539°.

Today, the 20th, I called on Foreign Minister VON RIBBENTROP, and he made the follow-
ing statement:

"I have held absolutely no conversations with Russian Ambassador DEGANOV(b) recently.
Two or three days ago he called on Vice-Minister WEIZSAECKER relative to matters of
ordinary business. —— It was erroneously thought he had called on me. Just as I told you some
days ago with regard to German-Soviet relations, up to now we have conducted positively no
negotiations with the Russian authorities and, in addition, to the best of my opinion,, we have
absolutely no intention of carrying on any such negotiations with them in the future."

"Russian Ambassador to Berlin.

Traia. 6-23-41

A-331

TO: Moscow M#Kt%bw.
Iteceived&om London as #435.
^Ain^fmii^ddly garbled.)

1. Ambassador Cripps returned on the 11th. In ft-eipversation with the Vice Minister on the
12th, he stated that the Ambassador believes a Soviet^^nian war possible but that the army
and S^ttt8:-ia^i^i^#t)sed and that Stalin will not consent. T^e lafadpal Getman desires are oil,
food and ccantXcd iSf^OiAmUBiif^tions in the Black Sea region.

In a speech on the 1st, Prime Minister Churchill stated that a Soviet-German war is in-
evitable.

2. As in the case of Turkey, an Asiatic- European rapprochement, at least on Anglo-
Russian oil, is possible since Britain is fighting countries constituting a menace to Kussia.
Russia would make her pairtai:a|i*£flMi in a fjesce tt^^gm^ me^itk&l upon acceptance of lier
demands.

3. The general view here is that German- Soviet hostilities are inevitable to prevent in-
creasing todrclement of IHteiflia ia ^elffln asad Afj^eHiifltefi J«|!^oSis ftfid s (5e!i^M "i3t^^

of Turkey.

4. Ambassador Cripps' mission did not materially improve Anglo-Soviet relation^.
dievelopmmt of German-Soviet Illations ig lw^^fe^

Trans. 6-19-41

No. 654
FROM:

Moscow

June 16, 1941

^Partl0f2r.

Beym»«^*. ' *

When on the 13th, I spoke to HIRUGAA on this question, he said that insofar as the Embassy
here is concerned, it knew nothing of it. In compliance with your instruction, again on the
leth, I had MIYAKAWA question him for over an hour, but it seems that the matter in question
has not yet taken place.

MIYAKAWA asked, "Judging from the manner in which denials were published by the Tass'
on the 13th regarding the question of Russo-German relations (for the text please refer t9
Domei reports), did not the Soviet (^miwntmmp^lSBiS^'&amii^ to reciptocste

by issuing denials?"

To this HIRUGAA — - t^^t JIwO'QS three days following the publication on May 25t^jrf#*i

article in the Pravda (deaMT^ iii& l

"Part 2 of 2, in which "HI" tells MIYAKAWA that&oittstru<AlQ6s hadlbeeflgiveiltby tbe Ch>vei9M*litfi9!r3]i«inlms<^

the Diplomatic Corps to return home. See II, 655.

'Not Bvailable,

'Official Russian News agency.

Tmns- 6-27-41

A-332

THE ■■MAGIC " BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

FROM: MoscoOF Junel^S^'
TO: Tokyo #708.

(Part 2 of 2)".

Through MIYAKAWA^ he ^id to "HT** that it appeared strange that the members of the

diplomatic corps, steps (garbled) were returning to Germany. "HI" said

that this was principally due to family reasons and that there were a few who had returned be-
cause of various rumors circulating among the members of the Knibassy? (Consulate?) and
that no instructions had been given by the government as t6 Whether they should return or
not. MIYAKAWA said that the impressions received from Berlin, here'' and from "HI" were
conflicting. Japan, as an ally, was immobilizing the British East Asia fleet and was working to
prevent the United States &om entering the war and that this was not a particularly satisfactory
condition. "HI" then stated that as far as this place'' was concerned, no instructions or informa-
tion had been received. The concentration in the border region was merely a measure in case
something should happen in respect to a neighboring country whose cunning intentions were
only expressed by fotce, and would it really be efficient to go only half way in carrying out siieh
a restraint?

There is nothing unusual in the conditions of the German Embassy here.

■Seen,

*Kir3t Secretary, Japanese Embassy, Moscow.

'Translator's Note: In message # 709, the person referred to as "HITLER", appeared in the text as "HI", which ie
the usual abbreviated designation for ''HTTL^^,. M^iM^,. ^ 4^ ^odleAte tb«t WIW^ ii Wt tiie

pftrsonnfeiied to in that message. See Q, 656.

*MQ8eow,

Trans. 6-21-41

FTIOM: Moscow

TO: Tokyo #700.

Strictly secret,

Be my #708".

When MIYAKAWA' probed the Italian intelligence Officer on the 16th, that office is under-
stood to have said: "In view of the deep-rooted rumor that a German- Soviet conflict would
shortly b^in, the Italian Blmbassy roughly one week ago wired its Home Government for in-
structions. No reply wire has as yet been forthcoming. Yesterday, the 15th, the ItaHan Ambassa-
dor questioned the German Ambassador concerning the evacuation of iamilies of members of
the Grerman Embassy staff." It is understock- itisMit the German Ambassador gave the same
explanation as 1 reported "HITLER" to have given in my wire. He continued his confi-
dential remarks by saying; "In order to take the responsibility for the female members of the
staff, the Italian AmbasMdor, ia acrardance with their wishes, is arranging for their evacuation
by tonight's train."

Furthermore, from the manner in which the above-mentioned intelligence officer spoke,
it may b« true that they have no information with regard to the question t$ cle^og Wbe iSnesl

A-333

I

German Embassy as tl»re is no indication that tbsy l^rt^ «t«lted
other similar steps.

•Seen, 655.

'Fiist Secretary, Japanese Embassy in Moscow.
'See Part 2.

Trans. 6-21-41

No.fi57 " ^ ^ A*.

FROM: Moscow June 16, 1941

TO: Tokyo — • #707.

Strictly secret.

Reyoar#^3*.- - — ^ „ • • » . ,

Concerning the matter mentioned in # 196* from the Minister to London, summing up the
views of various quarters here, no matter how much the Soviet is egged on by England and the
United States, she knows full well that she has to maintain a cooperative attitude with Germany
and carmot yield to such encouragement. I told you in my # 695' about the rumors of a war be-
tween Germany and Russia denied by Tass'. I think that British Ambassador, CRIPPS hUi
something to do with this and, as proof, it appears that he will never return to Moscow.

Relayed to London.

°Not available.
'Not available.

'O^cial Huseian News Agency.

Trans. 6-21-41

mm

Ifteait mkyo '|f«ne 17, 1941

TO: Washington Circular #1260.

Both Britain and the U.S.S.R. are reporting denials of the threatening German-Soviet
rupture and are minimizing the situation. They are also reporting the impossibility of British-
Soviet rapprochement.

However, the strained relations between Germany and the lU,TS,iS*v^»jfe>*|| fcct and ftfe tftis!
reason the above must be considered as mere propaganda.

It is quite possible that these events will follow the course of German-Soviet war; Soviet-
British alliance, Americmn-Soviet rappitj^iiemeiat and finally the entrance of the lliai^#^
States in the war.

Therefore, please obtain and send as much inidrmation as possible relative to these items.
This message addreased to England, the United States, Germany, U.S.S.R. Relay fefitt
Germany to Italy as this Minister's instructions. ' '

M _ Trans. 6-17-41

A-334

TOE "MAGIC" BACKaROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 659

WOM: Berlin (Osiaa) June 14^ J^. ^

TO: Tokyo #691.

Concerning the attitude that we shall take in case war breaks out between Germany and
Russia, although I think that you are already giving the matter your complete consideration,
since I believe it to be of exttem^ vital importance that we be up to date, once more I am re-
porting these ideas in detail,
'fteviously, Chancellor HITLER told me of the actual situation at the beginning of the
JSorway offensive and of the Western offensive drives, as you know from my # 208°. Since he
always, at the outset, launches out in a surprise attack, even in the apparently imminent
German-Russian war, HITLER has already finished making his preparations and but awaits
the moat propitious moment in the general setup of conditions and weather for the lightening-
like execution of his plans. On absolutely reliable information, the Rumanian army also on
the 13th was completely mobilized. HITLER returned to Berlin today, and it is confirmed fact
that BARUCmTSCH and HALDER (?) and other military leaders have gone to the front line.
Also, judging that the hour of conflict is approaching rapidly, will you, as speedily 9ts possibie,
decide how Japan is to cope with this situation.

"Not available^

Trans. 6-16^1

Wmt l^M^0m0 tfiaa* l8, 1941

TO: Tokyo #716.

1. In my #701°, 1 reported to you in the imminent probability of the opening of hostilities
]^i^Wee)i Germwy and the Soviet Union. Well, for some time now the Germans have been
talki^ in i'li08ll!e1te«Mti?J. se'raffil days the wtAtter had been bad, but since yesterday
the skies have cleared completely. Furthermore, the Soviet has become quite aware of the
intentions of the Reich, so I don't know but what we may see the outl^e^ of war at fnay mo-
ment. - .-ir • " - - ^ ♦

2. Concerning the pTobable outcome of such a struggle, as I have repeatedly told you, the
Genoaans have complete assurance. General HALDER(?), who has always advocated such a
move, says that so far as the Army is concerned, war with Russia amounts to nothing more
than a police action and that the whole thing should be over within four weeks. Judging from
the way the German Army has been going, it does that the Russian Army will be ajWii-
hflated in a short time. * ' . v -

3. Germany has gradually strengtheneS %er f^eparatk(iis bi the Netherlands, Belgian and
French coastal areas, and she is gradually evacuating hef natiotials from these regions so it may
well be that the Reich will make a decisive attack upon the British Isles while in the midst of
the Russian fray. Summing all this up, I would say that at least within the next several
months, the European situation will take a sudden turn, and the war, so far as arms are con-
cerned will end summariljf, £|iIqw in the face of this^ our most pressing problem is to meet the

Ml '

4. First of all, it is urgent that we adopt and adamantly stick to a policy assuring the estab-
lishment and maintenance of our area and rights of co- prosperity in Greater East Asia. We
mmt #eie<tily adopt a definite pOliey » 6"^? »elaticais with the South Seas, China, the United
States, and Soviet Russia. As I say, we must meet the European situation with a counter-
policy of our own from which we ourselves will derive the greatest benefits and carry it out
with resohition. At such a cnti^l moment as this, naturally, you must see to it that our eva^h
saries abroad are thoroughly advised concerning our Empire's policy, intentions, and plans
so please instruct them fully through the proper channels.

*Not available.

• Trans.

No. 661

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa) June 2Q, 1941

Since it has become impossible to handle American money remittances of the Berlin Branch
of the Yokahama Specie Bank, due to America's freezing of German and Italian capital,
henceforth, I think that ther« is nothing left to do but to send American dollar remittances
firom Tokyo directly to the Independent Bank here in Moscow. After you have given this matter
your careful consideration, please advise wmmio necesawy Jtarticulars as soon as you are able.

Trans, 6-25-41

No. 662

FROM: Berlin (Osiraa) June 21. 1941

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) * ''38.

Regard my #737". * — -

During a talk today with RibbentWip, he mentioned that U.S.S.R. was concentrating its Far
Jitter n forces in European Russia, and although he didn't mention it, he intimated that the
recent Japanese- Soviet relations might have something to do with this.

Thereupon, I explained that European Russia being the heart of U.S.S.R. and Far Eastern
Russia being nothing more than its arms and limbs, it would be perfectly natural, from the
military standpoint, for U.S.S.R. to concentrate its forces in the vital European Russia, and
that this move has nothing to do with the Japanese-Soviet relations.

Please keep me ulformed regarding the troop movements, ete,, th«i. §0!^^$^i^^0^S^

'Not avulabte.

Traae. 6-25-41

THE "MAGIP" BACKGROUND QF F^Rl< BAILOR

No. 663

Jtme^, 1941

it At noon on the 23rd, I talked with the German Ambassador, and he said, "On the night
ai the 21st, I received from my government a note to the Soviet government which said, in
effect, that since the activities of the Soviet Army on the border could no longer be tolerated,
hostilities were to begin."

2. He continued, "At five o'clcrck in the morning, I went and handed it to Mr. MOLOTOV,
who said, "We have already been attacked at four A.M." All I said was, "We ar« very sorry."

3. I asked, "Well, what I would like to know is if there have been aqy negotiatioQB witlt.f^
Soviet Ambassador in Berlin," and he replied, "None whatever."

-•4 I said, "You have been here in Moscow for several years and have done your best to make
afid keep German-Soviet relations good, and I cannot tell you how sorry I am that this day has
W& come." To my expression of sorrow, the German Ambassador replied, "Well, you need
laot grieve. I knew on April 17 few the first time that Germany was going to attack Soviet Russia.
No, the Soviet was not deliberately obstructing Germany's military action. There was abso-
lutely no reason for Germany to resort to war. I told them so, but it was no use. God only knows
what far-off objective HITLER has in his mind. It must be that the military leaders guided
him strongly in this venture."

5. The German Ambassador continued, "Here there are about 200 German o£&cials; throq^-
out the length and breadth of this land there are many more amounting to a huge figuml
asked MOLOTOV if they might first «o to Iran- 1%flee uttder Hm iurisdiction of our consul in
Vladivostok will be sent to Japan.

6. "Last night a final tel«gram &om Berlin reached me saying that I should leave our inter-

ests in the handa^iiiii»Bv^»maiLMialst{ff bsm at^i^ieij^ic^j^lg^^iiii^^
leave the city." ,

I understand that this morning the German Ambassador delivered an important note to the
Soviet Government and has begun preparations to evacuate the Embassy. I will immediately
confer with SCHULENBERG" and wire you back the details.

' GefiKtfin Ambassadgii in Moscow^

IVans. 6-25-41

No. 664

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa)
TO: Tokyo

June 22, 1941
#731.

TVans. &-25-41

A-337

r

N0.66S

WBOm m»Mvml^iOiiSii' Smie 22,1m

TO: Tokyo #223*

Strictly secret.

At 5:30 P.M. on the 22nd, the German Consul General telephoned me asking me to come to
see faim. At fixet, I sent Vice Consul NEI, and later went myself. He began by saying that he
really should have come to see me but that the iStmMi i^4'mit pmM'B'4Ki^ mtmAed his
apologies.

He said that he had not as yet received any official dispatch from his home government (and
^WwilA never receive it), but that according to the Berlin tadio at 2 P.M. a conflict had
to rage along the entire border between Germany and Russia. At 1 P.M. the German
y&mgn Minister and the Minister of Propaganda had announced this fact to foreign corre-
spondents. However, this war, coming so soon after tlie non-agression pact with Russia, ^fm
htOilght on by the fact that the Comintern had been engaging in activities within Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary and other countries coming within the German sphere
of influence, and also because Russia bad refused to accede to Germseny's demands that she
withdraw her armies from the border between the two countries.

This war (he continued) was started by Germany, therefore, for the present, it was hia opin-
ion that Japan should maintain a position of neutrality. Furthermore, since he and his staff
would soon have to take leave for Japan or Manchukuo, he requested our kind consideration.

I told him that I would be very glad to take care of any secret documents for him, and he ex-
press hid appredation for this but said that there was none left because he had f dd^^ii in*
structions two or three days before to prepare for disposal of all important documents, and
having received a telegram at 7 o'clock the night before, he had spent the whole night burning
SeiQ all Hp, At the prosent momenVlii^sl^v lu» had no^i^Eit'<i$iatever le£k but a Bttle mmey
and expected atany tuiietorecdve tlUi^^ to b^j^ yftway.

No. 666

FROM; Berlin (.OsimaJ June 22, 1941

The following is the war situation as described to me by a person near to RIBBENTROP

when he called on me on the evening of the 22nd.

Today's fighting brought out the fact that the Russian troops along the border had not been
completely assembled.

During today's fighting it is certain that as BSIl^ i^S^fe« l|«a<ire4«^
either shot down or destroyed on the ground.

Twenty-five Romanian divisions, in addition to German forces, have been placed under the
command of ANTENESUKO", and fifteen Finnish divisions, with addition of German troops,
have been put under the command of MANNERUSUHAIMU" (Mannerheim) . Both the
Romanian and Finnish troops, especially the latter, have been e^ctively used. All this goes
to show that the first day of fighting had proceeded successfully in &VfB^' WiyV'$3£li -]|ttS<l${)||r
tributed to greater confidence in the ultimate outcome of the conflict.

'Kanaspeliing.

Trans. 6-24^1

FROM: Koenigsberg (Sugihara) June 22, 1941

TO: Tokyo #24,

'Sitittt ifMxra of the 22nd (or 21st ?), Russian planes iWded TiJsit', but I unijerstand they did
Ito damage,

° City in East Pruasia.

* ^ - Trans. 6-28-41

No. 668 ~ ' ^ ~

FROM: Vladivostok (Ota) June 23, 1941

Regarding my # 225".

On the 23rd, I met tht> acting U.S. Consul- General, and in the course of our conversation,
the Consul-General reierring to the German- Soviet war, stated that with the great differences
of superiority and inferiority in all points between the German and Soviet armies, it is a fore-
gone conclusion that the German forces will take the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and the (elec-
trical ?) industrial areas, but that it remains to be seen whether or not they intend to smash
the Soviet at this time. As for America's attitude, it will likely be announced soon, but in his own
opinion, he was convinced that President Roosevelt will declare America's participation in the
war, and material assistance for Russia. However, he expressed his hopes that Japan, which
is in a unique position, would move with caution.

A member of our staff, for the sake of making contact with them, proceeded to the German
Consulate- General at 1 p.m., but the insignia at the entrance already had been retaoved, and
a civilian guard at the gate was keeping anyone from entering.

Selay to England, the Itoited States, aad Manchufcuo.

^ available.

Tmm 6-28-41

PROM; Tokyo June 25, 1941

TO: Berlin #566.

(In 3 parts-^omplet*)*

(Secret)

In the evening of the 22nd, Ambassador Ott called on me, bringing with him the German
note which was transmitted to the Russian government by the Foreign Minister earlier in the
day and acting under instructions of the home government, he communicated to me verbally
its contents and explained that Hitler has given orders to use every might and means (MTT
ALLEN MACHT MITTLE NENDGEGETRETEN (sic)) to march against the U.S.S.R,

A-339

I thanked th« Ambassador for this inft^matitm and told him that although I have been in,'
formed by Ambassador SI that Germany had declared war on Russia, it is not clear to me
from the present report whether Germany has actually declared war. Whereupon, the German
Aia!b^6ador replied that there appears to be no expression to that effect in the note.

I concurred in the particulars of his t6nijBXkBt and

ference would be extended. * * "*

At the time of this interview, I stated that at the liaison conference on the 20th, the French
Indo-Ghina problem had been the principal topic discussed. With regard to the Germtin-
Swiest war, it was decided on the 24th that this government would make no move until after a
Ml consultation with the German government, (Berlin to Tokyo #738°). Hie General Staff
and Intelligence Service will be consulted promptly regarding the Soviet Army's movements.

Regarding Poland, I said that this government will not quibble over details; that its conduct
will be entirely in accordance with the spirit and aims of the Three Power Pact. We are quite
satisfied with that treaty andhiWejmpth^ feAreipg^^act i^ accordance with it.
Please repeat to Italy.

"The Jap Amb. at Berlin reports his conversation with Ribbentrop regarding the Soviet's concentrating their Via
Bi^ieia Forcee in Ekwipeaa BoMa. Bibbmbop implies It to be a mult of IaptSossM ifdatioiM. Sselt, 6^8.

Trans. 6-3(Ml

No. 670

FROM: Vladivostok June 25, ISii

TO: Tokyo • #272.

Ileirour # 166°. Concerning my # 223*.

{called on Hi, I, Hu, and found that all three of them were well as usual.

Prom the 23rd on, as I explained in the first part of my telegram # 277", the German Consul
General has had no connection with the outside world and he does not go out at all. On the
same day, I called on the diplomatic representative "A" on some other business and at that
time I said that if the Kasai Maru was still at anchor the German Consul General desired M
embark on it and that the — — there were cognizant of this and should lend their assistance.
"A" said that regarding the mutual treatment of the German-Soviet diplomats and consute
general he thought that the governments concerned would have to discuss this matter.

"Not available.

*9fle I], G65 — The German Consul General at Vladivostok tells the Jap Consul General of his instructions
pertaining to the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and Russia, and in his opinion, Japan should maio-
^t^w^^ position of neutrality.

'See H, 668 — The U.S. Copsul General at Vladivostok has expressed his him conviction t^at Pres. ilooeifvelt will
declare partieipaUwi in the «m md ptcmds jnaierisl aaai^rai:^ Ruasia; a^, bis hope tbat Japan will nieve wilh

Trans. 7-2-41

A-340

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND Ob FiilAUL HARBOR

No. en

FBOM: Koenigsberg (Sugihara) June 22, 1941

I Bitft'lbeen informed by a member of the Nazi Party here that, paralleling her military
attack upon Russia, Germany considers it neceasary to bring about the establishment of a
pro-German regittife ds quickly as possible. The invasion haa already begun. Aside from the
regime in Russia proper, it ia planned to set up other separate governments in the Ukraine,
Wbije Rvi^a and the Baltic shore nations. Lithuania and Latvia, however, will coalesce and
lliU S as^emi i^ WeSim^^ High Nazi liave been disoming the details <^

this for several days, but as yet they are not in complete accord.

TPrans. 6-25-41

No. 672

FROM: Hsinking June 27, 1041

TO: Tokyo #379-

{Parti of 2".)

From Secretary YoaMtomi.

I presume that you have already obtained sufficient information from various sources re-
garding Germany's reasons for making war on Jfessia, however* for the sake of refereace 1 will
add my opinion based on my ^periewcea wh»ift.ss»»|)6!y |pt 0a opiaioiM

prevalent here, as follows: , ...

1. Germany's real objective h. 131* Cftjilifeg StMsta. IF she shtttiM he tMfTied '#om this
objective by the British blockade to disposing of the British problem first and then after that
tq dispose of Russia the result would not be according to expectations but would probably
entail a long war. If Germany should spend her strength in attacking Britain, America would
certainly enter the war and in time, Russia having completed her military preparations, would
enter the war against Germany and thus there is a grave danger that Germany might lose the
opportunity of crushing Russia, which ia her real objective, t ^hsk this is the reason why
Germany attacked Russia suddenly without waiting for Russia to effect her military prepara-
tions. (In September of last year the German attache, Lt, General KESURING, resident in
Germany (?) told me that it was generally understood in German army drcles that it would
take Russia two more yeats to pi^pare for war.)

2. Furthermore:

a. There were 162 divisions of the German army on the Ruaeian bordrar who were not only
inactive but could not be uied elaewhew. By making war With RuiKBa, Gennany did not need
to employ fresh divisions.

b. By attacking Russia, Germany would gain possession of the Ukraine's iron, coal, and
grain, and the Caucasian petroleum, etc., and by pulvmzing the Ril^a» army, Germany wouW
remove all anxiety about the future.

c. Also by such an attack Germany might not find it impossible to arrive at an under-
standing with England and America.

3. That Germany desired not the absolute crushing of Britain but rather an understaiiding
or compromise with her under certain definite regulations, was expressed to me msajf A'lMO

A-841

Again from another angle, there are many in England who, like the Duke of Windsor, cherish
a feeling of affection for Germany. (It is reported that it was for the purpose of cutting off his
relationship with Germany that Churchill exiled the Duke to America.) Germany for the
pveseat is turning her destructive strength toward Russia and by so doing will not only secure
her eastern front but will also lend strength to the arguments of those in England who oppOiSe
England's blockade policy and thus pave the way for an understanding with England.

'Sefr n, 75^ which k probably part 2 of this messi^.

Trans. 7-3-41

!?6. 673

FROM; Tokyo June 27, 1941

TO: Berlin #m

An Asahi dispatch was received on the 26th regarding the war situatirai as follows:
"The Soviet will retire to the Ural region and there carry on a long war but the Germans
will seek to terminate the war by the destruction of the Red army and then turn to the solution
■f^-^bik British question. However, the German authorities are regarding as a life and death
ioiHtter the effecting of a landing on Britain itself. In other quarters, there are rumors that the
Hiture objective of the war will be changed and a peace proposal submitted to Britain early in
July."

Please ascertain as to whether this dispatch passed the German censers. Also in view of the
American radio broadcasts and an unverified report that Von Papen has submitted an anti-
Comintem proposal to tJie Britiab Ainlm;%fi^#'lfli' i^uikara, plemet ascertain what Oermfmy's
attitude toward Britain is.

No. 674

FROM: Berlin June 29, 1941

TO: Tokyo #806.

Re your # 566".

1 have already discussed the matter of Germany's future policy toward England in my tele-
psaffi # 785', so I presume you are cognizant 6f that. However, on the 22nd, Chancellor Hitler
In an official notice stated that: "The policy of Anglo-Russian cooperation has become very
etear. It has become imperative that Germany send a large force to the eastern front to decide
the fortunes of war there. In order to accomplish this the air force in particular will be con-
fronted with difficulties." Since that time the German papers are continually emphasizing the
point that the Russian campaign is but a prelude to the British campaign and that the two
campaigns are individbie; I will Mlowlte'Sfeevewitiianotheor t^^ - •

"See n, 673. According to an Asahi dispatch, there are rumors that Germany will submit a peace proposal to Eng-
land early in July. In view oi U.S. radio broadcasts and a rumored anti-Comiiit«3n pn^lOsal te the Bdtid^ <^tob.. St
Ankara by Von Papen, please ascertain Germany's attitude toward Britain.

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUiND OF PEARL HARBOR

No, 575

W^: China Net

June 23, 1941

(CircuLar.)
,;Bi«eive4 from hmdm m # 4^.
Re my #440^.

(1) According to information obtained by our informant from Vice Minister of War,
GURIGU, on the 23rd, as a result of Churchiirs speech of the 22nd, in which he promised
British aid to Russia, the British government has decided to return Ambassador Cripps to
Moscow and also to carry out plans for aid to Russia by sending the Commander-in-Chief of the
Middle Eastern forces. General Wavell, to Moscow to confer on the question of joint actions &a
the part of the British and Soviet forces, and also by sending military missions consisting of
military experts.

(2) As the clarification of the United States' stand toward Russia has not yet been made, the
^itish government, seeking to keep in step with the United'' Sttttii, fit W%ti ^mlCSM
about concluding an alliance with Soviet Russia immediately.

(3) Despite the 22nd being Sunday, the Soviet Ambassador had a conference with Foreign
idSmiiSf Eden, extending to many houis. During this conference Edeii l^^d to have urged
Russia to wage a protracted war. (Britain fears that unless the war is protracted, the Russians
will have to fight Germany alone and since Germany has already its Fifth Columnist organized
not only in the three Baltic border states, but also in Ukraine and Caucasus, it would be a

simple liiat^ ^^immim^tfm/i^l^mtm^f:

At the time of our conversation mentioned in my # 759°, this man spoke as follows regarding
the political situation since the opening of the German-Soviet war, basing his views on various
information received by the German Government.

1. The attitude of Great Britain toward the German -Soviet war is that she has so far been
observing what success Germany has been making so that she may ascertain the extent of the
Grerman victories and decide what policy she should adopt toward Germany, However,
remembering the failures that she has experienced by interfering at the outset of the past
several wars, she is at first giving merely moral encouragement, believing as she does that it
would be dai^erous to formuliite too soon ai^ concrete steps with a view to approaching Soviet
Russia.

2. In the United States the Soviet Ambassador UUMANSUKU* contacted Assistant Secre-

FROM: Berlin

TO: Tokyo

June 24, 1941

#760.

A-343

/

of political value. Such ig the information received. The United States also will probably wait
and aee how the Germ an- Soviet war will progress and, if German victory becomes a certainty,
shfit it is thought, will forego her plans of giving Soviet Russia any positive aid.

3. General FRANCO has requested of Germany that Spanish volunteers be allowed to join
the anti^Communist crusaders. The German army is opposed to this idea because it has no
military value, but the political leaders are quite in favor of it because it would be invaluable
in the influence it would have on the South American countries and because of its propaganda
value^ The German Government has not decided as yet whether to accept or reject this offer,

4. In Sweden both the King and Army believe that Sweden should participate in the war
i^ainst Soviet Russia; however, the Government as a whsiB 18 opposed to this step, heiS^
strongly colored as it is with republican idealism. Public opinion in that country is at present
divided and the country is facing an internal crisis; however, the anti-Soviet faction is

'See II, 748 and II, 749.

'Kana spelling of OUMANSKY.

TEobablySUMNBK WELLES.

information is of utmost se crecy :

Ill order to steal a march on the Soviet Army before the latter could increase her forces,
Germany suddenly opened war, despite the fact that her forces in Finland had not completed
preparations for attack. Therefore, the Finnish Army and the German troops in Finland,
which are to cooperate with the Finns, have not yet taken the offensive and F^B^RBtdt Ib ttt
present camouflaging her real intention by pretending to defend her neutrality.

"2, Yesterday, the 23rd, HITLER went to the General Headquarters in East Prussia and is
personally leading the campaign. Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP is piteBiog f^^'i^
General Headquarters the coming week-end."

Please take special precaution so as to keep this message secret.

Trans. 6-25-41

'liib AlAe.iL tiAcKuiiuUND OF PEARL HARBOR

FROM: Tokyo (Maf8lli?*»i
TO: Hsinking

Message from Moscow as #834.

Re your #681".

1, Day before yesterday, the 30th, when T conferred with the American Ambassador, I asked
him if he had met the members of the British Military Mission, but he replied that he hadn't.
There are only a Major and an Army Captain now at the American Embitssy. They are not
qualified to attend the conference and; besides, since the United States has no reason for being
so intensely interested as is England in giving Russia aid, 1 hardly believe the conference is a
military conference of the three powers,

2. The American Ambassador is strongly anti- Soviet and seems to be hoping for Russia's
downfall. He has often said to me that even if the United States give assistance to Soviet
Russia, it would not be given m time inasmuch as it would take four months in the case of the
United States and three months in the case of Great Britain for aid to reach Russia. Also, in
regard to the outcome of the war, the Ambassador seems to have a very pessimistic outlook.
He seems to think that the German troops would be advancing in large numbers into the
vicinity of Moscow within the next ten or fifteen days. He has been urging me to jointly address
a question to MOLOTOV; namely, the question: "How is the Soviet Government going to
manage to provide trains for the removal erf foreign diplomats in the event that Government
must move to another place?" But I am urging him to wait awhile before asking such a ques-
tion since at this time, when the war has not yet developed to the stage he describes, such a
question would be an insak to the S0e|@| liOVeRmtml. Be te- J^BOiWd lllC-

the £^bfee^ f»y^4iwuy^ the day time.

No. 679

FROM: Rome August 5, 1941

TO: Washington No number.

(Message to Tokyo #512) (Part 1 of 3) (Strictly Secret),

Re your Excellency's # 708° to Berlin.

1. Your caption message makes the attitude of the Imperial Government, as well as your
own opinions, quite clear on ih» exercise of our national policy as laid down on July 2. 1, too,
needless to say, have great hopes of seeing this policy materialize. Let aae point out, however,
that since our forces occupied French Indo-China, Great Britain and the United States have
tied in still m<»e closely with Chungking, and their relations with CHIANG are more intimate
than ever. The United States, while avoiding physical violence with us, is, nevertheless,
meddling in our iiSliirs and strengthening her poh^ of ecoQoinic pppfE^on, beyond any
doubt, it l& trae 1^'WSM'^^k^-'^&mi^% govem-

mmt m iibmS6IS:hir v^tasy §faem, m>ji1&tm wBo to tie up mtk t^mM im hs^^im va

July 4. #^1 '
#369.

A-345

the background, but with the passing of time, this hostility may become weaker, and the
United States may use supply bases in the Far East to help Russia and to cause her to com-
plete the encirdement of Japan.

'Sw n, SC14 which outliiies the Mperial Goverameiat'a |Kilid«8 And vieira with rffgard to helping Germany against

Trans.

No. 680

FROM: Rome August 3, 1941

TO: Washington No numbei.

(Meseage to Tokyo # 512) (Part 2 of 3} {Strictly Secret) .

Once RussO'American solidarity is achieved, we may encounter the inevitable necessity of
fighting their combined forces. This is not at all unimaginable; so just as soon as possible,
befOTC this takes place I think we should make ready and settle the northern question. I cannot
tell you how much I hope that we will act in unison with Germany and Italy in putting an end
to the Soviet regime.

2, The United States in particular is scheming to cut us off from all petroleum supplies.
Although this will anger our populace beyond bounds, I still think that we should use our
occupation of French Indo- China for the moment merely as a threat against England and the
Ujiited States and not yield at present to their p^voeatjons. We should prepare quickly and
ialee#ie solid blow northwards.

Trans, Not dated

FROM: Rome August 5, 1941

(Message to Tokyo #512) (Part 3 of 3) (Strictly Secret)

Thus, if we strike Russia severely, although I do not believe that England and the Unitai
States would atop assisting her, I do not think that they would even challenge us. First, we
could pulverize the Soviet's Far Eastern forces, get a foothold in the petroleum regions of
northern Sakhalin, and get a naval base at Kamchatka; then we could proceed to occupy
important areas on the continent. We could seize the important thoroughfares to Europe, then
would we, indeed, be alUfei^f tlte -unity ealled for by the Tripartite Agreement. Then,
indeed, would we make it easy for Germany and Italy to crush Great Britain. We will get our
chance to deal with England and the United States, never worry about that, but we can deal
with them better when we ate stronger. There is plenty of time for us to get the South Seas, i
1!^ succeed with the plan I have described above, with no trouble at all we could finish off all
Anglo-American opposition to our settlement of the China question. This, I think, would be
the beat way to carry out the letter and spirit of the Tripartite Pact, which U the keynote of the
policy of the Japanese Empire.

1 have wired this to Berlin and Washington,

• • • ,

Trans. &-7-tt

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HAR30E

No. 683

FROM: Helsinki (Sakaya)
TO: Tokyo

Re my #95°.

Defenses in this country have been improved constantly ever since the Russo-Finnish war of
last year and especially has the eastern border been firmly guarded. Although there has been

no as yeL emergency mobilization has been ordered — and it is said that as many as

10,000 men have been called to arms on the 15th alone. Also, women's rehef detachments and
supply detachments have been formed. (The maids in official residences have been drafted.)
Anti-aircraft guns have been placed at strategic positions in the city. The members of young
men's associations and others have joined the — — German troops who have come into this
country and seem to be determined to fight for restoiation, with intefest payment, of the lost
territories. There ha» been a sudden dedlw m iimmmW ^ teb^® aa*4 ^«P© k a mark^i
scarcity of taxicabs.

Trans. 6-24-41

No. 683 _

FROM: Hsinking

Pekingf, Nanking, and Shanghai '

(Circular).
Strictly secret.

I hnve recently been actively investigating repercussions of the iUis^i^eWJaan to ifcse
areas to the east and present hereunder a summary of my findingi^feSd*^'

1. Concerning movements of the Russian Far Eastern Army.

o. According to late reports the Red Army of the East seems to have received orders ttOta
Moscow on the 22nd to take up positions within the areas adjacent to the border, viewing Japatt
as the imagined enemy, but to strictly refrain from actions which might in any way arouifi
the suspicions of Japan and Manchukuo.

h. It appears that troops in the Eastern Manchukmoan front ittf fe^ng trima-

ferred westward.

c. At about 3:00 P.M. on the f2nd, Soviet troops in the Eastern Manchukuoan front sud-
denly, in plain view of our observers, began to engage in all kinds of sports such as basketball
and "catch ball." This was evidently a pretense because on the other hand they were con-
stfttistiiig **Te<SiySl^'*<|» type of Russian trench) and bringing up sapplies of ammunition in
preparation for a possible attack.

2. Soviet activities in Manchukuo — As yet nothing appears on the surface, but even as they
are endeavoring to keep from provoking the Japanese, they are sending many spies and plotters
into the interior of ManchuktMJ to work together witij theix aubversive orpniza^a
established. ^

June 18, 1941
#102.

June 24, 1941
#110.

3. Popular reactions within Manchukuo — In general, everyone is calm but there are those
of our nations who emphatically maintain that now is the time lor Japan, in one stroke, to ad^
r^^il^ to a positicm on a line with Chita and overthrow the Soviet system, thus taking advan-
tage of this opportunity to eliminate this "root nf all evil" in the Far East. There are also some
White Russians who manliest the same desire. There are some Japanese, on the other hand,
who are very apprehensive over the idea that Manchukuo may shortly become embroiled in
the conflict. Notice Manchukuoans have thus far remained silent.

4. Movements of the Communist 8th Route Army — I have not yet been able to make defi-
nite observations, but there are those who believe that depending upon the way the war goes
in European Russia, this army may be moved to ^^^^'WB^0i^ €ti pretext timt China
must defend both Russia and Outer Mongolia. " ' - . r

Relayed to Peking, Nanking, Shanghai, and Harbin.

:Tran8.e-g?--^

FROM: Hsinking
TO: ShamM Nanking, jp^kix^e

(Circular).

Jk^^ Tokyo as # 367.

ik^idti«a of the Soviet Army on the Russo-Mai[|^^y9^|^|fPii^'t|ptdt!ie«v^liogQlthe 2Stk:
a. Ccraittete light control on the whole front.

h. Increasmg the supply of airplanes, cannon, automobiles, and bi^-an^ guns.

c. Emergency mobilization of the army.

d. Opening of the embrasures in the pill bt^esi.

e. Constant mmm^eace towac^.^ ani IhuKlbig s| fiKe^iNM|lQes'4itildlN0iefe j^^
as at the time tQjf tlb»l4l^ffiQb^

'ftan8,6-3&-41

Na.68S

FROM: Hsinking June 27,1941

TO: Tokyo #378.

To Vice Foreign Minister Ohasi from Yositomi-

( 1) The Kwantung Army is maintaining an attitude of reserve regarding the present Germem-
Soviet war and it is avoiding moves which might cause the U.S.S.R. to suspect l^e attitude
of our government. It is also adhering to the policy of friendliness in affecting both countries
apropos the final settlement of the China affair. (However, at this time, with the outcome of the
German campaign still an uncertainty, the Kwantung Army i» opposed to diverting its fcvfi^
to the China area.) (See my #254°.) On the other hand there are many young officers in the
Kwantung Army (especially those at the scene) who think the time is ripe to take the offensive
in settling the Russian questitm once and for all.

(2) According to information obtained by the local gendarmerie, the attitude of the tmp^id
headquarters toward the U.S.S.R. has taken a sudden jingoistic turn since last night.

June 25. 1941
#117.

A-348

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

(3) The Manchukuo government is said to be sending to Tokyo in a day or two a representa-
tive from the Bureau of General Affairs to €m£^ msfyma^ t& hs SifSf^M^ by Manchukuo
in case of Japanese-Russian war.

'Not available.

Trans. 6-30-41

FROM: Hsingking June 30, 1941

^■t Tokyo #m

Strictly secret.

Re my #367",

Tile following is a des^^^n of the movements of the Soviet Eastern forces since my
last report.

X, They have mcreased the scouts and vigilance by the guards has become much more

2. Although they placed bombers in the first line immediately after the war between
Germany and Soviet Russia began, they have been moving them to the tear since the 26th,
and have been concentrating pursuit planes in the flrst line. This is indicative of the faet that
defense preparations along the Soviet-Mancbukuoan border have changed fifom teiBi>orary
preparations to permanent preparations.

3. It appears that they have entered thfe seccmd stage of preparations m the Par East (by
"tiie second stage of preparations" is meant that they have taken the position for going into
aieticai wlsanever necessar^r).

^jkt available.

No. 687

PROM: Hsinking July 13, 1941

TO: Moscow #44?-

Re Moscow to T«l^ #!^*

Since the beginning of the Germ an- Soviet war, Russian observation planes have been
crossing the Soviet-Manchukuo border daily. We wish to avoid incidents, therefore, with the
approval of the military, we have had the Manchukuo government make representations to
the Soviet Consul General in Harbin. The recent Soviet complaints may be their answer to
the above xefixeseiitaticms.

Trans, ^'4^1

A-349

688

FROM: Hsinking

TO: Tokyo

July 16, 1941
#461.

To SAKAMOTO, Chief of the Europe-Asia Section, from HANAWA.

On the 12th, KYURUBON', the German Consul General in Vladivostock, arrived here (he
expects to take the post in Hsinking hereafte*) lind spoke confidentially as follows to a member
of this ofQce.

1. "I was back in Germany in February and March of this year. At that time, the leaders in
the German Government were of the opinicm that, because of insufficient preparations,
Germany must postpone the invasion of England until next summer. If Russia, at Germany's
feaidk, threatens Germany with a powerful air force, Germany will not be able to concentrate
biKr entire air power next summer when the invasioa^f England is to take place. Therefore, she
mi^lt destroy the Russian air force this summer » On my way back to resume my post, I stopped
in llbscow and conferred with Ambassador SCHULENBERG. When I conveyed to him this
opinion of the German leaders, he said, 'To attack Russia at the present time is not a wise
policy, inasmuch as Russia is supplying Germany with more materials than she had promised
to supply.'"

2. "The Russo-German war wiE end, of course, in a German victory, but it would be
dangerous to expect that the STALIN regime will fall very soon, since the government would
very likely be transferred to Siberia. Germany, no doubt, will follow the policy of organizing
independent countries for the various races, but will meet with consid^bJLe ^i^ci^ty in
controlling these independent countries. This is a matter of great concern."

3. "It appears that the Kwangtung Army has become quite active in Northern Manchuria.
It would probably take a tremendous number of troops to occupy the region east of the Baikal^.
Perhaps the greatest difficulty would be experienced in governing the region after the invasion,
in as much as the territory is vast and means of communication quite inadequate."

(Circular) .

Action of Tokyo as # ?.
(Abstract)

Refers to Hsinking' s # 360°.
Review of conditions in Manchuria.

{1) Manchurians, especially the working cl^siss, me- pdtefirily ccmcemed fliHt.jKife iBendi-
tions, and are calm with regard to the Russian situation.
(2) They are attentive to Soviet activities and fear an attack on Japan.

'Kitna spelling.

July 1, 1941
#133.

A-as0>

(3) One group oousideni the present a good e^jportunity to settle the Outer Mongolian
situation.

(4) Soviet nationals in Manchuria are app^^iiQsli;^^ i^tc^it^
tary service .

(5) Jews in Mi^^toS: Sffe mostly ahtf-6«rman, and they fear that Japan's entry into the war
would result in the loss of their property.

"See II, 68n. Intelligence report from Hsinkinf^ on Soviel military on the Russo-Manchukwoau liBrttat;

Soviet activities in Matvcbukuo; popular reaction In Manchukuo and movement ot the Communist Route Army.

" ' " * Trans. 7-3-41

No. 690

FROM: Hsinking July 4, 1941

TO: Tokyo #416(7).

view of the political situation, there is a danger of Manchukuo being used as a stage for
espionage activities by third -power nations. Alter discussing the matter with the Manchukuoan
authorities, we have decided confidentially to carry out roughly the following measures in order
to supervise with greater stringency entrance, passage, and residence in Manchukuo by mem-
bers t>f any third-power nation. Of these three, especially the question of passage through
Manchukuo by members of third-power nations is one which has to do a great deal with our
concern and, therefore, there is need of the Manchukuo Government keeping in step with us in
supervision. Will you, therefore, wire me your opinion in the matter? Furthermore, we would
like to have the representatives of the KWANGTUNG authorities participate in the passport
conference. I shall wire you the names of the representfitivfes at as they have beett 4%i^dM:
(We shall directly get in touch with the KWANGTUNG Government.)

1. Entrance by members of the third-power nations. — Except in case circumstances do not
permit it, instructions should be sought for the handling of each case, and permission should
be issued individually.

2. Passage by members of the third-power countries. — (1) Those traveling eastward from
Europe (as given in my # 277"). (2) Travelers passing through on way to Moscow. In both of these
eases instructions should be sought. However, for reasons of the Russo-German war and also of
the relations between Britain, the United States, and Soviet Russia, as a matter of general prin-
ciple, no visas should be granted to Americans and Britishers.

3. Travel and residence ia Manchukuo. — Stiver mp«r¥isioii should be exemsed gene^illy
in these matters.

'N(*«vailabl«.

Trans. 7-12-41

■mm

I I

No. 691

FBOM: Hsinking July41i^
T0t Tokyo #415.''""

Secret,

From Commercial Attache HAN AD A.

With the development of the present situation, there is no telling when and what sort of con-
dition will arise within the Soviet Far Eastmi borders. In oisiw to l>e prepared for such anmer-
gency, I believe we should have the officials of the Foreign Oj^lS'Who are connected with Russian
affairs quickly sent to Manchukuo, which will be the base of our operations, and arrange to have
tbem take whatever steps that may be called frar and thus take all measures necessary for
pfecatition. In other words, officials withdrawing from Soviet Russia, those who have found it
impossible to take up their duties in Europe, as well as some from among those belonging to
our diplomatic stafis in Europe who are versed in Russian affairs, should be assigned to the
Special Affairs organizations in HARBIN, HILAR, BOTANKO", TAONAN, and KOKKA'. I
would like to have these officials carry on the duties in these organizations as members of the
Foreign Office and have them maintain liaison with intelligence organizations and other bodM^

•Kana spelling fat Mu^nkiang (3).

HAHBIN, HILAR, BQf'AKKO, TAONAN, and KOKKA are all Manchukuoan centei&.

traiis. 7-14-41

n9.m

■•msms Hainking July 11, 1941

TO: Tientsin Circular # 156.

Action Tokyo m^4^.

As scheduled, the conference of the Consuls assigned to posts in Manchukuo was held on the
10th and 11th. From the home otbce Secretary Narita and three others were present besides all
of the Conetils in Manchukuo. Also present were Secretai^-SiftMiWiim^tidi^Watanabe from li|f^'
Nanking office. Consul Okuma and Clerk Sekinui from the Consulate General in Kalgan. Among
those representing Manchukuo was Commercial Attache Ogawa of the Foreign Bureau.

On the first day greetings were expressed by Counselor Hanawa and Secretary Narita. fSgl-.
lowing these. Secretary Yositomi described world conditions as affected by the German-Soviet
war; Interpreter Katoda spoke on the ability of the Soviet Union to resist Germany (see "A" of

separate cable); Staff member described tU^ ttfuM^Bsee petpetoated agaiurt Mtmkn^m

by the Comintern (see "B" of separate cable).

As special reports, the following papers were read: The actual formation of the Red forces,
by (Major Kotani ?); the strategy of violence by the Soviet Sw?eeff <Aould a total war betwcMi the

Soviet Union and Japan become an actuality, by Lieutenant ; the trend of the general

attitudes of the people of Manchukuo and Korea by Vice Chief Ide of the Chief Inspector's
office; recent outioc* in Kofea, administ»tion officer of the CJovewior of Korea's office; eeo»
nomic value of Mongolia, by ¥amemoto of^e research section of the §(»jtb,M8neh|K^ |ten
waA, etc.

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROU>iD OF PEARL HARBOR

On the second day, spokesmen for the various offices in Manchukuo and China submitted
reports. After these, opinions were exchanged on matters fiertaining to (a) countOT-espipn^e,
and (b) gathering and disseminatiiig of intelligence.

The outline of the special m^o»^|6||kiiiftJ

1. Staff Officer Kotani:

Th«re were questions on the general outlook of security in the Far East and as to the military
strata of the German- Soviet war. (These deleted here.) With regard to the quality of the Soviet
forces the officer said that both the officer and men were of fairly high calibre. This is particu-
larly true of those connected with the air force and tank forces, who, for the most part, are
poduates of the KOMVSOMOW^ Wi^^!^Mi^Mt$bls tactie«l knowliilie «ai ^Ity and
are quite patriotic.

(Part 2— badly garbled.)

Hane (person's name) (formerly chief of the — — section of the police department; as such
he was in diarge of the "dangerous thoughts" control of the Kwantung Army): After taking into
consideration the developments during the various acts of violence by the Soviet forces against
Manchukuo, including the Nomonhan incident, the Soviet Union will undoubtedly make
much effort along the lines and through the channels enumerated below in the event of a total
war between the Soviet Union and Japan, (The speaker Went into considerable detail on all
points brought out below.)

(1) Incite disunity of thought.

(2) Promote riots and strikes in factories.

(3) Incite disorganization in the Manchukuoan army.

(4) Pronilliiba^i^KsiISi

( 5) Instigate activities jamouf the banditry,

(6) Gunfire.

(7) Destructicsi.

(8) Spreading of disease germs.

(9) Throw credit into a chaotic condition.

(10) Economic disorganization.

(11) Distribution of printed material.

3. Vice Chief Ide brought out the following points:

Japanese leadership among the Manchukuoai^ 4s becoming weaker of recent m^ths; the

non- materialization of various plans; oooilictmg economic policies through various pressures;
the not-too- bright future for the colonists; dissatisfaction among the Manchukuoans and Ko-
reans. - -' '

4. Administration officer Mizuno said that for a time subsequent to the outbreak of the Sino-
Japauese incident, conditions in Korea were very favorable. However, since then, and to the
accompaniment of the liicidtnt tum4nto a long affiair and one of the criticalnesa of Japaaesfe-
U.S. relations. One faction among the Kweans — particularly among those students in schools
above the secondary class — is engagil^ in a movement of independence and radicalism.

5. Investigator Yamamoto of the South Manchurian Railroad described the importance to
the matters with Union of the industrial European Russia.

Copies of this message, together with the separate cable, have been cabled to Peking, Tient-
sin, Shanghai, and Nanking, and a copy was sent to Harbin, Peking will please relay it to Kalgan.

Tirans. 7-17-il

No. 693

f^OU: Shanghai June 25, 1941

Tokyo # 1081.

(Abstract)

Russians in Shanghai, both Reds and Whites, are uniting in enthusiasm for defense of home-
land,

Tram.

No. 694

FROM: Nanking June 26, 1941

TO: Hsinkiag Gogai.

(Abstract)

. J^ljfmsmission of #45to Tokyo" and Circular #152' to your office.

Nanking government requested information regarding instructions to be given to news-
papers concerning Nanking government's poUcy towards the German-Russian war. I suggested
that the emphasis should be placed on the fact that time for peace in China is at hand, as

'K^ available.

No.ms

FROM; Tokyo

TOt Hasste^ fitoto Shanghai, Tientsins Peking and Cam^

(Part 2 of 2)

2. Another agent called on such members of the opposition group as CHIEN YU JIN", GAN
KEI KEI*, CHO— ROKU', and KYO SU CHI'', and got their views, according to which:

They realize the fact that is great. For this reason, although it is

impossible for Japan to show definitely where she stands, depending on her power of endurance,
it is expected that she will, in time, make her attitude more clear. They consider that common
action on the part of Japan and Germany against Russia is not beyond the realm of possibility.

Chungking may be able to eliminate the danger of by abandoning her hostile attitude

toward the Chinese Communist Party. However, should the present war become increasing
favorable to Germany, it ir bound to facilitate d GOtnprehensive settlement by Japan of til
China incident and this, they believe, would eliminate future anxieties. Although it is said,
that CHIKN YU JIN° had urged Chungking to join Britain, the United States, and Soviet
Russia and proclaim oppceitton to both Japan and Germany, Inasmuch as Communist
STALIN i& a :^aginatic f/mm^i there is a passibiJity flf big seeing, bc&»re It is loo lirte, the

Trans. 7-S-41

July 1, 1941

Circular "/ 1373.
Message from
Hongkong #313,
June 28.

THE ' MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOK

inevitability of Russia's defeat and of his compromising with GermaAy. Since Germany has no
intention of annihilating Russia, it is a question whether these two countries will fight to the
end. In view of such possibilities, it is unwise for both Japan and China to be swayed by emotion

*Kana spelling for CHEN YU-4BN (EUGENE CHBNX a iaiinfeeir the. EcasirtSve Yi^-sad fbEmsr^ Ba»ig»
Minister in the Chinese Government.

"Kana spelling for YEN HUl CHING {W. W, YEN), Chinese Ambassador to U.S.S.B,
°Kana spelling for CHAO CHI-LU (?}. head of the GDV«mment of Kianisu Ktovinoe.
^Kaua spelling fbf HSU GMUNO-CttlH, kspecteaf and memter of the N*tian«liat "Bw^..

Trans, 7-10-41

Ho. 696

FROM; Tokyo July 1, 1941

TO: Nanking, Hgjikow, Shanghai^TisatiTOi^Pekiiig, Hsmking, and Cir , # 1376.

Canton

(Metiaage from Hongkong #314, June 28.)
Re my #813".

1. Although Chungking officials are somewhat worried &f fear that Japan might concentrate
her energ>' in prosecuting her policy toward Chungking now that she has been freed completely
from the Russian menance, it is clear that the Chinese foreign policy will be carried out with
greater facility than heretofore. They consider it best to formulate a policy by first ss/SS^^e^^H^^
Japan's attit;jde and also by observing the development of the war situation. There are some
who advocate Chungking's taking sides with Britain and the United States and severing
relations with Germany and Italy; but the great majority are of the opinion that they should
wait and see. Such being the case, the central authorities have issued an order to the respective
organs of public opinion advising them to refrain from publishing opinions too much in favor
of either Germany or Russia (the foregoing is CF) .

2. Various foreign representatives in Chungking, and, above all, the Soviet Ambassador PA*
are extremely active. On the 24th, PA* proposed a Chino-Soviet alhance to the Foreign 0th ce.
To this the Foreign Office replied that the propo^ would have to be referred to the various
section chiefs upon their taking their respective posts, and to the National Defense Conference.
It is the opinion of the Foreign Minister that in principle there is no objection to concluding
the alliance, but inasmuch as the British and American attitude toward Soviet Russia lies in
their desire to cooperate with Russia in the European war, it is important that China wait and
observe what future developments might be. Referring to this question, GAN KEI Km" on the
25th sent a telegram to the Foreign Office to the effect that Soviet Russia's diplomacy being
— - — , it is an object of odium to the various European nations, and so Soviet Russia is likely
tb disintegrate; and that inasmuch as further aid from Soviet Russia is a matter of question,
these factors should be taken into consideration in adjusting Chungking's relations with that
country. Furthermore, it is said that the British Ambassador had made some sort (rf pw^jS^fA.
to the Soviet Ambassador with a view to attracting Japan (please refer to my # 315") .

3. On the 18th, CHIANG KAI SHEK appomted to governorship for SHENSHI Province,

relieved StIO TES BUN' of his jjoliticsl siofciea and put hta in ch&rge Oif twelve divi^0ns prin-

A-355

cipally for the purpose of defending that region, and entrusted him with the entire responsi-
bility of watching the developments in ENAN', However, since the commencement of the

Eusso-German war, CHIANG has softened the demands made of the 18th Army and has

been taking the attitude that it would be sufficient if the Army does not rebel against the

Chungking authorities, Furthermore, he has requested MO TAKU TO* to come to for the

ptirpc^ of directly negotiating the question ui joint action. Also, it is said that he has promised to
consider the demand made by SHU ON RAI'' for the payment of stipends covering the months of
May and June, a demand which SHU based on the f act that his army had strictly observed the

"Not available.

'PANYUSHUKIM, Biwsian Ambassador to Chungking,

*Kana spelling Sw^ffllBtn CHING (W.W. YEN), Chinese Amtinmdw to Ruiais.
"^n, 696A.

*ltana spelling for CHIN AG TING-WEN, Comnlaflaw (TttleStlltttteft,

'K.ina spelling for YENAN, a town in north central China, Kansu Provmee.
*Kana spelling for MAO TSE-TUNG, Chief of Communist Party.

1Va»9. 7-5-41

FROM: Tokyo June 30, 1941

TO: #1362.

Circular

Message from Hongkong #315, June 28. Report.

TRI SO HA" who arrived at on the 213th in order to assume the position as director of

the seven great newspapers of the Seiji* chain, as well as the manager of the LO library (refer
to page 405 of Who's Who and to my letter #323',) spoke confidentially to an agent of this office
NYO JIN Sl^ (a member of the educational committee and one who was an especially good
terms with TRI in the days of the Gkyu Wo Nippo") as follows:

1. On the 2l8t, the day before the war began between Germany and the Soviet Russia, the
British Ambassador in Rome, acting in accordance with instructions from London, conferred
with the Soviet Ambassador and said, "Britain would lifce toseethe threat on the eastern border
of Soviet Russia eliminated and assure the British colonies on the Pacific safety by, jointly
with Russia, urging Chungking to compromise with Japan on condition that the latter with-
draw from the Asi&". To this the Soviet Ambassador replied on the 23r^t, stating that he was
speaking on instructions which he had sought from Moscow. He said, "While on the other hand
there is no posiabiHty of Japan withdrawing from the Axis, the Chungking Government
cannot believe that Japan wo^ld submit. Consequently, until Japan's attitude becomes
definite, Soviet Russia does not wish to take any positive step regarding questions in the Far
East. It is not that Soviet Russia considers it advisable to regard the Japanese-Soviet treaty
■m imptfftant, but that the Japanese-Chinese war is an itepomiat factor kt present in keeping
Japan from aiding the other Axis Powers".

The two diplomats conferred for four days without Coming to an agreement (PA' also
adiaitted tfcat tMittEl^ Ambassiwior ^rtfened with the Soviet AinbaasiidoBry

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF FEAKL HAKBOR

2. On the 23rd the Chinese Communist Party wired Chungking a message expressing its
friendly attitude toward Soviet Russia, demanding the closing of German and Italian Embassies
as well as Consulates, the expulsion of Germans and Italians from China, and promising full
cooperation with Chungking in the war. On the other hand, the pro- German Faction lea^fffit
SHU KA KA* urged the govermnent to confer with both German and Italian authorities before
announcing its stand.

'Kana spelling.
'Probably "Star" chain.
"Not available.

^Kafta Bpellijig te Peng Jen-Chih,

'Kansapelling, a newspaper,

'PottyuBbukin, Russian Ambassador to Chungking.

Trans. 7-5-41

FROM; Tokyo August 4, 1941

Shanghai #782.

According to intelligences received by the Mitsui branch office in Soerabaja, it is understood
that they are planning to transship East Indian rubber at Shanghai, exporting it from there to
Vladivostok. Furthermore, according to a military wire from Shanghai, the Soviet is buying
p^tTQleum from agents of British and American firms in your city, and it is thought that they
may try to transport it to Vladivostok. Please investigate and report the truth of the matter.

Trans. 8-6-41

FROM: Beyoglu June 26, 1941

TO: Kaboul Message to Tokyo

#117.

1. Yesterday, the 25th, a treaty of non- aggression was signed by Germany and Turkey. It is
thought that Turkey would watch developments for a time and eventually become a member
of the Axis both in name and faet. • -

2. On the 23rd, Turkey declared her neutrality toward the German- Soviet war and is now
endeavoring to keep herself from being embroiled in it. Expecting that this war would even-
jM^ Stiminate the iong-st^diog t^i6^ .^^UlSt ^ii^

w^eome the outbreak.

S; It is generally believed that aiter fightuig Russia, Germany would advance southward
ftom CAUCASUS'* through IRAQ and SYRIA and attack EGYn\ On the 25th, what is pur-
ported to be a military expert's view, was published in the London A-l, according to which it is
quite possible that German mechanized forces will proceed from IRAN through BALUCHIS-
and press on toward the Indian border, and already there are miti^ uSIt^ <$llJUBiall^
wtakii^i^^elSF inIBAi^J . This arUcle has attracted a great deal of interest,

° A division of Russia bci wC'l:ii t he Black and CaBpip9;|S|i^.
' An area in southwestern Asia, west of India.

A-357

No. &99

FEOMj Ankara July 29, 1941

TO: Tokyo #152.

X. Piecing together converaations with the Italian and German Ambassadors and other offi-
cials it seems that there is no doubt that Germany is only waiting till she has delivered a knock*
out blow to Russia to require Turkey to join the Axis and permit transit of troops and occu|}ation<
Ambassador Papen is urging submission and appears rather optimistic.

Furthermore, it is an established fact that Germany is only waiting till the German army
iitVades the Caucasus to land troops and supplies at Trabzan on the Black Sea and cross Turkish
t^itory and effect a liaison there. Regardless of the course that the above negotiations take
"fHirkey will have to make clear her attitude and course of action very soon.

2. On the other hand England and Russia are spreading propaganda to the effect that Crer-
nvan;^^ is going to attack Turkey, but Turkey is expecting the collapse of Russia and would wel-
ediaeit so she is not much njoved by the propaganda, I think.

No. 700

FROM: Ankam . July 12, 1941

TO: Tokyo # im.

Since the beginning of the German-Russian conflict, for awhile 'IXirkish newspapers main-
tained a very cautious attitude. Since then, however, they have begun to make manifest their
gradually increasing anti-Russian feeling and their opinions with regard to the superiority of
the German troops. It is becoming clear that with regard to Russia, their lon^-htirhored resent-
ment against her is gradually gaining support. Recently, LITVINOFF in a speech referred cyni-
cally to the Turks who felt themselves secure in Nazi guarantees and thus continued to main-
tain neutrality. The Turkish radio on the 11th manifested its resentment in a deliberate
attempt to refute such an attitude, but there are not a few aesfis^ajwrs who violently attack
this tendency. On the 12th, the influential JUMA-FURIETO' M9'tte' ©titer papers were ordered
to discontinue publication for some days.

The tendency is, as the German -Russian war develops, for the anti- Russian feeling to gain
considerable strength, particularly in regard to the CAUCASUS question mentioned in my
# 126'. Furthermore, while this trend is going on, it is clear that tije genK^al pro-GeEip«a,
tendency is gaining strength.

'Kana spelling.

Trans. 7-17-41

/

(

I

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROtJND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 701

$5ft^lfs Tokyo July30a&41
TO: Hsinking #437.

Strictly Secret.

Message # 146 from Ankara,

(Parti of 2)

The present situation in the Near East and the outlook for the future are as follows:

a. For the moment an all-solemn silentness reigns over the Near East because of the neu-
trality of Turkey and Syrian armistice, but after occupying the Caucasus it is probable '^St
Germany will traverse Iran or go through Turkey to attack Iraq. Aa a matter of fact, everyone
expects war to break out in the Near East in the autumn and to last far into the winter.

Iraq is the key to the defense of Egypt and India and its importance has therefore increaei^'
tremendously. Not long ago Britain put General WAVELL in charge of the defense of Indii.,
including Iraq, and is doing everything possible to increase the Iraq Army, of which a German
Attache told me that there is about one division in the neighborhood of Basra. The GeinnaS
Italian Attaches have just told me that during the last part of June from 4l!,00fl t© 4e|$9&Bs|i^
soldiers left the British Isles, headed for Basra, This I think to be a fact.

b. On July i9th the German Naval Attache said to me, "Tiu-key is stepping lively to ke^
out of trouble. She is playing for time and avoiding giving over to either London or Berlin, but
if Iraq becomes the object of attack, Ankara will no longer be able to mark time as she is doing
today. The reason is obvious. Both Great Britain and Germany will naturally present ulti-
matums demanding that troops be allowed to traverse the country."

Trans. 8-1-41

No, 702

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hsmking

July ao, 1941

(Part 2 of 2)

'*Aa a result Ankara can do one of two things— refuse both or decide upon vrhmh, to yield to.
And in either event the inevitable outcome is likely to be war."

Doesn't this show how indomitable are the intentions of the Germans? I cannot see any re-
course for Turkey but to submit to them. Look at how the Germans act. This shows that no one
can dilly-dally with them. In my belief, once again far beyond the expectations of the laity,
Germany will draw her sword and with the rapidity of lightning strike Turkey to the heart. So
far, however, I have nothing to go on but supposition. Ntjveriheless, it is certain that up to now
Turkey's attitude towards Germany has been far from pleasing to the Berlin ofhcials and, in
order to carry out her policies im this part ietf *lbe W^liS|,liieN^|Se$I^

I believe that the time of political activity is about over dt^::]iiittti!<t ji^ti9ai.||'J3$ar at hand.
Relayed to Vichy, — — , — » , and Bagdad.

Trans. 8-1-41

A-359.

No.r03

fSSC^Mt Berlin tftiijetT, 1041

TO: Tak3«j

With Hungary declaring war today ^^^l^'ilifeS Italy preparing to send its troops to the eastern
lldttie fronts, the greater part of the ISutitJipeail countries are about to participate, directly, in
1^ 3#Br. Although it appears that the German military heads did not ififeise^farily welcome
faiituation (see my #760°), as it is clear from the declaration Hitler made to the German

|e on the^<^ Germany moved aj^iinst Soyiet Russia, and also from the German Foj^gp
6fflc^ liiote' Soviet govemtti^,^ette «^^e objectives of this war is to save world ^IPktirfe
from Bolshevism which to Hitler is not simply an idle excuse but a most sincere aspir;sf itm,
and for which reason, it was intended that the forces of other European countries join the Ger-
man crusade against Bolshevism. Not only must Japan not relax in her efforts to promote
Japanese and Manchurian commerce and to establish supremacy in East Asia, but she is also
Bi^rally obligated to support this war by virtue of that spirit which prompted her to take tbe
initiative 'iB,'^^cludicg an anti-Comlatern pacilmll^^ ' ' '

IVans. 6-30-41

FROM: Rome (Horikiri) June 25, 1941

TO: Tokyo #404.

With regard to the war with the Soviet, the Italian Propaganda Ministry gave the follo*ijig
instructions to Italian newspaper editors on both the ( date)" and the ( date)''.

a. Otdfir of the Cdatej)"

1. Point out the inevitability of the war.

2. P(3Wit out that the war against the Soviet is based upon ideological differences and
"realtS6litik.'» '

3. Point out that the demands of the Soviet, particularly the demands against the Bal-
kans,, were definite threats against the safety of Italy.

- 4. ' ^ftt^tflte»<«S*imil^6ift^ for solidarity betw€eB#S*m«&yiWiiW^

5. Answer the refutation appearing in the Tass of the ( date)''

6. Use the actual statements of HITLER and RIBBENTROP.
7» Awidtitiell^ia(Wl|iS&W^

b. Ordiers of the ( date). *

1. Do not refer to the attitude <^ VaiidfOS countries, either allied with Italy or on friendly
relations with her, toward the war with the Soviet until public rtn4»itoeKaftMt' lM8i'ie«l'*aiaide
by those countries of their attitude.

2. Do not refer to the fundamental attitude of the various Baltic States with regard to

' Dates marked IjP.^ I^sg^..

Trans. 7-&-41

A-360

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

FROM: Ra«i@^SEBSI%l# .fe^^'iM
TO #304.

1. I had MASE interview PURUNASU" regarding the Russo-German war. I understand tha%
PC said that no information has come from the German Government to tjMS It^ian Govettt-
mmt regarding this question, not imB fhfe #e^atf MSd^^mJfl^fl* ialked Ifir IMisin He^
said that the Italian Government had informed the Soviet Ambassador in Rome
Government has been in touch with the Soviet Union since 5; 30 A.M. on the 22ad*

2. On the other hand, accordmg td an !nt«M^16i^'tii^p»^ f i»y|i»^ak^iihiat Oermany haa
recent ly transferred the work of guarding the occupied territories it) the Balkstis tO' the Italians.

I am sending you this information for the present,
itela^ed to Berlin.

Trans. 6-24^1

No. 706 _ _ . . ^

FROM : Berlin ( OaJma) July 29, 1 94 1

TO: Tojcyo #958 (Separate

" * — message).

(!) Anxious know public reaction in India and your personal reaction to Russo-German war.

(2) Expect American pressure bring about liberal policy in India and further attempt for
compromise with Congress be made by British Government despite failure of present attempt.
Please adopt all possible measures for preventing such compromise. If we continue our na-
tional struggle, then independence will come before long.

(3) Even if America enters this war, Germany will not be beaten this time. Germany has
whole of Europe within her grip now, her internal economic situation is good. India's hope for
independence lies in victory of Tripartite powers .

(4) I intend recruiting some friendly powers for financial assistance. Please arrange country-
wide propaganda against compromise with British Government.

(5) Germany hopes for victory over Russia in a few weeks. Thereafter, I expect Germany to
make pronouncement about India's independence. After this, I intend appealing to our coun-
trymen to cooperate with the Axis powers and fight England. Will this appeal meet with pub-
lic approval or disapproval? Big upheaval in India should be started after Axis declaration
regarding India's independence. Cabinets for centre and provinces should be prepared from
now and they will have to take over administration at proper time.

(6) Ask BAKSHI to send some reliable unmarls^ ffi^ il^i "SW^ 3^
rades in frontier province and tribal territory.

(7) Japan's active policy in the Far East including IndO'China should be welcomed by India

national objective.

Note: ^^gielf 1145, 2 Aug. states Gayda wrote as follows in Giornale D'ltalia, today: "The
Indian Fkifeljadna is one of those which must be solved satisfactorily at the conclusion of the

A-361

present wai. This has never been the British aim because it is contrary to Britisb policy that
bidift^outd have indepeiideit«t^Ao .jlKiB m^ii ius*"

Very Secret.

From Yoshitomi" to Head of East Asia Section:

1. While the Soviet will be forced to retreat for a while in the war with Germany, they have
extensive territory and are rich in resources, both of man-power and materials. Furthermore,
the fact that in three months winter will be setting in, must be taken into careful (K^nsyUkFatiiOp
in trying to forecast the future of a war between Germany and the Soviet.

The thorough-going propagAsd&rtac education that has been carried on for 24 years, ever
since the Revolution, having now resulted in the rather deep permeation of the Communistic
ideas into the minds of all classes, it is very dangerous to assume that a revolution will break
out in the Soviet immediately upon the outbreak of the war, and that the Stalin regime will col-
lapse. At the same time, I think that it will be well for the Imperial Government to assume a
very prudent attitude in respect to this German- Soviet war, and, observing the transitions in
the situation for a while, gradually determine the position which we should take.

2. That is, I think it highly important that we guard against anything like taking advantage
of the German-Soviet war to force a settlement of pending questions between Japan and the
Soviet, and Manchukuo and the Soviet, or taking the offensive agaiirat the Soviet; but, at the

same time, utilize the fact that the Soviet has been forced to to concentrate our full

powers on the settlement of the China problem and thus at the earliest possible time strengthen
the poUtical and military position of the Empire as regards Britain, the United States, and
the Soviet.

3. Therefore, we should studiously avoid anything that would cause the Soviet to feel the
least suspicion with regard to oiu* intentions, or that would excite a sense of precaution against
Japan. {According to military intelligences received, it seems that the Soviet have already
begun various military precautions, including the building of pill boxes, on their eastern
borders.) With regard to such matters as pending questions between Manchukuo and the
Soviet, etc., I think it rapper, to contiiwiijaegoWfttiQiagaD. a feieadiy mawDier on the basis of our
settled policies. ^ " ' ' • ' ^ " * " ' ' - - - -

The above is not very well worded, but it is sent for your information. In regard to paragraphs
2 and 3abava,tJj^ M.wm^mM^m^m^ witom^p^s.

tTrans. 8-2-41

No. 707

-'^WSM'. Hsinking
TO: Tokyo

June23i^*i
#354.

Trans. 6-26-41

A-362

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEAKL HARBOR

No. 708

FROM: Tokyo {Jap Foreign Minster) June 25, 1941

TO: Moscow (Koshi) ,

Action Circular #l31St.

(3 parte— complete )

Yesterday, the 23rd, at 4 p.m* iflittoft)ll«iior Smetanio" called on me (MatsueAa) and the
following conversation ensued:

The ^attaeiBador presented me with Molotov's dedaration, and said: "I presume that you
know in general what it is all about." I replied, "From Ambaasador Tatekawa's** reports, I have
a general idea; however, 1 will read the report". He inquired as to whether it was Japan's inten-
tion to honor the Neutrality Pact. I replied: "As I have stated in my conversations on 22 April,
following my return to Japan from my European tour, the Neutrality Pact has no relation to- -
nor influence on — the Japanese- Germ an -Italian Tripartite Pact. I believe that Stalin and
Molotov are aware of this point. As to the attitude the Japanese Government will take toward
the present turn of events, the government itself is not clear, and opinions are not crystallized. I
think this point will come up perhaps in the joint aessioa tomorrow (the 25th). It's necessary to
get in touch with the German and Italian Govemmenisi8li^]y||^i>ilC^^

The Ambassador said: "Am I to understand that yoiy? ||;J5gpmment's attitude i?; undeter-
mined?" I replied: "Certainly; however, it is very clear that Um#ill have no intiuence on Japan's
stand as determined by the Tripartite Pact."

The Ambassador then inquired: "How do you interpret article 2 of the Neutrality Pact?" I
replied: "The Tripartite Pact is the keynote of our foreign policy, and Japan is certainly not going
to make any decision that conflicts with that. Recently, when I talked with Stalin, I told him that
Japan was not going to collaborate with Britain and America, but was going to walk along with
the Axis. At that time, I did not anticipate any such thing as a Russo-German war. Had there
been any indications of such an occurrence, I would not have hesitated to undertake the role of
mediation. How has it come about that I was not given this opportunity, nowthat war has broken
out?"

The Ambassador aalijf^&BS^-ieiHrried out the Russo-German1j(|l!|*^ent whole-heartedly, and
the Germans had no cause for complaint. In spite of this, they attack^. iSildU^ly, wifelM}'iit.#
declaration of war. It was like a peal of thunder out of a clear sky."

To this 1 replied, "If you read Hitler's pronouncement, you will see that l£e*il!» ^mething to
say, also. Which contention is just as difficult to determine at this early date.

"To speak trankly, just why did Ambassador Cripps' return suddenly to England. Is it not
possible to Coni«tiictf«v<tlli^ th)i^;%ltS'«{K^

statement?" . ^ . ,

"The Ambassador said, "Foreign Ambassadors return to their home COtxntriCNS S^&t Stt in-
tended term of service for a period of rest. It was for this purpose and not for some shameful
talk that Cripps returned. The Germans made no complaints before they attacked, but as a
device for the attack, they listed a lot of reasons which were all merely inventions, and if
these are considered impartially, it can be seen that no real tesmn for the attack exists."

"I replied, "The Tripartite Pact is the axis of our national policy, and according to this
Japan has thrown her fate in with Germany and Italy. On the other hand, 1 have always
worked for the improvement of relations between Russia and Japan, and at present an out-
break of hostilities between these two countries would be most unfortunate indeed. .A^ ;i mai ler
of fact, I had the report of the German Ambassador last evening, and the Italian Ambassador
has jtiat called on me and questioned me/'

A-363

The Ambassador said, "The British Ambassador also worked directly for the improvement

of R^fio- Japanese relations. Of this fact lam personally well aware, and I am thankful for it,
■m |HPe also the Russian people. 1 hope that your government will take an objective view of the
'^^^S^$im,^i^^^f&^^1i*i iii ^ lairness. Ift any event, i'vi^-i&B^'^['^-i^i^'^'mie^-ia^.
t^U^^aSiuiTe your frank opinion." ' ' - * • • ■

I^to^cd him for his consideration, and the interview cloaedL

° Russian Ambassador to Japan,
'Japanese Ambassador to U.S.S.R..
'British Ambassador to U.S.S.B.

Trans. 6-27-41

No. 709

FROM: Vichy (Japanese Ambassador) June 25, 1941

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #322.

On 24 Jun#^^MOGORO$^'.til«^€«ivlel hmhsmasMi<m^iSimt^h^ said
that if there were no objections, he would like to inquire my opinion regarding the stand Japan
would take in view of the outbreak of Russo-German hostilities. I replied that to date I had
had no instructtons from my gtrvemment, but according to my o>puiion, Japan would consider
conditions very carefully, as a signatory of the Tripartite Pact, and also of the Neutrality Pact.
The Ambassador went on to say that the Soviet for her part had observed strictly not only the
sacred treaty between herself and Gefmany, but also the ix&de pact, up to this day. And now
that Germany had suddenly attacked her, conditions were as serious as they were in 1905 and
aptin in 1918. He said be hoped that Japan and Russia could maintain the friendly relations
indicated by the Neutrality Paet.

In answer to my question, he said that he had called on the local .American Ambassador,
Admiral Leahy, bvtt that the said ambassador had not made a clear statement of the Ameri-

i'^l6^S^mmm&, dMno^ nak^a dedan^Q«i of sympatic

TraiK. 6-26-41

No. 710

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Ministef) ' iteBe2B,1941

TO: Rome (Koshi) #161.

On the afternoon of the 24th, the Italian Ambassador called on me and notified me that
Italy was at war with the Soviet, and then asked me how I regarded Japan's neutrality pact
with Russia. I replied that the neutrality pact had no connection with — or influence on —
the Tri-Partite Pact, and that while during the course of my conversations with Stalin and
Molotov I made no direct reference to the Tri-Partite Pact, still the fact that it is the pivot
<rf Japanese foreign relations and all Japanese international policy is influenced by it must have
been clear to them at the time of the negotiations regarding the neutrality pact, and I anqi foift
that Stalin and Molotov can have had no grounds for a misunderstanding on this point,

IHirtbermore, in the published conversation following niy return to Japan, Uiifi point wm
itetid v«y'^to%., Ag-Wi^^ attitude fiiat1i#|apBflE«»e 0^

A-364

THE "MAGIC bACKGROLND ut FEAliL HAHBOR

time, I can say that no policy has as yet been determined, but as soon as a poHcy is decided upon,
I will announce it to the German and Italian Governments, and, if necessary, I will talk with you
regarding it.

HeaS'^ transmit this to 6a;£ftj|^tliav« seat ife 1^11^^

Trans. 6-26-41

No. 711

FROM: Vladivostok (Ota) Jane 26, 1944

TO: Tokyo - • - . #2S7.

In the event a situation such as you have described in the last part of your # 167" arises, I
intend to take the following emergency measures in order to preaerve seci;ecy, and so 1 would
like to have your permission in this matter,

1. Both codes and machines will be burned or destroyed at the last moment when their
coaatiinQ^duse is considered dangerous,

^. hi this time, the following telegrams will be burned as quickly as possible:

Telegrams from and to this point consisting of bound volumes covering the period 1934
to 1936, inclusive (those for the year 1937 were destrajred or September 11^ mitti jfiB»
permission), and the period 193S and 1939, inclusive, ' " * •

Also telegrams to and frran (Berlin ?) in bound volumes firom the p^k>d 1934 to 1969,
inclusive.

3. Telegrams and letters fyx 1940 and thereafter will be burned simultaneously with 1.

I^p«i9 ^oii^ iNifip€«ees<^it!f^i^

FROM: Moscow , June27,3M.

TO: Tokyo #777.

(Parts 2 and 3 of 3 part message — Part 1 not available.)

I explained that, late in April, some such statement was believed to have been made by
tte German government to Ambassador Oshima but it certainly was not made in the form of
an oflScial statement. While I myself refused to believe the report, the rumors kept on
mounting day by day. Finally, I sought your opinion regarding it and much to my satisfaction
I was reassured by Your Excellency's reply that it was nothing more than just rumor.

If the Japanese government did know of the German decision, I am certain that it was not
until a few days before the hostilities began, for the courier to (jermany was sent from Tokyo
on June 20th, and two of our officials were on their way to Germany and to the Balkans, and
one of our secretaries and a clerk were sent to Iran on the 21st. Therefore, it is qu£|^^6^^^l^
able that my government had no advanced information regarding the German plan.

It is quite possible that some time in the pa@t Foreign Minister Matsuoka did warn
Germany not to do anythmg of thu|:i^,^.^^1t^ Mm^is!^^f<i;>#^ap||^^^n m
this subject from my government,

Thereupon, Molotov smd that since there is nothing in the Tripartite Pact regarding Soviet
Russia he felt that Japan was not obligated to oppose Russia.

He then continued, "Since we aie neighbors, we should not consider only the immediate
interests but should also think in teams ef futUW intedfe^, and it is my aincar© hope i^t
both sides will refrain from taking steps which will eSed our ]]}tlii^»} good relating, wMM
recently have taken a turn for the better."

1 told him that as an Ambasaad^v tasiA ako as a partieipailt ill l^aM^ of the
Neutrality Pact, I definitely expect that the Japanese governmwat w3I respect the Neutrality
Pact and I also expressed my agreement with his remark that no ilC^>^ould be taken to up-
^ ttie good relations now enjoyed by both countries, and indicated that we expect Sovtet
Russia to refrain, hereafter, from issuing propaganda designed to agitate the laboring cl^s,
and also suggested that greater facility be extended to issuing entry visas, (Your #660').
MSolotov then replied that he will see to it that early reply will be given regarding these points.

I then asked him whether the report circulated just before the war about Russian- British
alliance was just another rumor. He replied that there is absolutely no truth to this report
md aesured me that no negotiations to this eflfect had been carried out. However, he said
since the hostilities began arrangements Ijave- hsm made Jtqi 'havt^ &i^^t^iSs^ i^^^pjf
Iti«pt»8e of negotiating suchan alliance.

"Not 9vfiilablfc

Trans. 7-3-41

No. 713

FROM; Moscow June 27, 1941

■ #.m. ■

Due to the most recent move recklessly taken by Garmany, no doubt you are confronted with
a nation divided in opinion. I appreciate the difficult task which faces you. Though I can see
this difficult situation, I must admit that I seem to be unable to conjure up any brilliant plan
sad for this reason I have kept silent on the matter.

I can see that we should make some gesture to show that we are not cold to the terms of the
Tripartite Pact. At the same time, with our troops so scattered as they are at present, we
probably could not oflfer Germany our complete military cooperation.

In the final analysis, it is my opinion that we should maintain the status quo until such a
time that our forces in Manchukuo become an actual threat in the East Siberia area. In the
meantime, in my opinion, there seems to be no other coui^ than to exert our every effort to
bring the China Affair to a close.

I realize that the above suggestion is exceedingly short of being a comprehensive course of
action, but at times, having no definite plan is a plan in itself.

The U.S.S.R. and the Soviet armed forces have already exposed their weakness. Apparently,
the Soviet forces are falling right in with the German force's strategy. It seems to me that there

is a necessity for the German forces to after the next three or four days, but there are no

guarantees against a radical change being brought about in the situation.

Please advise me of all the points of which 1 should be aware as well as of the attitude of the
goveranwnt. (ff tlie go-vemmsat has Mot determined its definite atSude, please infom
of ^ ^xi^ral fxtnd.)

A-366

THE "MA^IC" BACKeBOUND OF FEARL iJARBOB

The entire staff here is in good health -and Mgfa spirits, and is preparing itself for any
eventuality.

Translator's note: Abovif Ofethe views «f Lt Gfto. Tftl^kawa, I.J,A, (ret.), present Ambaffl^r
dor to the U.S. S.R.

Trans. 7-10^1

No. 714

FROM: Tokyo June 27, 1941

TO: Bmhn

f Abstract)

Regarding your #767".

On the ocdttsito of my conversation wife AifilWlssadMr Ott, I explained that at the time of my
visit to Germany, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop said nothing about seeking Japan's aid in the
event of German-Soviet war, therefore, I assumed that for one reason or anotlier tiermany was
not particularly anxious to have Japan take part in this war. Since the impression I got from
Ambassador Osima's message was that Ribbentrop is somewhat puzzled because Japan is not
making necessary preparations despite her intention to take part in the war, I felt it necessary
to explain the above circumstances to Ambassador Ott.

*Not available.

Trans. 7-3-41

Nil, 715 — fc, .

FROM: Rome June 30i If*!

TO: Tokyo #415.

Parti of 2\

Now that Germany and her AUies are about to conquer European Russia, I suppose that you
have aheady considered flie ^Itcy ^ shmrldiliM m!/»)Amii^m^^S^^1Sff '

you the following as a supplement to my # 377*.

1. The order issued by the United States Government for giving aid to Russia gSe^ 1^
CMlAMGI'Tegime a great t^ht. BWiih«*l*He*i!; improvement af relations betwe«i Japan and
Soviet Russia has contributed immensely toward enabling Russia to move a part of her troops
eastward. Because of these developments, the Japan-Soviet Neutrality Agreement may be
said to have tost its historical signiflcance. Though there is no need of Japan adhering strictly
to this agreement, it is clear for the present cabinet to immediately adopt an anti-Soviet
policy — even if the government in doing so attempts to maintain the appearance of justice
and integrity by placing the blame on Bolshevism — would give the impr^aion that Japan is an
(^portunist country and so would have a bad effect not only on the future of the country but also
on the integrity of the country; for, the government, in total disregard of the country's traditional
policy and ideology, has been spreading propaganda to the effect that fifieadly relations
between Jj^liift «w|»<^j^ ]^!«%ipi,f^ ^fP^^IWi TT|f^«§<, it^ aecessaiy

A~367

that the fov^ment ta^ **?-^ ^tude Mi*iS4^ili3Niii%^«^ militsiy mixm «^at

•See 11,716.
'Not available.

No. 716

FROM: Rome June 30*1941
TO: #411.

(Uigent.)

.^art2of2r.

2. The Alliance Powers, primarily Germany and Italy, have as their objective in fighting
Russia the overthrow of Bolshevism and the saving of the civilization of Europe. Needless to
«^f^i^;dfei^«4eti!on of Bolshevism coincides ivith our nationifl gaei if we, too, fight Russia,
that would be our primsay aim, but we also have something else to bear in mind. We should
eradicate this one greet root of evil which is such a threat to the peace of E^t Asia. We ought,
forthennore, as I see it, to take measures to fwevent third powere fimii is^sa^ Asiatic Russia
as a base whence third countries can assist Russia. This would strengthen the unshakable
basis which we are trying so hard to establish for continued stability in greater East Asia. I
think that if we would now do our part to prepare the ground for the new era and make it cleta
that we stand with the Axis, it would strengthen the morale of our people at home and make
it easier for third powers to understand the adamant position we are taking. I also think that it
would contrihute to a happi^ readjustaiee£. # f^tlot^ with Oerman^ MMs pans
concerning the future of Soviet territory in greaJtfir East Asia and laid our schem^^, «^t is to
come subsequent to the war with Russia.

This message has heen sent to Berlin (?) and Moscow (?),

•See JI, 715.

Tnattfc 7-3«41

FROM:
TO:

Berlin (Osima)
Tokyo

June 28, 1941

(Parti of 2.)

The fact is, various informations sent to me, as well as European newspaper articles which
have appeared from day to day recently, deal with frequent meetings of the Japanese Cabinet
and other organizations, and these have caused the reader to he concerned over the mdecisive
attitude of the Japanese Government and to arouse extreme anxiety in the hearts of the
Japanese living abroad as to what the future holds for Japan. Already even the smallest group
of liiirot>iifii9; ^n^p^ ^^'jtayil ^ir respective attitudes clear, ailil^ 1^ the Japanese

A-m

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

government not to have been able to make its attitude known, despite the fact that Japan is
an important member of the Three- Power Alliance and also the fact that she led the way in
concluding an anti-Communist agreement in 1936, is indeed a matter of great re^et inasmuch
as it affects the honor as well as the integrity of the covintiy. I well understaneft^^iSf this is parfily
due to the difficult situation existing within Japan and I realize your solicitude, but this is
not the time for arguments. What is needed is a bold decision. I beg of you to decide pur
attitude as soon as possible. - - • V •

Please litmisait thia message to both the Army and tifae Nayy,

. . Trans.

No. 718

mOM: Ankara

TO: Berlin, Moscow

Action Tokyo as # 123.

(1) It is clear that a complete collapse of the U,S,S>R. is inevitable and it is my oimiidn Hs^
this will tato^fiefe It! i^m^^lif&&is&.M:^im %^^ urgent task st

this time is to do away, once and for all, wiflktfc#:Sci^^fiB«aS^ a firm fotmdatioB

for the establishment of the Greater East Asia.

While I re^^ th*^ Aiie to <rar peculiar domestic situation, om- govemm^t Sad td lateifdfete
eaatimi and reserve in all matters since the beginning of the China Affair, However, I am im-
pelled by the urgency of the times to submit herewith my humble views for yo\jr consideration,

(2> The obligation to respect the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact might be given as an
argument against declaring war on Russia. However, such an argument is without logic. As
indicated by the spirit of the Tripartite Pact, the Neutrality Pact presupposed freindly rela-
tions between Gesrmany and the U.S.S.B. Now that the situation has changed the same obli-
gation no longer exists. As a matter of fact, it is generally expected here that sooner or later
Jajpan will join in the war, and this is being played up variously in the newspapers as the

(3) Of course, the contention that we must act with caution because the U.S. may enter the
war or they might enforce embargoes or trade pressure is not something that has just now had
its beginning; and if in such an opportunity we are still going to allow ourselves to be restrained
by the U.S., the destiny of the Empire is sealed, and the effect on the morale of our people will
be most serious. As I view it, if we take advantage of this splendid providential opportunity,
we should surely be able to make our operations against the Soviet decisive in a very short
time, and even fnjm the standpoint of the U.S. it should be apparent that the collapse of the
Soviet Union would be only a matter of a short time, inasmuch as they are in a desperate
situation already, regardless of whether we enter the war or not. Therefore, I think it highly
doubtful that our participation in the war would bring on hostilities between Japan and the
U.S., or even lead to .any extremely oppressive trade measures, in view of the fact that it
miM 'fee Jt the ett^ini^h <ff the **Ifolsehviki.'' American participation in the

war is more likely to be determined by the outlook in regard to their aid-to- England program
and the prospect of the outcome of the war between England and Gm&m^t than J^i til^
situation in East Asia. Therefore, to continue to hedtate as we have'ta liKi |»ilstt^ '^'cie^
avoiding a crisis between Japan and the U.S. is sure to bring it on and lead to our falling prey to
the American schemes.

July 1, 1941
Cbnumbered.

A-369

(4) There is no need now of my callii]^ attention to the great importance of oup plans for
settling the China Incidont and pushing southward, but a clearing out of the Soviet forces
would prove one determining factor in connection with settling the incident; while it is a
reproach to us that in such a matter as t*«>l^hward advance, we are still merely loud in talk
but with no accompanying action.

(5) If we merely spend the days in arguing over such points as the above, and by long chanee
^^'fMtiiffl JBttirt «i0m*kue to the last to hold ourselves back, then we mliW*»»ift («f<f) betecoii-
ciled to the ultimate extension of Germany's influence even to the Far East.

(6) To sum it all up, it seems to he the most proper and natural thing that we shO<ald at this
time effect an out-and-out settlement of our problems with the Soviet and ttios ^riag about a
realization of the ideals of the Tripartite Alliance. The world at large is expecting this. This
must also be said to be the deep-seated conviction of our united people at home. I expect you
liflB %e taking some action, but if by any chance our movements should prove too late, with
consequences that might be comparable to the contemptible course pursued by the Soviet
Union in the disposition of Poland, any strategic advantage gained would be far outweighed
by the spiritual loss^ that would be sustained,

Therefore, I think it is h^gUy important that decisive action be taken at once, bo that tins
ejl^ortunity be not lost.

'ftans. 7-15-41

No. 719

FROM: Tokyo June 28, 1941

TO: Berlin #&75.

For sometime now you have been requesting me to send yOu instructions concerning the
policy of the Imperial Government, now that Germany and Russia have gone to war, I pray
you, be more patient. No country in the world, so long as it is not autocratic, could come to
any immediate and easy solution to a problem like this. As you know, at first to prate at ran-
dom about such a subject as that would be dangerous because important secrets might l(?ak
out. Until some decision is finally reached on this policy, it has been and still is my intention
purposely to hold my peace. However, in three or four days, I shall have some iflstmctions to
wire you which are to be transmitted to the Italian and German Ambassadors. For your infOT-
mation, I forecast this for ^ou. This message has been sent also to our Ambassador in Rome.

• " ' Trans. 7-2-41

No. 720

FROM: Berlin (Osima) June 28, 1941

TO: Tokyo - " ' ' * • #«''^

Re your #57&'.

I hear that a conference will be held within a few days. After that the Government will spur
on the people into a solid group. <It is clear 1) that faith in the destiny of the oountiy will widen.

'In which MATSUOKA teUs Berlin that in three or four days he will wire instructions ta be transmitted to the ItaUfta
wad Gertiwa AjubBsaadoTs coneeininEthfipoli^nf the Impwial Government. See U, 719.

Trana. 7-12-41

A-370

THE "M49IC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HAH60R

No. 721

iSiMr "Tokyo (MaiWKjita) July % 1941

TO: Betlin

"Ssi message which I just received looks interesting, but it was not in time for the morning
session of the Diet. In that session we decided upon our national policy, concerning which I
will send you instructions again. The German and Italian Ambassadors will both be greeted
if me at 2:00 p.m. Please tell Foreign Minister RtBBENTROP that I am very sorry that Ma
soiessfige arrived too late but that nothing can be done about it now.

"Not available.

Trans. 7-21-41

No. 722

FROM: Berlin July 2, 1^1

TO: Tokyo ' §m*

handled in Gamrnmie^^^ik

(Parti of 3)".

'^^^im^iM^^ ibe 1st, I flew to the QferiM^^^^uarters in E)ast Prussia and conferred with
Foreign Minister I^I^^NTROP. ThsA-^tlssism I Imi^ id Bi^j^. €^ ^^eoversation was aa
follows:

1. RIBBENTROP said: "As I told you yesterday morning over the telephone, I felt that now

when such world-shaking events are taking place, I wanted to communicate my most inti-
mate feelings to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA. I wanted to do this quickly so this morning I
instructed AMBASSADOR OTT to go and tell him &ankly how I felt. I could not tell you all I
wanted to say on the telephone and thjit is why I asked, yon tp come to pur lieadqa0!^;|t§|l|j.
1 wanted to talk to you personally."

2. Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP continued: "Moscow, London and Washington are
spreading propaganda to the effect that our attack on Russia was deliberate and provocative.
As a matter of fact, although it is probably true that upon contacting the German forces it was
not the Soviet that immediately began the attack, still they were concentrating a tremendous
force on their western border, planning first of all tQ Strike at Finland and Rumania. We had
found that out and feared that while we were in the midst of an attack on the British Isles they
would embark on a military venture against us.

° Part 2 not available,
'Not available.

Trans. 7-7-41

A-371

No. 723

FROM; Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: BerluA

July 2, 1941

Message to Moscow # 690.
' Oral Statement (Translation).

I take pleasure in infonning Your Excellency that Japan necessarily feels deep concern with
the German-Soviet war that has unfortunately broken out. To be frank, Japan finds herself
in the most awkward position laced with the war between Germany and Italy, her allies, on
the one hand, and the U.S.S.R. on the other, with whom she has but recently begun to im-
prove relations in sincere desire to promote and maintain good neighborliness, Japan is,
therefore, most anxious to see the termination of the hostilities at the earliest possible date,
earnestly wishing that they sia|^ Al-bp^ ^e «OffifidM ^
the Far East where she posa^s^ vital iotiifest,

Message to Moscow # 690.
Part 2 of 2.

The Japanese Government takes this opportunity to state that they do not at present feel
compelled to modify their policy towards the U.S.S.R. except to the extent of their natural
desire not to give rise to misunderstandings to their allies. It is their sincere hope that they
will be able to pursue a course of policy carefully calculated at once to serve their own interests
and to presierve the spirit of mutual trust among the allies, while maintainmg good relations
with the U.S.S.R. 1 need hardly add that their Excellencies, Messieurs STALIN and MOLO-
TOFF, may rest assured that I will do my hest but that future developments will lui^ly
decide if the Japanese Government can consistently abide by this policy.

Tokyo, July 2nd, 1941.

Not0: Text in English.

Trans. 7-5-41

No. 724

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

July 2, 1941
#588.

TVans. 7-5-41

A-372

THE "MAGIC BACKGKOUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 725 ^

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) iuly2,1941
TO: Berlin #§S6.

Parti of 2.

ORAL STAJTEMSNT.
(Translation).

Please convey the following to His Excellency HERR VON RIBBENTROP:
I have duly noted Your Excellency's request made through Ambassador General OIT in
Tokyo and Ambassador General OSHIMA in Berlin. I have taken particular care in studying^
the views set forth by Your Excellmcy in approaching the Japanese Government with the
request.

In replying, I take pleasure in stating that Japan W)^iSp&ie^>i(st all possible eventualities
MJ^ards the U.S.S.R. in order to join forces with Germany in actively combating the com-
munist menace. Japan is keenly watching developments of conditions in Eastern Siberia
in particular, determined as she is to destroy the communist system established there. It is,
I believe, hardly necessary to add that the augmentation of military preparations, among
other things, with an eye to realizing this object, together with the aim of restraining the Soviet
Bussia at the Feer Eastern and kept in the mhicKj#

the Japit$^f(ivmunent.

missed.

Trans. 7-3-41

No. 726

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 2, 1941

TO: Berlin . tm.

Part 2 of 2v

At the same time, I beg to state that the Japanese Govemmcrit have (sic) decided to secure
points d'appui in French Indo-China which will enable Japan further to strengthen her pressure
upon Great Britain and the U.S.A. In this connection, I would like to draw Your Excellency's
attention to the fact that Japan has been keeping constant vigil in the Pacific including the
southwestern ocean with a view to restraining these two powers and she will continue the efforts
and even intensify ihem, if necessary. I trust that Your Excellency is in full agreement with me
that this really constitutes a vital contribution towards our common cause, indeed no less
vital than Japan's intervention at this juncture in the German-Soviet war. Japan cannot and
will not relax her elforts in the south, which after all possesses a very important bearing upon
Utit-^ole course of the war out of which I am aMM^itconfident that Germany aiid Italy Will soon
emerge victoriously. I assure Your Excellency once again that the Japanese 6o\^Iuai^^ :i^Il.
not fail to act in accordance with the aims and spirit of the Tripartite Pact.

Wme: TextinEn^isK

A-373

No. 727

July 2, 1941

At the conference held in the presence of the Emperor on July 2nd, "The Principal Points in
the Imperial Policy for Coping with the Changing Situation" were decided. This policy con-
aiBts of the following two parts. The first part "The Policjr" and the second part "The Princi-
pal Points" (I am wiring merely the gist of the matter). Inasmuch as this has to do with
national defense secrets, keep the information only to yourself. Please also transmit the con-
tent to both the Naval and Military Attaches, t(^ether with this precaution.

1. Imperial Japan shall adhere to the policy of contributing to world peace by establishing
the Great East Aftia Sphere of Coprosperity, regardless of how the world situation may change.

2. The Imperial Government shall continue its endeavor to dispose of the China incident.

Hemy # 688\

Ambassador Smetanin called at my request at three o'clock on the afternoon of the 1st. I
told him that the Japanese government's basic policy regarding the international situation had
been decided upon at this morning's Cabinet conference.

I said that in reply to his recent inquiry the Imperial government found the situation com-
plicated, and the atmosphere tense. It was thought best to present a written statement to him
(my message # 689*) in Japanese and in English translation.

The gist of this statement is, that with reference to the German- Soviet hostilities, the
Japanese government feels that Japanese-Soviet good relations must be preserved at all costs,
and that this government wished to lend its good offices to both Germany and Russia. Because
of th6 eomplt^ty of tibe situation it ig hoped that the Soviet govenunent will exercise due
(^ution.

* 't added to the Ambassador that I bespoke his cooperations, and that his failure to do so
would disturb the situation, and i-^s^i^^; t# ttois at aU isBrt^* A similar statement from
bim would be vej^ encouraging,

The Policy.

No. 728

fltOM: Tokyo
TO: Waahingt^

#1433.

(Circular).

A-374

IW^ "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HAiiliUR

I added, however, that if war materials are supplied through the Vladivostok repon; Ger--
man^ ajkd Italy must maks^ dipilinds upon the Japanese government to s<^p this.

'Not available.

Trans. 7-7-41

No. 729

FROM; Tokyo July 10, 1941

TO: Berlin #1483(??).

[#1433]

(Circular) ,

I^Mfc Impart 1 mifia|^,)i

Action M0800W as #686, {?), [696] 3 July.

I told him that as the national policy of the Empire is based upon the Tripartite Pact, we,
naturally, cannot take any course that will interfere with the smooth operation of the Pact. On
the other hand, there is a great danger that the action of the United States may stimulate the
puhlic opinion to the point of forcing the already delicate situation of Japan to an open rapture
with the U.S.S.R. While the effect of the British action is not quite as strong as that of the
United States, if such a thing as the British-Soviet Alliance occutb, i^fe^ be necessaty Wti^i^
our policy somewhat. For this reason, I asked that Stalin and Molotov be prevailed upon not
to permit this to happen.

I further told him that, in view of the times, there are maiiy' Ms^f fatfee^Sifeat in Japl^
and suggested that discretion be used in this regard.

Whereupon, Ambassador Smetanin replied: "I fully understand the various points you have
just mentioned, and I will give carefial study to yotir written note. I am grateful to you for your
effi«?fts towards better Japanese-Soviet relations, and I am particularly happy to note that
fSxice your assumption to your post the relations between the two countries have improved
i^hendously, and many of the outstanding difficulties have been settled. It is my belief that
we can contribute much to the welfare of the world by favorable adjustment of Japanese-Soviet
Halations and I hope that greater efforts will be directed t«t tll|» «»d/'

Trans, 7-15-41

No. 730

FROM: Berlin 4<i^% 1941

TO: Tokyo #.»

Tramhtor's note: FoUoiiViQgOH^iii^lf^^ilf garbled; gist guessed at.

(Abstract)

I have recently become ill a^d find that I am unable to fulfill my duties. For this reason, will

FROM: Tokyo (Mfttsttsfet)!
TO; Berlin

July 4, mi
#607,

From the Vice-Minister.

The Foreign Ministei' was at variance with the general trend of the ForeUsi Office, and ym
see what happened as a result. Please keep this in mind.

Regarding your # 830".

Please give reconsideration regarding the matter of your desire to return home.

While I sympathize with your physical condition the effect of your deserting your post at a
time like this will be extremely unfavorable and considered quite inopportune.

It goee wi^out saying that nime^vs m free to do as be pleases ia. tMs world and our duty to
owt coimtry demands that we put a^de our phonal desires and unite in a single effort for the

|£edl<eiE:^^l^ <tibat #&^ttrai^em facing our country are fairly well understood through the
"oral statement" submitted by me to Ambassador Ott {Germany), Inmari {?) (Italy) and
Smetanin (Russia). I am also quite certain that Foreign Minister Ribbentrop will have no
difficulty in und^i^aiiic^ing our position.

The declaration of our countries concrete policy involves more than a declaration of an
opinion, it involves various problems affecting military preparations, etc., and certainly a
t»rilliant person such as Hitler can appreciate this without difficulty. It also should be clear
that the resumption of our relations with the Soviet is not due to any fondness on our part for
the U.S.S.R, In considering the various problems involved, we are forced by circumstances
beyond our control to maintain the present attitude, and I would appreciate your giving
greater consideration to this point.

Regarding yovec f^pii^nation, this requires the approval of the Emperor, and ^ J^|)CtaxitV
in view of l^e Hmk 1^ :fi|f#rattelt liis ll^iiN^^^ it, X ^«ref<»e, bfiiwil yim |e xemala
at youj post and awpetat© with me in se^g our country through these troubled titnesi

"See II, 730.The JspAmkatBeifo wn^sTti^olteKiU cmdltiimlbteto^i^

Trans. 7-22-41

No. 732

FROM: Tokyo
fOj Beriirt

July 5. 1941

hmm at once.

Trans. 7-22-41

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

(Parti of 3)",

On the evening of the 8th, your personal message was transmitted to me through Ambassa-
dor OTT. That evening I asked the Ambassador to transmit to you my humble opinion con-
cerning the views you expressed to me with so much confidence in me, and also my thanks for
your having done so. The Ambassador thought the Oral Statement that was given him that
afternoon regarding the important decision Japan had made on that day and the few remarks
I had made in reference to the decision ctuo^tntei my reply to your messa^. Cansequently,
nothing more was done about it. Furthermore, since then there has not been any request made
by the Ambassador for a reply. Besides, I did not tbiisk that you were anticipating a separate
«^i^from me, I have thought m^'ff^'lISiQfiili^Sa^ til^ and since last night when I had
to go to bed with a fever, 1 again thought over your message, and although I felt that I had al-
ready replied to it, i also began to feel that as a close friend of yours I must convey my humble
i^^pdnions to you agetm, and so, prompted by the feeliof that we are intimate firieiMte, I tiia
writi^ this message to ym briefly and solely for you.

•Seen, 734, 736.

(Part 2 of 3)°.

(1) I trust that you have been able to understand through the oral statement which I handed
to Ambassador OTT, as well as through the few remarks I had added, the trend of our country
which you were desirous of knowing.

(2) As you know, Japan is not Germany; that is to say, she is not a country in which a dicta-
tor decides the national policy. Furthermore, there are, unfortunately, many people who,
because of past foreign intercourse and of international tradition, are still incorrigible wor-
shippers of Great Britain and the United States. Since there is among the subjects a consid-
erable divergence of opinions, unlike Germany, these various opinions are being put into
practice with good intentions. In other words, a condition exists in this country such as we
find in all non-belligerent countries at present and which had prevailed in Germany before the
appearance of HITLER. Therefore, I cannot help but ask you to consider sympathetically the
filt^HMire must at all times exercise patience and resort to soft pedaling methods 3Bd utit^'yt^y
work toward our original objective, at times making an efiort to be even more cautious.

(3) I wish to thank you very much for the iiitormation and forecast relative to the war be-
tween Germany and Soviet Russia which you gave me in your message. I am at all times pay-
ing close attention to developments taking place in this war. These developments are impor-
tant in view not only of our common objective, but also of the tremendous eifect it will have
upon the fiitore d this f!ej^|^,. l||^<^tBl^i^:^ji^^

pm, 7-19-41

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

July 12, 1941
#637.

A-377

many has been winning up to today. Howe^, | liave some (dlsagTeement?) vnth Te^std to
your opinions concerning the future.

Trans. 7-21-41

No. 735

FROM: Tokyo July 12, 1941

TO: Berlin #637.

{Part 3 of 3).

(4) I was quite elated to find in the message which you sent me that in most points regarding
the future you concur with me. As to the question of disposing of Soviet Russia, I ^i;ip^!gt>7mth
you entirely, as you will judge from the answers I made when I conferred with you coticmting
that country.

(5) However, as you have noted during our conversations, we differ somewhat in our views
regarding the possibility of the United States entering the war. I am praying day and night
that things will turn out as you are hoping they will. If only we could take a common measure
in order to keep the United States out of this war until i be Russian questkm ia settled, it would
be fine, for, we agree in what should be done thereafter. It goes without saying that Japan is
constantly endeavoring to realize her objective in this direction. However, regarding this ques-
tion—it may be because I know little about the Uai^ States— I, as a Foreign MinJifeirif^Hi
allied country as well as an intimate friend of yours, cannot help but be greatly concerned. I
would greatly appreciate your informing HITLER of this fact which 1 have repeatedly pointed
out. What I am endeavoring to do is to prfelpMe Spiritually 4fi6tiswldly iSi!^^

a situation that might be disadvantageous to us,

(6) In regard to the concluding words in your message, I need not point out by means of ex-
ip^teit^stl am entl{«^#iie^

Trans. 7-21-41

Mo.73«

FROM: Ankara July 28, 1941

TO: Tokyo # 150,

On the 26th VON PAPEN, referring to the suppressive measures taken by the United States
against Japan, said: "America beyond any doubt never has desired, nor does she now desire^
war with Japan. The American Isolationists are tending to become stronger. Therefore, if you
Japanese are content with consolidating your gains in French Indo-China and turn rather
upon the Soviet, I do not think that the United States will fight. On the other hand, Germany,
too, is taking a very cautious attitude until she has defeated Russia. She is doing her best to
ftffestall a conflict between the American and German naval and air forces in the Atlantic and,
«k il|gi<!ftasi9 t£li[ie, to defeat Russia and pr^a^e fot an attack upon the Britiiit>fite^1%llr^cw^
ever, seems to me an impossible task,"

Relayed to Berlin. Relay to Hsinking.

Trans. 7-29-41

A-378

THE "MAGIC BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 73? •

FROM: Tokyo July 15, 1941 '

TO: Washii^aa #1§05.,

(CiTcular)

AcsttoaMwcowas # 737.

On the 12th, Soviet Ambassador Smetanin called on this Minister and stated that he has
been advised by the Ambassadors of Britain and the United States that I had said that the
Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact is an impotent instrum^t tcom the legal standpoint, and
that Japan was not obliged to adhere to its terms. The Soviet Ambassador wished to be told as
to the truth of these alleged statements.

I, therefore, replied that:

1. The Pact wag, of course, effective. However, in view of the ciTCumetances at the time of its

signing, it was not applicable to the present war. Japan intends to strictly adhere to the aims
and spirit of the Tripartite Pact, which, in fact, is the foundation of Japan's entire foreign
p©Hcy. The neutrality agreement is effective only in so far as the Soviet's relations Vfith all
countries excepting those countries which are our allies (sic).

2. To date, neither Germany nor Italy has invoked the Tripartite Pact to demand our en-
trance into the war. Moareovrar, this Ministts does n«t anticipate that either will make such, a
demand in the future.

3. 1 am firmly convinced that in so far as this particular war is concerned, Japan need net
be subjected to the terms of eiliier the Tripartite Pact or the Neutrality J%efe ajiid that she is
in a position to decide upon a policy entirely independent of both.

Speaking in a strictly legal sense, the terms of the Tripartite Pact could be interpreted to
mean that Japan is obligated to enter this war. Howe*^,"Qmnany, which has the iMVWiftf'
side, has not demanded that we enter this war. I advised that the Soviet Union act with care
and urged the Ambassador to make an effort to facilitate the carrying out of Japan's policy
which I outlined to the Ambassador on 2 July.

According to press reports, I said, the turning over of Kamchatka to the United States by the
Soviet Union is being considered. Other newspapers report that Great Britain is dispatching
military officers and other personnel to Siberia.

I pointed out to the Ambassador that such reports excite Japanese public opinion to a great
degree. Even if these reports are denied, the feelii^ of doubt would no doubt sharply rise.

Please be advised that paragraphs 1 to # Wi« "
the Ambassador. When the opportunity aris^, f^^tg^ ]relteiate
the various points outlined above.

Relayed to NZB and Washiiigton.

- - Trans. 7-16«^

No. 738

FROM: Tokyo July 15, 1941

TO: Washington #1506.

(Circular)

Subsequent to the outbreak of the war between Germany and the Soviet Union, I explained
and clarified Japan's stand with regard to Japanese-Soviet relations, to the Soviet Ambassador

A-379

on 24 June and again on 2 July. On these occasions, the Ambassador gave every indication
that he was satisfied. The fact that he again called on me for further information (see my mes-
sage to Moscow # 747°) indicates that the British and United States Ambasgadors in To^o «re
itimnghimup,*

'Brans, 7-^16-41

No- 739

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa) June 23, 1941

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #742-

Reporting conditions here since the beginning of hostilities:

1. Since immediately following Molotov's radio broadcast, long lines of people have been
seen waiting to purchase food supplies and k^mstiifr "» '

2. In the city at every open space, crowds are seen listening to instructions broadcast regard-
ing air-defense (also in meetings in all factories), but not much enthusiasm is shown.

3: When night falls, tl^»%isi«ft some movement of --^^'^m^B&'!tm^mii'&!^
gun positions.

4. Very strict control is exercised over of all dwellings and dormit^diS.

5. As for telegrams frofii Kndlaud, # 117" from the Minigtw tbere to the Foreign MiniatCT,
mA # IS^ wererei»ived this morning and aftrapnoon, respectavely.

Trans. 6-27-41

No. 740

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa) June 23, 1941

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #743.

1. The German Embassy here was ordered to vacate the local legation of former Poland and
the legation residence of the former Austria, in which the Germans had been housing some of
its staff members. It seems they will be able to take care of all the staff members in dwellings
belonging to the Embassy, but all contact and telephone connections with the outside are cut
off.

2. The Italian Embassy has had no communication from the hodiie govemoieitt, and,
therefore, it is not known when they will be leaving for Italy.

3. —^■Js^^^^mm^MiemM^i^^ '--^ *s«i*'«ii^ fiwfta **«~ ^ garbled for c«rapl6-
tion).

THE "umo?' mmmmmsi m mm* mmm

No. 741

FROM: Moscow , June 24, 1941

tPiigfo (Tatekawa) #747.

1. An air-defense maneuveir was held here for about 30 minutes bom 3:O0 A.M. on the 24th,
during which period airplanes flew over the city and shells were shot fmm anti-aircraft guns.
Although this time the maneuver came immediately following the opening ol the Russo-Ger-
tuan War and no advaiie$F''tt^«@<ird9 # it%' tm the whole, Considerable efficiency was
shown in mobihzing both |»@i^iet^ units and security units, and the citizens appeared
to maintain an attitude of calm.

2. I have noted a marked decrease in the number of taxi cabs in the city, and one now Mies
hardly a cab in use. Lines of people waiting to purchase food and otiier daily necessities have
grown fewer. There is abundance of food, but the market price is tending upward.

Trans. 6-27-41

FROM: Tokyo June 30, 1941

TO: Hsinking Nonuiaber.

Sxtra

1. We are confident that they will peirfo^ their duties with all zeal and assist the Red Army
and Navy which will win the final victory,

2. Every enemy in the past, notably Napoleon, that has invaded Russia has met disaster.
'Aiat in itself is a good omen that the ultimate victory will be to Russia.

3. Reporte on the war are scarce, but on the western border the Red Army's counter-offensive
S^pe$3rs to have been successful. It appears that on the 22nd and 23rd, 50,000 prisoners were
tjE^l^ snd 300 tanks blown up. Scarcely any reference is made to their own losses. However, it
|».:fi|(Q)rted that up to the 24th, 381 Gterman planes w^e downed ifflyEll^ the Bed Amy lo^
^ ' ' ' ■

I have sent this message to Hsinking.

Ttaaa. 7*3-41

FROM: Tokyo July 16, 1941

TO: Hsinking ##4,

Received fifom Moscow ae # 15 July.

Second report on the developments of the Russo-German war.

1. The German army in the north is continuing its herce attack to the south of Leningrad
in order to facilitate the aivaxtee d the main German forces in the center. Apparently, it is the

German strategy to use this northern force to compel the northwestern forces of the Soviet
jphion to abandon Leningrad. However, since about a week ago, or after the capture of Ostrov,
tUe German army has not shown much activity.

This seems to indicate that the German force in that area is not large, or that it is purpose-
ly avoiding the entrance into the area between Leningrad and Moscow. The scenes of the cru-
cial battles are now shifting to fy&^t -txtS W^^kk, to the north of the highway connectini;

Minsk an [5 Moscow.

Between the Soviet military bases in this area and Moscow there are no natural or artiiicial
barriers to Bpeak of. If the Germans succeed in capturing these Soviet military strongholds,

then they will be able lo pour into Moscow from several directions. These battles may be said
to be the key to the whole war and, therefore, the Soviet Union is making all out eflbrts to hold
this area.

Basically speaking, the outstanding feature of the Soviet defense strip is its extreme depth,
which, according to common knowledge, reaches 40 kilometers if division bases, army air
oc»ps beaes ami oth^ ^mtes sie included in it. It is passible, therefore, that the German fbrc«3
which by fierce attacks succeeded in breaking through the first and second lines of defense, are
being held by the subseq^uent Soviet defense bases. Unless the Germans succeed in breaking
'ibiotigh ih^e last defetnii^'l^g^ within this week or so, it is believed that considerable time
iriUine required by them to reassemble their attacking forces,

in the South-Central front, the fall of Kiev is expected within the next few days. However,
the Geim^ forces will be confojnted with the big problem of crossing tbe 0^^^ River wMch
is a big^ obstacle to hurdle. They will not doubt require considerable time to make preparatioBB
for the crossing unless the Soviet forces make some unexpected and inexcusable ^oia>

2. Apparently the Soviet fer^gs are gradually overcoming their original confusion. They
have managed to rush troops from the Ural and west Siberia to the front lines to bolster the
forces regularly stationed in European Russia. Through such means, they were able to form a
defense organization of sorts in the nick of time .

However, about one third of the cream of the Soviet air and mechanized forces was lost in
|he v^ battles. Already, there are indications that they are fighting with their backs
^^^t^S Wafti 'ft is, therefore, firmly believed that the-tjdfi)ipf^'*Ei1^fti Wthe Soviet forces
is only a matter of time.

3. The government tif the Soviet Union has clamped down a St^ct censorship on news to the
general public, of Soviet military defeats. The news which is reteased is not accurate; rather,
it is a reflection of wishful thinking. It is regularly reported that "the German advances are
being turned back over the entire line." The general public in Moscow are still ignorant of the
fact that Minsk fell into German hands shortly after the outbreak of fe^iHefc At'te''feime
time, since Germany has not bombed Moscow as yet, the |>0opie ate ctai^erably less exdted
now than they were at the outset of the hostmties.^

Ym i^''^m^ imagine the surpzicM^' iobi^ iH m^mnv^ m^ks^ M ii^lp^

when, ^ of a sudden, they hear German gunfire and are shenmed with @GSra^iA>^^M(^^
(From here to end garbled, guess workco^tained)>

The general public has been advised that if the war continues, it will have to be put on a
ration system. However, there are indications that there is an extreme shortage of food and
daily necessities already and it is to be doubted whether this shortage could now be overcome
even if an extreme ration card system were put into effect tomorrow. Since the outbreak of tiiis
war such articles as fish have disappeared from the market counters.

Please relay this message to Manchukuo.

Trans. 7-21^41

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 744

FROM: Vladivostok (Ota) June 23, 19*1'

TO: Tokyo #228.

The situation in Vladivostok is, on the whole, as calm m before. The coast defense areas and
each of the government trusts are under rigid military contaol.

Trans, 7-1-41

Nbl745

WtiMi ^^$^mk>k June 25, 1941

TO: Tokyo #230.

There has been no great change in conditions here up to the 25th, Emergeney measures are

in force, the regulation of commodities and supplies tq the defense force . The fleet and

the air corps began practice on the 24th. The attitude toward Japan {?) has undergone no
change. Some civilians talk to the officials.

Details of the military conditions are as follows:

1. Conditions on the 22nd.

(1) About 7:30 P.M. emergency orders were issued to the army and navy sentries who had
gone out f(tt th^^yepmg. and (^ul4.b# feV¥5yw|^#SB ia ^ #^^4^***^ posts of
duty. '

(2) At about 9 P.M., one truck loaded to capacity with armoured infantry and following
this three navy trucks lo^ed with 4-turret higti angle machine could be seen moving out
to guard (duty). * '

(3) The fleet was inactive and nothing out of the ordinary could be observed. Thfe corps
that had charge of air defense seemed to be at their posts.

2j CdnditionB on the 23rd.

(1) Military trucks were going back and forth constantly in connection withaix d^filifflifK.

(2) The fleet was still inactive, but part of it engaged in target practice.

(3) The radio broadcast throughout the day concerning coastal defense. 1^— ~ ^

3. Conditions .ni the 24th,

(1) No change on the land fr(syi Item tite previoua day. The number of soldiws in the^ity
seiMttled to be about as before. - -.j, . j>

(2) The warships that had been in the hai^ fer -tif^ l(Si*-]*i(Sa^j4^
the morning apparently for practice maneuvers.

(3) The air corps began making flights this morning. The guards who are on duty in the
city in ordinary times began practicing in earnest.

4, Conditions on the 25th.

(1) No change during the forenoon.

(2) The fleet had already gont du| !» fB^iE^gSpf "ilUWeli^^ W.^!© WplS^t l^i'fe
harbor at 8 A.M., were as follows:

1 light cruiser

1 minelayer

1 submarine tender

4 destroyers
10-20 submarines

5 special service ships

Most of th^e were being repaired. Trans. 7-2-41

A-383

No. 746

FROM: Vladivostok
TO: Tokyo

July3.1Ml
#259.

Report on recent naval activities in this area.

Since the beginning of the German-Soviet war the naval authorities here have lightened up
on watch and are engaged in naval preparations by enfardng various exercises to meet any
eventuality. However, naval exercises are limited to only one section of the force for there are
many ships which are undergoing repairs. Evidently the preparations are intended for defense
against Japan.

(1) Activities of the fleet.

A part of the ERU type and SICHA type submarines assigned to this area appear to be oper-
ating somewhere else, for there are comparatively few submarines in port at present. However,
the remainder of submarines, the torpedo boat division, mine layer division, mine sweeper
division, high speed torpedo craft division, etc. are still here and are either undergoing repairs
or are engaged in exercises. The first phase of exercises ended with the basic maneuver in
early June and the 2nd phase is already underway. Lately the departure of craft from the bay
has become infrequent but since the war, those craft which do go out seldom return, even
though it be Saturday or Sunday. Not only this, but planes of types SB, E15, E16 and OFU-
BOOHU are quite active and it appears that they are engaged in exercises with the fleet.
However, the exercises appear to be greatly handicapped by so many ships being placed under
repairs.

Report on general local conditions since decj^l^tion of war.

(1) Shipment of arms and foodstulfredii^)^ considerably.

(2) Official papers express need toe ti^^i^precautionary attitude towaKis Japan,

(3) Foodstuffs scarce dne to control.

"HctsvidlaiJle

Transv 7-3^1

FROM; Tokyo
TO: Hsinking

(Parti of 2)"

(Abstract)

Received from Vladivostok — Vladivostok to Toksro # 264, 6 Juljr.

Julys, 1941

ftittar #1388*.

Trans. 7-14-41

No. 748

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

June 24, 1941
#759.

CPartlof2).
Stdcily Secret.

This morning, the 24th, one close to REBBENTROP called on me, and since I had previous-
ly a^ed KIBBENTROP that daily reports of the war be given me, this man spoke to me
follows on the last two days of fighting.

1. The number of airplanes destroyed in the air, as wril as on the ground, up to the night of
the 23rd (the second day of fighting) exceeds two thousand. Thus, the Soviet air forces in the
first line at the outbreak of the war were completely annihilated and the German air force has
gained, ah«ady, the mi^tery of the air on the battle front and it is now extending this area to
points in the rear of the enemy. As the result of this success, from today on Berlin will be
cluded from the danger zone defined by the German National Defense Association.

2. Raids oonducted by the Soviet air force within German territories consisted of the follow-
ing points up to the end of the second day of the war. They raided Meemeru", Tirujitto",
Insuteruburugu" and Grutensuburug" only once, and Keenihisuberugu" three times, but they
have not flown to any points outside of East Prussia. As to the number of machines used, sA"
though fifteen flew over Orutensuburufrii to other points, only two or three machines were used
for raiding. The casualties totaled twenty dead and there was no damage done to military ob-
jectives.

3. Since the Soviet air force wail *SiBIQ)letely absorbed in the morning of the first day of the
war, more than half of its planes were destroyed on the ground and no great air battle took
place. The impression received during the two days of fighting attests that although the Soviet
air forces have excellent planes, the Russians proved to be more unskilled than expected in
the matter of handlmg machinery and piloting the planes. This has given Germany the assur-
ance that siie would bt as suoceea^l in this war as she had been in Polaiid.

Strictly seciet.

4. The German Army has completely absorbed the enemy on land as well, and not 4»j6
bridge along the border has been destroyed by the enemy. It has captured the barracks along the
borderline practically intact. Judging from two days of fighting, the Russians have unmis-
takably shown their shortcoming; namely, tht lacrk of positive individual judgment. Their
morale is also poor, and fjse have OoUced that their detachments am BWely lacking in both
education and training.

No. 749

T

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

^6^4, 1941

47m

5. The German Army, by the morning of the 2^rd, had captured Renberugu", mA by 0©
evening of the ^t^i^^d day of the war th^ Qerman detachments have penetrated far into Bu^da,
•esioa^' '^tk^fi«^a«s im^ atid e^is between two
hundred and two hundred and fifty kilometers, Am^l^ ^fis m^cbKnized deiachments, so:me
have ah-eady surrounded the enemy's supply line in the rear.

Especially along the Baltic coast, the German forces have been able to penetrate north
of Kobuno" and completely annihilate two Soviet detachments.

6. The Rumanian troops, also, fought successt'uily, and Germany is very much satisfied with
this fact.

7. So far, the Soviet Navy in the Baltic Sea has been quite inactive, and although the ses
passage from Germany to Helsinki is, of course, thwart with danger, GerBaany is still able to
do what has to he done.

8. In many respects German successes durini^ the first two days of the war have exceeded
theix expectation. However, information on this subject will not be made public for a time in

order to conceal Germany's plans for the future. 1 believe about the end o£

l^is week.

(Message incomplete.)

"Kana spelling.

On 2 July, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop's office forwarded us the following information
concerning the prt^ess of the war. (The contents of this report have not been made public.)

1. There have been no outstanding battles on the Rumanian frottt. Howtvetj of
places from which the Prut River will be crossed, were captured.

Hungarian forces are fast replaetftf tltm Sw^^t forces which have fallen back, aleftg
their entire front, and are still advancing.

3. On the southern fyont, the Soviet crack armored forces have been completely
swettrnded in the vicinity and to the north of Lemburg. Their annihilation is imminent.

In the central and northern fronts, the main German forces are advancing along the
BURENNA {Berezina ? Brenner ?) River and the DUNA (Dnieper ?) River. The Soviet troops
caught within the second pincer movement between Bialjmtok and Minsk have been approxi-
mately halved.

4. After a bitter battle on the Finnish front, the German forces smashed the Soviet forces in
ihe Petsamo area. The Germans are continuing their advan<;e, ^ S5 *faiie, another 25,000
prisoners were taken together with 600 tanks.

5. There were no Soviet planes over Cierman territory on 2 July. Xn spite of unfavorable
Weather conditions, the German air forces continued to show much activity.

Trans. 6-25-41

No. 750

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

July 3, 1941
#833.

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 751

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

July 4, 1941
#840.

On the 3rd, WIEHL" told MATSUSHIMA* that judging from the facts that since the begin-
ning of the German-Soviet conflict, the German Army, in invading Russian territory, has not
blown up the bridges and that the Russians left behind livestock and agricultural products just
as tbey were, and that Stalin's pictures in public buildings had been utterly destroyed, it would
seem that the Russians held great antipathy for the STALIN regime. In the light of these
facts^ they seem to eatpect the early overthrow of STALIN control. Since considerable troops
have been stationed at important points along the Siberian Railroad, it is apparent that they
are attempting to gurantee transportation facilities. Within a few months it is thought that
ti-ansportation faciMM^ it^U lie, && the whel^ ^iH^ impem^^HWt.^^m^m ^^ 1|»3^lare,

^Clrii^rf|te5Me Bureau.
'J^tttiiilil^itetffl in Berlin.

From the main headquarters of the GermaiiEi 'Jpia^- M 'Bast fWipia,, Foie^n Minister
RIBBENTROP has just wired me the following:

"For strategic reasons I have refrained from publishing the ffliiiltery situaticai so far. This,
however, is no longer necessary, and the press and radio may release the news, but if it is
agreeable with you, I would like to stop the special reports I have been giving. Nevertheless,
every time there is something important which tnay not be published, I will let you know. "

In reply, I expressed accord with this.

The report he gave me of the latest military situation is as follows:

1. In the fighting north of FUFEIPBTTO" the Soviet forces have been prac^efeal^!^i^ifve^
defeated. In this area they can no longer muster any considerable resistance.

2. South of PURIPETTO at LEMBURG and in the area north thereof, the Sc^et^i&^#
were rotited.' '^BsVmvBt, they -iiSStiiBying to some extent and endeavortefto collect their fiafl^BS
for a counter-attack. However, a serious offensive on their part is preposterous.

3. The troops in Finland are purposely postponing their advance until the strategic moment,

4. The Ukraine can be taken without a strong drive and will be aubjugated by Germany
principally through subversive measures,

5. 6,000 tanks have so far been destroyed. How many new tanks they had before the war
broke out is uncertain. However, it is possible that they bad a few. The majority of their tanks
now in use were fresh from the factory, and since tbey had not eveB beett tested or tried out*
losses are known to have been tremendous,

6. In the theatre of war, the German air axm. has almost completely gained sapfremaey of

No. 752

FROM: Barlin (OaSiftij)
TO:

July 8.1^1
#866.

TVam. 7-11-41

"A*387

I

No. 753

FROM: Berlin July 14, 1941

TO: Tokyo #899.

In response to RIBBENTROP's invitation, I am going to ttie Eastern Front on the 14th (Lt.
Colonel SMGO will accompany me). After observing the battle front, I expect to return to Berlin
on the 18th. I shall probably meet HITLER while at the front.

Your "message" sent in your telegram #637" will he handed to RIBBENTROP on the same

"Not available.

Trans. Not dated

No. 754

SSOM: Berlin (Osima)

Having visited General Headquarters and
returned to Berlin this morning.

Mly 19, 1941
tmptetedl way Im^fs^am ^ Ibe fa«^i^S^ili, X

No. 7^5

FROM: Tokyo July 12, 1941

TO: Hsinking # 396.

< l^Q^dOm Berlin # 890.

Keiny#856".

Jiieeording to confidential information received by a member of this office from the Propa-
g^sada OflSce, there is a report that in addition to sending Ulegal counter broadcasts over Russia,
Ctefiwany is sending short-wave anti-Soviet broadcasts throughout the country. It seems that

°Not Available.

Trans. 7-15-41

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) July 30, 1941

TQt M«0fk No number.

As in the past wireless communications between Japan and Germany have recently becoiie
very difficult owing to interference and this is especially true with reference to transmission
from Germany. Since it loflks at though this is due to Russian strategy, I would like you to

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

suggest to the German communications oflSce that certain definite counter measures be studied
and let me know the result of this request by wire.

1. When interference has occurred: Tokyo-Berlin telegraphic communications since July
4tii. Tokyo-Berlin telephone communications since July 15th. Washington-Berlin telegraphic
communications since July 8th. In all of the above cases interference was detected in the re-
ceiving of telegrams and in making telephone calls.

2. Method of interference: In both the telegraph and telephone circuits transmission from
Berlin was made completely unintelligible through interference of a series of unvarying letters
or dots of 3 K.C. frequency. Somewhat stronger waves were used than those emanating from
W&lin. Telegraphic communication was completely destroyed. Telephone communication
was possible although extremely difficult. However, at night it besaine A little difficult. How-
ever, at night it became a little easier to talk on the telephone.

3. Wave lengths of stations sending out interference:
DGO - 13235K.C. DFZ — 20020 KX.
DOY — 14880 K.C.

No interfemice has been experienced recen% itt photo transmi^icm between Tokyo and

Berlin.

4. Since we are able to receive wave lengths up to four, please arrange for suitable oorre-
eiKW#!^l^g|##t^l»nQ^ your end.

Nq. 757

FBOM: Berlin Aafustl,lMl

On the Slsfe,* e^H^^t^ reliable German made the following comments ^rfi^lpfwd to tlge
German-Soviet waif,

1. Soviet loeste due to death, wounds, and captures, have reached at least 2,500,000 to date.
Because the Soviet «re putting up a jstubborn resistance, the number of their dead is
enormous.

2. Up until the 27th, there were about sixty Russian military groups, both large and small,
which had been surrounded by the German forces, (This was due in part to the fact that the
Germans advance beyond the encircled groups without waiting for their annihilation.) There
are about twenty Soviet divisions trapped in the German circle in the area noartheast of

Smolensk.

3. Timoshenko's central forces have suifered severe losses. Voroshelov's northern forces have
also su&red serious damages with the exception of the forces under his command in the e^-*
treme north. Although the forces under Budenny in the south are faring fairly well so far, they
too are gradually becoming the victims of German encircling tactics. Severe blows have been
dealt to most of the Soviet crack troops. It is an imdentable fact that the tUalifcy Qi^ii
fighters is becoming lower.

4. In the north, a striking force reached Leningrad last evening. However, a public announce-
ment will not be made until the city has definitely fallen. In the central section, the Germans
have advanced to a point east of Vyazma, while in the south Kiev has been encircled. The bulk
of the German forces in this area are advancing southward beyond Kiev, without awaiting its
faU.

A-3^

5. About 10,000 Soviet planes have been destroyed to date, and the quality of the remainder
are definitely inferior. However, counting the Soviet air force in the Far East, approximately
one third of its originalslaiei still remaiiis-. - - » « *

Just last week, a strong Soviet force including tanks, attempted a counter attack in thfe
area to the south of Smolensk. For a time there was only one German division avaUable to hold
this attack. For a time it had been hard going, but.j^a^4ib;Mi the Oefinans, having tqmed the
table, have succeeded in encircling the Soviet forces.

The Soviet forces were apparently composed of enormous air, tank, and man powers. It
must be said that Germany has had good fortune in having been able to smash the oppoeiti^ to
the extent it already has. Had Germany delayed acting when she did, it is an absolute certainty
that the Soviet Union would have completed a gigantic arms program.

@. To the GettbiH StsrS^ists who plAce impdrtance in annihilating the enemy iif'tialS
ations, it is very fortunate that the Russian forces stuck to their posts to the last without re-
treating, German operations are proceeding exactly as planned and the commands are in
exceedingly hl^sl^ts.

*?. Because Germany doc» not -announce wftr developments, not only the Soviet Union but
Britain and the United States seem to be flooded with various reports. Attempts are apparent-
ly being made to utilize these iinfounded reports for political gains in such amis as Turkey.

Foreign Minister Ribbentrop is advocating more public announcements of the progress of
the war so that political use may be made of them. Hitler, however, places the most impor-
ixSmiid^Sie military aspect and insists on keeping the reports secret.

8. It is true that a few Russian stragglers managed to hide in the forests behind the advanc-
ing German front lines. These make an appearance sometimes. However, the general public,
particularly the fanners, «4ciiaiei lilii st^^^ Mi&tiSS& ^ifsmA^yf&->^

fare is h$mg t^nducted.

# 379 (Part 1 of 2; Part 2 not available)

It is quite possible that the reaction of the anti-communism groups and others in the United
States to the recent German attack on the U.S.S.R. will ha^^e the salutary efl'ect of dampening
the war sentiment in the United States. (Since it has been reported that Hess informed the
heads of the British government that Hitler's real objective is to crush Russia and stamp out
communism, also tiiat Hitler considers German-American war as mutually suicidal and
accordingly made peace overtures to England, it can be assumed tjiat the present '^ep&BQ.-
attack on the U.S.S.R. is directly connected with Hess's mission.)

'^en if Germany fails in seeking British collaboration as a result of her campaign against
Russia, she will be able to secure sufficient materials to put her in a better position to wage a
long drawn out war with England. In order to realize this, Germany took the offensive before
Ru^ia could complete her military preparations and at the same time is seeking British and
American conciliation. It h dn the basis <rf these edventages that Gemany has carried her Vfm
against Russia,

Trans. 8-4^

N0.7S8

FROM: Hsinking
TO: Tokyo

June 27, 1941
#379.

Trans. &-30-41

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

PROM; Tokyo
TO: HoIbJsw

Griginatedv^kara. Ankara to Tokyo # 154

August 1, 1941

On July 31st Foreign Minister SARAJOGURU" told me that Russia has called up nearly all
of its reserves, invasion (?) has continued so far into the country that even retreat is impos-
sible, most of the army must have been destroyed and the collapse of Russia is a matter of
another month or month and a half. It seems that a few days ago he told the German Ambas-
sador in an extremely optimistic manner that the above was the observation of the Turkish
tnilitaiy department.

The Foreign Minister said further with reference to the occupation of French Indo-China
ttiat Japan's having accomplished this by peaceful means was a great success and that in the
future it was very cleit «e* Isetweitt ^l^an and England and America would not be deMT*
able, and that he did aot think that conditions would get worse than they we)D^;lW^^
that Japan's next objective would be rather in the direction of the north, etc.

Trans. $-7-41

Ne-760

FROM: Tokyo AufiUstS, 1941

TO: Hsinkii^ #450.

• —

Part 1 of 2

I am hereby sending messt^e #111 from Stockholm to this Foreign Minister.

Under the guidance of the German Ministry of Propaganda a certain pro-German ttem
reporter recently made a complete survey of the front lines in the vicinity of Baranovitshi. (I
think he is a reporter for the Stockholm Tidnigen.) Upon his return he gave an account of Jro
observations to a clcse friend of his who in turn told it all to me. The story runs as follows:

A. The Soviet's main method of warfare consists of air raids, but the German land and air
ferces are both superior to those of the Russians and no matter how many conscripts strengthen
the Soviet forces, Germany's ultimate military success is beyond doubt. The casualties suf-
fered by the Soviet forces as well as their losses in planes have been enormous, but it could not
be said that their air power has broken down and that the Germans have gained superiority in
the heavens. It seems that the most conspicuous resistance is being offered around Leningrad.
German officers say that the reserve power of the Red army is very great and that they probably
still have great power of resistance and that, therefore, it is too early for optimism. Now in this
connection it is to be noted that the Red army lately has put into action some new types of
American tanks and planes. It also seems that in the region of the Volga and in Sib«i» the
latest American material and skill has been used.

On their route of invasion how many and many a time has the German army met witll HB*
expected obstacles! How often ha^ it been rendered impossible for thei|l<1^tlf|^$f|||Hil$^
bitic^i^t^^ units ! For this reason much precious time bas b^cp hft.

entering old Russia, Germany's greatest QtAiS^ lamti'iSm ^ m^M^!i^$oii^MM^
^'i^«dt % ii^ Wiet sold^TB mi the civiliaa inhabitanta. These is a.lE%^nplijM IBcN! $1

A-391

the Piipet swamps. Ther6 are still many, mnny ret&aining ttoops taking refugfi in it. A Gler-

man force endeavored tn rout them; but knowing nothing of the area, failed completely. These
people have become wild men — savages. When they are in the verge of starvation, or order to
seek food they emerge upon the neighboring villages. They know that the only safety for the
hopeless is to hope for no safety and with a courage born of desperation they set upon the sen-
tries and tear them to pieces. Such of these as have been taken prisoners are mostly without
overcoats. They are all hatless and barefooted, and few of them indeed have any underwear;
but they know not the meaning of answering a command. The word obedience is not in their
vocabulary and the Germans would be better off without them because whenever they try to
handle them, they get their hands humed.

Parts of 2

Wnitt 3 fiC 4 (This message was evidently originally a four-part one.|

When these men retreat they usually burn villages to the ground and leave nothing standing,
and suffering in this region is terrible. The danger of epidemics lurks in the drinking water. The
dlffitemi^ lielttffimr^^i^^ during the nigM ^ t d^feiliiig the day are eac^HSU^ jpl^

hard to endure. Along the northern front the shortage of houses and sleeping timejplllff
people out. The majority of the prisoners are weak, suffering from malnutrition and inclii^st^
ible foods, not at all ^s^goratis as were the Soviet soldiers dxmng the last war. As a matter of
fact it is difficult to understand how with such weak bodies they can offer the resistance they
do. A prisoner told me that aside from bread he had been hying on only the meager est and
vilest tasting diet, became there is hardly any meat at all, let alone potatoes.

B. Among the territories occupied by the German army the residents of former Poland are
the most docile, but the residents in Soviet territory are nowhere stroi^ly opposed to the war
and evidences can he seen nowhere of a trend to break away firom the STALIN regime and
establish independent area. A very strange thing, however, is to be noted. The Llkraine itself
was not on the road to independence. I venture to sfly that this gave the Germans quite a sur-
'pHbe imd a setback. Hie officers in the froat line ste saying that Germany will win the war,
but on the question of maintaining peace and order after the victory they maintain an uneasy
silence. It can be seen that they are too happy over the outlook on this score. The War
apunet Russia ia surely a sta^ange oaie. It might be and indeed often is compared to the China
incident.

Even though Moscow is taken and the critical stage in military operations ended, and even
l£tough the war ends this Autumn with a victory for the Germans, that will not be the last word.
Guerrilla warfare will continue and as far as the Russians are concerned, it will after all be a
surrender without a defeat. H we were to look for an example, none better could be found than
Ns^leon'a expeppienc^ in Spain. Sooner « later this Getman-Soviet war will be ovetr, but m
man. &fm. !C^^&m^ W0t^^ vmtme a. gue% as to whatwiU happen afM '^t,

mOUt Tokyo

August 2, 1941
#450.

Ttens.8^5^1

A-392

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

So. 761

TO: Tokyo

^e22, 1941
#747.

As a result of the German-Soviet conflict although actual fighting will cease shortly, it will
be some time before transportation facilities will have returned to normal), for the time being
teavel through Siberia will be impossible. Therefore, please send us iramediatete^ ypur opinions
with regard to the following emergency measures;

1. Courier pairs SOMEMIYA— MATAYAME (recently left here by plane but were forced to
return to Berlin ftom Warsaw); EIGAOKADA; and SHINAGAWA— KAGA, eunently in Europe,
should be sent home by way of the United States.

2. After we have discussed with these persons, soon to return to Japan, former Manchurian
Railroad official NAKANlSHIj M.P. HASE; Miss WAKAKO YAMADA; Secretary from the
Department of Jurispfw^E^Bi^^^gijy4^8|lj, what they wnild like to do, we shall take corm-
sponding measures.

3. Hraiceforth, courier connections between the home office and Etoope should be by the way

of the United States.

With regard to those mentioned in 1 and 2 above, we are making inquiries at the present
time in Lisbon for l^ir passage on mail steamers, but it is understood tfaat American sli^i^iSif
lines recently have not permitted Japanese to board their steamers. In view of the present
situation, please negotiate with them so that they will permit their steamers to take on these
passengers. With regard to the naval mission wluch is in Berlin at the pr^nt time and soon to
return to Japan, after we have discussed thft th* «^J*l pa#^ here, I wijl let

you know by wile what we plan to do.

TC)t TiSikyo ##^.
Re my #775*.

We are laying to make arrangements iar the 70 persons here who are scheduled to return to

Japan to go by way of North or South America in Portuguese or Spanish ships. However, ves-
sels are few and passengers are many and it is impossible to get booking for more than a very
lew persons each montii. I have previously made request to Tokyo for arrangements to be made
icB' Japanese ships on the North or South American run or the African run to call at Lisbon and
I realize that as you stated in your Circular # 1498° to Rome that such a procedure would be
dlifficult to accompli^: Recently, the Minist^ resident in Iran has requested that a Japani^
on the Bombay run be sent to the Persian gulf in order to evacuate the Japanese residents
in that country. If this could be done, it would at the same time solve the problem of those
desiring to return who &S&^i!0mk^, WHm^ utmdsit W 1^ is accom-

j^hed.

Trans. 6-24-41

No. 763

FROM: Berlin

July 15, 1941

Trans. 7-16-41

A-393

No. 764

FROM: Berlin

TO: Tokyo

June 27, 1941
#793.

Re # 759 from Moscow to the Minister',

On the occasion of the conversation regarding my telegram # 789*, for the sake of reference I
stated the situation of the German Smbassy as above and WA*" expressed his thanks for this
and said that although he had suggested to the Soviet government the reciprocal exchange of
German and Soviet Embassy persons in Turkey he had had no reply yet. He intimated that
th& Soviet Ambassador there was receiving courteous protection. However, in order to clariftf
the situation, I prontised to report and I have relayed this to Busdia.

'The Bulgarian Legation at Moscow has made Infjuiries r^^l^'ild^M^^mmihitMmtS there, but ao (m
have been unable to make contact with the German Embassy.

°Weisaa»t

Secret outside the department.

I believe it is of utmost importance to get the diplomats of the several countries which are
engaged in war against Russia, who are still in Moscow, out of the country safely, not only from
the humanitarian point of view, but also from the point of view of saving their own lives. There-
fore, will you, at once, as if at your own suggestion, after talking things over with the American
Ambassador in Moscow, unofficially suggest to the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, with
regeird to the diplomats of those said countries, in accordance with tJie ordinary courtesies,
and according to international practices, the plan of holding a meeting and exchanghag at a
given place, the diplomats of those several countries who aje now in Moscow, for the Soviet
diplomats who are residing in the belligerent countries.

Now, I want you to try, at the same time, to arrange with them to permit Commercial Attache
YANNEFtn of the Italian Embassy in Tokyo, to leave the country, having been one of tiie parly
along with Vice-Admiral YAMASHTTA who were forcibly detained in OTOPORU.

'Notavailabte,

Trans. 6-30-41

No. 765

IKOM: Tokyo
i^r' Moscow

June 28, 1941
#368.

Trans. 7-3-41

A-394

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

■.mm-

mmik ■■'^m- • J^^y 2. 1941

TO; Berlin
This Fore^ Minister's # 695 to Moscow.

On the 1st, we received a request from the Soviet Embassy to assist 160 members of the
families of their staff in Tokyo who plan to go home on ships saiUng the 6tb and 16th. For your
information.

Trans. 7-8-41

No. 767

FROM: Moscow - July 3, 1941

Wi Tokyo #842.

1. In view of the present situation it is inevitable that the Soviet government evacuate
Moscsw in the near future, I have had instructions to take a part of the staff and accompany
the government, in case such a situation arises, and leave the rest of the staff' here. However,
conditions at that time may be such that it will be impossible for any to leave and we may all
have to remain here. At any rate, I desire your permission to act according to my discretion in
the emergency because conditions in this country dMer firom conditions in other Euroi>effli
countries.

2. Regardless of which course is taken it will be pointless to leave a lai^e staff here and
would result in unnecessary complications. I think it would be well at this time to designate
clearly the ones who are to be included in the third evacuation. There are a number in the
office who have arrived recently from Japan and I think it would be better to transfer them to
other European countries rather than have them return to Japan at this time. However, in order
that those who are to return may begin to make preparations please decide on them and wire
knmediately. The figures in parenthesis give the time that the following arrived at their posts;

S, Sumino, ChanceHor, (Feb. 1931)

Nagato, Secretary, (May, 1941)

Ftmimi, Clerk, (April, 1940)

Wttanabe, Clerk, (Aug. 1940)

Komuro, Clerk, (May, 1941)

Mitani, Clerk, (Feb. 1941)

Hanai, Employee, (June, 1941)

Saito, Watchman, (May, 1941)
Total eight. Those who will remain if the occasion arises will, in addition to myself, be ail
members from this office, five minor officials, and thiee workers, (including my cook).

Tlrahs. 7-10-41

A-395

No. 768

4me 26, 1941

Since Italy's p^ticipation in this war, the Imperial Government has taken over the protec-
tion of Italian interests in India, the overseas dominions of Australia and Canada, Netherlands
Indies, as well as Iraq. Now, once again through Italian Ambassador, by virtue of the specific
request of the Italian government, they have decided to have you t ake over the protection of
Italian interests in the country to which you are accredited. Therefore, since this is the caw,
make a formal request of the Soviet and after you have received their approval, please procMd
to take over the protection of Italian rights and intetsest^

Now. the following is for your information aloner

1. The scope entailed in the protection of Italian interests is limited by international law to
l^e supervision of Italian diplomatic estal^il^ii^&l jft te^etliiri

nationals within the borders of that country,

2. By nature, the protection of interests of belligerent powers in this case, even though the
Soviet grants its approval, differs in character froua the method of consular sanction. There-
fore, by virtue of this we haven't the authority nor are we duty bound to protect the interests of
that country in place of the Italian Government, but it will be sulEcient merely to render as-
8i«tancie in tiae heindliKg of Italian intra'egta in the Soviet on a practical basis.

3. Furthermore, with regard to the evacuation of Italian Elmbaasy officials (refer to my
#654°), please render immediate assistance,

I have transmitted this to Italy.
Italy will transmit this to Crennan^.

Re your #659°.

I met Molotov on the 26th, and handed him the official document regarding this matter and
Slso communicated to him the gist of your telegram # 654*. Molotov said that he would have to
give his reply later but in general the problem would have to be settled mutually. In that case,
I said that it would be necessary for me to get in touch immediately with the Italian Ambassa-
dor, Molotov replied that he would guarantee such contact as soon as he had a reply regarding
the protection of interests. I inquired as to whether the Italian Ambassador were still in Mos-
cow and Molotov said that he wondered whether the Italian Ambassador hadn't moved to
some other city along with the German Embasiy Staiff.

"Tokyo directs Moscow to arrange foi taking ov« the proteaticm of Italian mtesata in Rua^: HU'^al]^
i^tJapun's responsibility in this cimectieft9«tm<tfe#l^&cte«f>«tR«)«
'Not available. See U, 768.

TVans. 6-28-41

FROM: Moscow (Tat^awa}
TO: Tokyo

July 8, 1941
#776.

*rraiis. 7-9-41

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Tokyo

Immediately on wceipt of your #654', I called by telephone to request the Itdian Ambassa-
f 1^^™T* f ^ "^'^'^ connections I sent Miyakawa. He found five or six uni-

ZTl i?"" the entrance, who, by orders of the Soviet Government, were prohibiting any
mgms or egress, and he was unable to enter and there was nothing to do but leave. The W
contact we had with the Italian Embassy was when their intelligence officer, Itelli, caUed cm
Miyakawa in the morning of the 23ra to receive information contained in your # 63l'

available.

*fe**1*«»^Tokyoandarewell. ™ ' " ^'^ '^ ^^^mW^ ^Wassnto aad Seereteiy ftat their

T^ane, 7-1-41

No. 771

FROM: Tokyo July 10, 1941

TO: Rome #187.

Received from Moscow as # 866, 7th.

Re my Telegram # 821", part 2,

We received a list of the Italian property from the Foreign department on the 6th, but the list
was very incomplete and contained mainly the paintings and the automobile. The property
that the Italian Consulate has was borrowed from BYURORTN, We made a thorough investi-
gation of the place and the Soviet authorities have no objection to our taking over the Italian
interests here. The Itidiltt Simbassy is closed md &e^s^'^ex 0mi^'9i^!&& t '^^
duty at the entrance.

According to the Swedish Minister here, the Swedish Legation with the consent of the So^l^
had taken over the protection of the Slovakian legation recently and since that time some one
had broken into the garage and cellar and taken away things stored there. This had been ex-
plained to the Soviet government but so far no action had been taken. As regarding the Italian
Embassy it will be impossible to guarantee that such an incident might not occur. Particular-
ly is this so regarding the Italian Embassy for the Italians have there priceless paintings from
the Museum. Also in Leningrad and other places they have real estate and buildings, and it
WfU be difficult to maintain strict protection over these. As regards the extent of the control, we
to exercise over the said property, your telegram was not very clear. We desire instructions
iregarding the consulate. Please get in touch with the Italian Ambassador in Tokyo regarding
this.

Pleasfi relay this to Italy.

Trans. 7-11-41

A-397

No. 772

FROM: Berlin (Osiraa)

#891.

On the 12th, 1 had a member of my stafif call on the officer in charge of the Foreign Office to
inquire of him the number and names of the members of the Chinese Embassy who left Berlin
on the 10th. Though we have been requested hy the Nanking Government to ask for authoriza-
tioD to commandeer the Chinese Embassy Building, its movable property and deposits which
are owned and in the name of the Chinese Government, the Foreign Office official in charge
made the statement that the German authorities would like to comply in giving such^ttflhfffJty
and right to commandeer this property. He continued by saying:

1. The Chinese Berlin Embassy staff (with the exception of one minor official who is sick in
bed at the present time); their families; two members of the Hamburg Consul-General^
(the Vice-Consul and his secretary); five members from the Consul-General's office in Vienna
(the Consul- General, his wife, the Vice-Consul, his wife, and their private secretary; as well as
the staff member of the Embassy ui Belgium who came here to Berlin to live; making a toft^l
of 44 pereons, left Berlin on the 10th for Berne, Switzerland. A member of the German Foreign
Office accompanied this party and saw to it that all members entered Switzerland.

Furthermore, it is understood that the party of six which preceded this last group has already
headed for Turkey. The German Government has adopted the policy of not permitting those
who have been deprived of their official status ta ewtinue livir^ within the realm of the Ger-
man line,

2. The German Government on yesterday, the 11th, through their police organization, took
over the Italian Embassy building and the equipment and properties appurtaining to it (sic).
Though considerable surveillance is being brought to bear upon this property, the German
^vernment is ready and willing to accede insofar as possible to our wishes with regard to the
various points of the representations filed with them. Furthermore, the German Government
is prepared in this coimection to advise the Japanese Goverimient each time any measures

Re my #844".

When WEAMAN* conversed with KASE^ he told KASE that Poland still had an Embas^
in Japan. Because he thought that Japan had various reasons for retaining the Dutch Ministry,
he would not make a question of that, but Germany would like to see the Polish Einbasgy ^yith-
drawn from Japan, I understand he spoke thus to KASE in a casual way. I If^lJi^ i^MliErl^^

Trails. Not dated

No. 77.^

FROM: Berlin (Osima)
TO: Tokyo

July 4, 1941

#845.

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEA{tU HARBOR

a reasonable demand and so it should be complied with as soon as possible now that a war
is going on betwew Germany aad Russia^ » • N

'Not available.

'Chief of Political Bureau.

Tniiiiinilnr nt ilmwii^iifi liiiiilimimi in Tluiliij,

No. 774

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) Juiy 10, 194X

TO: Berlin #626.

Re your #845".

Although the Japanese Government has been making arragements for the withdrawal of the

Polish Embassy, because I have come to the conclusion that it would be better to postpone the
matter in view of vaww circumstances, we are not at present forcing this question. 1 inibrmed

Trans. 7-2<Ml

No. 775

FROM: Tokyo . . ^ . , .-^ , July 15,

TO: Berlin #649.

Re your #867".

There are no objections to your proceeding as you suggested with the turning over to Germany
gratis the lands and buildings belonging to the Polish and Czech diplomatic establishments.
However, in regard to liquidating the liabilities on them it will be very difficult to make a re-
quest for an appropriation for anything but special fund (?). However, please state that in re«
gard to the establishments in the German occupied areas of Belgium and France we are not
prepared to su^ wm&t » phltete^e eo^^liv^^ m wltit itats^ course of events
may be.

'Not available.

Ttam. 7-18-41

A-399

FROM ; Berlin (Osima) June 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo #780.

A large quantity of our purchases in this country is at present en route through Russia. Please
negotiate and arrange suitably with Soviet officials so that these will go through without obstruc-
tion.

Traas, 6-30-41

FROM: Berlin June 24, 1941

TO: Tokyo #75g.

In order to adopt a comprehensive policy concerning commerce between Japan and Ger-
many now that war has broken out between the Reich and the Soviet Union, on the 23rd, 1
«<Sieti^ked representatives of infiuential business canceraeil'-ii^^We dIacUBBecl the ttiattef and
as a result arrived at the following opinions:

I. As a matter of principle, new business deals will be postponed.

H, Business deals already under conta-act wiU cancelled by «mf'!#i will, however, in

the meantime watch the situation closely,

m. Payments involved in deals already contracted (installments on orders of machinery,
returns on import dials ^la^^fei 1^^ t3le Reich, etc.) wOl, for the time being, be kept iti the
Yokohama Specie Bank. ^^ybi|:il^e time, the individual concerns will figiure out how much
is to be paid out and re\^ ihs^ figures as may be necessary. When this is done, we will have
another conf^enee*

I will wire you 1at@r the results of the conference mentioned in HI. Concerning the adjust-
ment of Japanese-German relations mentioned above, and concerning the maintenance of
trade between the two countries, if you have anytiiing in mind which you think we ought to
(^inmder, plea$i» wire ice back immediately,

Trans.

No. 778

FROM: Tokyo July 1, 1941

TO: Berlin #677,

Re your #775°.

in the matter of the 27,000 tons of accumulated freight for Japan mentioned in your message
referred to above, and the goods on fflfder oi which it is expected we will take delivery during
the next six months, please confer with the mihtary and naval attaches, and on investigation
^vide the goods up into the four following classes, with number of tons of each and advise us
ail to l^ tesUltB at once.

(1) Goods being received by officials that will need to be secured in a hurry.

(2) Goods being received by civilians that will need to be secured in a hurry.

A-iOO

(4) Civilian goods that do not come under No. 2.

Furthermore, as the firms in Japan that are concerned in this are cmxious about it, please
tell their branch offices itt youi city for their information:.

'KotavailoWe,

Trana. 7-3-41

^779

fmU: Tokyo July9,ia|l; ,

TO: Berlin #1466- '

(Circular)

Action Moscow as # 718.
Re your #815".

1. Inasmuch as Germany has insured the freight going west, it is being sent F.O.B. as a
matter of form. It appears that the Soviet contend that they have proof that it is being sent a&
German property. As a matter of fact, it will l)f possible with regard to some of the freight to
give proof to the Soviet that title of ownership has not yet passed to the Germans. (Actually
such a proposal has not yet been made.) Again the Soviet has required that a certificate ac-
company all freight west and it is possible that such a certificate may not be available for some
freight. It might be well to leave this loop hole in the negotiations open so tjhat in order for the
merchants to obtain it in the future they may have to make a requm'll^^lO'fiE^ ^i^'^
procedure hence it mif^ht be well for you to withdraw your statement to the Soviet.

In harmony with the other party's request 16,(KX) (yen ?) has been entrusted to the Soviet
txade representatives in Tokyo, it has been ascertained.

3. The "disposition of the rest" referred to in my # 702°, part 1, was to the effect that if the
owners desired representation should be made to the Soviet to purchase the freight or .

4. When I have a reply from Germany regarding my #666°, part 3, last paragraph, I will
transmit it.

Trans. 7-15-41

No. 780

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

Secret. Re your #303".

We would have you defer the conclusion of the format contract in regard to the supplying of
HANNOOTOO* until after it becomes more evident that freight can be shipped, but inasmuch
as we wish by all means to secure the same as much as possible before June of 1943, we would
like to have the preliminary negotiations with the Berlin parties gotten under way now, so as

Julyl5,ifU
#648.

to have everything in readiness, that, if need be, the formal contracts could be closed up on

short notice. Accordingly, you will please take note of the following points, and then begin
preliminary conversations with them, advising us as to results. For the time being we would

present. _ •

{1} The amount of the order 37 HAN5ll^®C>0 (7) (2880 kilo tons), special boiler (?), 790
kilo tone. Howev^, ilim fl^niSij tol^ |g! |ie4^ iii«]gRi^«byitlaii
capacity.

{2} The time limit for our securing t&e above Whi no later than June, 1943, and it is desired
to have delivery made at as early a time as possible within the above period.

(3) We will furnish 30 kilo tons of ferro-molybdenum needed in the raEinufaeture of these
articles. (This is the estimate of our technicians.) However, if the supply of HANNOOTOO to
be furnished is redticed, to Supply of ferro-jQolybdenum will also be reduced accordingly.
Furthermore, the delivery of this will not be made in advaacBi but will be-^pp^ front Japan
simultaneously with shipments leaving Germany for Japan.

(4) While ferro-tungsten is not a material needed for the manufacture in question, we are
prepared to furnish this as a compensation up to a maximum limit of 100 tons. (We would
keep it at as small an amount as possible.) Time of delivery and conditions for reducing amount
supplied would be the same as in the case of feny-molybdenum.

"Not. available.

b» smm mnvUmsfi "t^^f^ st t^t^baag m connecttoD with melal productioa m m&ung! or could it

Trans. 7-22-il

No. 781

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoika) ~ * July 18. 1941

TO: Berlin #663-

This question is still being ^ 4&(bfir{eB>^^k^»eij^

developments up to the present.

1. We have decided to make actual payments for good already shipped as well as for those
contracted for in the manner described in the messages addressed to the Financial tnd
to the Yokohama Specie Bank in your city, so please refer to them for this information.

2. For the payment of contracted goods not yet shipped, it would be necessary to apply anew
for import permits for these goods. The Ministry of Finance wishes to make payments, as a
matter of general principle, after the goods have reached their destinations. However, among
the goods ordered by the military, there are many for which advance payment has been com-
pleted. In view of this fact and of the'fact that if the principle set forth by the Finance Ministry
is adhered to too strictly, there is danger, as you have pointed out in the first part of your mes-
sage, of contracts being cancelled by Germany, there is a tendency to favor changing the terms
of payment to f .o,b, factory for those items which we consider as absolutely necessary and thus
make sure that these goods may be gotten. This Ministries concerned are holding a joint con-
ference at present in order to learn the total amount of goods akeady ordered and to study
other details.

A-4t)2

"MAGJiQ" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

3, As to new orders, setting aside those which for the present do not require advance pay-
ment, there is no way but to set a limit to the orders. It would b6 necessary to decide on a
policy in regard to this miSttt^K ivith our future trade with Germany in mind (for instance, be-
cause of an increasing d^Mlid'tm our part, our supply of whale oil may be radically reduced.
In fact, supplies to Germany from us will probably be reduced generally), 'ThettiSare, IMs
question is being discussed together with that mentioned in paragraph 2.

With regard to the request which you had made ctmceming new orders in your caption tele-
gram, we are now negotiating witkl^li^||ficte^;^S|IRie^^ «0 to i^e^ 4*«M^i^on ini^d^
aa it is p^^isbk to do

•Not available*

Trans. 7-2l~41

No, 782

FROM: Tokyo July 21, 1941

TO: Berlin #673.

Regarding your #B14°.

I have explained to the German government that —

(1) We expect to spend, in the period of five years, the sum of ¥250,000,000 on machinery,
Pfttents and drawings and also for the exchange of technicians through the instrumentality of
the technical treaty. Our expenditure regarding the above for the next year or two to be met by
the ¥100,000,000 credit to be extended to us by Germany and fiiture payments to be ma4e
either in foreign currency or in trade, whichever these Germany wishes to chooae» Accordin^j!^
the ;^U§stion of making payment is a matter of a year or two hence.

(^•^lNfef^^1»e&i»6e*ef wanmg export efforts to Germaaiy, *l ah*adS' r#Eii^1Seid in my # 663",
but also due to further reduction in exports, necessitated by the removal of German silver to
new quarters, whose space is somewhat limited, and also to the nature of export gooda, it

(3) As regdj^ ^e trade negotiations, the question of detailed list of articles, and quantity,
wiU have t& be deferred until the settlement of the German-Soviet situatiott. However, we are
now ccmsideeiQg tiie question of estatitlW(atw>me aort €£l»db^^rei»a^t as a necessary jpne^
lude to economic mutual assistance.

Trans. 7-26-41

No. 783

wMt mm^ki^i^: July u, 1941

TO: Tokyo
Jii^S&'&mmm #011.

On the 11th, I visited an official of the Foreign Office and inquired allSigl Italy's decision re-
garding this item. The above official said that for military reasons Italjf o6«dd not permit the

A^

transit through Italy of machinery desti^^.j^ America and, therefore, it was unavoidable
that Italy return a negative answer to th^ Japanese proposal. However, inasmuch as Italy
was deeply interested m the e^spansion of Japanese manufacturing capacity, if Japan could
think up some otim ^g^^^a^$$0uk^^ BiKfe Jto^F ^Ei^>>e more than sJa4 t0 jsive B.
further stu<iy.

■ftana. 7-22-41

No. 784

FROM: Tokyo Jubfig.mi
TO: Moscow '^'il^.

Having been appoftiiBrf -fe Ifefr jtM^fe 4rf Fordid Min^feiEi cf tetend to do my humble best*©
meet and clear up the difficult situation C6nflf6nting us, t would apj»edate yotw staying eai at
your post and cooperating with me,

TVans. 7-21-41

No. 785

FROM: Moscow (Tiitdtswt) July 20, IHl

TO: Tokyo #964.

I thank you very much for your kind telegram. As you may stifiDtsd^j there was one reason
why I had agreed to take upon myself this great responsibility, notwithgta«lfi3Sat'<^'ft«^'tb8* 1
was far from equal to it, and that was because I was heartily in agreement with the Foreign
Minister's ideas, which I knew would not permit my refusal, and because I was deeply moved
by his strong detenninatiea. Mt lM*t ^Ucy was €lttfe el-'idtoWISffe^SSHi^fe ito^#t»
Power Alliance or at least of keeping that country from moving closer to Britain and the United
States. However, the general situation has now radically changed. For our Government to
ftmnulate an entirely new policy toward Sovi^&a^ li-©lfly to be expeetfed; 'tItfsSAimfe'l'
expect will meet with some difficulty when it comes to application. We may expect that it
would be wise to change our attitude in regard, for example, to the question of rights and inter-
est in northern Karafuto' flfom the attitude we have heretofore taken. Under the CiiSiMn!-
stances, it would not be so easy for you to make me a leader in breaking a promise, for the
making of which I had been partly responsible, and so I cannot willingly accept the offer. I
believe, ttieirefOTe, that it is both ftft>le and natural that you should appoint a new Amhash
sador who well understands the newly instituted policy. I am extremely sorry to have to reject
your offer, especially because I realize the gravity of the present crisis, but I trust that you will
und^taaid what I have m ^ im^&mmA^ ^mMi^^ «ltd# mt^^NMElE'i^li!^'*

'Jiipimm naaie of SakhfOia Msii4.^c&«f

Tmn&. 7-23-41

AhW4

Tm ''MAGIO" fii^GKai^UJTO OF PEARL HAilBOB

No. 786

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa) July 22, 1941

TO: T0k0 • #t^' •

Re my #829".

Since conditions have become more threatening, we are taking the following steps at 6:00
p.m. on the 23rd (Moscow time), and so please be SO informed. All codes with the exception of
those listed below will be burned:'

'Not available.

'DoD Comment: Details deleted.

Trans. 7-28-41

No. 787

FROM: Tokyo _ JnlylS, 194],

TO: Shanghai #728.

According to MMM report, the British Commercial AttacMliM beim^ffilTOOtedtoftdBitate
departure of cargo vessels going to the U.S.S.R, and also to tbe Ileit^ States. Please let me
know situation relative to exports from Shanghai to Vladivostok.

In view of our stand toward the U.S.S.R. we should not resort to measures which may be too
provoking. However, please see whether you can find a way to assume some sort of control over
transportation of goods to the U.S.S.R. and let me know.

Trans. 7-21^1

No. 788

FROM; Vienna (Yamaji) Augusts, 1941

TO: Tokyo #063,

(Strictly Secret.) * " *

A considerable number of persons in influential circles in this area are now strongly advo-
cating the capturing of the Trans-Siberia Railroad to better communication facilities between
fy^mi md Germany, and for other reasons. (It would not be particularly difficult to do this,
&sSss {j^^Ons insist, particularly if the project is carried out through the joint action of Ger-
many and Japan.)

T^Ja a ^^9iK'*!tio6 whicbis worthy of our special attention.

Trans. 8-19-41

A-405

No. 789

FROM: Tokyo
3*0: Canton

June 10, 1941

On the 7th, French. Ambassador HENRY called on this Minister and stated that since the
occupation of the island of Weichow", French missionaries of an evangelistic organization had
heen persecuted by the Japanese. Since last year, the whereabouts of SONNUFUROO and
KASUnOO, white men, have been unlinown, and rumors are circulating that they have met
foul play at the hands of the Japanese. Furthermore, one exiled Chinese minister and six nuns
are tiBdelPStdS*^ W be under strict Japanese surveillance, in addition to which all religious
activities have been banned. In view of these statements, they request that this Chinese mm-
ister and the nuns be permitted to leave the island and they have requested that they be placed
under French jurisdiction at Fort Bayard*. Therefore, after you have contacted the local mili-
tary avithorities and made careful examination of the facts of the matter, wire me your findings.

{I am sending you by air mail the taraosiatian qf th© SMygaOTandum handed over to us by the
Ambassador.)

•Weichow 13 an island off the cost«f Kw<nl]tU!^ Province inSooUt QuSft.

(Msg. to Shanghai # 560)

Re my #424°.

On the 7tb, the French Ambassador called on me and said that to hand over these docu-
ments would have a had effect on the French rights and interests which exist principally in
the unoccupied areas of China, and he requested that we reconsider the matter. Accordingly,
on the 18th, the Chief of the East Asia Bureau told the French Commercial Attache that there
is a danger that the attitude which the FVench authorities have and persist in keeping will
again bring about an unfavorable attitude toward France. In order to expedite the settlement
of this matter, he requestted that instructions he sent out to the actual place.

Relayed to Nanking. '~ ^ - . «, _

Trans. 6-1^-41

No. 790

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Nanking

June 20, 1941
#216.

'Not available.

Trans. 6-2^1

4^

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No, 791

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

June 7, 1941
#1216.

(Circular)

Action Vichy as #219.
[A bstract) Re my # 206°.

The Japanese army in Indo China has decided to insist upon the right to seize and requisi-
tion property destined for China. The question of French responsibility and sovereignty is
involved, but by Franco- Japanese cof^er^ition it is believed baseless fears can be alleviated,
probably by consignment of seized merchandise to Japanese interests in Indo China. An
f^eement upon this subject is being drafted.

'Itettficatipn hy Japanese of tbe F.LC.-Thai peace treaty will be about 26 June — by Thai, about 26 June. Request

Action Tokyo as # 297 (In four parts, Complete).

My observations regarding Franco-German collaboration after having recently conferred
vrAh. the important cabhiet members, with Ambassador Abetz resident in Paris, and with
Laval, are as follows:

1. During the five months interval from the Laval incident in December of last year to the
time of the Bercht^gaden conferences of May of this year, there were not political relations
between the two countries and events were simply allowed to take their course by both sides.
However, since the turn of events in the Balkans, the Vichy government, stimulated by the
poverty of the necessities of life, and watching the direction the wind was blowing in the
British and German camps, decided that there was nothing left for them toi^fi^^ to
secure national independence and prosperity but to cooperate with Germany.

Therefore, recently, at last in line with Laval's thinking, Franco-German collaboration was
decided upon. Declarations came in rapid succession from Petain and Darlan on the heels of
the Berchtesgaden interviews and the policy of the Vichy government is to strongly propa-
gandize Franco-German collaboration while steadily putting it into practice.

2. No clear pattern of the content of the Franco-German collaboration has as yet been mani-
fest. However, the leading spirits on both sides are in complete agreement regarding the prin-
ciples and motives of the relations between the two countries as set forth in the Berchtesgaden
interviews and by this a new era has opened up before ovir eyes in Franco-German collaboration.
That France is to undertake the protection of the home and country and the possessions herself
is generally understood. Indirectly this will lead to the approval of the preservation of the
integrity of the French empire as a whole. Getting down now to more specific problems, or
rather to secondary consideratiops, it is provided that, as far as possible, there will be a redue-

Trene. §r.9^X

No. 792

FROM: Vichy (Kato)

TO: Washington (KOSHI)

June 11, 1941
No number.

A-407

tion in the price of the seized war materials, and that the resttictions on the circulation of
persons and goods bs^^il'e^-oetnij^ied. md unocii^pijEKl France m$l. be zelazed and prisqi^ei^ ne^

turned.

3. A large part of France will continue to be occupied by Geiiman'ioldiers. There ivijf Wft
large number of Anglo-American sympathizers who will act in unison with, or attempt to act
in unison with, the maneuvers of De Gaulle. In view of the present situation in France there
will of course be difficulties in effecting a collaboration with Gmnahy. Geimi^^lf^ its part,
in order to secure coastal air ports and bases in the rear to support military operations against
Britain, will find it necessary to hold the present occupied area for some time to come. Again,
it is inevitable that there should continue to exist in France many anti-coUaborationists who
desire to see France remain an enemy of Germany and, therefore, it is necessary that Germany,
while recognizing the desires and aspirations of France for a united territory, reserve certain
guarantees of ^'ranee's good faith. Therefore, it is necessary for a time at least that the occupied
area remain as at present, and thus it is apparent that the course of the military operations
against England and the faithfulness with which France discharges her share of the obligations
under the coalition are a clue to the continued existence of unoccupied Prance as such.

4. The matter of the conclusion of a separate peace during this interval by either France or
Germany is a problem that has come up but no final peace could be concluded that did not
aiclude the return of the occupied area and hence siich a oc^^i^gseilfl^'i^ hai^ll]? conoeivftble
and certainly could not occur immediately. Regarding the basis of peace, the return of Alsace-
Lorraine, PADDKAKEE, and part of France, a member of the Vichy Cabinet said to met
"Them h no help for iUsace, but there is certainly no question but what Lorrame is a part of
France and it is certainly unreasonable. As to PADDKAREE this is very hard to understand."
CHUNIZn was established solely by the French and inasmuch as they have no right to request
it from the Italians, they have a tremendous antipathy for the Italians. This fact was voiced by
all the Cabinet members. I could not see that t^ere was any BgtvemesA at presei^ in the talks
regarding the problem of Africa and Syria.

5. In view of the conditions resulting from America's inevitable participation in the war,
Germany is aware of the possibility of French territory being used by enemy countries and is
ctmsidering the problem of protecting French possessions. A large amount of the aims and
munitions that were prohibited under the old agreement are being sent out to the armies in the
possessions. However, to what extent Germany will lend a hand in case these provinces are actu-
ally attacked remains to be seen. Immediately after the outbreak of the Iraq incident, Iraq
requested German aid and while Grermany sent a few divisions of the air force by way of Syria
she found it impossible to dispatch the air force that Iraq desired because the synthetic rubber
and synthetic fuel that the German army uses will not stand the intense heat of countries like
Iraq. Also, because she did not wish to extend the battle line so far shs did not dispatch soldiers
there either. At present, even if Syria could be occupied by Britain there is a question as to
whether Germany will dispatch soldiers or not and only the course of events will determine this.
It is difficult now to see that France and Germany have an understanding regarding this area.

6. France's aim in this Franco-German collaboratioin is to secure for herself a leading role
in the new order to be established in Europe after the war. As far as the continent of Eturope is
concerned France sees that German victory is inevitable. Collaborationists of the old guard
like Laval and Hitler, hold an idea that is absolutely contrary to the conventional one regarding
conquered people. While Germany retains the absolute leadership after the war, she will
abolish the meaningless national boundary lines and while respecting the autonomy and in-
dependence of the various peoples of Europe she will expect them all to work together for the
common welfare and interest of all. Thus, in the future, the relations between conqueror and
e^Q^ii^!'^ 8* 8*1 entirely new meaning and France instead of endeavoring to establish her

A-408

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

autonomy and mdep^dence will endeavor to play a leading tole in the New Europe. Germany
recognizes on her part t^t the establishment of this new order in Europe would be very difficult
without France's coo^ierataon. Sincere belief in this does not permit of hesitation advo-
cating J^wc«ft|S«^iiifc'Sii$^^ in IVance — — (Last two lines
garbled't!^>

No. 793

FROM: Tokyo (Matsy^ June 12, 1941

TO: Vichy ^ - - #222.

You inquire about my # 216". Well in it I told you about the feeling that I have had for many
years that I would like to see France and Germany make a permanent peace. I merely thought
that this would help you along in your future negotiations with the Rrench, and did not mean
to say that we have any definite plans for mediation between Etance and Oennany right now
under the present circumstances. I mo. Sire that ytm were not, mistaken abo«t this* but I
thoiji^ I b^ iie|t§&^ j|ilf(!ey>

° Set; n, 79;j A, B, and C, in witleh MATSUOICA ^«!la»e that miy m mdmam6ia$ het^wem Germany «ad Rtshcb

will there be peace in Europe.

Trans. 6-14-41

No.79aA

PROM: Tokyo (Mataueka)
(Parti of 3)

I, the Foreign Minister, have always entertained the belief that since Japan emerged from
isolation as a great power it is our mission to be a stabilizing force for world peace, in the
realization of which we are able to contribnte vefy jgrestif. I^soking at the real facts of the world
situation today from the point of view of fundamentals, I do not believe that we can stand
idly by and see the stability and peace of Europe, which, after all, was the fountainhead of
ekttiaation of our times, vanish. Now, the stability and peace of Europe depends
primarily upon a reconciliation between Germany and France, followed by continued
harmony between those two nations. The British Empire itself ought to realize that this would
be best for her own good. Prom her heart she begs and prays for peace and security, but when
she faces the problem of peace throughout Europe she is too deeply involved on that con-
tinent to extricate herself and view the matter realistically. Her interests are so vast and
varied in Europe that she has always followed the policy of, as they say in English, "divide and
rule." History proves that! No country in the geographical position of England, bound up as
she is by interests in Europe, could ever hope to contribute to the stabilization of this
continent, but our empire, which has relatively small material interests in Europe and who
can view the world on a broader plane, stands in a good position to bring about harmony
between Gennahy and Prance. For thirty or forty years 1 have entertained this view and it
has been my constant hope that om empire might; contribute to the peace <rf the wt^ld.

June 4, 1941
#216.

A-409

FROM: Tokyo (MatsiWka)
TO: Vichy

June 4, 1941
#216.

(Part 2 of 3)

Last autumn we entered into an alliance relationship with Geftnany and Italy. Using our
convenient position produced thereby, I have hoped to take a step, even though it be but one
step, in the direction of realizing the ideal of my lifetime. Nay and more, the fact that some
years ago we concluded the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany (immediately upon my
return to Tokyo ftom Geneva without a moment's delay I advanced this proposal, confident
in the hope that it would lead to an alliance) and, proceeding further, converted it into a
Tri- Partite Pact, was motivated and conceived by this single idea of my own. When 1 recently
visited Etirope, in Germany I reiterated my deeprooted convictions and I learned definitely
fipom Chancellor HITLER that he intends to give France the position of a great power in the
new order which is to be established in Europe. How glad I was to hear him say that! I also
ffankly told Foreign Minister HIBBENTROP what I have been cherishing Ovct these long,
femg years and went on to explain to him th.it rlapan, wfeo is a friend and ally of Germany, is
aa a favorable position to mediate between Germany (and Italy) and France, in which case I
hoped that Germany would do her utmost to assist France.

Well, in Japan I met and came to know Mr. ROBAN" and fortunately before I left for Europe
and also after my return, 1 confidentially told him of the confidence and hope of my whole
I^time, (Atnbssgador HENRY knew all about it) and Mr. ROBAN said to me: % too, all my life

He continued, "Unless this happens, I am of the opinion that there will never be peace in
Europe. I absolutely agree with what you say." I then said, "Well then, Mr. ROBAN, on your
way back to France I want you to be sure to stop off in Japan and to talk with Ambassador
STARMER, and if it is alright with him, to go to Germany and talk with Foreign Minister
RIBBENTROP and then even perhaps with Chancellor HITLER." Mr. Roban repUed, 'T
will talk with Amb^sador STARMER, but before I converse with HITLER and RIBBENTROP,
I will have to go first to Vichy and commune with MARSHAL PETAIN. Otherwise I fear that
the plan might be dljSicult to carry out." On this we both agreed. (The last time Mr, ROBAN
was in Japan he did not get a chance to talk with Ambassador STARMER, who was very busy.)

Will Your Honor please study this message well and when you have it in mind, go and tell
the German officials with appropriate empbfl^ W^sit I have so fervently hoped for over
iSEtese many, many years. Please use 1|i get them to a^ree to our mediation.

Trans. 6-7-41

No. 793C

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Vichy

Part3af3,

J\me4, 1941
#216.

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

When I was in Germany, I explained to Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and to Ambassador
STARMEIR the fine character of Mr. ROBAN and I said to them, "Gentlemen, here is a man
of the futm*e upon whom we must keep our eyes." Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP listened
with great interest and nodded in assent.

Please wire this to Berlin.

Trans, ©^7-41

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoika) June 16, 1S41

TO: Vichy #233.

(Message to Berlin #51$,)

(Parti of 2.)

Re your ii 685".

In view of the trend of events, the ^Eopifial. Government finds it necesaitty.festof all to secure
airplane-^^'lt^^iit^? WB^^^^d^M^ ^ '^m^'^^S^^^'S/i^hy our
warships can freely enter j'i^ji^ave that olf^fB^f^. Will you, therefore, immediately go and ask
Foreign Minister VON RlfiBENTROP to Have tiie Vichy Government secretly agree to this so
tbat we may without any delay definitely obtain ports and airplane bases. Please ask him to
have Vichy wire the French Indo-Chinese officials to support our claims so that we may obtain
tiiese rights and begin to expand and strengthen them. Use my next number, 520°, as the basis
of your explanation. If this plan of ours does not succeed, if and when the times comes, the
Imperial Government is determined on its own to take whatever measures may be necessary.

It goes without saying that our Empire has no intention of invading French Indo-China, This
point is darified by the recent exchange of notes between Japan and French Indo-Chine^
authorities, as well as by th«^a%li|^ilie» in tite peace txeBjt'^^m!^^^|^si^^^^^^^
French Indo-China.

'Not available.

Trans. 6-17-41

No. 795

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)

Message to Berlin
(Part 2 of 2.)

The Imperial Government has in no wise changed its policy of continuing its guarantees to
respect the territorial integrity of French Indo-China, To tell the truth, as things now look it
would appear that it is Great Britain who might subjugate that country and make it a base for
an attack on Japan, It is our desire to offset the danger of Great Britain seizing this important
a^eat. ^S^^^^^ Mm « li^ 'Fo be sure, I fed that Ithe fr^aeb

June 16, 1941
#233.

know that it is to their advantage as well as to ours to make secure the strategic position of our
great Empire in the Far East and that our interest, as well as theirs, centers in French Indo-
China. Another thing: Lately the DeGaullists have been strengthening their position in south-
ern French Indo-China and there is a tendency for the people no longer to listen to the Gover-
nor General Please explain that also to RIBBENTROP and ask him to guide and advise the
Vichy Government to speedily acquiesce to our demands without any misgivings as to our good
intentions.

This situation will permit of no equivocation, so please negotiate with this dearfy in mind.
SRbiis ineHsage is smt aim to Vichy*

Trans. 6-17-41

No. 796

VmU: Tokyo June 17, 1941

TO: Vichy #234.

Action Berlin as # 520.

Aii^orts agreed upon between Japan (?) and French fodo-China in the order of ^^^jpot^
tance:

1. Saigon Bienhoa

2. Phnompenh

3. Kompontrach

4. NhatTfUig

5. Soctrang

6. Toura — (Tourain)

7. Simreap

Harbors in ord^ itCi^ei^^Ql^Sinie&i

1. Saigon

2. Camranh

had be^ relayed to ftmce^

FROM: Tokyo June 18, 1941

TO: Vichy #237.

Message to Berlin r'-' 533.

Re your // TOO" and #707".

Will you please communicate my # 519' verbatim by word of mouth to Foreign Minister
MBBENTROP. In that message, you 1 spoke of suitable measures, etc. Now, if the Foreign
Minister questions you, tell him that I want him to put complete trust in me. Tell him that
the Imperial Government would not take such a step as this without strong resolution, and
that it goes without saying that our Government has no bad faith in mind.

During this conversation, if the Foreign Minister takes the view that. In view of the nature of
the relations existing between Germany and France, even though he tried to get Vichy to

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

accept OUT proposal it would be impossible to do so, please be sure to tell him not to even
attempt it because this is a serious matter and if it leaked out that we were trying to get Ger-
many to bring pressure to bear upon Vichy for such a purpose a serious secret would be dis-
closed and our future schemig blasts M BTOBEJ^TBOP', in ottMie ««S^iir MbSi^ Germany
could not succeed, we will have to think of womm vnsf to Approach the matter em our own. Please
keep this in mind during your conversation.

° Not available.

'Matwoka wires Osima in Berlin to aak Ribbentrop to bring prcflaure io bear qd Vidhy to obtain airplaae basw

Trans- 6-19-41

No. 798

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO; Vic%

Message to B^lin # &49.

June 22, 1941

Hease go to l^ftiiti^ WH WBUBW^&Q^ tettitilk^ laid ^bonfy the following

points:

1. As I said in my previous message, il' Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and Ambassador
ABWrZ" do not think that there is much chance fiO-icHiceedlagt Kb^>.tM Japanese Grovemment
is prepared to broach the subject with V^ichy and the French Indo-China Officials and to b^in
negotiations with them, tell RIBBENTROP to drop the matter.

2. It is absolute «£W^iM'#iat we get military and air laam^' m&'pm0»i^ "WQ^
at their expansion, and it naturally follows that in order tO defend the same we mnst stati^
in the areas concerned a sufficient number of soldiers.

3. If we cannot by the regukr diplomatic methods cause France to agree, we are definitely
determined to achieve <HU'-ol%t^ by milita^ means.

Relayed to Vichy.

'Not available.

'German Ambassador to Vichy.

'Saigon and CaituBiitU^f!^«BN|»^9i^ea,

'Seven sir Iwses in Sd^^i^fit^MttM«^l^ _ - .

Trans. 6-23-41

No. 799

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 30, 1941

TO: Vichy #252.

Re my #571 to Berlin'.

In spite of what our Ambassador in Berlin says, we consider that it is now absolutely essential
to make France accede to our demands, so please follow the instruction in my caption message.
Please Ixansmit to BerSb^

"Not available. Trans. 7-3-41

A-413

No. 800

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Vichy

(Circular)

(Secret outside the Department)

Re # 230° addressed to this minister from Saigon.

June 28, 1941 •

On the 25th, the Economic Affau^ representativ^^j^^nje confidentially as follows:

**t« I think it would not li^ifflfficult, by meaiis & fliegO#alfeion8 between Tokyo, Berlin, and
^chijr, te^iew of the outbreak of war between Germany and Soviet Russia, to have Japan take
(tegi of nibber from FVench Indo- China; namely, 1,875 tons (at present waiting for a ship to
cofty it) destined for TOKUSHU', and the 1,000 tons destined for the same port and to be
shipped in July; in all, 7,875' tons.

"2. I believe it would be possible also to — — regarding the 5,000 tons (the

second shipment) destSMed^a'^jpto if iFapan negotiates with the Vichy government."

In the light of the situation described above, I think it is very important that we take ft Ijold
step at this time regarding rubber, I am giving you my huttUjte augfestit© bopiM W^at »l*pild
be of interest to you. ' ' • W •

• • ■

"Not available.
'Unknown.

'Probably a mistake for 8,875 tons.

Trans. 7-1-41

t -

FROM- Tokye July 4, 1941

W'* #609.

SefOiif#« ' .

We have come to the conclusion that it would be of no use for Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP
to try to prevail upon the Vichy Government to accede to our demands and that he would have
hardly any chance of succeeding. Therefore, will you, in accordance with my previous mes-
sage, advise the Germans to refrain from speaking of the matter at all? On the other hand,
will you please immediately inform Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP that as soon as we get a
Suitable opportunity we are going to negotiate with Vichy and, if they say us nay, we will fight.
In this case, aftef l^i^jtoi SH5 bigUB, m WMf i» Sfe ^ fegaest M IftWfe m&^a^
frppi Germany.

"Not available.

Trans. 7-7-41

A-414

THE MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

FROM: Berlin July 7, 1941

TO: Tokyo #860.

Chief of Office routing.

Re your #609°.

On the 7th, I called Ambassador Stahmer and asked him to wire Foreign Minister Ribben-
trop at the office of the High Command and at the same time I asked him to communicate it
immediately to Ambassa^S^^jitltti .

°See n, 801. "We have come to the conclusion that it would be of no use for Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to try to
prevail upon the Vichy governnieint to accede to our demands and that he would have hardly any chance erf succeeding.
Therefore, wiU you, in accordance with my previous message, advise the Germans to refrain from speaking on the
matter at all. On the other hand, will you please immediately inform Foreign Minister lUbbentrop that as soon as we
get a suitable opportunity we are going to negotiate with Vichy and, if they say us nay, we will fl^t. In this case after
bo^bKyet^i^^Sg^ w« may se« St io leq^a^i^iim^mi^t^mimpm.'^m^m^t'

TVans* 7-18-41

No. 803

FROM: Berlin June 28, 1941

TO: Tokyo #800.

Re your # 571°.

I reported additional data on France's recognition of the Wang regime in my # 791° but since
you made no reference whatever to this, I believe our messages must have crossed. If we want
to insure for ourselves in the future freedom of action in French Indo- China, in my opinion, it
is decidely not the best policy at this time to press the point of recognition of the Wang regime.
I beg you most eamesiiy to drop the matter.

Transmitted tQk-Bsp^^^

*Not available.

TVans. 7-1-41

No. 804

FROM: Tokyo July 4, 1941

TO: # 1425.

(Circular)

{Message to Vichy # 256)
Re your # 336°.

The People's Government is most eager to get France's recognition, and so please again
press the matter strongly on the govm^aea^ .

* Not available.

Trans. 7-8-41

mm

FROM: Tokyo (Mateaofeai) JulyS, IMI

TO: Vichy #263.

Re your # 347°.

We have decided, everything considered, that the basic negotiations will be carried on in
Vichy. In view of the extreme gravity of these negotiations, you will please undertake them
with great assurance and lirmnesa. 1, th$ Foreign Minister, trust implicitly in your ability and
Ismm ym wiU spare no efforts.

Trans. 7-11-41

No. S06

FROM: Tokyo {Mat^oi^) July 10, 1941

m Hanoi #J#.

In exchange for compliance with our request that regular air service between Japan and
Thailand be increased, the French authorities have been asking that we sell them airplanes.
Having decided to comply with the request for the reason that we wish to increase our influent
ift f¥emch Indo-China in the matter of aviation, I und«lraitaiid that Aftftiy has sent the
lowing telegram to Official SUM ID A. Thereft)re, please be so informed,

1. A reply be addressed to the French authorities that we would sell, in exchange for in-
WsSmi air service, airplanes (two airplanes the Japtraese A^da&m^
Company), and, furthermore, that we would like to fcave the EERU FURANSU* made a com-
pany jointly managed by Japan and France.

2. The airplanes are to be supplied them with the i^Utical developments in view. This l»
to take placftvlis^ i^aigust taiipatd. (Howtv^, k«ep th^ date staiietls? ^sret fisjm the iVeiacit
authorities).

■Am FEANCAIS-

•feans. 7-15-41

No. 807

FROM: To^o July 11, 1941

TO: Vmy #270.

(In 2 parts — complete.)

To Hanoi as #172,

Exchange of ratification of the economic treaty between Japan and '^iit^l&itt^^ina has
now taken place at last. We feel very keenly the need of having promoters sent at once to look
after our rights and interests which are stipulated in Article 5 of the protocol, and as a px^lim.-

inary to adoption it was decided that for the purpose of speeding up economic investigations
with such promoters in mind, an investigative committee be organized and sent to French
Indo- China under government direction. Please bear the followil^ (Points ia mind and fs^fsse
the consent of the French and also their facilitation of the plan:

iiyOi'^t the time that we negotiated for the dispatch of experts to make a survey of petroleum
resources in French Indo- China, we told them of this plan, but written representation was
made by both the Governor General and the Ambassador in Tokyo to the effect that such a
survey would need to be referred to the economic conference called for in Article 7 of the pio-
tocol, and that it could be carried out only to such an extent as approved by the conference,
and therefore, the dispatch of any investigating committee cannot be allowed until after this
procedure has been followed. As this was just before the ratification of the treaty we refrained
from taking any issued with the French in their position, but allowed the matter to pass that
way, however, we cannot recognize this position. Inasmuch as the French in the present treaty
have recogniztid in principle our pMticipation in the development of Pr^ch Indo-China re-
sources, it becomes absolutely necessary that we make a survey of the resomrces and go ahead
with dehnite plans for their development. To defer the very first step in the conference would
be inconsistent with the spirit of the protocol. As we see it the French, in taking this position,
are merely endeavoring to delay our beginning of actual operations, under the pretense of an
economic conference, and at the same time they would limit the scope of our investigations,
and t hus they would reduce to mere words without significance the basic principle involved in
the launching of enterprises by Japanese, which they have already recognized. Not only in
this matter but in everything, the attitude the French have taken gives one the aaipresBion
that they are doing their utmost to minimize the real essence of the treaty, ajtld l)t>^ievent our
economic advance, and that they have no intention of making direct ecohoitoc coopetation
with us amount to anything, which attitude we regret very much.

This is a matter to which we attach great importance, and we want it emphasized from the
first, and therefore, we ^ Fr^cfe to a^<;^ jtp tMj^^i*e«t in this matter just as we

have planned it.

^) It is expected that the group to be sent on this missicMI wfll include technicians and
promoters, who will engage in technical stUfveya under the direction Of the gov^raent^ To
leave the work to the individual "initiative** «f the various firms would only leid 'tiS'€(5fl^elS^
tion and speculation which would be detrimental to real development of resources, and also
lead to untoward results in financial conditions in French Indo-China, and therefore, it is
planned that a sound development program shall he pushed along under governmental eoffl-
troL

(3) As a matter of fact the and other Japanese firms have already begun operatiems in

iron, manganese, apatite, etc., or are endeavoring to launch into it, and, therefore, it is essen-
tial that the government at once have surveys made and begin to direct the Japanese enter-
prises in lines of mutual endeavor. We wish to send party of uavestagatOTs very soon and
are laying definite plans for it,

(4) As to the make-up of the party. There will be a chairman (we intend to giue Wm

status of an envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary), and several — fifott headqp^ftept

to be resident in French Indo-China to make contracts with French Indo-China a«th^(itlie9'.
Besides these, other experts will be sent from time to time on the basis of replenishments who
will make investigations in regard to the mining industries, (iron, coal, manganese, and the
non-ferrous metals), agricultural industries, (rice, yellow hemp, rubber), forestry industries,
and marine products, etc.

1^ t}e^ rel^d to H«noi. Hanoi will send it on to SaigQH by the next mml-

Trans, 7-29-41

fiOM: Vichy /, July 11, . 11*1 . „ .

tb, Tokyo #356.

Be your #267".

On the XOth, 1 had Harada surest to ARUNAARU that as the Germans had agreed in prin-
ciple to our "schedule"'' we would like to have him arrange at once for these supplies. "A" re-
plied that he had no advice as yet from the Germans, and to a question from Harada he is said
to have replied that as this was the first he had heard of any understanding between Germany
and France regarding the remainder of that which was to be loaded for France proper, he would
like inquiry made of — at once.

'Not available.

'For Bhippin^ tubber and other strategic materials(?).

Trana, 7-14-41

No. 809

FROM: Tokyo May 7, 1941

TO: Vichy #184.

Re your # 194".

Please prod the French authorities without delay and reply outcome.

'AjtiAmbaBBad'ot Heniy to be vetg busy, the Japs ask the French to allow the ueKotiatioiiB on F.I-C. rubber,
«A|0^iMtiecl on in VkJ^

Trans. 6-12-4t

N0.SIQ I. . , J

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 14, 1941

TO: Vichy #282.

(Secret.)

Re my #184".

According to a wire from Ambassador OSIMA*, the German authorities have already agreed
to the matter, and so will you urge the matter on the French authorities as soon as possible and
wire me the results.

'See n, 607 concerning negotiations on A«ia#M^'i(^lKlle!^llMI^'r
* Japanese Ambassador in Berlin.

Trans. 7-17-41

Ar41B

TOE "*MAiH|r^»aW

No. 811

PROM: Tokyo (MatStt^l' July 12, 13€J

TO: Vichy " #272.

Important messages aye bein® sent out tod^i^, the 12th. Keep the office force in readiness,

Trans. Not dated

No. 812

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Vichy

July 12, 1941
#273.

Secret. To be handled m Government Code.
(Parti of 2)".

1 . Because of the new international conditions which are extremely difficult, the Imperial
(juvernment had decided that the acquisition of military bases and the occupation by Impe-
rial troops in French Indo-China is necessary for the establishment of a "Far Eastern Sphere
of Co- prosperity." Representations have been made to the French Government recently
along these lines. The United States and Great Britain protest this action. Putting aside this
action on their part, the foregoing will be realized. With the decided strong determination of
the Imperial Government, should the French Government and the French In do- China au-
thorities be opposed, exceeding firmness will be employed.

2. I think it may be said that the relations between Japan and French Indo-China were
gradually improving, but as yet a condition of full satisfaction has not been reached. Further-
more, America and England have been constricting us by encirclement. Now if a foothold is
gained (by them) in southern French Indo-China, the outcome would be that French Indo-
China would not completely follow along with us. There is a feeling that, although the French
have successively compromised, this present demand is being forced upon them, the Imperial
Government really does not want to do this. In addition it may be said that because France
has been approaching the Axis, relations have become delicate. The position has been taken
that it is truely inevitable that Japan for her own existence and self-deifense follow out a policy
of southern expansion.

3. Negotiations are again being made with France. Starting from the point of self-defense,
the occupation by Imperial troops and considering the question from a broad view-point, am
answer of assent or refusal is to be secured from them. Following out the persuasion (inserting
'on the 20th Japanese time' In the representation suggested in #274*), you are to secure an
answer from them. We are very desirous that the French accept the demands of the Imperial
Government in regard to the (several ?) questions in order that the occupation may be a peace-
ful on0. H the period of negotiation is long, it would give France the opportunity to delay and
in the uteantime the United States and Great Britain would make a great uproar. In order to
avoid this, the negotiations must be carried out in the shortest possible period. This would at
least, diu'ing the aforementioned period, force them to make a definite answer of "yes" or "no".
Shoud tl^y accept, the diplomat?^ i^^sbieb lef erred to in #276°. —

p^aratic^ are being iaad^.

Once this has been started, for strategical reasons definitely refuse to allow changes. For your
information only; should Prance accept, the occupation would be a peaceful one; if not, a

''Paj't2, See n,813.

*See H, 814-815. Matsuoka dsscribes the aituatii>n in French Indo-China and urges the French Government to

Japanese terms and tiiifliMiiecessary ^tep^i with the object of defending French Indo-China jointly.
°Se« Q, BXl. Matauoslta'si SMI^ to th^ French Government submitting tbe ptopoaalg regarding Frencli Indo-
CMna.

Tram. 7-16-41

No. 813

TO: Vichy .MM*
(Part 2 of 2)',

1. We are very determined in the present demands. It is difiiuult to say that there will not
be a great change in the position of French Indo-China if the French refuse our demands and
the Ehnpire for its own standpoint must station the Emperor's troops there. It is desirous that
tliey clearly realize this. If the French a(;[;ept, provision will be made for the guarantee in all
seriousness and respect for the sovereignty and integrity of French Indo-China, It need not be
said that this present agreement viewed within itself contains the deepest feeling for the car-
rying out of obligations. Be sure to use this to the fullest in prevailing upon them. And, fur-
thermore, of course it is the intention that should France accept, French Indo-China would be
feoosidered as an allied country, being in as far as possible, supplied with materials and
munitions.

5. In addition, since the establishment of the agreement of last year between HENM and
MATSUOKA and until the recent French-Japanese Protocol and Economic Agreement, the
French, through their sincerity, wert bringing about at one time a rapprochement with Japan.
Now again, mihtary requests are being made. No doubt France finds this strange but it is due
to the stringent conditions of late. It is highly desirotffi VhM^^'i&e convinced that there are
no designs of infringing upon French sovereignty.

6. As there is a strong feeling that HENRI in Tokyo is a DeGauUist, the Imperial Govern-
ment is negotiating as soon as possible. The English Ambassador has actually been informed
(?) {garbled at this point). The present negotiations are to take place there (Prance). In view of
the importance of the matter, you are to negotiate directly with Premier PETAIN and of
course in those things of the country to which you are accredited you will deal with DARLAN.
There is danger that reports of this upon reaching the British would further unnecessarily
eomphcate things, so do not let this leak out. Take strict care with the French. Please tele-
gr«^ Germany.

SeeH, 812forpart 1.

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. Slit

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Vichy

• Inly 12, 1941
#274

Separate wire.
Strictly secret.
(Parti of 2.)

1, In view of the pressing situation, Hue partly to radical changes in recent international
relations and partly to military and political activity by the third powers in the South Seas
which form a pigii-ie$iih» #©at Far Eastern sphere af co-prospe«ty, the Imperial Gki-vemment
has found it necessary to resort to every effective means for the purpose of Japan's existence
and self-defense. A situation has developed in French Indo-China, and more particularly in
its southern section, in which a factkm not desifiaf t6<*6fip!W(tei*iilft lapan, as well as Ftench-
men in the DeGaulle faction, are plotting in various ways together with the British and
Americans. This is a situation which causes no end of concern to Japan, It may well be said
that if as a result of this French Indo-China falls in line with Great Britain and the United
States with a view of surrounding Japan and if French Indo-China secedes from Prance and
creates a situation that we see today in Syria, it will not only be a great loss to France but a

serious matter . To prevent the rise of this situation and to safeguard French

Indo-China from Invasion by third powers and, also, at the same time to perfect the cooper-
ations between Japan and French Indo-China, is an obligation not only m. the part of Japan,
whd is concerned with stability in the Fm WMl^ but, also, of France. Whi* UtmSee, conditions
have reached the stage already in which we can no longer remain inactive. (Should they deny
that the situation Is not so serious, will you reply to them that even if the situation has not
yet reached that stage at present, it is clear thaide*®lGpment»li^>lfejeeli'^^ ffotet sooner
or later in accordance with the plans of Britain.)

However, inasmuch as it is not enough to depend on the political agreement recently com-
pleted, if we are to realize the aforementioned objective, Japan wishes at this time to take the
initiative of cooperating militarily with France with a view to defending French Indo-China.

2. Reviewing the situation at hand, it is clear in the light of recent events that France is not
in a position to effectively defend alone hef colonies scattered over various parts of the world.
Notwithstanding this fact, the developments in French Indo-China have taken an a serious
aspect, as described above, and so Japan, regarding as she does French Indo-China as an im-
portant part of the Far Eastern sphCTfit l* ۩-pro6pe*ity, cannot ^and by with her hands folded.
It is believed, therefore, that if France intends to really guarantee the safety of Indo-China,
she would have to cooperate and join hands completely with Japan, not only in an economic
way, but also militarily. For IVfflice to comprehend the world tienda in the true light and
accept our proposals without reservation by placing absolute confidence in Japan — thia M'fi^'
pijly weyjr tOBave French Indo-China from conf usion.

Trans. 7-14-41

A-421

No. 815

PROM: Tokyo fi^i^aii^ July 12, 1941

Part 2 of 2.

3. Tb« Mpmese Government urges the French Government that it accept the following
terms on the £Oth Japanese time and take all necf^sw!^ witk t^e object of 4^gdin£
French Indo-China jointly. Namely: . ■ •■■ .-z. -

(a) Dispatching Lo southern French Indo-China the required nwmher of 'droops, several
ships and the required number of air detachmmite.

(b) To permit the use and our establishment of facilities at the following places:
Air Bases SIEMU REABU:

Splaces: BUNONPEN:
TXJRAN:
N-YATORAN:
BIENHOA:
SAIGON:

SOKUTORAN: and

KONBON-TORAT|®H?TJ»
Naval Bases SAIGON: and -*
2 places: KAMURANH.

(c) Recognize the right of the expeditionary force to conduct maneuvers, to reside and to
fteefy move about and to provide special facilities for these purposes. (This includes a cati-
cdttation of all matters in the NISIHARA-MARUTAN Agreement placing a limitfltion upon
Itoii^t of residence and freedom of movement of the expeditionary force.)

"fb take all ifditfi|3fe>iiefea8ures in order to prevent a collision between the French Indo*
China forces and the Japanese fort^ at the points of landing cxr th^eabcut whi^ will be speci-
fied in a special telegram.

(e) Recognition of the principal conditions relative to the movement of the expeditionary
force. {The landing forces are the same as those mentioned in (b).) (However, inasmuch as
this point concerns an important military secret it should not be submitted until the other side
has given a comprehensive approval of our demands, together with instructions concerning
distribution of troops. This point should be made known only after we have wire you.)

(f) As regards details of the expeditionary force, they should be decided at a conference to
be held at the military headquarters in FVench Indo-China (the SUMIDA Organization) with
the French Indo-China authorities after the French authorities have approved of our proposal.
However,, in. case these details have not been agreed upon by the time the landing forces have
i^ivetf^tth&TjfeMriirtifeding, they should be decided after the landing has been accom-
plished.

(g) To issue currency for the use of tbe espedltioaitty liwce {the details are given in s^^a-
rate message #275"),

Arm

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

FROM: Tokyo (Mateioka)

TO: Vichy

#27S.

Special Message, Secret.

To be handled is C^fjEfflB&ept OlHje.

Regarding the amount of troops sent to French Indo-China.

1. The French Indo-China authorities are to guarantee to supply the amount in piastres
through the organization set-up. The spedflc method will be brought out in a separate a^ee*
ment.

2, The amount to be paid for the balance of the year is 23,000,000 piastres (monthly amount,
4,500,000 piastres). This is to be paid in "free yen" (Literal translation), American dollars, or
in gold, whichever the French Indo-China authorities desire. Furthermore, the amount of
1,000,000 piastres a month 'loaned' to the army stationed in the Northern section is not in-
cluded in ihs above figures.

Separate Telegram,
Strictly Secret.

I am taking the liberty of approaching you with this letter, I have the honor of submitting
to the government of your country the following proposal regarding Indo-China in accordance
with nistructiong from my home country.

1. Japan and France should cooperate militarily for joint defense of French Indo-China.

2. For the purpose of this military cooperation, the government of France should grant the
following to Japan in French Indo-China: Herein should be listed (a), (b), (c), and (g) given in
my telegram #274" (the content of my #275' should be added to (g)).

3. Regarding the landing of the aforementioned expeditionary force, the French Govern-
ment should recognize the principal point resafding the activity of these forces and, further-
more, should take all suitable steps, including withdrawal of the French Indo-China garrison
and air forces in the neighborhood of the points at which the Japanese forces will be landed so
that eolHaion between the Japanese for<»s and the French Indo-China ftirces may be avoided.

4. The details concerning the movement of the expeditionary forces djould be decided by
the milittury authorities of the two countries m French Indo-China.

It is my wish that the govranment of your country will agree with the foregoir^. I would like
to add, furthermore, that it is the desire of the Japanese government that in case the govern-
ment of your country agrees to this, the agreement be recognized by means of a formal written
notice as soon as possible. I would like for you to transmit, etc. (In case the French authorities,
after nogotiations, refuse to accept our proposal, omit the aforementioned /. As to the written
agreement, it would be necessary to put 1 , given above (Joint defense) in the form of a protocol

Trans. 7-10-41

No. §17

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Vichy

July 12, 1941

{a draft will be sent you separately), and tibe poitifm coming under 4. into a diplomatic docu-
meiit Iiaving the 'nili^^ll fcH^.

'See 11, 8U, 815.
*See U,ai6.

Trans. 7-14-41

No. 818

FROM; Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Vicby

Tb be handled in Cknr^mant Code,

, Strictly SeOTet.

Please hand this menage to Mr. RORAN" as the personal message of this Minister.
(Furthermore, please caution ROBAN to be very careful not to let this leak out to absolutely
any other person.)

This Minister has filed representations recently with the Prmch Government demanding
military bases in French Indo-China, as well as other essential concessions, but for the Im-
Ijerial Government to do this has become absolutely unavoidable in the defense of the rightfi
tit gitf-esfetence, self-defense, and the defense of our position in thfe gteet'1^«r'%^Ej^. fe 'Sfii^
lemnity the Imperial Government respect the sovereignty of France and the integrity of her
territorial rights in French Indo-China sadwi^es to make clear beforehand her rigid adherence

to the duty of ^ — with <<^^ iki (^e^rePiSift arising

from international agreements already eeiaWished. Not only does it go without saying that we
liave no intention of avoiding our duties, but should the Imperial Government be able to work
in closest concert with the French Government in French Indo-China, it is her me^t ardent
-^ish to carry out to the fullest extent the responsibilities arising in measures of cooperate
d^nse. On the one hand, the current situation in the South Seas area, of which you are well
aware, is as you have repeatedly told the Government of your homeland. These extremely
straitened circumstances have already forced the Imperial Government to outline in these
representations matters which it cannot possibly excuse. This Minister is able to discern the
circumstances between the French Government and the real intentions of the Imperial Gov-
ernment and. in addition to this, considering the effect of a world upheaval, it throws not the
slightest doubt on the intentions of the Imperial Jj^aneae Gov^nment. We will not stop by
merely hoping for the acceptance of these repreis)^*lt^9'^tJt-ft«^tiffeiS^^t^
vstion.

With regard to this matter, separately Prime Mhiister KONOE has aheady sent a personal
message to Marshal PETAIN. You are well aware of the world situation, and particalffl^^
the situation in the Far East. I would have Your Excellency, therefore, offer to your Home Gov-
ernment expressions of friendship, and it is my most ardent wish that you will extend your
very best efforts that they may accept the representatums of the Imperial Japanese Govern-
ment. I, the Foreign Minister, know full well the great efforts to which Your Excellency has
m (ffder to maintain Eranco-Japspm fti®|idahip but I would have you know tfeat I have

July 12, 1941

THE "MA.GIC" BACKGIi^)U$^P Qf PEARL HAftBOE

been unawidaUy fmced to ask you to go to great troiable again and again, even more t^n one
could hear, because this is a moat seFious ptoblem .

Trasffl. 7-1441

No. 819

FROM: Tokyo {Japanese Fofeign Mi»witer)

TO: Washington

(Part 1 of 3)". Message to Vichy # 279, on the 12th. Strictly Secret.

The following are noticeable instances of activities on the part of the DeGauUe faction; or
principal anti-Japanese activiti^ on the part of the Frencb authorities; and of the militarily,
economically, and politically threatening situation in the South Seas. And, so in
tiations, will you use these instances suitably and in accordance with necessity?

(1) Members of a group now holding important positions in tKe f^feitfe fisd6-<3hlM <^0*e¥h-
ment prove to be clearly members of the DeGauUe faction. They are in close ctmnection with
Britain and the United States mi are aptii^ caa liiwa ^^cb betray as well as oppose Japan.
These are:

Capt. JUAN, Chief of the Attachees in the Governor Generals i!M.ise
Col. MANIAN, Chief of Staff of the Army— Kanbojia

DERUSAARU', formerly Chief Secretary in the Governor General's Office, at present Chief

Director of

MANTOBUANI'', Chief of the Political Section of the Governor General's Office
SHAARUTON*, Chief of the Education Section in the Governor General's Office
GANEI', President of the Bank of Indo-China

DORASHUVUROTIERU', President of the French-Chinese "Depresshu" at Saigon.

According to what was revealed to us recently through very reliable information, Capt.
JUAN, mentioned above, concluded on January I8th, of this year, at Singapore a secret
British-French commercial and navigation treaty. This treaty not only violates unmistakably
the sovereignty of France but also contains anti-Japanese clauses in contravention of the
Matsuoka -Henri agreement concluded on August 30th of last year.

For instance this treaty promises the British that the French steamers which may be con-
verted into armored cruisers— namely, Maresharu-Joffuru'; Darutanian': Araniisu* — and also
other French steamers capable of a speed of fourteen knots or more which may enter French
Indo-China ports in the future, shall not be allowed, without previous consent of the British
Naval Headquarters, to visit Japanese ports which lie outside of the protected areas in China
and shall not be allowed to sail north of — ,

It also permits British civilian aviators to use the facilities and airports in French Indo-
China. Furthermore, at a conference held on January 20th, with the commander of the British
fleet, this captain promised that in the event relations with Japan reach the worst stage,
French Indo-China should send her ships either to Hongkong or Singapore and place them
under British control.

Of late, meetings held between the members of the DeGauUe faction with the Singapore
at(tlj((ritiea ha,yjt Ijecame incceasip^ ftequent.

July 15. 1941

C2) Thtt French Indo-China police offieials have insulted the meiobeis Of the Japanese Army
who have been entering French Indo-China since last year for occupation; they have oppiessed
X^ddent Japanese; they have put pressure on natives who have attempted to approach Japa-
■ii^ civilians and ctfcers and soldiers; and while shutting their eyes to anti- Japanese activi-
ties carried on by the representative of the Chungking Government, they have by resorting to
violence, invaded the office and expelled the representatives of the Nanking Government, which
Ib cooperating with the Japanese '6tew«fflsa«a«. & varimw ways, they have been per-

sisting in anti-Japanese activity. Again, more recently, they have had referred for consider-
ation by the Japanese-French Economic Conference, the question of sending an economic
investigation commission to French Indo-China despite the fact that the conference had
nothing to do with the questioa aaj^^^^^ t^y i***^^ ^ a:ttitude of n^*^|e!^«i'ftti©a

towards Germany,

"Part 2— See II, 820; Part 3— Seelt 821.

(PartZitrfa)".

3. Political and Military:

(!) England, the United States, and the Netherlands Indies, during the first ten days of
(February ? August ?), entered into an agreement lor the joint defense of the Pacific and de-
veloped lines for joint action against Japan in the fields of politics, economy, and military
endeavor. On the basis of this, in Washington, Singapore, and Manila, officials of those coun'
tries frequently met for conversations. (Prior to this time, England, Australia, and Canada,
as you know, entered into conversations pointing toward joint action. )

(2) England, the United States, and the Netherlands Indies have brought about the
participation of CHIANG KAI SHEK in their mutual front. One plan called for the institution

of SHANG CHEN' as chairman of a group of military representatives which met in and

m Singapore. It was decided through con%-ersations among the leaders in Washington, Manila,
aiid Singapore that England and the United States would send specialists to Chungking. Sub-
sequently, on the 12th of (March ? SepitfeBabfer ?) in Rangoon, a school for t he training of leaders
itt guerilla warfare was entered into jointly by England and China. On the 19th of March, Eng-
land and China signed then: military agreement. (This covered aid to the Chinese by Britain
and joint defense of Burma.) During the latter ten days of March, an agreement was entered
into for the construction of the Burma railroad. In addition, at the same time that the United
States dispatched Major CONNELLY, an aviator, to China, the United States entered into
an agreement with China for the joint use of Chinese air fields and the tafan^er of military
fliers.

Furthermore, most recently, on the basis of the British- American- Chinese military agree-
menti preparations are afoot in Singapore (?) for the establishment of an allied general staff,
a»d it im feetai decid^ -l^t |EbvpgiBbag wiB dispatch mvm memhmm t» it. However, in addi-

'I¥ans. 7-16-41

No, 820

July 12, 1941
#279,

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Wem to SHANG CHEN, they are planning to send (one?) (three?) persons. FurthermOTe, they
have reached a mutual agreement whereby within one week after a clash in foiFce with Japan,
60,000 CHIANG troops will be dispatched to Malay.

Furthermore, according to the most reliable intelligences, it is expected that the British-
Chinese military alliance will be concluded between the 10th and 20th of this month. Accord-
ing to this, this alliance will become effective at the same time that Japan moves to the south,
in such an event, it is expected that Chungking will have special troops sent into Burma.

(3) England's schemes with regard to Thailand are as follows: On the one hand, the con-
centration of military strength in the areas adjacent to Thailand's borders; taking a place gf
leadership so that she, through the anti-Pibul wing, the Chinese organizations abroad, and
the Communist Party, may bring about either the assassination of PIRUL' or the overthrow

of his regime; the exercise of limitations on the export of ; or bring about military, eco-

naraiCT and political pressure, but particularly economic pressure, by means of freezing Thai-
ese funds in London. On the other hand, by exerting first stringent and then lenient measures
with, regard to our supply of petroleum (first of all ? a minimum of ? 60,000 tons), she is en-
deavoring to 4tm Tb^almA within km mm 'i^m.p and to drive a wed^ |ei^A«e& tTapan and
Thailand.

"^eet $i0^'^pS. For Pan 3 of 3, sue Tl, 821 .

*lfei^)^tij|;^Od Route Piimy ; he has for many years been the military a^Wjptal for the Nationalist Party.

FROM: Tokyo July 12, 1S41

TO: Vichy #279-

Part 3 of 3°.

4. Economic:

(a) The United States, as you are well aware, has already started to piit into operation an
embargo against Japan on petroleum and other essential goods. May 3^1^ 1i|^:VBnt.8Ct ^
make the export quota system apply in the Philippine Islands as well.

(b) In the British possessions, scrap iron, nickel, hemp bags, jute, manganese, rubber j
tin, bauxite, etc., are being embargoed. In addition, with regard to wool, wheat and iron, th^
are exercising greater stringency in the issuance of permits on their expc^ ijuota system.

(c) Through British and American machinations, negotiations between Japan and the
Netherlands Indies were broken ofi', as you are well aware.

(d) Thailand and French In do -China, through pressure brought to bear upon them by
England and the United States and without regard for their duties as contracted, are making
it very difficult for us in the manner in which they are supplying us with rice, rubber, tin, etc.

(e) In connection with the military establishments of Britain, the United States, China
and the Netherlands Indies, they are daily making stronger and stronger preparations, as
proof of which we need not quote any figures.

5. The situation being as I have outlined, in the encirclement of Japan, as long as we do
not take strong measures at this time in the southern part of French Indo-China, Thailand and
French Indo-China wiU be drawn into their camp and thare is a feiu that a mtaation fiixtul^

to that in Syria would probably develop. It is but natural that the [m penal Government
should show grave concern at this time. Since the situation is becoijiin§ dwigerous for France
too, for the above reasons it has become necessary for the Imperi||i#la!^9aH*^|f.'tl>. l8ii8f'4i#
i^Slj^i^^at this time and more strongly,
l^f^ transmit this to Germany.

•Btet liK*iimlable. See n, S19,

The Imperial government recently opeBeS negotiations aimed ^ Establishment of
Japanese military bases and the stationing of tedc^ in French lado-Ciiilitt, wftJl the government
of France. The reasons that ^spm feels the necessity ^Mm these ateps which are to be
taken in the name of joint- ^dstm l^mm Stipm mi^ ffm^ ia&/^m^--m-0m-il^ mf
separate Circular # 1536".

It is Japan's destte to put these measures in efitect pkfiacil^ily, if ttts f«t S^^S^i^
however, the French Government refuses to agree to our requests of if Britain £Uld/^'$|it^||cd'
States should interfere, Japan intends to carry out the project by force.

I report the above for only your information. V^^ wfeh to avoid any friction with Britain aild
the United States, particularly with Britain.

There are no objections, therefore, to your explaining, on the pretext that they are your own
personal opinions, the situation along the following lines; Japan has no intention of using
bases in the southern part of French Indo-China as jumping off places for further military
penetration; by taking these steps at the present time the territorial integrity of French Indo-
China will be guaranteed; moreover, it will prevent possible clashes with the Netherlands
East Lidies and the Malaya area.

Please make every effort to prevent the officials in the area to which you accredited from
becoming unnecessarily agitated in the belief that a crisis is at hand. At the same time, please
prevent the Japanese residents there from feeling too iinea^ aver tJie situatioai.

This message address to Singapore and Batavia.

Trans. 7-14-41

No. 822

FROM: Tokyo

July 17, 1941
#1535,

Trans. 7-18-41

THE "MAOIC" eACKORQUMD QF M4B«aS^

FROM; Tolsyo
TO: SmgApote

July 17, 1941
#1536.

(Circular).

Strictly cocifidential. Separate cafele.

The Imperial government, has now decided upon a definite policy. It was adopted to meet
the rapid changes which are being brought about in the world situation which is making the
southern part of French Indo-China vitally necessary to Japan's continued existence and
defense.

The recent attitude of the veiriouis British colonies, the Netherlands East Indies and the
Philippines, have tnade it essential fOT Japan to be guaranteed access to needed materials in
French Lido-China and Thailand, It is a mBUm'sii^^mA'jSx^^^'-'Si^iliaitm^'l^smd m
access to those materials.

The British and the United States are assuming- an anti-Japanese attitude in an ever
increasing degree. Their military ties with the Chungking government are constantly bemg
intensified and at the same time, they are now applying pressure on Thailand. Moreover, they
are urging the De Gaulle faction and the Chinese in the southern part of French Indo-Cluna
to sow the seeds of dissatisfaction and discontent. All of these tend to endanger Japan's
position in that area and, under some circumstances, m^ make a second Syria out of French
Indo-China,

Added to the joint action on the part of Britain, the United States, and the Netherlands,
in the south Pacific area recently there have been reports of a Sino-British alliance, and vigorous
penetration into China by the U.S. air force. Through such means, the British- U.S.'
Netherlands-Chinese bloc is showing an ever increasingly antagonistic attitude towards
Japan. There i& p^jossibility, moreover, that this bloc will tie up with the Soviet Union at mme
future date alfi^ilSnch an aggression against Japan,

Even from the viewpoint of meeting such an eventuality, it is of the utmost importance to
take this step at tJie pjc^Kit time. Japaa ewaiKJt. for reasons of self-defense, delay tM& mme sm
longer.

On July 1, I had a talk with DAELAN. DARLAN never once i&eQtioned the question of tJie
occupation of French Indo-China, Naturally, neither did I. 1 got a slm^ ietpms^m4Mm pSff3l^
thing DARLAN said that he never dreamed of anything like this.

Two or three days ago when the military and naval attaches here talked with the French
mihtary officials, the French officials asked questions which seemed to indicate that there was
a leak, bat both attaches expressed complete ignorance of the whole situation.

Trans. 7-18-41

FROM: Vichy
TO: T^li^.

July 12, 1941

'Not available.

1>ans. 7-17-41

A-429

No.»25

FROM: Hankow July 1?, 19*1

TO: Tokyo #223.

At 2:40 the morning of the 12th, seven or eight civihans attached to our Naval forces, clashed
with French Concession guards. Having been fired upon by the French guards, one of our
Naval personnel was killed and another wounded. Immediately, all of the gates of the

Concession were closed and . The Naval authorities here have prohibited the

COTimwnication or publication of all details with regard to this uxcident. That is all for the

Tfms. 7-16-41

No.«26

FROM: Tokyo July 14, 1941

TO : Nanking and Shanghai # 1500.

(Circular)

Message to Hankow # 144.
Re your #223°.

The Naval authorities in your city requested instructions to proceed with demands as
follows concerning the French concession; partial police control over the French ccracession;
the patrolling of the French concession by our police troops; in case of necessity, the transit
of armed militia; the approval of all this by the Control Board and an apology from its chakman;
the punishment of the perpetrators and executors of the crime; indemnities for the injured;
and guarantees for the future. The Central Naval officials, after conferring with us Foreign
Office officials, wired back their approval, stating however that, in order to succeed in this, the
French concession must be closed. The entrance and exit of persona and materials, as well as
water, must be limited. The instructions continued that the takii^ over of the French con-
cessi<m is to be postponed until further orders are issued presently,

Hela^^d to Nanking and Shanghai.

Trans, 7-21-41

Nft. 827

FROM: Hankow July 15, 1941

TO: Net #061.

(Circular).

In 3 parts— complete.

Action Tokyo as #22,5. {Retransmission).

The points that have been cleared up as a result of subsequent investigations are as follows:
M t^^a^m W^mim whd wm a chauffeur atta^e^ mvsi ham m^iid i^'^4r«ffc

' A-430

THE "MAaiC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

fl»d about 12 a.m. on to 11th he took four oS his frienctB who wese also navy chauffeurs and

drove to es certain Chinese restaurant in the French Concession in a navy automobile. They had
lunch together as a sort of farewell for him and after eating went out on the street again. While
they were talking to some Chinese geisha girls one of the Concession policemen (a Chinese)
came up and an altercation started. The first pciliceman started to fire and several other
policemen came up with bayonets and all fired «t the automobile. Shimizu, who was in the
auto was severely wounded. Vfhea tli#'lefc£«a;ipi|l£a^ (f) M

was taken to the navy hospitol by bis eomiu^lons Where be passed away <m tbe morning ^ tbe
12tb.

In addition to this one of bis companions received a slight injury from the glass in the cax
window. One of the Settlement policemen received a bayonet wound but aH none of tJl&
Japanese was armed it is very clear that the police must have stabbed each other.

On the 12th, in the presence of myself and the French authorities a coroner'a inquest was
held as a result of which it was determined that Shimizu had four bullet holes and sev^ei
bayonet wounds in his body. Also eleven bullet holes were found in the auto.

In connection with the above incident, the French a^f^arities arrested five of Shimizu's
colleagues and two other Japanese. On the afternoon of the 12th, I negotiated with the authorities
concerned for the release of the Japanese who were being detained but was informed that untU
fis i^^s establi^ed that Sbimizu's death was caused by his resting the Settlement -^^^Icii
their release would be very difficult. (As a matter of fact, the Settlement police do not have any
reasonable grounds for detaining the men.) However, as a result of further negotiation on the
afternoon of the 12th, the French authorities saM that it had been asc^ained that the death
was caused by resistance to the police and that the others were innocent of such resistance and
hence they might be released. While it is true that the above incident may be viewed as a result
of a misunderstanding between the injured parties while under the influence of liquor and the
French Settlement police, still the fact remains that unarmed men were shot at and stabbed
with bayonets by the police and this clearly proves that there was murderous intent and the
fact that the police shot at a naval automobile was proof of an Stc^-idif -hostility toward the navy
of that nation. The naval authorities are taking a very grave attitude toward the problem and
they do not consider it in the light of a local aifair but feel that it will have grave international
complications. This OpmiOn was communicated^ me on the 13th.

1 am sending my opinion of the affair in a separate communication but I am dispatching this
much for the present.

Trans, 7-i7-4l

No. 828

FROM; Shanghai

TO: banking, Peking, and Tientsin
(Circular.)

Message to Tokyo # 1294.

Re # 219° from Hankow to this Minister.

We cannot be indifferent to the question of the policy which should be applied to the FVench
concession in Hankow. Ambassador KOSUMU is at present here and 1 expect I shall have to
take up negotiations with him sooner or later. (According to a report puhlisbed by the Frpjich,,
the Ambassador is supervising the activity of the Consular staff.)

July 18, 1941

A-431

I am sore you are well aware that, depending on that attitude the French take, this question

will have a serious effect on the policy we may adopt toward the French concession in thi^
city (Shanghai), as well as toward the international settlements. I am setting down here my
own views on the matter:

(1) It is not clear what is exactly meant by "taking general control of police power." §6
iong as it is not actual confiscation, 1 suppose this means the exercise of pohce power eithQF.
by our Army w Ifsf aitt-'tfclian officers. If that is what is meant, it mauHA in isffeet be i»
different from our taking control of the administrative power in the concession. (Without the
exercise of police power, administration of a concession means nothing at all.) Furthermore,
it ia ft question whether, in other districts where the local hai^^(6mi$>(ilsiiks:^ back^ftrund)
differs, police power could be exercised along with administrative power.

Of course, it may be possible to place concession police power under the control of our
^nay or to exercise the usual police pow«t dif AJGoni^ssion along with that of the Army; hosPr
> j^^, in that case it would not be a ocanprehensive epntrol of the poUce power. We need io
tlarify this point.

(2) Inasmuch as resistance by fco'ce by lte.<l1^m^^;tM4) a question, it is possibie fot ua t(y
realize, once we have decided to do so, the supervision of police power in the manner suggested
above or its complete confiscation, or even the confiscation of a part of all of the administrative
pmm»'m0ff &» my^ym 'B6imm, befoze m^fiigiijp<«Mir «a^i8 li^^^ it would

be necessary for us to consider carefully what attitude we are going to take toward the French
concessions in Tientsin and in Canton, as well as in this city. To be sure, we could keep our
hsmA off of the other concessions on the pretest that situations such as have arisen in this
concession do not prevail in the other concessions; but a conflict of this kind is likely to arise
(or could be made to arise) at any moment. This goes without saying. Therefore, we should at
ihjg time determine our general policy.

■.0). Regarding the policy recently adopted by our Government concerning the concession
^^tion, 1 have been notified by Administrative Official SIMAZU. The application of this policy

(10 lines missing) disastrous effect it would have is a serious qu^tion

indeed. It is a question of tremendous importance when viewed from the .standpoint of settling
the China Incident, This is because they think that, while Japan is cautious in her attitude
1^IH^#^''1ii^il>ed States and Britain, she is abuiaib^->^^eaker countxy, and because it would
ikS^-Stl effect of deepening the suspicions they cast upon our ideal for the establishment of a
mrder, as well as upon our ability to bring the China Incident to settlement. (The Asaocia-
tim of Concession Supen^Sf^ te at present of the^ume opinion. )

(4) In other words, while the recent incident in Hankow's French concession is not more
than a local question, the policy for the disposal of this question is, for the reason given iB
paragraph and in view of the piti^stll 'peitliisat ^titation, one which affect our general
policy relative to all concessions, tt is, in my opinion, a test case. I would like to have the
Government take every precaution and study this question and issue clear and detailed instruc-

iMayedto . Tt£^l^M0ii«»mwij!}i3^ t^

'%<ii avaalaliie.

Trans. 7-22-41

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 839

FROM: Tokyo

TO: Nanking, Cantt3a|,|Mgbii^#Sd]B^i%
Re your #236*.

We consider it necessary to take steps to bring the concession und^ our actual control,
though not to the extent of really taking it over. Therefore, will you negotiate with the French
officials in yenr eity i^^^W^-W^^t^W^'^i^ to paake them accept the deott^l^
in part 3 and 4 of yetur captiod mem^. (tl^ Aj^ lHliHiVf

°Nf)t available-,
'Seen, 826.

Trana. 7-21-41

JnlylS, 19*1
#1546..

No. S30

FROM: Hankow July 21, 1941

TO: Net ' #066.

(Circular)

Action Tokyo as #231.

On the morning of the 2lBt I called upon the French Consul regarding the albtw© lii<adent aBd
explained to him the serious and delicate nature of the problem, particularly as regards the
Aimam patrolman and how we could no longer have confidence in the Concession police. In
order to effect a fundamental situation of the problem a revision Concession policy system will
be necessary, I declared, and presented the following as Japan's final proposal for the settle-
ment of the case. The French Consul said that he r«ie|^ed the fravity of the situation and
the unwarranted act of the police, however, he #as not in a iprajMon tft^^^
teilJSfe- would give careful consideration to the matter and report to the Alii.biiiCil(^|£H!:;ll^-l!^^l^
an answer as sotm as po^ible. With this, the first interview closed.

In order to prevent any recurrence of the d^rder for the preset, ftom the 21«t all military
and naval mjs^ ast jds® atitTii^^^
cession area.

Text of the Japanese demands:

1. Demotion and dismissal of the Annam poHceman.

2. The employment by the French Concession authorities as peStim (h^S^^ patrolmen)
such Japanese or Chinese as are designated by us.

3. Abolition of all weapons dtiili^'by French Concession patrolmen, except bayonets.

4. Permission for Japanese army patrols to make tJie rounds of the French Concession.

5. Permission for Japanese armored units to cross the French ConC£^S^£ni m tibt ftSiiCl'
should occur.

6. An apology from the authorities concerned jn this incident.

7. Indemnity for the injured of Y63,875,

A-433

1 1 1 • < I

8. Compensation for the damaged car, Y8, 175.

9. Punishment for the offenders md ti^s^ concerned in the incident.

Trans. 7-24-41

Na.831

FEOM: Tokyo July 22, 1941

TO: Tientsin, Peking, Nanking, Shanghai #1575. ^

(Circular)

(Message to Hankow # 149.)
Re your #229".

The question of the French concession in Hankow is related to other French as well as joint
concessions. Under the present circumstances, I think we had better not take over the French
concession in your city. As I told you in my # 147', that is the opinion of the central authorities.
Furthermore, the exercise of full police rights is a question which concerns the very nature of
the concessions. Therefore, let us avoid suggesting this also. As for the other matters, arrange
them according to my #147*, l^m^ hm^'^0lm» hm0 ^l^mi^Y wired joat JBft^ ^dg^^^^
same instructions.

"NotnTtulafale.

*See S, in which it is stated that it is considered neoesaary to take steps to bring the concession under actual

Trans. 7-25-41

No. 832

FKOM; Tokyo • • JuJ^.^JSit. .

TO: Net #1696.

(Circular)

Acticm Tientsin as # 168 (?).
(Abstract)

The French Counselor (?) resident in Tokyo calls on Vice Minister Yamamoto on the 24th and
requests him to use his influence toward reaching a peaceful settlement of the Hankow French
Cmcession problem.

Trans. 8-5-41

A-434

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 833

FROM: Hankow Jtily3l,l&4i
TO: Nai^l^ #75.

(Circular) •»

To Peking as Circular # 74.

Action'M^ as # 234.

(Separate tel^am.)

1. Dismissal and immediate repatriation of all Annam policemen.

2. Return to their respective sections of the three police concerned in Shimizu's death.

3. An apology by the superintendent of police.

4. Payment of Y40, 000 indemnity.

5. Employment of Chinese policemen designated hy Japan in place of the 65 Annam police-
men dismissed. V I . .- . I - .

6. Arms of the personnel of t he French police force to be limited to bayonets.

7. To employ as qualified police superintendents two Chinese designated by us.

8. Employment of one reliable Japanese or Chinese who understands French with rank of
liaison officer in order to facilitate contact between the Japanese and French authorities.

The above to be appointed as secretary and translator for the French Consul and public
affairs department, but it is to be understood that he is not to be used by the French police,

9. Recognition of the right of Japanese armed military and naval patrols and gendarmes
to patrol the Concession.

10. Recognition of the right of Japanese troops to cross the Concession at will. " ~' "

Trans. 8-12-41

No, 834

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) ^. . W- ' -t- Julyl4, 194'1

TO: Vichy #281.

Re your #362',

Resent as follows: "The Army is now ;
preparations are beii^ completed,"

°Notavailsble,

^ Trans. Not dated

A-435

mm-. Canton July 14> 1941

TO: Tokyo #.2§6-

To be kept secret within the Departsaeat.

Re my #253'.

Subsequent information from the military officials to the Attaches is as follows:

1. The recent general mobilization order expressed the irrevocahle resolution of Japan to
put an end to Anglo- American assistance in thwarting her natural expansion and her indomit-
able intention to carry this out, if possible, with the backing of the Axis, but, if necessary, alone.
Formalities, such as dining the expeditionary forces and saying farewell to them, have been
^pjEKsed with. That is because we did not wish to arouse greatly the feelings of the J|^|i^^
populace and because we wished to face this new war with a calm and cool attitude.

2. The immediate object of our occupation of French Indo-China will be to achieve our pur-
poses there. Secondly, its purpose is, when the international situation is suitable, to launch
therefrom a rapid attack. This venture we will carry out in spite of any difficulties which may
arise. We will endeavor to the last to occupy French Indo-China peacefully but, if resistance
^.offered, we will crush it by force, occupy the country andSft y>p martial law. After the occu-
pation of P^rench Indo-China, next on our schedule is the sending of an ultimatum to the
Netherlands Indies. In the seizing of Singapore the Navy will play the principal part. As for
the Army, in seizing Singapore it will need only lom division and in seizing the Netherlands
Indies, only two. In the main, through the activities o£ our air aim (in your city,the Spratly
Islands, Farao, Thaiese Singora, Portuguese Timor and French Indo-China) and our sub-
marine fleet (in the South Seas Mandate Islands, Hainan Island, and French Indo-China) we
will once and for aU .(qcu^ jiki^OtAmsrican inilitaiy pgmt: mi thjeii abili% to a^i^t in «wy

schemes against us.

3. The tjoops soon to occupy fVench Indo-China will be reorganized as the 26th Army Corps
(one Army Corps consists of four divisions) and also the 30th Army Corps, consisting of the
South China ibrces, which will be assigned to special duty with airplanes, tanks, and howitzeis.
General UDA (the IIDA Array mentioned in preceding telegrams has been changed to the
Nishimura detachment) will be placed in command and general military headquarters will
be set up in Saigon, All preparations have been made. The ship fees have been paid and the

jph 2, 4th sentence is information or opinion rally erf Japanese MJlitaiy in
I not be regarded as immediate pxopess.

*Not available.

Trans. 7-1S-41

FROM: Tokyo JubflS^mi

As the Ambassador in France has already notified you, we have at last commenced nego*
tiations with France with a firm determination. This marks the first step in our southward
advance; at the same time, it signifies a very grave life and death step in our relations with

A-436

THE "MAGIC" EACKGIiQUND OF PgARL HARBOR

England and America. We have thrown in ova lot with Germany and Italy in harmony with the
Tripartite Pact and intend to cooperate with them. Under the form of negotiatiotiK a request
has come from the French government t_o the government to which you are accredited to get
them to mediate a tefosal t^M im&^S^^mw'Me dejtttods. In case they dodge the issue,
please ask them to help us from the flank and persuade FVanes to accede to our miuests.
Please relay this as instructions to Italy.

Trans. 7-18-41

No. 837

FROM: Tokyo July 16, 1941

TO: Han^ #1518,

(Circular)

The Imperial Government, cognizant of the recent critical turn of the international situation,
in order to carry out the establishment of the Far Eastern sphere of co-prosperity, has in con-
ference decided that the bnperial forces are to invade the southern portion of French Indo-
China with the view of securing military bases. On the 14th, formal representations to that
effect were presented to the Vichy Government. Though the United States and England will
attempt to thwart this, it is the Imperial Government's firm intention to remove those barriers
and to bring about the realization of our aims. Therefore, even though the French Govemment
and the French Indo-Chinese authorities oppose it, we are going to carry it through.

With regard to these representations, we are now negotiating so that their reply of assent or
dissent will be handed to us on the 20th, Japan time. As far as the Imperial Government w
concerned, it makes no difference whether this invasion is carried out peacefully or in force.
Our nationals living there we plan to remove to Takao" for the time being; therefore, after you
have acquainted yoiu^elf with this, please make preparations alcmg'ihe ft^Ios^Bg; Imes:

I, Saigon (on the basis of the former Consular area of jurisdiction) ,

Item: Recommendations for evacuation. (Though these are not orders, all people are to be
evacuated.) This recommendation is to be issued on the 21st. All are to be on board ship by the
23rd. The ship should sail at early dawn of the 24th. However, until this order has been wired,
be most careful not to let it leak out.

Item: For the accommodation of all evacuees, the Osaka Shosen steamer, Kanju Maru,
scheduled to leave Saigon July 18th, is to be held over at your port. With regard to this matter,
all details have been cleared up with the Ministry of Communications.

With regard to the reason for the delay of the sailing of this ]^li>^i3?leas0 give out the reason
that it is due to loading and unloading delays. Please take evety precautimti not to allow the
French authorities to learn of our plans.

Item: Have a member of your staff respectfully carry out the Imperial portraits and after
the arrival of the boat in Takao, request that they be placed in custody of the Provincial Office.
This staff member of yours is to remain in Takao until further orders.

Rem: Only the ab$olutely essential telegrapWe CO^ill^'IW M fcig^. lil«.JD#t,;'«^^^
burned. Wire me a detailed list of those you burn.

Item: Telegraphic material, as well as secret material, are to be absolutely handled in es-

A-437

Item: I will further advise you by wire aii to the immBkmiA <Qf ymamU itoid ifaftJ|^^|^^iol

your offices,

II. Hanoi (on the basis of the former Consular area of jurisdiction). Though as a i^:^^ of
{Kfliey, we are not going to insist upon the evacuation etf li} tlO^^Si^ 30^^'.iiX. 9xd.
other distant places are to move into Hanoi.

m, I have already secretly dispatched this to Saigon.

"Port in Formosa.

Trans. 7-17-41

Ho. ^8

FROM: Canton July 16, 1941

TO: Tokyo #264.

(Secret outside tl» pepiar^imt)

Re my #255°.

The troops to occupy French Indo-China will leave here the 17th and arrive at SAIGON two
ire^jtefee* after stopping over on HAINAN ISLAND. - i . •

Trans. 7-18-41

No. 839

lEPM: Tokyo- July 16, 1041

TO: Berlin #655.

On the 15th, Vice Minister OHASHl iii(vite4 the Qermatt ai»d JtaUaa ^J^abassftdors
SifpfU'ately and told them as follows: < - > ^

"In the name of joint defense trf the area concerned, the Japanese Government has decided
to demand of the Vichy Government the right to acquire two naval bases and several air
bases in southern French Indo-China, and also that of occupying that region by the Imperial
Army. Furthermore, Japan plans to complete all negotiations relative to these demands
without giving Vichy much time— that is by the 20th— so as to prevent any move on the part
ei the opposition countries. Japan intends to carry out this plan even if French Indo-China
louses to comply with the demands, or the United States and Britain interfere with its
execution. However, this does not mean that Japan is of the mind to occupy French Indo-
China or to violate her sovereignty, or to break the treaties made with her. This plan is the
first step in Japan's southward advance which Germany has been looking forward to for a
long time. In view of the close relation obtaining between Germany and Italy, and in
consideration of Japan's desire to obtain her object in as peaceful a manner as possible,
Japan requests that they recommend France's acceptance oi Japan's demands."

A-438

TH^ "MAGIC" BAQKGROUND OF IJABiOE

Both Ambassadors replied tiaat they would communicate this request to their respective

governments at once.
Please transmit frpm Berlia and Rome to France.

Trans. 7-20-41

No. 840

FEOM: Tc^ Jqly 19. 1941

TO: Vichy

(Strictlysecret.)

Mthougb there were some political alterations recently, it should be unnecessary to state
tliat they in no way shall affect our foreign polif;y. It should he clear that the Cabinet shake-up
does not make the slightest change in our attitude with regard to French Indo- China. I
mention this fact l^cause there may be some unnece^^a^ confusion if the French govern-
ment is under the erroneous belief that we intend to soften 03( :chaAge OUT attitude "Witfet the
eRtrajiee^pf anew Foreign Minister into the Cabinet.

Ir '^l!^*'^^*® getting the wrong im^fes^

Trans. 7-22-41

No. 841

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) July 19, 1941

TO: Vichy #29S*

Regarding my #273**^

Since the military preparations have been completed, the time for embarking on the
enterprise has been set for the 24th, regardless of whether the French accept or reject,
and orders to proceed will be issued on the 23rd, Japanese time'. You will therefore act
upon the following:

1. If the French reply to your #366' is favorable, yon will then immediately hand them the
note mentioned in my #276'' and secure their consent to my #293' paragraphs 1 to o, and
advise me by return dispatch as to the results,

2. If the reply to the above is a refusal, or a conditional reply, which will be taken as a
refusal (If French conditions are in such phrases as to not alter the sense ot our demands,
they need not be considered a refusal, but in such a case you may accept them with reserva-
tions that the approval of your home government will be necessary) you will then immediately
make special effort to cause the French government to reconsider along the following lines
and advise us as to results by return dispatch:

"Matters having reached the present stage, we must be free to take such course as we
deem necessary, and the military will begin advance into Southern French Indo-China
on the basis of our planned action. We desire that orders be issued to the French Indo-
China authorities at once that they take all effective and appropriate measures, when
our advance is made, as will avoid the necessity of any clash of armed forces. If the
French government does not act in harmony with this request of ours and an unfortunate
clash of arms should result we of course cannot guarantee that serious changes may not be
brought about in the status of French Indo-China, much as we would regret this. If the

A*439'

Bnzich government does give full consent to our demands (in my # 293') be&Jire the time
for issuing the above mentioned marching orders to the military, there is a possibility '
that the situation can still be cleared up in a peaceful manner by negotiatifois, mid ve
th^^ore wish to aixBt^y ucge upon tfa« i^oi^ pvv^iiittmi ifesf; lisigl^
and reconsider."

3. In your dispatch reply, giving the final attitude of the French on the basis of the above
paragraphs 1 and 2, whatever their attitude is, be sui« that ,y«!US:i:<^ tt»t^llfi$
the 2.:Vd, Japan time (taking into consideratiqw cUfeliftJ^ for
sending, receiving and decoding the message).

"See n, Si2 and 813, "Outline of line of reasioning to be used in presenting demands on France for F,I-C, bases.
Japan does nut want to appc-ar to be forcing the Finw^ Ijti^ tiiey' «m (l^ftotn^
peacefully il' France accepts, militarily if she refuses,"

■DOOO 23 July, Zone-9 (Tokyo tim«) is 1000 22iid, Waetungton time, and 1S« 22n4 GMT.

'Kotsv^ilable 20-7-41.

Trans. 7-2(Ml

No. 842

FROM: Tokyo July 20, 1941

TO; Hanoi #187.

(Part 2 of 2)'.

3, On the 17th, the Ambassador for the second time called on DA'' and gave him a strict
warning: to /tbt ^Sed&.&iak^ iiE£^^unately, Frendi cooperation is not forthcoming and a reply
rejectii^<8IK4aBtiagPsal is made, we will take military action in accordance with our plans and
pieparatitma recent change of Cabinet has no influence whatsoever on this particular
{M^<^). At tbe same time, the Ambassador requested an early reply £rom the French Govern-
ment. To tlua, DA^ agreed and promised that afteat earful consideration he would r^ly by
Saturday,

4. Furthermore, yesterday I wired Ambassador Kato the following instructions:

In case the French reply of the 19th is (1) an acceptance of our demands, he should make
them accept all our demands atter exchanging diplomatic notes with them. K the reply is
(2) a rejection or a condition reply (in which case he should regard it as a rejection, he should
not accept it and then tell them that Japan has no alternative other than commencing free
action and that, in accordance with plans already established, the army will occupy
southern French Indo-China. He should, in that case, ask iJiem to issue an drder to the
French Indo-China authorities to take effective and suitable measures in order to avoid clash
of forces. He should warn the French Government that in case the French Government does
not comply with our request and these measures are not taken and, as a result, an unfortunate
inc^d^nt of a military clash occurs, we cannot promise that there will not be an important
^ange in the status of French Indo-China, We should inform them that inasmuch as it
goes without saying that the Japanese Government does not wish to see any incident occur,
the whole question could be settled in a peaceful manner if the French Government recog-
nizes our demands as a whole on the 23rd at the latest. He should strongly urge the French
@Qvemment to consi^ and reconsider this question. (3) He should tell tl^m to make ^

A-440

•rafi "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL WiS^^

arrangements so that their reply will reach Japan not later than the 23rd;, wbetiief iiiat r^ly
is one qi the other of the two kinds mentioned above.

°Part 1 not available.

"Piol^bly Dailan, Vice Frernier of France.

mOM: Tokyo Jtily20,1941
TO: Vichy ^ #206.

(Message to Berlin # 670) .

(Strictly Setaret. To lb« Itandled in Government Code.)

Ambassador KATO informs us by telegram that the French Government says that out of
consideration for the Berlin- Vichy armistice treaty, it will be necessary to confer closely with
tilw^i^xmans on this matter. On this excuse, they are postponing an answer. Therefore, today
Vi<*rMinister OHASHI called on Ambassador OTT, saying that the Japanese Government has
already completed all preparations, and regardless of whether Vichy accepts or refuses, is
determined io take certain action. If milita^ act^ is inevitable, there is no guaranteeing
that the status of French Indo-China will not be affected. This is sure to have a bad effect
not CHily upon Tokyo- Vichy relations, but also upon Berlin-Vichy relations. Consequently,
will you please advise the French to accept the Japanese proposal. Ambassador Ott replied,
"Well, you know we are now at war with Russia, so by what logic do you imagine that we are
in a position to take a strong attitude toward Vichy? No, sir, I cannot tell you what attitude
the Germas Oovenmient is going to take in this matter. All I' caat M is ifelA I
transmit immediately to Berlin what you have told me."

Will you, too, on the basis of these statements of mine, ask the German Government to
sSmm lim'S^ek aplii^ mS^iifSll wJiafc^^b^

No. 844

FROM: Vichy
TO: Tokyo

Remy #38r.

On the 20th, I conferred with Foreign Minister DARLAN and Council President BUNOA
MESIAN (?) (LENOIR MESSIEN). Though, as a result, 1 have not officially received any
reply m yet^ the details of why 1 4^biDlp^l^^iR«f&i$i^.# .o»mpLy with
the tel^am describing our conversatii»i.

'Not available.

Trans, 7-21-41

No, 845

W^U- Vichy
•jidd Tokyo

July 20, tut
#389.

Re my # 386".

Alter conferring with DARLAN on the afternoon of the 19th, I received your # 295*, and
SO the ttiomiil^ of ih#^!i'f Aet ©MHIlAfir ISd^ tcl® 4ti& that ittstructibns received after
the conversation of the previous day showed that Japanese troops will be sent very shortly,
Itttd Igf this reason it ig clear that Japan cannot allow him aa much time as I said she would
allow, t tlfeift astea Mta. im ^ms tiKe necessary ordeal totjit-^cials in French tido-Ghina
to the effect that armed <^^lites should be avoided in orte -to prevent any possibility of
unfortunate rocidents, for Sf any unfortunate incidents occuf, ^ cannot be certam that it will
not have a far-reaching effect on the status of French Indo-China. As I have previously
referred to this matter several times, Japan does not want any such thing to happen. We
would like to have the French Government's acceptance of our proposals by 6;00 p.m. on
Tuesday, the 22nd. Thus, I urged him to reconsider the question. To thft ^lied
by asking whether he was right in understanding that what I said consisted of (1) an objection
to the French reply given yester4ftyf C2j| a request that an order be transmitted to the authori-
ties in French Indo-Chin*- fti^-to S^E^'-Tgldsetffieei 'M^

accept the proposals. I replied that he was right, and DARI.AN seemed to understand it all
very well. He answered that a reply will probably be given tomorrow after conferring with
Marshal RETAIN.

'See II, 841 in which Tokyo advises that tha ocBupatian wcnjld take pteoe on the 34th T^gaxdkm sf whether
WttOK^ accepts oi rejects the propoaak.

After my conversation with Foreign Minister DARLAN described in my #389" of the 20th,
1 talked to BUNOIR MESSIAN. 1 asked him if he had heard what 1 told DARI^AN the previous
^ht, and he replied that he had just conferred with Colonial Minister FORATON on this matter
at DARLAN's residence, as a result of which a final decision had been reached:

( a ) France rfeqspiizgs ^^ipan's demands.

(b) Japan gh&li'^*t^ iltl make a public statement concerning the maintenance of
territorial integrity of French Indo-China.

(c) The French forces will cooperate with the Japanese only in resisting the infringement
of third powers and will cooperate in no aggressive schemes whatever.

BUNOIR continued: "You will get an official reply On this matter today or tomorrow from
Foreign Minister DARLAN. the meantime, let me say in coimection with the statement
mentioned in (b), if "KfiafitSS #6uld order its officials to cooperate in this manner without
explaining why, we could not expect them to do it and still maintain their liunor as
soldiers. You Japanese ought to be particularly capable of understanding that, 1 think,
because you have a military code of morals of your own. Furthermore, this statement is

"Not available.

Trans.

m. 846

FROM: Vichy
TO; To^Q

July 20, 1941

#392,

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF P^ABL HARBOR

absolutely necessary to satisfy the public mind in France. We expect you to make some sort
of pviblic announcement, say like the one contained in Premier KONOYE's message to
Marshal PETAIN. Let roe say also that this cannot be done too soon. Now with respect to (c),
as I said, France is ^di^pod^l^ wi^ you Japanese militarily purely and simply for defense,
and we will not ei^^ kk 3^ M&^ms:^0mkm
weil understand this.*" _^

'8m

Trans. &-2-#4i.

mm

FROM: Vichy July 20, 1941

TO: Tokyo #393.

As to (2) in my #392°, the French authorities might demand a confirmation in the form of a
protocol or a diplomatic note or in some other form. In regard also to (2), they might want to
insert in the protocol or in the French reply a clause to the effect that the French Indo-China
Army shall not participate in any plans of an offensive nature. They might also ask that the
period of validity of the agreement be definitely fixed. In case they make these requests, will
you give preliminaiy consideration as to whether they should be complied with or not, anil if
they are to be complied with, in what f(»m it should be dom. I woid|fi^^|p3*eciate your infoim-
ing me by return wire. ^

Relayed te *

'11,846.

IVans, .8*3-41

No. 848

FROM: Vichy July 20, 1941

TO: Tokyo #394.

In the light of what you have said in the last part of your # 287", I presume that it is your
desire to have the final text of the protocol in the two languages. Today when speed is the prime
requisite and under the present situation in which courier service or any other form of reliable
service is out of the question, it cannot be said that there will be no misunderstanding on how the
Kana spelling should be used. Furthermore, if both languages are used in the final text, the
French authorities would probably take a great many days in examining the translation. There-
foTE, I think there is no other way but to use only the French languag.e for the final text. I would
appreciate your giving me your opinion by return message.

'Not available.

Trans. 8-^2-41

A-443

No. 849

FROM: Hanoi July 21, 1941

TO: Vichy

The following is a digest of th« first paragraph. (In French.)

The exceptional facilities which the French Government is disposed to accord to the Japa-
nese cannot under any circumstances have the character of a military occupation.

The Japanese must remam strictly confined to the needs of the militaiy operations. They
are subject to French military authorities and entirely under the latter's control. The Japanese
shall, however, be accorded freedom of passage between the point of disembarking and the
zone (rf operations.

(Part 2)

Japanese military activity shall be limited to the territories located north of the Red River,
hi the zone of operations the French administrative and military authorities shall remain in
their posts and in possession of all their powers. The Japanese shall act through the mediation
of the French authorities in dealing with the native popxilations.

The armed Japanese forces landing at the same time cannot under any circumstances, ex-
ceed two thirds of the effectives actually mobilized in Tonfeing, that is, not in excess of 25,000
men.

The Japanese army promises (1) to bear all the costs of transporting, stationing and installing
of its personnel and material.

No. 850

FROM: Tokyo July 21, 1941

m Hanoi #196.

Re my #191'.

After seeing Foreign Minister Darlan on the 20th, Ambassador Kato talked with the Minister
of Colonies, and others. As a result of these conferences the French Government agreed:

(1) To recognize Japan's demands.

(2) To announce officially Japan's participation in the defense of Indo-China territory.

(3) That Japan alone, and no third power, shall cooperate with the French Indo-Chinese
army.

Regardless of whatever Foreign Minister Darlan' s formal reply may be, from the viewpoint
of the honor of the French Army, and of French chivalry, it is absolutely necessary that the
import of Prime Minister Konoye's message to Marshal Petain be considered, and that this
aaove is inevitable in view of conditions in France.

Consequently, we anticipate Foreign Minister Darlan's concurrence in our views on the fore-
going three points and a public proclamation to that effect.

A.-444

■mE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

The details of actual landing points, numbers of troopis and places to station thw^, ^
decided upon as soon as the fVench make the official recognition of our demands.
Keep in touch with

Re your #393".

(1) We are prepared to give assurances regarding the Inspecting of the territorial integrity
and the sovereignty of French Indo- China. As to the form in which it should appear, in their
r^ly of acceptance, this was demanded by the French, but when the formal documents are
drafted, we would like to have the title of the protocol dealing with joint defense changed to
read "regarding the territorial integrity and joint defense of French Indo-China". Then,
changing Article I and II to II and HI respectively, add as Article I a statement that "The Japa-
nese government declares that it will respect the territorial:^!^^ gi^f^eoi^^ '£miSl-i@kio^
the sovereignty of France over the Indo-China Federation."

{2) In regard to making it clear that the French Indo-China army cannot cooperate in any
plans for aggression against a third power, we have no objection w the French stating this in
their reply of acceptance, but if the French demand that this be clearly stated in the formal
doemOifnt, you will point Oiit that the intent of this is made clear m the preamble and in
Article I of our original draft of the protocol, and try to suppress such a demand. If the French
insist upon it, we would rather have a secret exchange of notes in regard to Article I of the
protocol, or a statement by thie French only, to the effect that "the military cooperation be-
tween Japan and France, anticipated by Article I of the protocol on the joint defense of French
hado-China is purely of a defensive nature and does not include any plans for aggression
agaimat a third power". Or as a last resort, we would suggest that the above import be added as
B qualifying explanation to Article I of the protocol.

(3) As to the period of duration of this ag^^^nient, you will please reply that while our pro-
posed protocol does not specify any time lasL% this does not mean that we intend to formulate
everlasting promises, but it means that the way is left open for changing the protocol at any
time by further mutual agreement between the two countries. In case they insist upon a time
lilttit, you might approach them with a suggested wording to the effect that "when the inter-
national situation that has made necessary the joint defense of French Indo-China shall have
passed, the governments of the two countries shall confer for the abrog^tian flf tWa pFO^PCol",
but as a last stand we have in mind agreehig upon a five year time limit. " '-:»-•--

'Not available.

No. 851

July 21, 1941

Trans. 7-24-41

FROM: Vichy
TO: Tokyo

July 21, 1941
#396.

(Parts 2 and 3 of 3, Part 1 missing.)

Part 2. It is in this regard that the French government, faithful to the policy which it has
ftlways affirmed, and in cooperation with the Japanese government, will guarantee the de-
fense of Indo-Chinese against all attack, and particularly to exclusion all offensive operations
and alleged defensive measures having this protection as their ©b^feettm After agreement of
the ffe*^ Japanese commands — fteK&^m^tii^eit t^lb/Mimtij

Part 3, On the other hand it must be thoroughly understood that the presence of Japanese
forces in the territory or waters of the Union can only be temporary, and that the Imperial
government will proceed to the complete withdrawal of its forces as soon as the removal of the
dangers which led to their admission.

The French government insists upon the extreme urgency of this indispensable declaration
in the circumstances for the maintenance of order in indo-China and th© effective carrying out
of tfap measures made mtmBstyhy the anivai of the Japanese armed forces.

(Part 1 of 2, Part 2 not available)

Re my # 389°.

At his request, I called on Darlan during the morning of the 21st. He advised me that the
government of Prance had decided to cooperate with Japan in defending French Indo-China
in accordance with Japanese demands. Thereupon, 1# tge^ |j3 >i||i|t
being forwarded to you as my separate message # 396*.

He then went on to explain the reasons for the use of the phrase to the effect that France has
no alternative than to be inclined (s'incliner) to accept the Japanese demands.

There may be those, he pointed out, both within the country and without, who would protest
against the paradox of French resistance to the British in Syria on the one hand and the wel-
i|»ming of Japanese troops in French Indo-China on the other.

Actually, however^ France is anxious to have Japanese cooperation in defending French
Lado-China. Please be advised, the Fore^ Minister continued, that France is in no way op-
posed to the Japanese demands.

The French attach considerable importance to our immediately publishing a statement
along the lines of Premier Konoye's message to Marshal Retain, regarding the respecting of the
sovereignity of French Indo-China, Darlan said. The statement to be published was put in the
form of a supplement to the French reply to our demands, he said, and proceeded to read it to
me. The text of the statement is contained in my separate message # 397^

He added that there was one more point on which France wanted to be assured. This was just
that the Japanese forces do not order the removal of the FVench Indo-Chinese forces now sta-
tiotted in French Indo-China from their posts; that demands are not made on the various fa-

FROM: Vichy
TO: Tokyo

July 21, 1941
#395.

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
cQfMes Mm tieing used by the French forces; md that &ghtkm and nwrchant vessels see not

•Not availaMe,
'Seen, 852.
*8ee 11,85*.

Trans. 7-3^-41

No. 854

FROM: Vichy July 22, 1941

TO: Tokyo #397.

The French government attaches extreme importance to the published declaration relative
to respect for the integrity trf fedo-China and for FVench sovereignty.

Since foreign troops have arrived in territories which they considered it necessary to guard,
in spite of this declaration, it was necessary to know exactly the number of such troops sta-

Trans. 7-23-41

No. S55

FROM: Tokyo J«tly24,1941
TO: Hanoi #10J«,

The reason why the French so readily accepted the Japanese proposals was that they saw
how resolute was our determination and how swift was our action. In short, they had no
alternative but to yield. Now lately Prance has been going through a bitter experience in
Syria. Japan has guaranteed the territorial integrity of French Indo-China. We decided to
undertake the miHtary occupation of French Indo-China under the guise of a joint agreement
with France. This however, does not mean at all that they heartily approve of our action.
At this time when relations between Japan and France are so delicate and when the French
feelings are, to say the least, hurt, our army must show the greatest leniency and understand-
ing. If we take the attitude that, in view of whatever military operations we shall have to carry
out in the future France must be forced to follow us to the end, the sentiments of the French
people and officials may become so incensed that a permanent estrangement may result.
Our Empire must take a long view of its destiny and not bring about any such situation as
this.

During the recent conversations, DARLAN strongly stated that if Vichy recognizes the
occupation of French Indo-China by the Japanese forces, Japan must positively not interfere
in the administration of this territory.

Again DARLAN asked what statement we were ready to make upon occupying French Indo-
China, saying that if we demanded the withdrawal of French troops or confiscated private

A-447

property, the wrath of Frenchmen in soil(||iij|i,l^Mll^'fcdo- China Would be tembte, which
in his opinion was something to give us pau^^

Trans. 7-28-41

No. S56

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Vichy

July 22, 1941
#299.

Secret

Re your #392".

If you find that DA's* formal reply does not di^ from the statement made to you by BU,

will you proceed Immediately along the following lines and wire me the result at once;

1. 1 would like to have you tell them that we will comply with th^ir wishes and at the same
time Japan will quickly publish the statement in (2) and algo i^Wwe Will recognize (3),
namely, the fact that the French Indo- China Army will not participate in any plans of an
offensive nature by putting this point, in accordance with the F^nch desire, into a proper
form. (Please refer to my #298°.)

2. We will exchange the document mentioned In your #391'', and at the same time
recognize what is in my # 293'', (If they question the necessary number of troops specified in
my #293^youneednotletthe»feB»#Mii»fe^^

Relay te

'n, 846
*DARLAN

■n, 851.

Strictly Secret. ~
Be your #394'-

Masmuch as the custom of using the Japanese language for the final text of a treaty is a
wU-established fundamental rule and especially since the protocol in question is one of great
importancEj we cannot agree to having only the French language used. Of course, it would be
aB right for the sake of expediting the procedure to proceed with the negotiations on the baeis
cjf the French draft and then, after the draft has been put into final shape, to wire us the same.
We Will use it to make a Japanese version of the text and wire the latter to you. As you may
m^^d*^ recently concl^iiiil'^'fN^' 111^^ frott
WmM^ S*SsHehina eeoiuame fBeaiy, the Preneh Ga^emm^i^ did mA expase^ any emcmm-

Trans. 7-24-41

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Vichy

July 22, 1941
#300.

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARB^

over these treaties being in the «^^|l^ig@;]^guage. In fact, they left the entire matter to our
discretion and so I hardly think tljey'trould have any objections to the suggestion, given
above. However, in accordance with what is customary in Prance, only the French language
may be used in case of diplomatic notes.
I am sending you this information for your reference.

H,S48.

Trans. 7-24-41

No. H58

FROM: Tokyo July 22, 1941

TO: Hanoi #197.

(Strictly secret)

Re my #198'.

At noon on the 21st, DARLAN handed Ambassad&t i^A't'fit aif eiidai reply. It is essentially like
what BUNOA NESIAN' told the Ambassador yesterday. There are only two discrepancies.
The note says that Prance is forced to submit to Japan, and as soon as this occupation is no
lon^r necessary, she expecis the troops to be evacuated as soon as possible; and DARLAN
verbally stated that he trusted that the French Indo-China army and navy would not bet
dislocated from it» present positions and duties.

No. »59

FROM: Vichy (Japanese AmbaBsador)
TO: Tokyo

Regarding your # 305°.

Upon making inquiries of the French Authorities, I understand that the Spokesman in
connection with the French Indo-China question and in reply to queries as to the truth of
the report concerning the establishment ol a compromise between Japan and France saM,
"The time is not yet ripe for making any kind of a statement."

It was thought that in all probability newspaper editors, in writing their editorials, had
waxed fdfi£iyt

Then again, I had Harada call on Vice-Minister Roshier. The latter is understood to have
said that insofar as France was concerned it was necessary to prepare public opinion to counter
ih& vigorous propaganda of England and the United States of the past few days. He continued
by saying, "Since France is powerless in the Far East, it is but natural that she should waUt
to maintain the safety of French Indo-China through the strength of Japanese leadership in

July 24, 1941
#426,

Jisia." Saying this he expre^ed himself dBsavog to emphasize mcrndt^ td wlUlag
^efiipistutian with Japan from this d»y forwal^ ttaougfh the newspapers.

Foreign Office Secret,

Til confteefrtiSte Dur occupatitfli' cf tn^fiiaa, ye^ .^Mi i^rftict a vigorous

pnipasfrnd;) campaign which you deem to he the most effective iiitS^^itjli^a, in cooperation
with our military and naval representative there. This propaganda caia.pai|in shall be conducted
on the general outline set forth below. We have discussed this with the army and navy
authorities here.

1. The program outline herewith shall be launched simultaneously with the announcemeat
pertaining to Japanese occtipation.

2. The main object of this propaganda campaign is to irickue the French Indo-Chinese to
whole-heartedly cooperate with us to facilitate lightning action whenever it becomes
necessary and at the same time to promote the understanding of, and the placing oftsliiii!^
Japan by the people of other areas in the south seas, particularly those of Thailand. We wish
te csjrry out this program without uiidwly shocking the jadminiatr^tive and economic aet-up of
f*fehch Mdo-tyhSoa.

3. The bulk of otrr propaganda efforts will be made in French Indo-China and in
Thailand. However, in view of the fact that the already existing anti- Japanese propaganda by
the British, the United States, and the Netherlands will undoubtedly continue with added
vigor, we shall carry on our campaign throughout the world. Bearing in mind the fact that we
will undoubtedly be unable to carry on this campaign in such areas as Burma, Malaya, India,
Netherlands East Indies, Australia, etc., we must make preparations to invigorate our outlets
from French Indo-China and Thailand to those areas. We shall place particular emphasis
on propaganda work toward the Netherlands East Indies and Australia, suice we wish to have
acce^ to the former's oil supply in the future, and to encourage the movement for independence
in the latter.

4. The propaganda campaign will be based on the Imperial govemjtaesit'^ statement, whi^h.
wOl be issued in connection with actual occupation operations. Its otf^sriiiail^'^iifflSf SSfRit'ttf
the promotion of unity in Greater East Asia, including such factors as instilling the spirit of
defense of Greater East Aisa; emancipation of the oppressed people; distruction of the British
and United States policy of the "almighty dollar"; and the promotion of anti-Communism.
Except under special circumstances, we shall guard against any talk of giving the natives
j^f French Indo-China) their independence.

5. With the occupation of French Indo-China, Japan's aim of establishing a foundation
for a New Order in Greater East Asia will have been realized. Hereafter, therefore, we shall be
able to put all of oiu- efforts into bringing the China Incident to ft ciwil^usion. Through such
propaganda, we intend to encour^e the Wang regim* 'toB ^fe i^ Mnd while applying

'Not available.

Trans. 8-6-41

No. 860

FROM: Tokyo
T&t ' Washington

July 23, 1941

THE -MAGIC ' BACKGKObi\D ut PEAki. HARBOR

mote the feeling df adhetftOE* tSTjapm Chinese resident HXA tiiB natives of the

South Seas area.

6. To counter the antagonistic propaganda emanating from such unfriendly sources
as Chungking, Britain, the United States, and the Netherlands, through which they are
attempting to deemphasize the importance of Japan on the international scene and to
drive a wedge between Japan and Germany, we shall concentrate our efforts to point out the
fact that positionally thc»aa couotfies surroutid Japan and #how definite signs <rf
aggression.

We must not, however, give the impression that we intend to make further militaiy
penetrations to the south or that we are intending further military penetrations to the south
or that we are intending further military ties with Thailand,

7. With regard to propaganda work in the United States, we shall endeavor to point out that
we are proceeding towards a New World Order on the basis of — ~. We shall also point out
that the foreign policy of the United States as it is expressed occasionally by some of her
leaders, cannot lead to world peace. We shall also conduct a racial campaign in Central and
South America in an attempt to separate them from North America,

8. In the Soviet Union, we shall intimate that United States interests are to the south.

If you find any propaganda material which may be used by Tokyo, please advise us of it
by cable.

This cable addressed to: 1. China and Manchukuo; Peking, Shanghai, Nanking, Hankow,

Canton, Hongkong, . 2. South Seas: Thailand, Hanoi, Manila, 3. Americas: U.S.

(The U.S. will please relay it to Germany and Mexico?).

Upon the announcement of the occupation, U.S. will please paraphrase this message and
relay it to Canada, as well as to all offices in North, Central, and South America. Pleaw
contact New York ecmceming this matt«t

Trani. 7-24-4^

No. 861

Wmti Vichy July 2a, 1941

TO: Tokyo #420.

(Special message.)

In his note of July 22, 1941, relative to the jxrcgect for FraBco-J*©ane8e milit^l^y cooperation
in Indo-China, the Vice President (states) :

"Your Excellency has been shown the spirit in which the Ftench government enters into this
agreement;— understanding that it is participating for purely defensive actions having as
their objective the safe-guardmg of Indo-Chinese territory. It is added that the presence of
Japanese forces in the territory and waters of the UmoB:f»imfK*l0ty, AliiJ^'flil^
foreseen danger has been removed."

I hasten to inform Your Elxcellency of the concurrence of my Government in these views.

Trans. 8-6-41

No. 862

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Vichy

July 25, 1941
#317.

Your #412" and #420*,

Regarding the time limit for the withdrawal of our troops, we do not wish to make any prom-
ises whatever. Besides, that was settled in the protocol and now is not important. In case there
firt; those who do not agree with the foregoing, you should never use the tefm "temporary" Itt
referring to the text of your # 420, but always state :

"The presence of Japanese forces in the territory and waters of the Union will ternii&tt
the danger has been removed."

— — (message fades out in last line).

"Lasthalf of French text of Vichy's terms for Jap occujuation of F.l.-C. H, 863.
*AvailafoIe, Seen, 661.

Part 1 of 2, Part 2 not available). See Note.

- — — have agreed upon the following arrangements:

(1) The two governments pledge military cooperation for the common defense of French
Indo-China.

(2) The measures taken for this cooperation will be the objective of special arrangements.
(The foregoing (1) and (2) are condensations of those sections of the protocol.)

In testimony whereof the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective governments,
have signed the present protocol, which becomes effective on this date, and have affixed thereto

Trans. 7-28-41

No. 863

FROM: Vichy
TO: Tokyo

July 23, 1941
#412.

their seals.

Done in duplicate in the French and Japanese languages at Vichy the ^#'361 ^^■^©41,

corresponding to the " day of the seventh month of the 16th year of Showa.

of2of2".

Note: First sentence of this message, in Japanese states "that which follows :^ actual^ Part

Trans. 7-25-41

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. S64

FROM; Vichy July 23, 1941

TO: Tojkyo. #4J9.

(French)

Referring to the protocol signed under today's date between our two governments, I have the
lsa!^«0 W mn&rm to Your Excellency the concurrence of the French government in the proposi-
tions contained in the letter which you Were kind enough to me uadea- tod6sif*« Sate, anfit
which is found reproduced hereafter.

(Japanese) (In the lower margin)

(French)

Accept, Mr. Amba^doc, the mmx&mm of xa^ hi^ibeat c^isidetationj

Trana,8-#-4i

FROM: Vichy July 24, 1941

TO: Tokyo

Re my #414'.

During the conference on the 3Qth, the French officials referred to the agreement concluded
on August 30 last year and asked thiat^ftde^-^as«'feSirit o# oee^

damages might be incurred, the purport in the last part of the said agreement be written into
the protocol or into a diplomatic note. I replied that, the recently CQnclud.ed agreement being
for the purpose of joint defense, France natctfiattly mwA shate fis** ^ ffSfgaiBiMlti^ mti.
that it would, therefore, not be proper to write the matter in a formal dii^fi^Sllic document.
I suggested that it would be well to leave the decision of this matter up tfiH^'teaders of the
army of occupaticnti

FROM: Vichy July 24, 1941

TO: Tokyo #427.

On the 24th I had a member of the staff again inquire of the French authorities what had
resulted from the discussion regarding the draft of the protocol. The French authorities con-
fldentially informed him that they were ready to accept all of our seccuid draft Contained in
my #421" with the exception of the following points. As to the content of the draft, the officials
on both sides had conferred thoroughly and so I presume that is no objection to complying
with the French desire to this extent. If there is no objection, the draft could b* craisideneft
as the final one. We would like, therefore, to have you approve of the exceptions insofar as it is
possible to do so and we would appreciate your replying by wire at once.

1. 1^ insert: "«« mmmam^ kemem ^^mx^mm^^ mi '^m'^*'M^^m^y.

A-4gS.

2. In their third clause of the principal text the French draft contained in part 2 of my #412*
should he retained. However they do not insist on inserting the mutter contained in the in-
structions. In of eat *~ of my # 419^.

"Not available.

'See n, 863-.|^i^sg^ietft Of protocol.
'n,864.

Trans. 8-5-41

No. 867

FROM: Tokyo July 25, 1941

m-. Vichy 0$3$.

ReyoiK #427'

No objections to 1 and 2. Various circumstances require that we complete the arrangements
immediately. It is necessary that we proceed with the formalities of presenting to the throne
a completed copy of the protocol and the exchanged official text of the proposals. Furthermore
in regard to the withdrawal of troops in our letter of acceptance, as I instructed you previously
be telegraphed, we desire to have the phrase "this shall be only temportuy" eliminate
Please see that none of the follovdog proposals are affected by this.

' See U, 866.

' Trans. 7-30-41

No. 868

FROM: Tokyo July 25, 1941

m*. Vim -

In the French text the name of France will be placed first and that of Japan aedi^l M'ilw
<S$egiSm^ text, our country's name comes first.

Traos. 7-28-41

No. 869

FROM: Tokyo July 25, 1941

TO: Vichy #318.

Re your #411" and #417'.

In harmony with former precedents we wish t& standardize the terminology in the recent
Japanese-Franco protocoll *' ^ -«'•

Please notice these points:
1. Write the word Protocol with a capital P.

A-464

THE "MAGIC" JBACt^GSQWiP OF HARBOB

2. Use the spelling Indo China.

3. In regard to names of countries 8& adjectives, capitaligj| .Itoft "Gouvernemeirt" only
wl9mitJMl(m^*^»Bt^'« Ott»r*?ie «i^aaoall letters,

■'Not available.
*Not available.

No. 870

FROM: Tokyo July 26, 1941

TO: Vichy #320.

(Strictly Secret)

1. The Japanese text protocol is as m Special Telegram #321* (Japanese text not required
in the official text to be exchanged) . , . .

2. The Privy Council will meet in full session Monday, the 28th, after the protocol hfi«^gie
examined in Committees.

3. When the protocol and the exchange of official texts is approved you will be niStifted %
telegraph immediately. As soon as you are in receipt of'#iis''?elegram, please hav^terpi^fSjcS
signed and the texts exchanged. (If possible on the 28th.)

4. After signing, send a telegram immediately giving hour and date and manner of signing
as well as the date of the document.

5. We will publish the whole test et1^m^^B^mm4mip^ of your tels^mm.

Trans. 7-31-41

No. 871

FROM: Tokyo July 24, 1941

TO: Berlin #689.

Considering the French reply of the 21st as a sign of their having accepted our demands as a
whole, we commenced negotiations regarding the details, and on the 23rd concluded a treaty
in French fodo-China. The government has decided to issue at noon on the 26th its statement
on the joint defense of French Indo-China. Will you inform at once the government of the
coimtry to which you are accredited the fact that we have succeeded in coming to an agreement
and convey to it our thanks for having cooperated with us in this matter. At the same time,
will you confidentially infora^i government the content of the Japanese Government's
statement as given in my # 1597*.,

No. 872

FROM: Tokyo

TO : Nanking and IJsisfcW
(Circular)
Strictly Secret.
(To be handled in Government Code)

In order for the Imperial Government to meet the crucial international situation at the
present time and to establish in East Asia an area of co-prosperity, the Imperial Government
deemed it urgent to secure military bases in southern French Indo-China in the name of
joint defense of this French pn^spsvion. The Cabinet decided to place Imperial forces there and
since the 14th the Japanese and I- rench Governments have been carrying on negotiations in
Vichy. On the 21st a satisfactory understanding was attained and on the- 23d a specific pact
was signed in southern French Indo-China. All that now remains is to draw up a protocol for
the already agreed upon joint defense and the making formal of the notes which have been
exchanged on this subject, along with the stationing of Imperial troops in the pertinent regions.
Therefore, the Government has decided to make public on the 26th at noon the statement
contained in separate Circular # 1594°. This Foreign Minister's instructions are that some-
time on the 25th you confidentially so inform WANG CHIN WEI and Premier CHO (CHANG ?),
lb case (jujestions are asked, yon may answer as follows:

1. Motive for this action:

Lately the international situation has been changing kaleidoscopically. Particularly in the
South Seas, there was a political and economic, as well as military, encirclement of Japan by
third countries. That is why we took this step. I'he very terror of this situation forces us in-
evitably to take some effective measure in order to maintain the very existence of the Japa-
nese Empire, as well as its honor iWfti position of leadership in East Asia. These third coun-
tries were conspiring with the group in French Indo-China which was displeased with French
co-operation with the Japanese Empire and also with the DeGaullists. It became evident
that they were about to succeed in divorcing French Indo-China from its motherland of France.
This rendered it irrevocably essential that our Empire obtain in F^eju^ In^Q^ina a politi-
cal, economic and military foothold.

2. Sketch of Negotiations:

In order to leavS nO time for Anglo- Am^dsffit connivances, we decided that all this must be
achieved with great speed. On the 14th we started negotiations in Vichy and had a reply re-
quested by the 19th. We made it clear that we wanted either "yea" or "no," They said, how-
ever, that they would have to confer with the signatories of the armistice treaty before they
could make us an answer or accept the Japanese proposals, but we told them that we had
ailready ihrashed this out sufficiently with the Germans and Italians and that their approval
would be a certainty. We further told them that we would like to receive word of their accejji^
ance by the 23d because if this were not forthcoming by that time we would have to take what-
ever measures of our own we deemed wise. We impressed this upon them and, as a result, on
the 2l9t at noon they yielded completely.

'Same test as H, 872A ythaeh gives the Statement of the Imperial Goyemment cwcepiii^ I^enc^ ^^^^bim
negotiatjcmH.

July 24, 1&41
#1593,

A-456

Tm "MAGIC" BAQKGROUISP Pf PEARL HARBQB

N0.872A

FROM: Tokyo
Wa Wi^iiiigton

July 24, 1941
#402.

Secret Outside the Department.
SMtemen$ (i^thelmpmai Government:

Beginning with the conversations which began between Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and
Ambassador HENRI last August, several agreements have been reached between Japan and
France whereby recently Franco-Japanese relations have quickly become more intimeiti».
Now, once again concerning the joint defense of Prench Indo-Clliinai the Qm&t^fiM!^'^^
two nations have agreed on a friendly policy.

The Imperial Government is determined to maintain the various understandings existing
between Tokyo and Vichy. The responsibility of the Imperial Grovernment, based upon its
solemn promise to support the territorial integrity and sovereignty of France, will be maintained
and hereafter we will endeavor to increase a relationship of amity between our two countries
and thus strive to achieve joint prosperity fcff bo^.

Re your (Circular) # 1595".

Local newspapers are making much over Japan's having secured military bases in southern
French Indo-China as if it were the first step in further southward encroachments, asserting
that next will come attacks upon Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies. It seems that
the public in general entertain misgivings on this point. Thoughtful persons are expecting
that there will be some statement forthcoming from the Japanese Government on the matter.
I think that it would be very fitting, when such a statement is made public, if it could also be
made plain that this present Japan-French Indo-China agreement has its origin in an earnest
desire to preserve the peace of East A^iat And that mjeh flf feing as making this the basis fo*
aggression is not even dreamed of.

° Dated 25 July. Re steps to be taken in investigating smuggling. Get in touch with local Naval and MUitary

Trans. 7-25^1

No. 873

FROM: London
TO: Washington

July 25, 1941
#069.

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda)
TO: Vichof

(Secret outside the Departaient}

After the materialization of the plans of the Army and the Navy for the occupation result-
ing from the agreement made recently for the joint defense of French Indo- China and upon
the execution of the terms of the various agreements which have previously been concluded
between Japan and France, the relation between Japan and French Indo-China will take on
added value and intimacy, and negotiations which will take place in that country will in-
cf^ase in number as well as in importance. However, with the diplomatic organizations that
are now existing, it may be impossible to cope with the situation internally and externally.
Furthermore, regarded also from the standpoint of unifying diplomatic activities, we need to
consider anew the disbanding of the headquarters in Hanoi. I believe it is of utmost import-
ance also to set up a powerful diplomatic organization in French Indo-China. What the gov-
ernment wishes to do is to send a special ambassador to French Lido-China; to have members
firom the Army, the Navy, and the Foreign Office work with him; to have them perform their
duties under this ambassador so that diplomatic work may be unified under one head; to place
the consuls in Hanoi and Saigon under the supervision of the ambassador; and in case a necessity
arises of sending officials, high and low, who are not membere of the armed forces, to liave
them become members of the Foreign Office; and lastly to have the negotiations between the
Army of occupation and the Indo-China authorities carried on through the medium of iiie
Itiaal^iBador. Will you, therefore, explain (and at once win tbe api»oval of Hie French Gwewa-
^Sf^Sk of the fact) that it will be very necesKary and also quite convenient to France, in coping
<witib the new situation arising from the agreement for carrying out joint defense, to have such
an ambassador sent and also that this plan no object other than to iKing aH diplomettic

Please convey the following to Marshal PETAIN as soon as possible as a personal message
from Prime Minister KONOYE: I wish to thank you from the bottom of my heart for your
sagacious judgment in agreeing to sign and seal the joint defense pact of Japan and France.
Not only do I congratulate you upon your courageous decision, but I should like to take this
sappKi^HBfi^r to express my firm belief that this act will serve more and % cemeat ^
fri*§Bd^ateIations of our two countries.

Ipray felOUr country's success and Your Excellency's good health.

Trans, 7-31-41

No. 875

FROM; Tokyo (Toyoda)
TO: Vichy

July 30, 1941

#333.

Trans, 8-H-41

A-458

THE BACKGKQUND QF EEA^ JtlAgy&OR

No. 876

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) July 30, 1941

TO: Vichy #334.

Please convey the? following to vice Premier DARLAN as soon as possible, as a personal mes-
sage from me. Regarding the signing of the cooperative defense protocol of French Indo- China
by Japan and France, I wish to express my siilbiPS iSppreciaticm fo* yetfP^^uSStecy'a en-
deavors in making possible the signing of this pact. Furthermore I firmly b^^j|^<|Ms will
guarantee peaceful conditions in the far east and contribute to the realization of co-defense and
co-existence between Japan and French Indo-China and also between Japan and France. I
recall once more the appearance of your Excellency at the lioadon disanuasa^t CoafereJMSe
some years ago. I pray for your Excellency'^good health.

Trans. 8-11-41

No. 877

FROM: Rome (Japanese Ambassador) Mt^? 20, 1941

TO: WasWaitqn ' ISo jiumber.

Mess^e to Tokyo #296.

Ate^g to the same spy 'f&p^f miming to a rep6r«>fi!i^ Wi^9€A'M-lM¥mki^ ftoft
tlSe Apostolic delegates in both Peking and Chungking respectively, CHIANG KAI SHKK is
aiuu^ning his scheme of bein| about to make pegice with Japan, as he is getting China aid

Japan in the Far East, he Is determined to COfiP^iftiSi :tibE^'Sght to the bitter end. In respcmse,
the Vatican, through its Apostolic delegate iii Cltni^kla^ replied that since it can cooperate
only in policies of peace between Japan and China, it has no alternative but to refuse the pro-
posal that CHIANG KAI SHEK send a diplomatic envoy to the Vatican, as reported ^ 03^
# 168*. Furthermore, the Vatican has so informed bothEngland and the United States.

"Not available.

'Rome reports that, according to intell^ence, CHIANG KAI SHEK ia plijinine to smA bfil p^sofiid emoy to
the Vatican with complete wpi!Ssi«lo£tfee rajitBa.|ft»ja^

Trans, 5-22-41

No. 878

FROM: Peiping May 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo #359.

Strictly Secret

CHINTBIEN, President of the Peace and Order Bureau, confidentially t6ld a spy of my
office that the Chungking authorities, rather than doubting the Japanese-Chinese peace terms
as such, doubt whether or not they can trust Japan's behavior, and until they get sufficient
guarantee from the United States, they will not lend their ears to talk of peace.

Trans. 5-31^1

-Wiami mo de Janeiro (fohii)
(Circular)

Message ttom Tol^o«s Cimilar # 1124 (Pait 1 of 3).

Now that we are trying to establish a new order in East Asia, the United States and England
are aiding China all the more. Furthermore, there is an encircling collusion of England, the
United States, and the Netherlands. This is tantamount to a treaty of alliance. Nevertheless,
with tlnglahd's successive defeats, particularly in the Mediterranean, the British people are
said to be wavering and that the officials have difficulty in keeping up their courage. Our
southward threat also adds to their fears.

ftene. 7-12-41

fmiii' Janeiro (Ishii)

nXl>: IJma

Message from Tokyo ag Circular #1124 (Part 3 of 3).

3. Our military occupation of FUKIEN has made exchange of money with the Chinese of
the South Seas impossible, and enabled us to seize various commodities destined to aid
CHIANG. Thus, China is sadly lacking in supplies. It is even said that the Chinese cannot
purchase food for any amount of ^^m^^^B^.tl^m^m-0&^^^»i^\^^^
spirit of the Celestials is declining.

Furthermore, (Russian ?) and American stations are broadcasting that we are makit^
peace with CHIANG through the good offices of the United States. This must be an attempt.^
se^v^ tig from the Axis, for we are busy organizing the new WANG government.

Trans. 7-12-41

No. 881

FROM: London (JapaneseAtnbaasadpr)
TO: Washington

(Message to Tokyo as # 408)

On the 28th day, 1 had a spy of mine, who is a bosom friend of Simfeassador BIDDLE, con*
sserse with him and under my instructions, as always, to make certain leading statements m
the Far Eastern Que^n in ordej' to drftW BIDDLE out, Reacting thereto, BIDDLE spoke m

follows:

"As usual I agree with you. I have been in touch with the President and there are evidences
of some improvement. Ambassador WIN ANT will soon arrive in Washington. His mission
in addition to maintaining liaison with Great Britain is also to discuss the Chinese problem.
(WINANT's principle mission for the moment concerns the HESS incident.)"

On the 30th, I talked with Lord HANKEY and he told me that he had talked over his plans
with Lord HALIFAX before the latter resigned, and the two were in perfect agreement. (Plans

May 26, 1941
#116.

May 26, 1941
#116.

June 2, 1941
#86.

A-460

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF. PEARL HABBOR

far HANKEY, himself, to make m unoflScial trip in order to persuade the United States I©

bring an end to the Chinese trouble.) He said; "The United States, you know, is in somewhat
of a better position to judf e thia$^ mom coolly than is Great Britain, who is immersed in the
throM of war. Therefore, t t!fiBlif ^"^tiM a Vi^firilf'^#<e'fettieSijt»rt^

Washin^on . "

Putting this statement and that statement of his together, I believe you will be able to maj^

Trans. 6-fr-41

No. 882

FROM: New York (Morishima) May 26, IHl

TO: Washington #30.

Ifi^aigiio Tokyo #208. .

Senator REYNOLDS told ° confidentially that in the present session of the Foreign

Relations Committee, WHEELER counsels that the United States cease aiding CHIANG and
make up with Ja]^* GEORGE also iMs. Wi®i5®f^ ^ Wf&'imm- 1^^^

PteaieU^i^ i^^tii^ thiSr but he h»s .a^^iiiSM^mme

Trans. 7-12-41

No. 883

FROM: Tokyo May 27, 1941

TO: Net #1136.

(Circular)

Received from Hongkoi^ as # 265. (Abstract)
Re my # 249".

According to a report from agent CF regarding James Roosevelt's representations:
There are good prospects of immediately getting permission for transportation by sea, land
aitd air. According to agent KC, 500 'ftiti^k^ l^en sent by the Burma Road and the mili-
tary committee is taking steps to improve air transportation along the Burma route, havii^,
30 transport planes make one round trip a day, scheduled to carry 4500 tons a month.

Major General Cragette of the Philippines flew to Chungking oa tlw I7tii i^jiis^^ JdfiftjSil''
American CDUg^boration in air defense, etc.^ it was rumoted.

taMo mi tte««p^^i|ji@ttft giving the deiwted figum on AiiiRic^i^^CiffaiDftt

Trans. 5-31-41

A~46,l

No.m

FROM: Tokyo July 2, 1941

TO: Nanking, Shanghai, Pekteg #1407,

Message from Hongkong # 318.

Re my # ia?^.J«rt.

According to separate reports, the number of trucks is 500 (not including privately owned).
These are of two makes, Ford and Dodge, (all of ton capacity). Most of these are to be used
to cottVi^ mititiiy sttppUes an^iii; i^m. Ite 1lQite4I^Gf^ This is a report of primary im-
portance.

Relay to iSanking, — , — .

'See n, 8S4A in whicb Hongkong relays an intelligence report sag^mg the Chungking officials asked the United
States t6 furnirik tmdcs in wMch to transport rice, and, as a result, obtain 500 tnacMoei.

Teem. 7-11-41

FROM: Tokyo

TO: Nanking, Shanghai, Peking and Canton
(Circular) Message from Hongkong as # 299.

(Intelligence of Primary Importance)

On the 18th PA reported as follows:

Recently, through Quo Tai Chi", CHIANG KAI SHEK had ROOSEVELT and HULL informed
that he would like to see the Chinese Incident ended simultaneously with that of Europe.
ROOSEVELT, however, is said to have replied that the European war will not end in a short
time and, after all, there is no ne@eiti^ ^ taMl^ tm^ 4 -"^^sm m ^m, (Refer to Your
Excellancy's #175 to Washington.)

For some time, particularly in Chungking, and in general everywhere, there has been a
great shortage of rice and the price trend has been upward; therefore, the Chungking
officials are trying to settle the question by planning and scheming to import rice from
Annam' and Thai over the Burma Road, Therefore, they asked the United States to fun^i
them with trucks in which to transport the rice and, as a result, obtained 500 machine. Nowtt
would appear that these trucks will be delivered within eight months to Rs^igpon.

Relay to Nanking, Shanghai, Peking and Canton. '

June 19, 1941
# 1274.

* Chinese Ambassador to Great Britaiif.

Trans. 6-21-41

A-462

THE "MAGIC" BACKGKOLND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 8^

FROM: Tokyo

TO: Nankiog^ Shanghai, Peking aad Cs»tCE.
(Circular)

Message from HjGasj^i^ ,#^3 on the 23th.
Strictly secret.

May29,XS41

On the 28th, PA° handed a member of my staff a strictly secret note which read as follows;
"A part of the $50,000,000 export loan by the United States to China is to be used in purchasing
800 airplanes from the United States. These planes, it appears, are of two types, including the
Boeing B-17. The United States will under this arrangement send pilots and mechanics to
manage the planes. To effect this deal will require one month,"

In this connection XYZ" reports that a Boeing can leave A given base in Chii^a, fly to Tokyo,
raid the city for two hours, and then tiy back to China.

Relay to Nanking, Shanghai, Peking and Canton.

'Probably Japanese intelligenGe agents.

TVans. 6-3-41

No. 886

FROM; Washington (Ntmura) July 10, 1941

TO: Tokyo #492.

(Intelligence of Secondary Order,)

The monthly quantity shipped over the Burma Road is from 8,000 to 10,000 tons— at best,
12,000 tons. If, taking paving material to Chma, DANIEL G. ARNSTEIN, etc., cover 800
miles of the road with a single crust, the amount will reach 20,000 tons. The material which
China was dbifitefiio^^otn Russia prior to the outbreak of the Russo-German war has heeti
stopped. China is very pessimistic about the whole thing and the activities of the Pacifists
in Chungking are growing very lively. OWEIN and LATTIMORE are going to China to squelch
peace talks and, if^ii^do mt sviiK#§4:WEJLKIE will be sent.

No. 887

FROM: Shanghai July 17, 1941

TO: Net #587.

(Circular)

Action Tokyo as # 1278
(Abstract)

According to HQ report. The High officials of the Chungking government are elated over
Latimore's arrival as sonifying a greater British-American-Soviet aid to China. They are

A-463

.ai^^t^y making preparations for a joint f^i|gpence. Also, as Latimore is known to be a firm
Tbeliever in a united Ciina, his first effort, iWobably be directed toward bringing unity be-
tween the Chiang aiidtiiui#ei;i(i3^l^^

{Ckeular)
(Parti of

There follows a report on the latest Anglo-American Soviet-Chinese relations:
1. On the 15th, PA confidentially said to a member of niy staff: "QUO TAl CWr held a
conversation with the British, American and Sov^ JS^ttisfe^S tJfliS tt ffe

» military alliance is immment. Now, I, who have no connection at all with Chungking,
have a friend who says that this is all untrue and 1, myself, do aot think that any such thing is
yet at hand. Let us look at the present status of the four cOuntrtSK.

o. "After the outbreak of war with Germany, and, for that matter, even before, the Soviet
furnished Chungking with no supplies for three or four months. Furthermore, all that England
and the United States have done to help China was to put into effect a loan whereby 5,000,000
pQUttdi were to be shipped to China as a stabilizing fund. (As one proof of this, China most
urgently needs airplanes, and, until she recently obtained some from the United States, ^he
only had some 200 old planes of Brit^h, American, Soviet, German «md Italian makes.)

b. "Chungking is planning a policy concerning airplanes proportionate with England
and the United States but this, too, is not likely to work out. ^

c. "Some time ago when CURME visited Chungking, he asked i^ t^M ^a^i'
Britain some veteran troops but this, too, did not work out.

d. "The United States asked Chungking to lend her an airport near the coast in case
Japan advances southward. Chungking gladly agreed but as yet the exact spot has not even
been determined. True enough, American aid to China has increased somewhat lately, but
aside from political and economic assistance, the United States cannot give China very much
military help. All she can hope to do is give China a few camphor injections. The United States
|»too much interested in her own military preparations and will not see fit to use her resources
in somebody else's fight. However, if the United States gets into war with Japan, then she wiU
afford Chungking every assistance that may seem necessary.

*CMn^ Ambassador to Great Britain.

No. H88

FROM: Tokyo
TO; China Net

July 16, 1941
#1S40,

Trans. 7-22^41

THE '*mmm" mmmmmm 9mm wmm

No. 8*!9

FROM: Tokyo

July 16, 1941

"The United States will send men to improve the Burma Road in order to increase shipping;
to deliver airplanes, trucks and other military supplies to Chungking and pilots and other
technicians to engage in aeronautical instruction but these will not engage in actual fighting."

Inte^ligenceRe^rtofSecondaryOrder: __

HYO SHI CHU learned from CHIN KO HO that recently, when QUO TAI CHI conferred
with the American, British, and Soviet Ambassadors, the American Ambassador, denying
that he was on his own opinion, declared that it is the policy of the United States to continue
its policy of assisting Soviet Russia just as prior to the outbreak of the war between Germany
and Russia. He went on to say that, of course, the United States intends to give every direct
assistance possible to the democraciesv hat will not fight herself unless it is absolutely neces-
sary. He went on to hint that his government would not favor a treaty of alliance under the
present circumstances, but that if Japan enters the German-Soviet war, the United States, as
a neutral, will give Moscow every assistance possible. The Soviet Ambassador said that al-
though Russia was now mobilizing a tremendous force, she still has foodstuffs aplenty, as well
as arms, and that he would assure at least the same amount of assistance to Chungking as
usual. The Soviet Ambassador went on to say that if Japan joins this war, he desires Chung-
king to make an attack along the whole battle line in order to cause Japan trouble in the rear.
The British and Chinese Ambassadors agreed that in case anything happens to the British Isles
there should be some common meeting ground for Great Britain and China and that, c&Bh
sequently, a Ministry should be established in Calcutta and a Consulate General in Hongkong,
It seems that they also discuss the founding of a Consulate at JO CHO KI. Aside from these
matters, however, m definitB;;^i|f iti^i^l^ilished.

(Circular)

{Message to Tokyo #1396)
Be my #1273°.

According to "HQ" HYU has been completely deprived of his military power in Yunnan, and
the stage has about been reached when he has to talce all of his orders from CHIANG KAI-
SHEK and . A conference has been going on in Chungking between the British, Ameri-
cans, and Chin^ cmcenamg the strengthening of Chungking's power and also to lay plana

-«Erans. 7-23-41

No. 890

FROM: Shanghai
TO: Net

July 30, t&41
#654,

A-4iBS

for the governing and defense of Yunnan, These conversations appear to center around the (ol-
lowing subjects:

Tte reinf^emei^^T^e Churning army o£ occupation in ¥una«|i by a (British?) mech-

Thc organization of m. goy^ssiil^ e@ta»ti8^ ^^m^m»i M m^mmmives Qt'Vh»
three countries.

The eccmomic development of the province, the United States funushing the necessary sup-
plies (the United States insists that the asilifeS be aoad SAteady two AaM»i«an
experts are on hand to plan this) .

The responsibility for the reopening of the fS^i&iten highway to traffic lies with other Ameri-
can expats, as also the traffic facilities of Keinan.

♦Seen, SWA.

NO.S90A

FROM: Shanghai July 16, 1&41

TO: Net NoapiJ^.

(Circular 583)

(Message to Tokyo # 1273)

Re my # 1249°. HQ report.

On the 14th, SHU SHO G.4KU' took RYUs' written reply to CHIANG KAI-SHEK. According
to information coming from the Chinese Communist Party, this reply is an indication of
RYU's submission to CHIANG. In it RYU demanded that the Yunnan Army of 220,000 (the
present actual number is 160,000) be supported and part of it used to guard the region be-
tween Kunming and Tali-fu and also other places and thus have them maintain peace and
order. However, CHlANtr is adhering to his original plan of placing on^ three regiments — that
is, 20,000 men— of the Yunnan Army under RYU's command. HAKU SU KF is suggesting

to CHIANG that 4,100 of of the Yunnan forces be kept in Yunnan and Hunan, and 4,000

mere be removed to Hongyo*, and thus divide the army. In view of thia_jBteitoB^v.#
compromise is expected to be reached in the near future between CHIANG and RYU.

Amy.

Trans. 8-5-41

THE "MAGIC" MCjCGSOUND OF P£A^ HARBOR

No. 891

FROM: Shanghai August 4, 1941

TO; NanlEi*!^. #236.

lEMessage to Tokyo # 1446.)

£[ilell^ence report frtm WA on the 2Qd.

According to an account by a competent person who just asnw^ m Shanghai from Chung-
king, the Financial Reconstruction Program liet setirely m fiilft &M)«fe.0f Hi© Biitjah m4 Axmrir
cans; and the socalled •production eo-operatots* WG*?fc 'hlfrtd' fia feftn^ fl^ tlui lfe!tiiE and
Madame CHIANG KAI-SHEK, but the Industrial (Commercial) Bureau has nothing what-
ever to do with them. The chief personnel is made up of Britishers who have come from New
Zealand and Australia, along with British and American scholars studying abroad, or grad-
uates of the Shanghai Anglo-American Church school. These persons conduct trade on the
side, and the goods, other than that which comes under the heading of utilities by the Shang-
hai authorities, being stolen goods, bring in a neat profit. There is no one who will expose this
because everyone is afraid of the power and popularity of Madame CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

Airplane machinery technicians also are English and American students studying abroad;
and Belgian, as well as students from other countries studying abroad have already given up

their studies ______ Furthermore, all diplomatic power is controlled by Madame

CHIANG KAI-SHEK, KUNG HSIANG-SHI" and TUNG HSIU-CHIA'?; and diplomatic
matters, I understand, are decided upon in coi^erences held by these three together with
British and American diplomats. Adet^ied «<*«^lrt1itS^i86g;1^'|ISi9^

Relayed fej Nanking.

Tiam. 8-3-41

FROM: San Francisco (Muto) August 5, 1941

TO: Ti^yo #160.

1. The of the Silver - ver Pacific Line left San Franrisco t he 1 ,5th for

carrying some 14 or 15 aviators and bomber technicians bound for Chungking, as well

as, a cargo consisting of military material and large caliber guns. The Klipfo-to-, scheduled
to leave this port about the middle of September, is taking on a large quantity of military
equipment and in addition 20 aviators and bomber technicians bound for Chungking are
scheduled to board her before she leaves.

2. According to intelligences emanating from the local the Burma road being

British, American and Chinese jointly are planning on the construction of a trans-
portation route between Calcutta and Chungking. This transportation route (part of it will tie
a military road) will pass through Darjeeling, Lhasa in Tibet, Seitei" in the province of Seiko
and the city of Seito having its terminus in Chungking. East of Kotei the road is planned to be
a military automobile toad.

A-467

3. Material to be used in the construction of such an involved engineering undertakit^ is at
the present time being assembled and prepared. TO CHIN EN" for this purpose is going to

on the Mdtsonia scheduled to leave the 2nd, Boarding a clipper at that place ^

' - fe'^ s^eduled to leave {ox home on ihe clipper flying from San Francisco on the

6th.

'KanaapelUng. _ •

TVans. g'-SEMl

No. 893

FHOM: Tokyo May 24^19^

TO: Canton #1122.

(Circular)

Received from Hongkong as # 259.
(Abstract)

"CF" reports two intercepted telegrams ftom CHEN PI-CHUN to MSAISIN' and from
TOGO* to YU HAN-MOU, re; general war situation in China and proposed negotiations for
Ctiinese commvmist-KuoioixitaQg mppto^ess-HBt.

°Japant:!^;^> version of Chinese name. LiCjSl-SfiN.
'Japanese version of Chinese name,

I'rans. 5-28-41

No. 894

FROM: Hsinking
TO: NankoftS^iliilgbmffeking

(Cima»> •

Message to Tokyo # 289. Strictly Secret.

The intelligence conference which was held in this ofSoe in March of this year was extremely
beneficial, viewed in the light of the gathering and exchanging information, and in judging
the state of affairs of the Far East. Based on the opinions which were unanimous at that first
conference, sometime aroiiM Hie WkWdSB of1}& mdotb Uli^'fi^ Ip^t^ tJie second of these
conferences in Shanghai,

Although I think that you have undoubtedly already considered ^je matters to be touched
on in the next conference, I am setting thent down here as they come into my mind.

(A) The state of Manchukuoan-Chinese affairs after the completion of the -Japanese- Soviet
Neutrality Fact, (the solution of outstanding questions between Japan and the Soviet, and
between Manchukuo and the Soviet; the Soviet's change of attitude toward Manchukuo and
China; m<]^ements of Uie Qhipe^ Cfiopiian^t F^l^i ^nd the Msnchukuoan Communist
Party).

June 4, 1941
#93.

1«B "MAGIC" I^mSC^UMO W I-^WyHAE^

(B) The completion of the commercial agreement between Japan and French tiido-China.

The settlement of the dispute between Japan and FVench Indo-China, and ; and also the

stiffening attitude of the United States concomitant with discussion on the state of affairs in

the South Seas, now under way with as the focal point. U other than the various South

Seas officials, such as the Consuls-General of Manila and Hanoi, the Governor-General of
Taiwan, and the Chief of the Foreign Affairs Section, etc., can be made to take part in the con-
ference, I think that considerable results will be effected. (It will be enough to have the repre-
sentative official of North China and a Foreign Office official of Manchukuo participate in the
conference.) . _ ...

Relayed to Shanghai, Nanking and Peking.

Tirana. 6-10-41

No. 89.^

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO : Singapttt* IsK^ji)

Foreign Service.

Before sending the HINOKI" code to you by courier, it is most important, because of its
secret nature, to ascertain whether or not there is any possibility of its being inspected. Reply

by cable.

"An abbreviation code.

Trans. 6-2-41

No. 8%

FROM; Tokyo (Matsuoka) May 28, 1941

To send matters of this type, the contents of which they are well aware, in code should be
avoided if we are to maintain the secrecy of our telegcaphie ^ttems. Th#refore, J would like
to have you use abbreviating code. ' ' " '

'Not available.

Tjans, 5-31-41

May 27, 1941
#133.

A-469

FROM: Tientsin June 6, 1941

Wl - Tok5fl» Nonumbw.

Extra. ^

To the Telegraphist NISHI from the Telegraphic Section:

We have a telegram which needs to be transmitted to the Chief of the Kwantung Province.

Please instruct us by return wire as to what code w0 should use ii' ^&i&fflfnission
Province, m well m teettier «)tmtries apidtftlCOTea.

No. 898

FROM: Tokyo June 6, 1941

TO: Hsinking #618.

Re your # 287° oral report.

Please let me have your answer by reply wire on the circumstances of the opening of mail,
and the types of mail which have been opened.

Trans.

No. 89$

Tokyo July 5, mi:.

TO: Canton # 116,

Hongkong to I'okyo #326*

Re your #366°.

1. The secret documents and telegraphic material have been placed in care of the Consulate
at Hankow (?) and as you suggested those left are so few that there will be no difficulty in
carrying them away. Further arrangetnents have been made fetirn them in very short order
should the necessity arise.

2. As a result of a conference with the head of the Japan Society here, I have decided to send
the Imperial Portrait which has been bequeathed to the National School here, to the Consul in
Canton until conditions become more settled. However, in order not to cause apprehension
among the Japanese resident here this will be carried away secretly and as soon as clrcum-
staa»Bs^ ^mmsM, '& «dU be returned again.

Hotavailable.

A-470

THE "MAGIC" BAgKGROUNP OF PfiAJtL HARBOE

FROM: Canton July 1*. 19*1

TO: Tokyo

(Message te Hongkong as # iB8. )

Be # 325* addressed to me by sfou.

On the 14th, I received in perfect condition the two Imperial portraits brought to tne hy
Consul KIMURA (i^ose for tbfi (^neral Consulate and for the Citizens' School).

TI,899.

Trans. 7-17-41

FROM: Canton July 14, 1941

TO: Tokyo #263.

Secret outside the Department-
Re my #261'.

On the 15th, the Chief of Staff Of the Canton Naval Base called on me and inquired as to
whether there had been any instructions from the Foreign Office with regard to the respectful
transportation of the Imperial portraits in view of the critical times. I replied as follows:
"Far from it. Judging by the example established by the closing of German and Italian
consular offices in Australia and other places, this is merely a step in preparation for all
eventualities." Continuing my remarks, 1 said that the current German-Soviet war has given
us the best opportunity possible in a thousand years and it shall not slip through our
fingers. Turning to the map, I said: ''The question isn't whether we shall move to the north or
to the south. They can't meddle with us in the ngstk. It j»^a;^ «6mp9*w ^itnse to strengthen
ourselves to the south."

^31,900,

No. 902

FROM: Shanghai JuneS,
TO: NankinfT #154.

Action Tokyo as a 915.

Re your # 153° and 154".

Regarding our activities in connection with foreign oil for which the ¥5,000,000 was
appropriiatfeS;

As a result of negotiations between the China branch of the Board of Planning, the field
service of the War Department and the Standard Oil Co., last November, for the delivery of
high octane gasoline to us, on condition that it be removed to the inl©^^ it #«i i^f^ild *6

A-471

have delivered 50,000 drums of 86 octane gasoline, but due to objections on the part of Tokyo
tbi3 agreement w#s ntyer fulfilled. However, since then, the Board of Pi&nning and its China*
tn^6^ liavB beftft feottfeiring on this aiid diflter technical matteH- Sft^ fe«*mtly have succeeded
in reaching a general agreement on the method of handling this situation.

Therefore, we have decided to renew our negotiations with the foreign oil firms alot^, the
lines set forth in separate message # 916".

Regarding the above, the China service of the War Department, which is most concerned
with this negotiation, has, in view of the experience of the past negotiations and of the
general adverse trend in world situations, — — — - (remainder of mesaage missing).

°Not available.

Trans. &-7-41

No. 903

FROM: Tientsin July 16, 1941

TO: Tsirigtao #100.

Message to Tokyo # 218.

Re your # ISS" addwftSi^'to this Ministet.

Shipftient of powdered milt since April has been only 5,400 pounds. (They were all of the

Meiji^ and not one of the Morinaga'.) There is none in stock in this city and we are very much
concerned because there are more than 2,000 babies in North China who are without milk.
Will you, therefore, negotiate with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and with other
bodiej. for immediate shipment . Will you, also, take this matter up with 'the ofllces CQOiceilted
so that priority might be given in assigning a ship to transport the same?

"Not available.

^Naines ttf confectioner fioa^Mraieg manvfactutaig ithct nkilk products.

Trans. 7-22-41

.No. 904

FROM: Tokyo July 16, 1941

TO; Tientsiti #1520.

Message to Hsinking #403,

On Febmaiy 28, 1938, by viture an agreement with the Manchukuoan Monop^ offleuib,
we consigned to Manchukuo opium and narcotics seized In North China. Lately, we have been
WSaMe to import opium from foreign countries and lack the ingredients for certailt laedicines.

iw»ajai^^in^: tm ^(sm^ming. We now need the opium and narcotiict whifM were
seized fof ?ise. Will you, therefore, please arrange for us to obtain it? Please explain

this situdl&l i& ttie Manchukuoan officials and try to get them to agree. Wire back the
results immediately.

Trans. 7-18-41

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

August 2,1941

No. 905

FROM: Tsinan
(Message to Peking #61)

Regarding instructions in your circular message #364%.

The local Shantung Automobile AsKOciation operates some two hundred vehicles. (Vehicles
ctf all guilds are included in this iigure.) (They use approximately fifty thousand gallons
of gaaoline per month. )

This organization conducts transportation of goods within the city, in the occupied areas
near about, as well as among rural communities. In view of the recent freezing order it has

become impossible for them to secure gasoline. As a result transportation and is

at a stand still. In view of the imminence of the period for cotton deliveries, we would
like to have you arrange to (tap?) the current stocks of the local agencies of the Asia, Standard
and Texas Oil Companies. (This amounts to eighty thousand tons,)

Hease wire us you* penoiasion to pfKiceed at as early St date as possible.

"Hotaimilflbte.

Trans, 8-6-41

N». 906

FROM: Peking August F>, 1941

TO: Tsinan No number.

Re your # 61°.

It wUl be, all ri^tit to permit purchases on the following conditions, but you will direct so
thit 'd^' li^fef of the nature of unreasonable raising of prices, due to the rush of
purchasing.

(1) As to the amounts and to be allotted to members of the Association, instructions

will be received from the supervising agencies on the grounds.

<2) As to the keeping of gasolme purchased, instaruetions wiU he received feom tht
supervising agencies on the ground.

(3) Purchases will be made from the stores now held at Tsinan by the three foreign oil
companies (?). (It would be desirable to have the gasoline taken care of by us, but as we are
already having an effective supervision over the moving of that which is in Tsingtao, it is
felt here that there will hardly be any necessity of |»^|^ agaia from

90a)

Transportation of gotids wiihiii [hr city has become impObisible due to inability to ^abtaui gasoline 98 a iMSUlt
of the freezing order. Suggest stocks of the local Asia, Standard, and Texas companies agencies lie (tafpe4?)-'S*ell,90§.

A-473

No. 907

FROM: Tokyo June 10, 1941

TO: Peking # 1224,

{Circular)

(To Shanghai as # 500.)

The British Embassy in Tokyo has informed us that our military authorities in Shanghai
are about to confiscate nearly $890,000 in Chinese legal money, which was found in the Morat
warehouse located in the French Concession on the Bund; and that England will not tolerate
Hm^ The French Embassy likewise is complaining, and has officially asked us to rescind
lifae^diiaiiand. Please wke me the facts on ihis matter.

Relayed to N£mking, Peking, Tientsin and Hankow.

'Trans. 6-12-41

m.9m

FROM: Tokyo June 23, 1941

TO: Hankow #133.

Action Shanghai as #569.

Regarding your # 199°:

During the Economic negotiations held here between the representatives of China,
Manchukuo, Japan and Gennany, Germany offered a proposal touching on the question of
transporting goods to Germany. (South Seas and South American products.) At that time,
some reference was made to goods belonging to Chinese and German firms in Hankow, which
were not permitted to be shipped to Shanghai.

Our answer regarding these goods was to the effect that, due to special circumstances, the
question of transporting these goods cannot be handled like ordinary transportation
problems, and that it involves consultation with the military authorities.

However, we did not give any promise or make any agreement of a kind described in your
message referred to above.

'Not availsbl«.

Trans. 6-26-41

FROM: Sh^f#m Julys, 1941

TO; Ni!dkii«g,P«iEk|&iatc(B^n^^
(Circular)

•|i«|i^^i(^okyo # 1203.

According to a report received by IWAI" on the 7th, the Clinging representative in
Shanghai, MISU KO k5', received telegraphic orders on the 6th tothefoflowing effect;

A-^74

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HAKBUK

Japan will shortly declare war and will confiscate all of the assets of Chinese living in the
foreign concession (particularly those related to banks) and will also put a stop to the
traffic of third-country ships along the coast of China. Therefore, all Chinese firms and
merchants im iSlMWighai should in all haste transfer their eomniOT^ftl tet«l»ta to foreign
names.

It appears that they immediately began to put this scheme into effect-

*A high Japanese o£Scifil.

*Kaiia ««dliBg for MI CHI FANG (?) .

^*%.jp^|^ted)

No. 910

- L I

FROM: Tokyo July 17, 1941

TO: Net #1568.

Received from Hongkoiif:; as #351.

Chiang Kai-shek's army is short of supplies, and Chungking could not hold out longe*'^^
ten months if foreign sources of supplies wee^'hjitfti!^: ' -•■wl--' ^

Trajas, 7-26-41

No. 911

FROM: Peking 3idy2S.^' *

TO: Tsiimn,Tsingtat> #347.

(Circular)

(Message to Tokyo # 438)

An order has been issued by the North China Army to the Japanese forces at other points to
the effect that they should watch closely factories, valuable property, warehouses, etc., belonging
to the British and the Americans. However, I understand that they have been warned against
using force or doing anything that might be construed in the same light. Will you, therefore,
get in touch with the military authorities in your part of the country and take steps so that,
except in case of absolute necessity, nothing should be done that is likely to provoke the British
and the Americans and bring about a worse state of affairs. Even when this close watching is to
begin, it should be done in a casual way and not as if it is actually being done. Will you arrange

with the military authorities to have this precaution taken — — so that this plan

would 1^ f9 Pii^p^ the Americans.

Trans. 8-&-41

A-415'

No. 912

June 27, 1941

(Circular)

Tp Tokyo as #1097.

The former governor of Chekian province Chiang Pro-ching's comments on the Russo-
German war as expressed to "AM" are as follows:

The German military effort is 70 % preparation and 30% propaganda while on the Russian
side these figures are just the reverse, so there caa he little doubt as to the final issue of the war*
Germany will not penetrate deep into f^tee^/Bva:^^; ll^Il^rl^.^ her ci^i^t

will bring the war to a conclusion.

The Chungking authorities last week prohibited the showing of Charlie Chaplin's picture
"The Dictator" in Chungking and are endeavoring to maintain effective relations with Ger-
many, This action was taken upon the advice of the pro-German propagandists and SHU-
KAKA, etc. As a matter of fact, Chian Po-cheng is himself a worshiper of Germany. Germany
does not desire, as America and England do, to use China's man power and material resources
for her own benefit. If Germany is victorious, the Sino-Japanese incident will be brought to a
speedy settlement and therefore it appears thet Jse is jdlJtiing his hopes on Germany. However,
since last year T.V. Soong and Madame Chiang Kai-shek have been advocating strongly the
necessity of opposing Japan through Anglo-Russiaij B]t4 U,|S,;Russian collaboration and have
been working to that end. SMee March of this year S<^!t ^(f ^ OlIiBa l^iieen cut o&t »^
Hiete is no hope of it being resumed in the futiirfe- However, there are Hopeii of getting supplies
from Australia for the next two or three years.

The Chinese Communists have always opposed British and American imperialism bttt
now since it is manifestly impossible for Russia to oppose Germany without British and
.^nerican aid they find themselves in the same position as Chungking, dependent on Britain
and XfBe^a, send so they have had to do an about face. For instance, it is true thftt "#9 ifeay
not see a revival of the former collaboration between the Kuomintang and the Communists
but there will at least be a strengthening of their position resulting from a neutralizing in the
friction between the two partis.

The official organ of the Communists is taking a <!dnservative attitude and has made no
statement as yet (but accordii^ to a dispatch from ENAN province on the 23rd the KAIHO
NIPPO charged the Grermans with breach of faith and declared that the Germans were digging
their own graves and that ultimate victory was certain, Russian aid to China was an example
and now Chinese Communists should help the Russians in the defense of their fatherland).
There are some Communists here who say that the Russo-German war was occasioned by
the establishment of an agreement between Britain and Germany hut this is hardly credible.

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND Of PfiAiU, HARBOR

No. 913 ~~ - * -

FROM: Shanghai Ju3fte23,1941

TO* .

Received a report regarding the attitude of the Chungking government since the conclusion
of the Jap-Soviet neutrality pact, from JK, who happens to be in this city at this moment. I
am sending by air mail certain parts of this report, which may be of in^^^g^^you, particulaa^
ly as it related to the quQS^m ^ K«9IIM|#i^(lNC!oTOmunist relsticm Skd tb €|i]^a^'l 3^1^^
toward |»p«e witih Japan,

Trans. 7-1-41

No. 914

PROM: Shanghai June 16* 19*1

TO: Hsinking, Nanking and Hankow # 491.

(Circular)

Message to Tokyo # 1006.

1. It seems that since taking his post in Chungking Ambassador GAUUS has been
vestigating the relations between the Natitmaliat Party and tSe''<lSKffi.'a«fes(^^arty by listening
to the opinions of the leaders of that Government. According to HA, he has on two different
occasions recently invited SHU ON RAI" in order to get his viewpoint of the matter. Further-
more, according to AK, the Ambassador conferred wftii itOSsiatt Asttljfega^ M*'. ^T&e
latter explained that, since the conclusion of the Japanese- Soviet agreement and of the agree-
ment by the United States to grant a loan to China for the purpose of stabilizing Chinese cur-
rency, there has been a sudden intensification of suppression of the Chinese Communists, and
the anti- Communist faction within the Nationahst Party has braushi about the worst relation
between the two parties in the last four years by refusing to supply the 18th Army with military
funds and by rejecting a perfectly sincere peace ofifer made by the Chinese Communist Party.
Of course, Soviet Russia's decision of not supplying any more war materials and funds to
China has had the tendency of encouraging internal dissension in China. However, Sovist
Russia is quite willing to immediately resume her assistance to China #tfitf 'CSte«i6 ??S#9»i
alist Party would change its attitude toward the Chinese Communist Parly. (Intelligence: B)

2. AK has further informed us that the central committee of the Communist Party pub-
lished through the Shin Ka Sha* an appeal to belligerent compatriots in which the committee
severely criticized the ruthless suppression exercised by the intransigent faction of the anti-
Communist Party against the military policy, as well as the printed organs of the Party. These
anti-Communists, the appeal says, furthermore, have cancelled the number designating t&e
lath Army and are now planning to place SHU TOKU"*, HO TOKU KAT and other leaders of
the Chinese Communist Party under arrest, thus placing us under threat. Although the Com-
munist Party has been endeavoring to avoid this scat of civil storife, if self-4efenae becomes
a fleccaaity* it will HhL, tim Bmm^^ th«a eRcowrag«d ti© people t® rise up in oacder tt)

overthrow the pro-Japanese Eaction sad to iMead &e deapQftcyatic political rights cf the people.
CIat|^igeiice: A)

^^ili^ed to Ptking, Tientein, Nankijsg^ Mmkmt<, Maachojuo and I^te^Kuis^i.

"CHOI." FIN-L.'U fConiiiiunisl Leader).

'Pmbably Ambassador PANYUSHUKIN in Chungking.

'New China Agency.

'CHU TE (Communist military chief).

Trans. 6^18-41

FROM: Tokyo July 1, 1941

TO: Nanking, Hankow, Shanghai, Tientsin, PeMng and C!^antitHi # tBlSt,

(Circular)

Message from Hongkong #313, Mm
(Parti of 2)

The following are views concerning the Russo-German war.

1. While the views of the Chungking authorities are extremely optimistic, the Chinese Com-
munist Party believe that Chungking's position is a very difficult one (XYZ) . -

(1)° Lining up of Britain, the United States, and Soviet Russia, which Chungking has beeH
hoping to see for sometime, has now become an inevitable phenomenon and with it opinions
eegazding possibktfi^aiee between Britain and Germany are no longer heard. Although the
Aetii^ of the anti- Soviet elements in the United States is intense, she is strengthening her
tnllitdjry preparation against Germany, increasingly restraining France from getting closer to
Germany, and becoming more interested in joint military activity in the Far Bast. At the
same time, she may be expected to become more insistent on Japan's withdrawing from the

Axis. Although Soviet aid to China has inevitably , China has not felt the lack of it

Ulufifiielcl on the basis the situation that has been prevailing during the past several months
of stalemate, for this lack has been satisfactorily compensated for by aid given her by the
United States. This turn of affairs has also had a beneficial effect in that it facilitated the
effort of getting the Chinese Communist Party to comply with the Orders ii^ued by the Chung-
king Government. In her relations toward Germany and Italy, China may be expected tO
continue her policy of not approaching them too closely or remaining too aloof.
^|«g|*i.'^thoagh there is no doubt that by taking advantage of the weakening of the belligerent
powers Sow* Russia would win the war in the end, the war may last for a long time. There is
very little prospect of Soviet Russia's relation with the United States and Britain improving
in the future, nor can Chungking depend on the continued assistance from the United States.
Heretofore, Soviet Russia would like to see Chungking keep up her anti- Japanese resistance.
For Chungking not to make her attitude toward Germany and Italy definite at this state, is
unwise. Chungking's international position will ^ow more and more {precarious with the de-
base of aid given by Russia and with the increased effort on the part of the United States to
appease Japan, nor would friction between Chungking and the Communist Party cease, for
li8**(:^U be increasing activity by the pro-Gertnan and pro-Japanese factions within the
cioun^ and ^ ^mt^ poesibility 4q| ^)^jQ4%^o^|SK0i9ifit^^ So

Tim "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOIt

as a result of the suffering among the people due to civil war and to rise in commodity prices.
On the other hand, Japan will devote her entire etlbrt in order to bring the China incident to a
settlement. Therefore, China cannot help but realize that Japan will bring stronger political
and military pressure upon her. Furthermore, as opportunities arise, Japan, in accordance
with the spirit ol the Tripartite Alliance, will make demand on Soviet Russia for political and
economic concessions in the Far East, and she would endeavor to secure in this the tacit con-
sent of the United States and Great Britain.

°(1) appears to be the views held by l lii- Chunffkmg authorities.

'(2) appears to be tiie views lield by the leaders of the Chin^ Communist Party.

Trans. 7-10-41

FROM: Tokyo Jimel9,194l
TO: Canton #J02..

Regarding your #218.

Unlike the case of French Indo- China, we will derive little or iio benefit from sending occu-
pation troops to Macao on the pretext in question. I have #S0(fi[^«d this point with thes army
authorities here, and they are in agreement with m«, wisA have promiaed to send iwteBe^^j%»
to the military at the scene to abandon the plan.

Trans. 6-24-41

FROM: Canton June 25, 1941

TO: ■■^^^■'-v . • sm^.'

Regarding your #102'.

In accordance with^tefbu^tions issued by the Army Headquarters, our South China forces

have abandoned the occupation of Macao. It has decided, instead, to take steps desmbed in
ray message # 218 and to order the Chinese to pay $150,000 (Hongkong dollar) in fine.

'S*e 11, 916 — Army authorities are in agreement with me, that no benefit will be derived from sending occupation

TVans. 6-26-41

No. 918

Tokyo June 28, VHl

Net #1348.

(Circular)

(Message to Canton #111).

In view of the fact that considerable smuggling of goods intended to assist CHIANG KAI-
SHEK seems to be taking place at l^fifeao, will you discuss the matter with both the Army and
Navy authorities in your city and have the official who is taking the place of Consul SUKl'I in
Macao file a strong protest with the local government there requesting strict surveillance of
this activity. Will you also refer to my # 238° of last year relative to this q«estitii*t?

This miillcr hfiK already been taken up with the Army and Navy autbc^ti0§«

Please transmit this message as instructions from this Minister.

'Not available.

Trans. 7-24-41

No. 919

FROM; Shanghai June 24, 1941

W&ir -i»teoife #51S.

(Circular)

Ke my #948*. JK Intelligence.

1. KO JESf RIN, General Manager of tbe Rei Stei Sha, telk me that about 150,000 yuan'a
worth of provisions, etc., i'or the use of American aviation volunteers has been received in
Hongkong. Currently, this is being transported to the interior.

f . An advance party of six members arrived in this port about the middle of this month.
This group constitutes a portion of the American technical advisors being sent to China to
give military assistance. Chungking is dispatching a reception committee to welcome them.
»»^r»]feli^ A^^bassfldor KERR has invited Ghimese cultural leaders to a tea party m Hong-
kong. The British-American- Chinese military alliance is a fact, and should war break out in
the Pacific, this will immediately become apparent,

Iltave tz'an@ttiftted t]&^xi»^^^ltt'1^ same wmim^-m^

Trans. 6-26-41

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

FROM: Tokyo
(Ciicular)

A special Asahi telephone message from Nanking on the 24th reported that 120 recently
recruited pilots, including second generation Chinese, had been sent to Chungking and had
arrived; and that this was purportedly done as assistance for Chiang, but in reality it is for
the purpose of establishing air bases in interior China in preparation for war with Japan. We
have abeady called attention to this in our # 176 to Manila", but you will please make every
i^P^ ittiEid fiietS aitt^ conditions relative to such reports and any information bearing
on air forces in the interior, and send it al&a| 4tt jdispatcheB, even thoijgh the

information be fragmentary.

June 27, 1941

"It is reported that Major Koaroo of the U.S. aviation forces is en route Chui)|;3d!y{ via Manila and Hongkong,

Trans. 7-1^1

FROM : Shanghai July 2, ^

TO: Singapcace #531.

(Circular)

(Message to Tol^o # 1126.)

H. Q. Report.

I. In accordance with a stipulation contained in the British — United States— Clbiija three-
power military pact, BOHAMU', Commander-in-Chief of the British%r^, fe'»M*makiiif
preparations in Singapore for the organization of the general staff, consisting of officers of the
three countries. The plan is for Chungking to send a staff of seven members and station them
permanently. For the time being, they have decided to send two members. It has been decided
that one of the two should be SHO SIN* and the other member is to be selected from officers
operating in KWANGSF. Furthermore, according to the three-power military pact, British
and Chinese forces, as well as the American and British air and naval forces, are to be jointly
responsible for the defen.se of YUNAN^ KWEICHOW^, KWANGSf, BURMA, MALAY, and
the THAIESE border. In casp the Jj^pnew Aijajr diould advance southward from the bases
in French Indo-China, the CMnfeile eetrtral fewfe Iw KWANGSI and YUNAN is to be placed
under the British command for attacking the Japanese forces from the rear. At the same time,
CHUNGKING is to sand an additional force of 60,000 picked troojia to MALAY and the
THAIESE border. - ^

2. SHU SI JYU, Chief of the branch of the Chungking Aviation Commission,

recently arrived in MANILA; also MQ HO SHQ, a member of. the same organization is to
arrive in Singapore in the near futurfe. 'Thelif mteskietl S to ^«a^ 's(^Eth British and 'j^M^^ti
aviation authorities on a plan for constructing at five different places in KWEICHOW, YUNAN,
and KWANGSI, air bases to be used jointly by the three powers. Accompanied by a special-
ist in the construction of air bases who represents the British and American air faces, the

afflnementioned two Chinese officials will first return to on the 11th, and on abfiWlt the

1^ SsiU proceed to KWEIYANG'' and commence the work of constructing the bases.

^Wh the 22nd, the U.P, reported that 100 American airplanes had reached China. The
^anghai Times reported that 50 airplanes of the Curtiss A -4 10 type had recently arrived at
RANGOON and will shortly be shipped to CHUNGKING. It also said that 50 other airplanes
are expected to reach RANGOON in the near future and that there exists a secret under-
standing between the United States and China, according to which the United States will aid
in the expansion of the Chinese air forces, and China would allow the United States in case
of an emergency to use air bases in Chiiia,

"Kana spelling.

*Kana spelling for SHANG CHKN, military inspector tat Chuagkiug Gcw^snuti^.

'Chineae provinces.

'Capital of Kweiehow Ptbvince,

Trans.

No. 922

mSM: Shanghai
TO: Tientsin

(Circular)

The highest defense tribunal of the Chungking Government met and passed a proposal
made by KO SHO KF, GO TETU JO*, and others for adopting parallel diplomatic policies
toward Germany, So^tB&ssia and Britain, and the government is having the Foreign Policy
Association strongly propagandize the inevitability of the policy. It is thought that this will
deal a severe blow to the idea of "ABC" {alliance ?), which is being advocated by KAKU
TAIKI".

June 16, 1941
#489.

"KUNG HSIANG- HSI (Member of the Central Executive Yuan)

'WU TIEH-CHE N G { Member of the Central Executive Yuan mid forme* (?) Mayor of Silai^aJ)
'Probably America— Britain — China

No. 923

W^&U: Tokyo July 5, 19*1

TO: Nanking, Shanghai. Canton, Peking # 1437.

(Circular)

Message from Hongkong # 322.

According to information which HYO SI CHO got from DAI KO HO, bombers supplied by
the United States (the number of machines is not known but I think they are the 10 Boeing

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

cases and 220 trucks {the Fords mentioned in my # SIS^ will reach Rangoon sometime between
July 15 and 20 on board a steamship belonging to the Ford Company. The bombers are to be
sent into the interior as they are. The trucks will be assembled in Rangoon and will leave
that towa^ *he «^ Jtlly ocr abdut t^e middle of August after M^ loaded with £rei^>
The Chungking authorities are quite anxious that this war material is shipped safely and
have sent MO HO SHO to Singapore to discuss plans with British and American officials.
I understand ^&mt '^ime ar« points in this information which coincide with wh^t Milli
confidentially told by PA to a mmimt^&^«ta& ivmjfmdim this tot^gmiafye^isix^^.

"Not available.

'See Q, 884 which atateft the United States had been, asked to furnish SOO

Tfms, 7-15-41

No. S24

FROM: Shanghai July 9, 1941

TO: Nanking and Hongkong; #1^6^ -

(Circular)

Action Tokyo m # L218.
Dispatch from "JK" (8th).

(1) With pretext of giving aid to China, the United States is building many air bases in
various southwestern provinces (in China) and has furnished 200 planes for the purpose
of guarding the Burma Road traffic and also to establish air service linking Rat^^oa, Singa-
pore, and the PhiHppines in compe#^imi$lt^^^ei^l^i|{ii^^ ^ --^

The similar spec ial Asahi dispatch ^■'ilk^^pm^^'^^^^^^^^^-^'}'' ^» fthfeady
been reported in my message # 895*.

(2) Regarding the activities ef the British-Chin^ joint special service organs at Hongkong,
Rangoon, and Singapore, it has been decided to confer with IBUNSU and TARYU of the
Hongkong police department regarding suitable plan to be taken.

"See H, 920. It is reported that 120 Chinese pilots have be«n sent to Chungking ostensibly as assistance for
Chiang, but in reality, for the purpose of establishini; air baara in interior China in preparation for war on Japan. Please
check up and wire detail?.

'Not available.

Trans. 7-15-41

No. 925

FROM: Peking

TO: Nankiiig and Shanghai

(Circular)

Message to Toljyo # 41 J.

June 24, 1941

On the 23rd, First Chief Secretary SMYTHE of the American Embassy here in Peking,
together with Commercial Attache BUTRICK, who is SMYTHE's successor, came to call on
me, the one to siay farewell, and the other to present his salutations. At that time, BUTRICK

A-483

told me that recently he and AMBASSADOR GAUSS had gone to Chungking, and af^
remaining there for a short time, he alone returned to Peldng, He went on to say
Ambassador GAUSS will comt back to Peking some tim,e in Novmber, but whether 1^
■would stay for some time or not, he did not know. BUTRICK said that he wasn't sure -but that
fee, too, might be going to Chungking from time to time.

Now, SMYTHE will leave Peking around the 29th, returnii^ to his own country by way of
Shanghai, so he said.

I have isent this mes^ge to Nanking, Shanghai, and Tientsin.

Trans. 6-27-41

IBOM: Hankow June 4, 1941

According to informfftitm obtained by oof ififepm# <Bfftriin)j the Msfecwctions issued by th6
American Ambassador at Chungking, on the 1st of this month, to all the American consuls
in the Japanese occupied territc^ in China, on the occasion of President Roosevelt's son's
%3 Chungkfi^ Jfi«l>t*sed to CMmit Kftf-shek k plsfi te eetiiftffeb -fetf- Tfit^^^tiMf
league of propaganda organs.

The plan for the above organ calls for economic and t«clmical contributions on the part
ot the United States, Great Britain, France, China and all tliiS-ftfeB governments of Europe,
Chunf^king government has agreed to this plan.

Agencies are to be established at Vancouver, Bombay, Honolulu, Burma, and Kumning,
and experts, certified by the League are to be sent out to carry on this work. The purpose
of the propaganda organ is to direct ett'ective propaganda, championing the principle of freedom,
in order to counter the Axis propi^anda efforts in South America, South and Western Asia and
AMcfl. . . .

Consuls are instructed to collect useful propagajj^tll^aterial and information In the
territory under Japanese political control and trans^lfeJ'Sfeaa direct to the Embassy, also

IVans. 6-^20-41

No. 927

fWOU: Tokyo July 24, 1941

"WaBWijg^ #399,

# ISIB from Shanghai 1

It seems to me that lately CHIANG KAI SHEK had a number of graduates ot foreign
schools, well- versed in international affairs, go to the United States, together with CHIN
something-or-other and LIN something- or -other, members of the Blue Shirt organization.
Their principal task is to engage in propaganda and intelligence work. Before they were
sent, the Government of the United States formulated a joint policy with Chim^'king and
Organized a collaborative Chinese-American propaganda association witii htjadquarters in

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEAKL HARBOR

of the staff of the IntelHgence Section and preemin^tfe leporters of the various telegraph and
pcepp ^^iipciations. Admiral YARNELL also ig a member. The Chinese membershiij
^ the whole staff of tht Chinese Embassy in Washington, the special correspon-
dents of the Central Chinese News Agency, UN KF and LIN YU TANG. They are to work out
ways and means of dealing with all phases of the Far Eastern situation and to exchange
intelligences between the United States and China.

°Kana spelling of Chinese name.

m.m -

FROM: Tokyo June 2, 1941

TO: Sbfti^t^

For your own offices intelligence and et^H^^ienmenl expenses for this fiscal year, we have
appropriated 620,000 yen, for your special agents we have appropriated 540,000 yen (of which
600,000 yen are for JK's special activities and which we are sending direct to Shanghai) (sic)
making a total of 1,160,000 yen. You know that nowadays we have to economize all we can
and it was only after considering how important intelli^nce work in your city is that we
igsl,i^«l;#i#taiJ^ $^imf so. in •■mm '^B m^fm^ W^ this money as wisely as

Trans. 6-4-41

No. 929

FROM: Shanghai June 23, 1941

TOt Nanking #512.

(Circular)

Action Tokyo as # 1068.

Rojibi ( ), a member of the Blue Shirt (Planyisha) special activities group, was

caught by the gover^M£^t In HongkDttf the ol communicating to Chief Engineer?
Okubo in Macao, intercepted messages from Chungking, was questioned, but escaped; how>
ever, during the inquiry the officials ascertained that he was receiving large subsidies for
this activity from Japanese sources.

The Chungking headquarters dispatched the director of their military jurisidiction depart-
ment, Yuchorin { ), to see the British Ambassador, mA &Ojn him learned the details

on this Japan^e activity.

Fl^aae s^d a suitabledi^tch on this matter ir^ ^^^af |e» Wf^&^t

No. 930

FROM: Shanghai Junel6,lWl *

TO: Tokyo #998.

(Parti of 2)".

When Mr. IWAI* visited Japan not long ago, he discussed by word of mouth with an official
in charge in our department the education and methods of employ of certain Chinese now
cooperating with us in our newly organized political investigations group, whom we are
planning to send to the South Seas. We had planned to have the Nanking Government

subsidize the woA, ft€t nnm Mr. IWAI returned, the atmosphere has feeccniie

quite confused, so we have decided to establish an independent institution called the JIKYO
GAKUSHA (Self-strength School), and to proceed with our plans to begin instruction. {The
Embassy was of the opinion that we should carry on absolutely secret instruction, but
hayt j)^de@^ mm bem ^Med ^ h«ng out a. shis^.)

"Part 2 t)f'2 not available,
'Stationed at Hongkong.

Trans. 6-23-41

No. 931

FROM: Shanghai June 16, 1941

r«rtlof2".

J^ecently having secured the cooperation of certain of my Chinese associaies in my
political investigation group, we have decided to establish here a school called the TZU
CHTANG (Japanese: JI KYO (Self-strength) Institution, and to begin instruction. In so
doing, it is our intention to organize and educate men under the supervision of otKcers
connected with out department, men who can help us deal with the South Seas question
which has lately become urgent, and who will cooperate with us in our activities among the
Chinese in the South Seas. (They will be our spies in peace time, and when war breaks out we
will convert them into our fifth columuistsj With a view to bringing about the success of our
machinations, from among the thir^ students feP $X9t is^e^^, w# will use twenty to
educate other you*)» ISIiriese. Ihsm w^u^ted wll! «Kcteb in and — and Macao to
select students.

■p«t |1#2 available, under study.

Trans; #-2t-4l

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF FEABh HARBOR

No. 932

FROM: Shanghai June 16, 1941

Cia^l^^ipottgkoi^g, Swatao, Amoy # 4^

To Tokyo #1000.

Part 2 0f 2.

For tiie lequirements for matriculation, consult my separate Circular #488° and the
appended (kscription of the TZU CHI'IANG School. 1 want you also to consult Mr. YUAN
SHU who, I understand, is soon going to your place. We have had relations with him for ten
years. Under our leadership he was a key man in the establishment of the new regime. At
present he is a lieutenant in the Kuo Min Tang, Vice-Chief of the Society of New China, If he does
not visit your place, however, I would like for yon please to consider having me send you
some ambitious youth who is interested in the project. Of course, this whole project will be
under our leadership, and we will foot all the bills. However, on the surface it must appear
to he a school, purely Chinese in naturei. devoted to instroction in business, ooinmerce, etc.

"Sw 11,933,

Trans, 6-23-41

No. 933

FROM: Shanghai June 16. 1941

TO: Batavia and Singapore #

Details concerning the matriculation of students at the JIKYO GAKUSHA:

1. Young Chinese aged from 18 to 25 who, either at home or abroad, have graduated from
higher and secondary schools or who have the equivalent education and who are!''^t^<^l^^
the right ideology. (We have entrance examinations, but ^oae whom the coagnk in the
places in question choose we will exempt illi that jpwup,)

2. The students will be only men.

3. The course will be for one year, but those of excellent record may finish sooner. The
specific work of each student will be determined by the officials of the school in cooperation
with ourselves.

4. Matriculation fees, laboratory fees, and books will all be bcsrafe hy the school, and we will
give each student 30 yuan for pocket money each month.

5. There will be two dates for the examinations, August 10th arid 20th'.

6. The last date for written applications will be August 14. Furthermore, with the vnitten
application there must be four card photographs of the bust, diplomas from the primary and
secondary schools, and a list of marks and credits. Furthermore, each application must be
accompanied by a fee of 5 yuan.

7 . We will furnish third class railway fare to Shan^BsS.
(Strictly secret).

Trans, 6-23-41

A-487

MM

♦i^bSll^ My 16, 1941

TO: Tokyo #im

Re your # 688° to the Officer in Charge of Far Eastern Affairs.

1, Now that our policy toward concessions has brought on an increasingly delicate situation,
f watfl^' 'like to ask the Foreign Ofl3ce to reconsider in the light of the new situation the
possibility of supplying suitable personnel for the Secret Service.

2. If it is impossible to do so, there is ttO way but to df(<;ide on a personnel upon considera-
tion after comparing the peraOn{s) BaeiitioBed ill y&ur telegifaSa with the candidate from the
Army {Colonel SAITO). In the light of the fact that what is described in my telegram # 1178" had
taken place between the Army and this office, it would be wise to leave the decision entirely
up to the central authorities. The Army has been notified to this effect. (Is the opinion
expressed in your telegram one based on a conversation you had with the Army authorities
after comparing our candidates with tho^ of the Army? I wo\»id like to know this.)

% jftssofar as I am concerned, I kho^HjM^g of WATA16%' qualifications (it has since come
tO' ©IJS knowledge that he is the younger brother of Colonel WATARI in this city, who is a
'tt^^tfff officer of the NOBORI Detachment). We are not sure of his being comparable to
C^cmel ^AlTO i^ho % a stodeM of foreign languages and a man of a diplomatic type,
having a vague idea of things), and yet it would hardly seem that he is the highest I^Bifial
may be sent from the civiHan brancil<rf1^gpyepi«eii^. Tbisisfpr yow information.

4. I unlttted that in Id Ibft^^ 11^^^^, tli^ other candidates for the

swvice who are already in — — - studying.

%935

EiROM: Canton July 21, 1941

TO: Shanghai # 54 or # 56.

Re your # 29.

As a result of confidential contacts with Chinese connected with this office, eight Chinese
have been selected as being of superior merit from among over 200 applicants. They will be
sent on the Suzan Maru leaving here about the 28th of this month. We are endeavoring to
find two more by that time. The boat fare will be advanced by this officf .

Trans. 7-29-41

FROM: Shanghai July 7, 1941

TO: Net #551.

Action Tokyo as # 1 195.

According to "HQ" the Chinese Communists in Enan received instructions from the
Third International on June 19th. Again on July 2nd, they received telegraphic instructions

A^88

THE "MAaiC" BACKGROUND OF BEABh iiABBOR

to cooperate with Sinkiang province and Outer Mongolia in forming a revolutionary shock
committee. (The Committee to be composed of three members from the Chinese Communists,
two members frpm^ Sinkiang province and two members from Outer Mongolia), under the
ehairmanship of MOTAKUTO (Mao Tse-tung) with headcjuartets at Enan but with plana to
move to URANBATORU in the near ftjtute.
The gist of the instructions follows:

1. The Central Revolutionary Military Committee of the Chinese Communists is to be
dissolved when the necessity arises and a joint J^ationaJiist-GoBamunifrt miiitaify ctiUaboration
is to be negotiated.

2. The Chinese Communist Red army is to be fitted out within a month with new equip-
ment. In this Chungking is to cooperate and the Soviet Ambassador in "UG" (URAN*
BATORU ?) will take the responsibility to promote good relations with Chiang Kai-shek,

3. Before effecting the agreement for collaboration between the Nationalists and the
Communists, the Communists have prepared for the withdrawal of a large part of the Com-
munist army in Central China and thus the way is paved for an amelioration of tl^ out-
standing difficulty in the collaboration between the Nationalists and the Committee .

Trans. 7-11-41

No. 937

FROM: Shanghai
TO: Peking, Tientsin, Hsinking

(Message to Tokyo P1252.)

The following is a report submitted by "HQ":

The third Intmnatidnal is^ at present organizing a Far Eastfem G'iniftclf'fof Revolutionaj^
Offence with MO TAKU TO" as its chairman and with representatives of onter Mongolia, of
Sinkyo' and of the Northeastern Volunteer Corps, (10 from the Communist party; 5 frQim
outer Mongolia and Sinkyo and 9^e6m ilw Nortlj»^9l«m Vol as participatiilg^

members. This Council consists of four sections; namely. Political, Organizational, Economic
iand Military, It is in touch with every — — in China and is planning to assist the Chungking
Regimeas well ag to cooperate with it. • - «•

The Organizational section is absorbing men and women in inner Mongolia, Neika'.
Sinkyo, Seikai'', and Tibet and is engaged in instructir^ them and organizii^ them into
armies.

The Economic Section is responsible for raising funds for this purpose.

The most important section is the Military Section, headed by RYU HAKU SEF. The
plan of the Third international is to have these armies, placed under the command of Red
Army ofiicers, organized into twelve shock columns (Consisting of 60,000 mtn, of which

(1) one column is a chemical detachment which is expected to have 6,000 members. The
Plan further has in view the esftsblishment of Ife'tiaining camps in UranbatOTu'. Enan'',
etc., with Soviet specialists in chemical warfare in charge of them. It is said that by October,
2,000 persons and by May of next year, 4,000 persona will complete their training.), to have
them get behind the lines of the Japanese forces, in four provinces in both Northern China
and Northeastern China for the purpose of engaging in chemical partisan war. They will also
burn up materials belonging to the Japanese Army and destroy military facilities as well;

(2) 3 columns, consiBting of about 16,000 members, will not take direct part in the warCaafe,

July li,mi
#574.

A-489

but will cooperate with the operations of the out® Mongolian Red Army, the Communist
Army, the Northeastern Volunteers and with the Shock Troops of the aforementioned'
Council in communication, transportation, and relief activities; and (3) 8 columns, consisting
of 40,000 members of Shock Troops will take part in partisan susntste and, in cooperatiliA-
with the outer Mongolian Red Army, they will create disturbances in the rear of the Japanese
forces.

Furthermore with regard to the organization of this Council, Soviet Ambassador PA' has
promised the Chungking Government that the troops will not take an active part in the
territories under the jurisdiction of that Government and he has, by this promise, succeeded
in winning tacit consent of CHIANG KAI-SHEK. The Council is also asking BA KO XI?,
the Governor of Neika, to act jointly with it. It is maintaining connections with the Grand
Alliances for N ational Salvation in Hongkong and also with CHIN KA KO as well,

®elay«d to Nmiking, Hsinking, — — , Hmgkmg. ^

'MAO TSE^TUNG, CommandBr Communist Army. 'Sinchang Province.

TSiingsia. « »

'Chinghai.

'Probatily LRi PO-CHK\'G, Chief of Staff of Commuiiii^iflmies,
'U!an Bator (Urga), Mongolian Republic,
'Unidentified.
"Shensi Province.

'Abbreviation tePAHI JUSHUKIN.

'U» BUNG'KtSt @»iawi6f 15& Semte Amj^ ,

(Mess^e to Tokyo # 1429.)
HQ report.

1, Most of the detachments under RYU HAKO SYO" belonging to the 119th Division of the
Chinese Communist Army have been transferred to Suihoku, This was done in compliance
with an order issued by the Soviet Red Army and with Chungking's tacit consent. It is

thought that the Chinese Communist Army will, in the future, be

Bed Army. After returning about the middle of August from the conference to be held in
Chita, RYU will probably endeavor to extend his influence with this in view. It is also
expected that arms and ammuJMtion for the new and enlarged army will be supplied from
Outer Mongolia.

2. Part of the JO KO ZEN* detachment and several hundred members of the Communist
Youth shock troops are attending to the transportation of arms and ammunition from Soviet
Russia along the Sen Hoku-Sinkyo' route. It is expected that by the end of August forces of
the Chinese Communist Army which will be engaged in this sort of transportation will
number 4,500 men.

•LIU PO-CHAO.

•HSU HSIANG'CHIEN, Command^ <tf the a»d Cofmmmufit Ann^f .

Trans. 8-14-41

No, ns

FROM: Shanghai
TO: Net

At^t 2, 1941
#674.

A-490

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PJSAMj HAJRBQR

No. 939

FROM: Peking Ai«Htefc<, 1^1

TO; Tokyo and Tientsin #397 -

As regards our policy concerning the Kailan coal mines, the local army and liaison office
regard it as very important. Especially this is so because there are proofs to show that the
Communist Party is active and making plans among the workers. Since it would be a serio^^
thing, indeed, should by some means the operation of the mine be halted, they are makin]^
every effort to direct those who are in charge of (especiaUy with regard W treatment of tJlft
workers) and guarding the mine. Several days ago the Chief (rf the' ^SSffl^ Section *rf litt
staff of the local army W^«e3ii& iQt lie Mwm «it^l^M£ Maison with the detackmwt there &od
with thc^ in control.

Trans. 8-27-41

No. 940

FROM: Tokyo July 8, 1941

TO: Nanking, Hankow, Canton, Tientsin, Peking, Hsinking. # 1453.

Received from Hongkong as # 323, 5 July.

(Abstract)

Newspapers report that President Roosevelt is sending Latimore to the Chungking
g(fiS«rMef>friB*"«ff-iSclvi8er.

According to "XYZ", high officials of the Chungking: fSi^inent &te displeft^ with
his appointment as he lacks experience in political matters, etc.

Trans. 7 -14-41

No. 941

FROM: Tokyo July 19, 1941

TO: Net #1565.

(Received from Hongkong as # 356) .

The local Chinese newspapers report that Latimore will go to Chungking on the 19th.
Since his arrival in Hongkong on the 15th, ht has been continuously entertained, first by

the Governor General, then the Pacific International Society, representatives of

Chiang Kai-shek, the Central China Propaganda agency, the Third International, and
various other supporting groups. On each and every occasion he has spoken words of
flattery for Chungking. However, according to XYX, Chungking fears that Latimore
wUl be used by the Communists jind the Third Internationale. (According to KC, Chiang

Kai-shek has wired to TOKENKO_regarding Latimore's immediately ). Immediately

9&m Xia^ofe's arrival TEISOHAO published an article in GAiSEnOBANPO regarding
the mi^mmmA'» ^^i^fl^l^^ #1 llt|llcniifll»S^ l^m^ fi^*^ ^^'^ Latimoa^'s

not intexferi^ mi^ tkt ChmgTMgm^ifmmi^^^

A-491

He went on to say further that Latimore's knowledge or understanding of China's affairs
was very meager and warned that caution would have to be exercised in the future.

H^ever, L.j|i4mQre pead little attention to the above. He attended a round table conference
i^eit^iS^'l^^ii^^ and appeared to give audience to vdfeiat they adwcttled

'Wot aviutebl©.

Trans. 7-31-41

No. 942

FROM: Shanghai August 2, 1941

TO: Hankow, Nankfa^^ Bi^i^Edoi "Eieiat^ili # 070.

Message to Tokyo as # 1424.

Aceofrding to HQ, LATIMORE, upon arriviW at Cfccffl^ing ^dfaastged opionions with

GAUSS and Fox and then emphasized that for the strengthening of China in accordance
with the previous agreement, it would be necessary to partially reorganize the Chinese

No. 943

ffe£fti?t T?B^CMatfiWM£a) June 4, 19^1

TO: Singapore #144.

Secret «ei^cte^Bt^artmeiit.

Re your #252".

In the Home Office with regard to thfi securing of visas which are currently pending, it is
going to be necessary to give priority to Home Ofhce Staff members. Inasmuch as IWATATE's'
visa application is of considerable long standing, we are wondering whether we should have
HAROLD FUJII, SAGARA's additional successor, remain in this office for the time being or,
in view of IWATATE's status as an extra official having aroused much question, we are
wondering whether it wouldn't be better to make application for visa as a press correspondent
attached to your office. Domei is understood to be corsidering the advisability of can-
celling this man's application and dispatching another successor. Please wire me immed-
iately your view on this matter.

"Not available.

^Recentljr ^Igtied as '*«x,tta ^etusisry" to Singapore.

Tx^m, 6-10-41

A-492

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 944

F&^m^ 'Peking Junel41&4l
Beyoui #61",

We have been giving information on the general situation to newspapermen here on condi-
tion that they would not publish it and would keep it to themselves. We have done so in hopes
of promoting among them a cl^er conception of the situation. The Domei wire in question
was sent after altering it to suit their own conveneience and without our permission infor-
mation which was supplied by us. We immediately called together the reporters concerned
and warned them against mch mistreatment. We wUl especially be careful hereafter in
dealing with newspapermen.

Relayed to Tokyo.

"See n,

Trans. 7-23-41

No. 945

FROM: Shanghai June 23, 1941

TO: Singapore, Haukow, Tientsin, Peking #510.

ActaoftTdtyo as '

A very disrespectful article was pubHshed in the June 21 issue of the "China Weekly
Review" on page 83.

Trans. 7-J-41

No. 946

FROM: Tokyo July 16, 1941

TO: Canton #289.

The group of reporters to attend the meeting in Canton composed of 23 people (some to join
en route) has changed its original schedule and will sail from [.'jina on the Government ship
"Naminoue." On the 27th, it will sail from Takao" on the "Amerika Maru", arriving at Canton
on the 29th (or 30th). The Japanese announcement has been drawn up as follows: "To increase
cooperation among agencies guiding public opinion in or^^ JBay estabhah a sphere

of CO- prosperity in East Asia, our declaration and proposals are nowh^lng prepared/'

The matter of the Government ships is the strictest of secrets.

"City inS.W. Formosa.

A-493

No. 947

li(OM: Canton July22, 194f "

TO: Hsinking #133.

M«fia®fe to T^kyo #273

Preparations for the newspaper conference to be held here have been made by the Prepara-
tions Committee which is made up of representatives from both Japanese and Chinese
newspapers and which is headed by the Chief of the Canton Province. Since the arrival
several days ago of KAKU SHU HO, the Vice Chief of the Publicity Department, thanks
to his liaison activity, various plans have been rapidly formulated and a program for the
*SttsSSt«ftll'*RtW "been on the whole completed. (I am sending the program by air). Chief of the
Publicity Section, RIN", will act as Chairman of this conference. On the first day, the
head of the People's Government will attend the conference at an appointed time and deliver
an address. I understand that they intend to ask the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister
to send telegrams of congratulations from the Japanese Government. However, it has not
yet been decided whether to request also the Chief of the Infonnation Section and the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army to wire congratulatory messages. (It is expected that tele^^
grams will be received from &g.j^te Minister of Manchuk.ua and fi?om the Foreign Mintstea*
of the Chinese Government.)

I understand that arrival is expected of the 23 Japanese representatives by

the (Rukusef?) Maru, and of the 7 Manchukuoan representatives and the 20 Central China
representatives by the Taichu Maru, which is leaving Shanghaijon the 21st. It is said the
tetfl^ntatives of North China will in the near future arrive by ship, but due to the fact that
there are only three pari^i^rii.if©^ North China, those concerned with^the trntetm^ feel
It strange.

UNPAI-SHENQ.

Ttemu 7-25-41

FROM Tokyo
TO: Shanghai and Canton

(Secret outside the Department)

With a view to starting a first-class Chinese language newspaper under the operation
SosAe Chinese living in Saigon, will you please look for a suitable person and wire me
wishes and opinions together with information regarding his bac^oiind. It wUl filno 1^
necessary to find a staff which would work with the newspaper publisher.

TVans. 8-6-41

August 2, 1941
# 1720.

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND QF HARBOR

mm '

flClil: Peking Julyl4,194i

Net #.m

Secret 6uteide the DepartmeM.
Re ray # 290*.

According to HAYASI, who has been working in TAIGHEN* until July 11, on this question
ever since he had left this city together with the Bureau Chief TANAKA on June 30 because

is ill with typhoid, YEN', SO FUKU SIN°, and RYU KITI HO' came to TAIGEN and

negotiated with Bureau Chief TANAKA, and as a result agreed on the following:

A, The SANSEI Army will itself bring about law and order in SANSEI'' (please refer
to my 259'). (1) The Sansei Army will be increased to 300,000 and Japan will, throagh
Nanking, furnish it with funds, arms, and ammunition. (2) After this matter has been agreed
upon, it will arrange an armistice with the Japanese authorities.

B. Upon the conclusion of an armistice agreement, an announcement will be made, in th#
name of YEN SHAKU SAN, on opposition to communism and for cooperation in the
establishment of a new order in the Far East. Simultaneously it will announce its discoix-
nection with Chungking and urge comrades to join them. The representatives agreed to
submit to Japan on the aforementioned conditions. On account of inadequate means of trans-
portation, it has been agreed that the agreement will be signed in TAIGEN three weeks later.
Bureau Chief TANAKA expects to go to Shanghai tomorrow, the 15th, to report this matter
to the central authorities. It has been decided that CHO KUO JU* and 0 SEI KOKU'
lepresenti^ the Sansei Authorities; and WAT AN ABE, Chief of Staff ci the Army p northern
China, Of twili^TSU, Coramander of the 1^

°Noft Available.

*Kana spelling far YANGBU, dty teSlN^Sff Swvijiefe.
Unidentified.

''Kana spelling fur SHAN SI Province.

'Regarding visit uf First Chief Secretary of the American Embassy and the Commercial Attache.

Trans. 7-29-41

No. S50

FROM: Peking July 14, 1941

TO: Net #302,

(Circular)

(Part 2 of 2).

(Message to Tokyo # 455) ,

2, Furthermore, YEN has requested: A. That a credit be arranged to back up 30,000,000
yuan worth of ciarency pi^Hi^js^tlS'^^ Pixwince.

A-495

B. The return «f ^'te;^)^ «@tsbH|}i^«q^ Csiansgeci by the Ax^l l»Bl^ei|^Bi M
SHAKUSAN",

C. TheTetum to Sansei Province of the 13 establishments of YEN HOKU*.

To this Bureau Chief TANAKA replied that although A and B may be discussed, it would
be impossible to realize C bfcaus§ of the lelstions maintained with the MO KYO' Govern-
ment. YEN agreed to this.

3. YEN SHAKU SAN is now having the Sansei Army's arsenal which is now located in

SIAN moved to Sansei and is having families removed from SISEN"*. He is also taking

steps to organize a larger army by sending representatives to SENSEF and SANTO' for the
purpdae. Furthermore, agents of U GAKU CHU* and of other generals have been secretly sent
to TAJGEN. They have requested that they be allowed to do likewise in the event that YEN's
negotiations with the Japanese are a success; at least there are various rumors to this elfect.
In consideration of the effect it might have on Chungking, it has been decided after a confer-
ence between TANAKA and RYU that the negotiations be reported to have ended in a failure.
This message has been transmitted to ONANGO and SHANGHAI. Please transmit it to
{longkonf.

'iJnideii i.ifisd.

° Waino-Mongolia Administrative Province",
^ Kana speUiu* for SEECHWAN.
'Kanaspelling for SHENSL
'in Shantung Province.

'Kana spelling for YU HSUEH-CHUNG, Governor of Hopeh Province; member of Nationalist Government Mili-
tary CkuBinittee. • -

Trans. 7-29-41

W^Ui Tokyo July 22, 1941

TtJ: Nanking # 305.

(Sep ara te Te le^am ) .

The recent change in the Japanese Government was made with the object of more vigorously
GSiTyuig out our national policy and coping with #e WMiii sitesS^R 1^ tapidly teorge£MHg
and strengthening our internal organization. As you already know from announcements made
ttie Imperial Government, this ia the reason for our having altered our cabinet. It goes with-
out saying that our foreign policy has not been changed in the least nor our traditional policy
toward your country, nor has the intimate relation between your country and ours, which was
strengthened by your recent visit to Japan, been affected in the least, I trust that, bearing this
in mind, you will courageously strive toward the realization of stability in the Far E^t, I wish
to add that 1 am resolved to cooperate with added elfort on the basis of the sacred pled|^e we
made to the end of bringing about increasing progress and power to your country.

Trails. 7^2i5-4l

A-496

TiiE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 952

FROM; Shanghai
(Circular)

The followmg h M0rmf0^^^^m frcwa HQ:

CHIANG KAI-SHEK has appointed CHIN SEF as Commander in Chief of Ten, Kin, Etau
and Sho. At the same time he has abolished the rear guards at Konmei^ and Keirin^ as well

as the organizations in Kei and Suiseiko. Thus, he has decided to organize rear guards

for the southwest at Kiyo'' and has appointed KARU SU KI' at the head of them. All this has
been done for the purpose of effecting unity under joint command of CHIN and KAHU of the
armies in the five districts of Ten, Kei, Kin, Etsu, and Sho, and to coordinate the activities of
the miscellaneous forces, thus preparing for a future attack on Thailand and French Indci-
China, as well as joint action by Chinese and British armies. At the present time, KA YI is
placed in charge of organizing rear guards at Kiyo. It is said that seven British oiScers lead by
Major FUDO' are in that city and cooperatiagwitll KAYI.

Rglay to and Hoi^kong.

Julys, 1941

°Chen Chen— Com. 14th Div.
^Kutigming, in YunanPiw^mtW.
"KlMulin, in Kwangai Province.
*Kweiyang, in Kweichow Province.

'Pai C h ung- h =i . Mem ber of Central IkMfUtKft Y\X9A $D.€ CoHimittae iaehm^ fiJt&f S»W, teoi^.

'Probably the name "HOOD".

*ftob«hlf Hflia Wei, f^mmxaiet oCtheKmi^ Ams$,

TrAns.?-!!--*!

No. 953

FROM: Shanghai July U, 1941

TO: Peking #576.

(Circular)

Message to Tokyo # 1255.

According to HQ, one division of the Kansii Army under KA YI', 8,000 spetcial duty troops;
and the Ko Ki Sho* Division of appr6ximate% f ,000 'mt^^Mi the Keirin' barracks have
received secret orders to quietly move into Burma between July 7th and 20th. Furthermore', in
order to form a second line, Chungking is planning to move into that country by the end of
September the army which has heen in southern Konan^ and which is under direct'''iefeS'^^
that Government. Relative to these moves. Great Britain is now negotiating with Chungking
for transference to the Chinese Army the responsibiUty of defending the areas concerned. Since
this question involves both political and economic matters, and therefore, is a difficult t»ie tef

come to an agreement on, CHIANG KAI-SHEK i.s having KE TSU make a study with

the Military Attache of the British Embassy in hopes of coming to an agreement. Chungking
has also issued instructions to Rt SAI SIN* and KO KYOKU SHO', who have been making a

A~497

secret inspection cohcerned, to submit proposals Cor a satiafactoiy settlement

°Hsia Wei-Commander of the Kwangsi Army.
'Huang Chi-Hsiang, formerly Commander of the Kwantung Army.
'KweiliiiPTovince. ^
Hunan l^ovmce.

'Li Chi-Shen, Military Inspector, Member of Central Executive Yuan.
'Huang Hsu-Chu, Governor of Kwangsi Province, Com, of the 15tlt Mmy.

Trans. 7-23-41

No. 954

FROM; Shanghai
TO: Net

July 26, 1941
#627.

(Circular) '

(Message to Tokyo # tft^l

1. Relative to the issuance of the order by the United States for freezing of Japanese funds,
at the behest of the army all officials concerned met in a conference on the 26th. The measures
adopted by the liaison committee of the Far Eastern Reconstruction Bureau on July 21 were
made the subject of the discussion. As a result, it was decided that further study should be
made of Measure # 1; namely, a plan to enlarge upon and strengthen the method of adjusting
export firpm China to the third countries, a plan which thij| proposed after the shipment

mff^&d for aiding CHIANG had come to a stop and whJ<Si was still being studied. .Al-
though Measure #2, namely the confiscation of the property belonging to Americans and
also a limitation of special commercial dealings, may not be very effective, the Financial
Section of the Army has been drawing up definite plans having to do with the application in
China of the measures to be published by Financial Officials and which had originated in the
Ministry of Finance, and the section has also been thinking of ways to strengthen the control
over removal of materials. It was decided to bring the results of these studies to this office on
the 29th and to draw up measures applicable to the area concerned by further dlscussi^ of
these plans and th^n to submit them to the central authorities,

2. We are afraid t%iat retaliations on our part will call forth further retaliations and, the!re-
fore, strongly advocate that all measures to be taken in the area concerned should be taken
only upon instructions from the central authorities and that it would be necessity to apply
them in the best possible way.

The Army and Navy authorities as well as the Far Eastern Reconstruction Bureau and
Financial Officials have all been apprised of these steps several days ago, but we have not been
informed of them at all. This may have been due to some mistake. However, we would like to
piceive information as soon as possible in the future in regard to such matters. Furthermore,
will you from time to time wire me instructions which 1 should keesp in mind in reference to
this question?

Trans. 7-28-lt

A-498

ism *'Mkmi^ mimmmm

No. 955

FROM;^ Shanghai
TO: ' ^Witsm and Nanking

(Circular)

The following is the gist of observations made by local Japanese banking circlee relative to
the re(.'eiU f reezing of funds.

1. From the very first FOX has advocated the effective use of Chinese stabilizing fiinds and
that for the purpose cf reconstructing Chungking's financial position it is necessary to quickly
revise the freezing of both Japanese and Chinese assets. When on a chance visit to Shanghai
a few days ago, HENCHMAN, the manager of the Shanghai -Hongkong Bank, gave him every
support in the above contention. Recently FOX hf^ been urging the United States to make
the move immediately and it is believed that be (POX) was chiefty reapondbfe for the &eezifig
order issued by the United States.

2. Japan's retaliatory measures being unexpectedly severe the United States showed signs
of backing down to a certain extent, particularly with respect to the embargo on petroleum
products etc. But this is a customary tfick on the part of the United States and we must be
careful not to unwittingly put too much dependence upon thek actiosos. As a matter of fact in
Shanghai no effective financial plan has been adopted in retaliation against the British-
American move and counter moves beyond the prohibition of exports through customs have
not been formulated. However, England and the United Statea obtain very few necessities in
Shanghai so that such restrictions amount to very littim. Al^fl^ lOS^ bSbiA is }o<^
American and British business firms are dealt a fatal blow.

3. The freezing order has not had much effect on the exchange value of Chinese currentry,
but commodity prices have begun to rise (see my weekly economic report.) A considerable
difference has been manifested right along between the declining ratio of domestic purchasing
power and foreign exchange rates and hereafter this tendency will gradually be aggravated.
As commerce in bleached cotton, 80 per cent of which is held by third countries, is out off a
sudden rise in prit^ ^ inevitable and many are »ym eapio«|pi¥!f,i^Jeir t^J. 4ist)irb$aces
will break out.

4. Attention is directed to the fact that as a result of t he above uneasiness about Chinese
currency, Chinese firms 8(re transferhng their deposits to the reserve bank in increasing
amounts. Just prior freezing, on July 2S, the total deposits in this bank were something
in excees of S7,000,000yuaii but by August I, they haA reached tbe stim 4^ Sl,OQO,O0OyuaiL

FROM: Shanghai July 28, 1941

TO: Peking, .Ti^tsia, $|(4^kiQ£ and HarJbsw *ft% .

(Circular)

Message to Tokyo as # 1373.

According to secret information secured from the Vice-Manager of the Chinese Bank, Ameri-
can banks here in Shanghai decided after conference on the 26th, that although they had

agreed to make payments in either American or Chinese currency, due to the operation of the
order freezing Chinese credits in the United States, they would be unable for a time to guaran-
tee payment in American money in New York. 1 have informed Japanese banks here of the

Belayed to

No. 957

FROM:
TO:

Peking
Tokyo

August 2, 1941
#123.

Re your Circular # 1550°

We,dPjro!lt.«n^rs|:^:^ what conditions are as no details of the freezing of Chinese funds have
b««a fiiS^*^& iNmi^id^^ delude North China are being made h^re. Please send us any

Note: This message is badly garbled, thus the trmislation ihay be doiibliuL

Trans. S-5-41

FROM: Tokyo . . ^ June 30,^

TO: Canton #1373.

(Circular)

Message from Hongkong as # 312 on June 28th.
(Report of Primary Order) .

According to CF, FOX of the Commission for Collections resents cttders issued to him by
Chungking and declares that, unless that Government institutes some changes, he will be
unable to cope with the situation and is very much dissatisfied. An influential man in the
local (Four Harbor Joint Facilities Station?) tells me that he has heard the same thing. He
said: "FOX repeats to the Chinese officials that so long as China does not institute some
fundamental changes in her financial and economic set-up, loans and other temporary pali-
atives will do no good. What he demands first of all is financial and economic reform. When
GURKY^ visited Chungking there was much bowing and smiling, eating and drinking, press
'Mterviews and a general waste of time. FOX, however, is determined this time to dispense
with the big dinners and get down to work. He is sending men out into the field to observe the
actual progress of the war and, with this in view, he himself has gone to Shanghai."

Now, when it comes to assisting China, I am sure that the information FOX stands in will be
the exact data that Washington is looking for and the (Foiur Harbor Joint Facilities Stations?),
are busy carrying out FOX's every demand.

Relay to — ~, Peking, Canton, and Hsinking.

A-500

THE "MAQia' mj^mmmD os pmm. harbor

Nd.959 '

FROM: Peking August 5, 1041

TO: Trf^te^ #88 (?K .

ReyoBlrtm

(1) 500 tons per month is not much more than previously, ami therefore afi^ 0fl^fyscfi^^^
with the local committee and reducing the amount some you may issue permit for it.

(2) It is our policy to have the British and American "Tru9t(s)" voluntarily submit a written
promise along the following lines meeting our demands, and then to allow them to continue to
do business. Negotiations have already been begun between the local officials and the repre-
sentatives of the "trust(8)", and it seems at present that the "trust(B)" will recognize our
(demands) in their entirety,

(a) In the operation of the British and American "trust(s}" from now on, the approval of an
adviser approved by the authorities will be secured at all times. "

(b) In order to preserve intact the ownership of (factories) and materials, these mil

not be transferred at will.

(c) Unconditional compliance will be expected in the matter of the stationing of guards
sent by the authorities.

(d) The instructions of the ^utiioritie^ wjll be foltowecl ifl the matter of raising of funds and
the distribution of profits. _ . . -

(Docoments eoflneeted with this will he sent fey ma ji.)

•Not available

FROM: Tokyo July^r^l
TO : Hsinking, Tientsin, Pekkigt T^ingtao, Nanking, ^nd Shanghai # 15t6i

(Circular)

(To be sent in Government. Secret within the office.)

From the middle of this month changes on a large scale have been ordered with regard to
transportation. With the reference to ships, you are to take the following steps imme-
diately:

1. Incoming ships:

(a) All foreign ships will be held up at (^iti&ise to the harbor. tJnlesa orders to the con-
trary are received, Japanese ships may enter,

(b) When absolutely necessary, foreign ships arriving at Kobe, Osaka, and Hakodate may
be authorized to anchor in the outer harbor.

(c) For the present, no foreign ships will be permitted to stop at any harbors other than the
above on the Inland Sea, in northern Kyu^u, and along the northern coast of Yamaguchi
Prefecture.

2. Regarding embarkation of foreigners: Foreigners will be denied steam ship tickets on the
ground that there are no stJCCroniotiatiQng, ^ tfee , event tihat tick^ete hfye aheady been issued,
these must be cancelled.

A-501

Fotthermore, for the present, fore^ers will not be sold tickets on railways between mSM
points ott the pretext i^hst there is ashcwtage of seating apace, lodging, and other facilities.

No, 961

.WmU: Tokyo .|^ju8t2,1941
TO; Hsinking Nomimbea:,

Re your #469° and #475".

As you know, with the change in the political situation, the methods employed for granting
visas to military men visiting our country have become both complicated and deUcate. For
some time this Ministry has realized the necessity of unifying these methods, and at present
we are having some visas handled after instructions for their disposal have been requested in
accordance with our directions. The method suggested in your telegram; namely, of your
office issuing instructions regarding the handling of visas to offices located m Manchukuo and
China, and which have been referring cases to this Ministry, and especially of having inquiries
of whether or not a visa should be granted addressed to your office, would result in ignoring
the power of this Ministry over the matter. I, therefore, ask you to be especially careful to
avoid this and, hereafter when yen) ^9^6 any visas, to be sure to request instructions h&m this
office before issuance,

Under the present abnormal circumstances, the policy with regard to handling of visas
should be that given in my Circular Telegram # 1724*. Regardless of the reasons given in your
telegram, visas should be issued according to this policy. Will jm, thetefam, wire messages
to this effect from your office to tM »Mm^ Wl^^^00W^^ 4s^^ mMm$e and wire me
immediately that you have done m.

'Not availal^ter

Trans. 8-6-41

No.%2

FROM: Tokyo August 2, 1941

TO: Tientsin , Peking, Tsittgtao, Harbin, Hsioking, Nanking and # 1724.
Shanghai

(Chcular #1724)

(Secret outside the Department)

Because of the abnormal situation prevailing at present, restrictions are being placed upon
travel of foreigners in Japan, Manchukuo and China. There is a rumor now current in this
connection to the effect that all vi.?as to foreigners are being (withheld?) but the fact is that, in
so far as we are concerned and setting aside instances of embarkation on steamers, there is no
injunction placed on travel by forei^ers. While it is necessary to take into consid^tion the
abnormal sititatiesi rd^e«t@t t% I fra^old Me to !hi# take care hi ^ ca^ ^ ^as

A-502

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND 0^ I'KARL HARBOR

regarding the handling of which instructions should be sought, you seek instmctiom sa imt^
tofore, in case of others, you do not go to the ^tr^e to regtricting their issuance,
I am sending this for your inforiuatioit.

Trans. 8-16-4X

No. %3

FROM: Hsinking " ' August 1, 1941

TO: Tokyo #51Ql

1. Recentiy, the army decided on the adminiatrative poilic^ will be applied on Hm ooa-
quered areas of Siberia. The plan will shortly be submitted to the Emperor $m his appmval,
it is said. The outline of their plan is as follows: ^

a. General Hata will be in charge of the adminiatration, with Chief of $«»(s^
Ikeda his immediate subordinate- Others in the committee include Lieutenant CoIomIb Saito
and Igosi (Egoshi?).

b. The fallowing exectt^'^^^^'^i %e set up ci»sltei«'^HaliB<)« sfiia^

body:

General Affairs, Peace Preservation, Transportation, Communications, Economics, Public
Affairs,

The Chiefs of these sections shall be (garbled).

c. hidependent of the above, bureaus of Investigation, Transportation, Communications,
and Propaganda, shall be estahliahed. They shall receive the support of &e E^eeuitve Sec-
tions and carry on investigations and other various duties.

d. The Investigation Bureau shah investigate the of the South Manchunan Railway.

e. Administa-ative bodies (CGareaponding to our Prefectural govemmeaats) shall be estab-
lished in the various districts, under the supervision of the above mentioned Executive organ.

2. There is practically no room for the Foreign Ministry in the plans as they stand at present.
This may mean that we would lose a voice in the settlement of the ■ affair. We believe
that it is of the utmost impertance to obtain s«?me mai<sr post m the new set-up and thus
assure us a voice in it.

a. The Foreign Ministry should at least get the assignment for the office of the Assistant to
the Chief of the General Affairs Section of th^ above mentioned Executive Organ, and the
office of the Chief of Public Affairs Section,^

b. The posfc #'iM-feffi^w Mfe'A^!l*^ttit Section should go to the

Foreign Ministry.

We are of the opinion that the above are the minimum requests we should make to assure
ourselves a to Ifce new set-up. WIU ^ i4^«t8% therefore, give this matter your iamm^
diate attention and talte steps before ,tfe|''|!iplJp6sal ii '.se^jJfim |e ^ ^p&Oi £as his tp-
proval. Please advise me of the results.

We intend to contact the — — concerning this mat^ hmii *£»i so please advise me of ifll
points that I should be aware oi'.

General Hata has already indicated to Secretary (Yositomi?) that he would not object to
haying a Foreign Ministry repres^lKSVe assume the post of section chief or assistant section

No. 964

FROM: Nanking

May 24, 1941

On the 23rd, the German Consul General called on commercial official NAKAMURA and
jaaid he had heard various rumors to the effect that Japan was negotietii^with the United
States, through STEWARD, to make peaee i/^tk Chungking. He asked vi^at Be truth was, and
went on to say that on Ambassador HONDA'S" return to Japan, the newspapers were full of
rumors to the eflect that Japan was trying to get the United States to mediate the incident.
NAKAMURA replied that there is no truth in statements to the effect that we are seeking the
assistance of the United States; that the Ambassador had had no negotiations with STEWARD
and, as a matter of fact, none of us Japanese have my interest wMtever in that fellow; that
th^e irumors are mere heresay which gather momM^Sf" as they r^'ft^ttt fela' to ear; that our
policy is as ever unchanged and that we do not have any intention of becoming particularly
iriendly with the United States at the expense of the Axis. The German Consul General then
weottt on to display considerable dissatisfaction over the question of German merchants in
China and said that he knew perfectly well that Japan was of the opinion that she could push
Germany around as she pleased in China; that he would like to know whether or not Foreign
Minister MATSUOKA said anything about this matter in Berlin; that we should be aware of
the fact that Chungking's relations with the United States and England and her dependence
thereon are now stronger than ever, whereas the Nanking Government leans toward the Japa-
nese-Berlin-Italian Axis; that, therefore, he considered any attempts to make up with Chung-
king under the present circumstances futile. He continued that what Germany expects of
Japan is that she treat German merchants on a parity with her own merchants in China be-
cause, as a matter of fact, when the Chungking officials were in full sway, because of extraterri-
torial rights, Germany was actually in a better commercial position than she is today.
Furthermore, communications at present are cramping Germany's activities. He said that
he would like to know Japan's attitude on these matters. He said also that he would like to know
why we have not established diplomatic relations with Poland and the other nations which
Germany had flatte*ed becat;^ J&£Kc}in ^ciaJja are aweh istet^ted in these two

Well, I feel quite sure that the Consul General *s visit was upon instmctions fifom Berlin.
Belayed to Shangiiai and Pelting,

° Ambassador to Nwlting.

points.

Trans. 5-28-41

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

mm

FROM: Tokyo Iftlfei^t941
TO: BerUn . #475.

According to a special dispatch the German government en June 1st established commu-
nications with Chungking via Moscow. Please ascertain the facts in the case and the German
govemm&c&f B motive in doing this and wire the legolt.

Trans, 6-5-41

FROM: Berlin (Osima)
TO: Tokyo

Re your #475'.

I inquired of the matter at the German Foreign Office and received the following information:

1. Heretofore separate airplane connections existed between Berlin and Moscow and be-
tween Moscow and C!i«*giElBif, feut because of the irregularity i€#i© «0B»^^il(WS^ fe^ Mos-
cow and Arumaata*, the service could not be utilized. However, reces^ lli^ ^vice was
established between these points and an agreement was made between ih& p&Stal authorities
of Germany and Soviet Russia regarding the handling and cost of mail matter between Berltit
and Chungking. The through service has been in effect since June 1.

2. The services between Berlin and Moscow and between Moscow and Arumaata are daily.
Between Arumaata and Kami'' there are two flights a week, and between Kami and Chungking
there is only one flight a week. I understand when connectifl^ 58#iS^as they should be* it
is possible to Hy from Berlin to Chungking in six days.

3. As you may see from the above, the connection between Berlin and Chungking has no
great political significance and so is nothing to be very much concerned overt

4. 1 have transmitted this message together with your caption message.

June 16, 1941

'See II, %5 in whith tukyo intorms Berlin that on June 1 the German Government established communications
with Chungking via Moscow,

'Arumaata = Alma— Atftj; c^it(d.vlKmakBspyiWie, Soviet i^igsift.

Trans. 6-18-41

No.%7

FROM: Tokyo June 2, 1941

TO: Nanking #178,

Separate message.

(Department Secret)

1. Mr. WANG CHING WEI" plans to visit Japan about the midiiHe of June so we are
proceeding with our preparations.

A-505

2. M a matter of principle, Mr. WANG CHING WEI is to be accorded the treatmeot of a
sovereign on Ms visit to ftg^ ^ #^JEMa« &e feief time qf his receptissu in the feiperM
Court.

a. The East iyfi ©e«»la^m«s|t"ClMap

of receiving Mr. WANG CHING WEI.
Points to be remembered:

a. On^e Japdi^ Reception Committee for Mr. WANG CHING WBlI wiW bft fivettlfilrteiB;
namely, the Premier and the Ministers of War, Navy, Foreign Affairs and Finance.

6« The general welcome will be unrestrained and we will give our people instructions to con-
duct themaelwa in such a way as to make Mr, WANG CHING WEI feel that he is
tmtmfnt due a cc^plete sovereign*

It is requested that SHIMIZU make an immediate reply concerning the following:
1. Please give details so that there will be no mistake in the order of names of the peraotts
accompanying (WANG CHING WEI). (It is rumored that there is dwibt as to the position to be
given ta &e assistant, ^HU JI CHO, and CHIN KUN KEI.) ^ _

i ife iifi tf^'^^^sMfef^ iSilence with the Emperor to be SHU, JO RIN, SHU, and
CHIN (KUN KED? ' _ „ _

3. {The persons properly qualiflecf tO fwm a part of ?) the party will be SHU Jl CRO, RA KO
RIN, CHIN KOKU KI, CHIN JO TO, O KIN GEN and (Sub?) Lieutenant YOSHIOKA.

4. Should the persons meeting the respect lve_ministers be SHU JI CHO as well as SHU
FUTSU KAI meeting the Prime_Minister, SHU FUTSU KAI, JO RYO, YIN PAKU SEP,
meeting the Naval Minister SHU FUTSU KAI meeting the Army-Navy (? !) Minister, and
SHU FUTSU KAI and CHIN KUN KEI meeting the Minister of Finance.

5. Also, would there be any objections to a summary of the daily program to be followed
being printed in the newspaper, this to form a part of the propaganda circtllating in Japan
proper?

6. A "statement" is to be made on tjtie 18th. There will be an interview of the important men
wfl^f ^peeiai tiiewapaper reporters M the S2ndt tiitd'telheaware; a iiay lyore leaving Tokyo it
is desired that a "statement " be issued.

7. No newspaper reporter is to have an interview with Departmental Head RIN from the
time of his landing in Kobe until the afternoon of the 18th. (There is no objection to photographs
being taken.)

8. The return trip will depend upon weather conditions, but it is considered safe enough for
it is considered safe enough for it to be made by the Kobe Maru and from Shanghai to Nanking
by the regular airplane service. (It has been raining in Tokyo since the 11th.)

9. The Japanese delegation which will be with the party until Kobe will consist of the repre-
sentative of the Premier, the head of the Far Eastern Section, head of the protocol (?) Section^

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Nanking

June 12, 1941

#203,

A-506

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Administrative Official SHIMAZU (SHIMATSU?), and Secretary MIYAZAKI, Ambassador
QJtiQ, Assistant SON RI, Central Protection Official, and the NmsI ®epfese)fttatiye.

10. My representative will be at the Koshien Hotel' on the 15th.

11. There will also be repdrters (both Japanese and Chinese) . Please reply.

"Also spelled RIN HAKU SEl.
' Well kncwn hotel near Kahk,

Trans. 6-18-41

No. '.m

FROM: Tokyo
TCk • 'Ifanking

Text of official *e^it
thel4th.

No. 976

KIOM: Nanking
TO: Tokyo

Wang Ching-wei left" by aeroplane at 3 p.m. on the 13th.

'ForTokyo, via Shanghai.

June 9, 1941

. :|ai; ithe. eveal^'i^^

Trana. 6-14-41

June 13, 1941
#394.

Trans. 6-16-41

No. 971

FROM: Shan^
TO: Ns»^P!yg

Message to ToS^ai
toJapan.

June 14» 1941
#178.

.#» tib« 14ii aijd lip^ his way

Trails. 6-18-41

No. 972

FROM: Nanking June 16, 1941

TO: Tokyo #398.

On the 14th, in a radio broadcast from Japan, it was stated that this visit to Japan of Chief
WANG m his second. Furthermore, the Shanghai Mainichi, in both an article and an editorial,
refers to a previous visit. Have you lifted the ban on publication of such a fact? I shall have liO
keep the papers here straight on this matter, so please wire me back.

Relayed to Shsotilteli.

Trans. 6-19-41

No, 973

FROM: Nal4s^ juried, 1941

TQj #365.

Re my #355*.

Wang's apprehension regarding ^ his life, in comi«@tte isitfe hk trip^ ^fti»ft, aUs^d
by our assurance of safe conduct.

Trans. 7-1-^

No. 974

FROM: Nanking June 5, 1941

TO: Tokyo #355.

CHOU FUO-HAI's mother" and other members of his family have been captured by Chiang
Kai-shek's agents.

"Former member of the Central Executive Yuan under Chiang Kai-shek; mm with the Nanking (Wang Ching-wei)
govwnment.

Trans. 7-1-41

No. 975

FROM; Shanghai June 12, 1941

Re youi # 119**iftt»;the Minister.

In addition to Police Inspector NIMUJA, I have decided to send five aides and four police
officers from the Shanshai office as far as the suburbs as an escort for WANCHIN WMsttdJh^
patty. Your approval is respectfully requested.

'See 11, 97 5A, in which Tokyo wires Shanghai that WANG CHING WEI will return to Shanghai following his visit to

1V«na. 6-1S-41

N0.975A

FROM: Tokyo June 6, 1941

TO: Shanghai No number.

Circular #1193.

Secret outside the Department.

WANG CHING WEI will leave Shanghai oa the 14th for Japan. After being k Tokyo for a
period of some ten days, he plans to return to Shanghai. In view of the present political situa-^
i»9«y^able Kof eana and Taiwanese (ineoaipieli).

Trans. 6-11-41

No, 876

FROM: Tokyo JunelO.lMI
TO: Nanking #201,

We will have to have railway passes issued to WANG CHING WEl's entourage, so please wire
leae back by return wire the names of WANG's secretary, his valet and the four Chinese news-
|li|N^;fOrresponden1^*

Trans. 6-12-41

No. 977

fHOM : Tokyo June 27* mt

TO: Nanking #228.

Action Shanghai as #606,

Please convey the following as my instruction to Wang Ching-wei:

"At the time of our conversations, I told Wang Ching-wei that if possible we would like to
announce the matter of the loan to the Central Government along with the matter of recognition
on July 1. However, as the outbreak of the Russ-Soviet (German) war jaofly occasion a delay in the

matter of recognition, we will announce the matter of the loan separately at 4 p.m. on the 28th,
as I announced in my separate telegram # 605° {to appear in the morning edition on the 29th);"
IllSVe relayed this my W^smU trfigriBm to the Ambassador in Nankmg.

"Not available.

Trans, 6-30-41

No. 978

FROM: Shanghai Mm^'^if'
TO: Net gm*

(Circular)

Message to Tokyo m # lt01.
Re my # 1096".

WANG and his party have left Shanghai and the ban on articles and reports will be lifted at -
6:00 p.m. on the 28th {Japan time). Please transmit from Peking to officials concerned In North
China.

This meaiage testt to NankiXNg* i^ltig> Hiu^i^ smAGmtm.

•Net available. "" '

No. 979

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Berlin

Strictly secret.

When I visited Germany on my recent European tour, Foreign Minister VON RIBBENTKOP
gave me definite assurances JlfBi,-%ith regard to the question of recognizing the New People's
Government, he would do so at any time, in accordance with this Minister's wishes. Now that
German-Soviet relations are strained has there been any change in German governmental
opinion in this connection? Find out for our inform atitaa* Aft^ baftt #iestioned Foreign
Minister VON RIBBENTBOP. wire me immediately.

Trans. 6-12-41

June 10, 1941
#498.

A-510

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 14, 1041

Re your # 679°.

In order that we may properly receive N[KAKULS'' on his visit to Japan, please make repre-
sentations to RIBBENTROP as if coming directly Irom me, in accordance to previous telegrams.
You are urgently requssted to reply concerning the results of these representations.

•Bee n, 981 in which HDBBENTROP states he has no objection to Tecogmtxa^ Wang regime if Japanese government
wishes it.

'Kana^lliag.

No, 981

FROM: Beriin (OsiiBa) June 12, 194X

Strictly secret.
Be your #498'.

As I have reported to you previously in my 159*. RIBBENTROP told me, also, that he had no
objections to recognizing the WANG regime, if it is the wish of the Japanese Government to
have him do so, (reserving, of course, HITLER's approval of the matter). He had given you the
same assurance last month, so now that German-Soviet relalaona are strained. I believe Ger-
many would not change her mind in this matter.

Althou^ r iiaw sent you my opinion on this question in my telegram #209', I have not yet
received your instnirtions in reply. I would like to ascertain RTBBENTROP's attitude again
after you have informed me of your decision in regard to this question, since to ask from time
to time the Ge«iwit1ifttftt|il|n'^thout our deciding our policy in whether we should ask Ger-
many and Italy toiecogmze the WANG Government is a matter of our prestige.

°ftee 11, 979 in whii;h Matsuoka asks Osima to ascertain whether or not tliere has been aii;^ change in Ribbentrop's
intention to recognize the New People's Government at any time that Matsuoka so wishes.

Ttana-f^-^J

No. 982

FROM: Berlin (Oshima) June 17, 1941

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #699.

Regarding your ^514°:

On my inquiry as to whether Germany will comply with our desires and recognize the Wang
regisi^ said that, as he had already replied to me in February, on this matter, as

far \S| s^a«©EWd, he of course intends to acm^m^ ffhsmmt Mpm i^iiSs

A-^li

it done. (See my message # 159*) . He then asked if the suggestion of your Ambassador is now to
be taken as a formal proposal of the Japanese Government, stating that if such be the case, he
immediately secnre the aM»6Vai #t!^^ittc^llor Hitler, as fcs h& not spoken to the Chan-
cellor on this subject as yet.

I told him that I would give him a definite reply after once more ascertaining what the in-
structions of the Imperial Government would be.

As I ventured to opine in my message #209*, to continue indefinitely to leave this matter in
uncertainty will reflect on the dignity of the Imperial Government, and therefore, I think jt
proper that we litte'lformally request the recognition of the Wang regime by the German Gm^
emment, or else at this tim© «^vey to ^ (kmmsi''&(mmm^ the t^imm ffliy w ie iiot
seek such recognition. . . . , jt

Please icoiEBe to a decision as to out attitude at once, and ii^t;tt^#i)v

"Matsuoka requeata Berlin to make representations to Ribbentrop re recognition of tt© W|Bjt l^Stew ia S»^lflrt'
proper reception can be given NIKAKULS (Kana speJlii^) em his viiit to Japan. See II, 980.
'Not available.

Trans. 6-24-41

No. 983

FROM; Berlin June 27, mi

TO: Tokyo fi90.

JR^my message

The German recognition of the Nanking government will he in the fottn of a comi
treaty, giving German commercial firms full rights in China.

*Nat available.

Trans. 6-30-41

FROM: Tokyo July 9, 1941

TO: Shanghai Ml40f.

(Circular)

Germany requests Japan to obtain the Nanking government's assurance that Germans will
be accorded the same privileges as those accorded the Japanese, before submitting the pro-
posals for a German-Nanking Trade Agreement to the Nanking government.

- "fl^vailabk.

THE "MAGIC" mQmmum w w^m. harbob

No. 985

FROM: Tokyo June 28, 1941

'Wk' Ket #1S@6.

(Met^age to Nanking #231)
Be my #229*.

Since we consider that it would not be well for the news of German and Italian recognition
of the People's Government to leak out to the newspapers prematurely from our side, wt> have
issued an order prohibiting publication of the question of recognition to be accorded by any
third power country to the People's Government. Will you also get in touch with the authorities
of the People's Government and takt> precautions. This ban will be lifted as soon as recognition
has been given to the People's Government.

1

"Not available.

l^DM: B^CCkstaia) Ju]y 8,ld41

TO: Tokyo #863.

On the 7th. WEEM^,^^<(^tjbe£^^£ke^^
mation to KASE*:

1:. **The departure of the members of the Chinese Embassy and consulates will probably be
delayed until after the 10th, but their withdrawal is certain. The matter of winding up the
affairs of the Chinese Embassy will be turned over to the Protocol Bureau who are to get in
touch with members of your office.

2. "After we advised the Chinese of our severance of relations with Chunskin<i, CHKN KAr
sent us a note severely criticizing our recognition of the Nanking Government. Since it was
entirely out of order for us to be in receipt of such a rude communication, we simply returned it.

3. "Within the Chungking sphere of influence there are now residing about MO Ciermans
whose safety is causmg us grave cojicern. If you Ja|>anese have any ideas as to how to handle
i^ ma^ef^ iw w^s^S^ very glad t^lMiMV^^i^

I will appre^ateit vsxgr macilt^ylnt wii^i^ up 1^'flflbii3««^^i«@'|nlil<tei^$^^ wire.

"Not available.

'Counselor at Japanese Embassy ibSMIllv
'Chinese Ambasaadwi]) GtxnOB^.

A-513

No. 987

SBOM: Rome(Horikm)
TO; Tokyo

June 2)8, mi
#407.

Re your Circular # 1318°.

I called on CIANO the 26th, and after I had made representations in accordance with your
inatructioiis, he said: "As you know, Italy all along has been prepared to recognize the Nanking
Oovemment. The fact is that not long ago I even wired WANG CHIN WEI, In addition to this
tkttt the pre^at Italian Ambassador to China, though he has lived there three years, has mst
80 far preseirtSsd^lStfeJentials to the Chunking Government. In the li^t of this, it is apparent
the Italian Covernment is giving de facto recognition to the Nanking Government. Though the
carrying out of formal recognition offers no difficulties from a political point of view to the
lUilt^' Government, we have no recourse but to keep in step with Germany. I will, therefore,
get in direct telephone commvjnication with Germany and have another talk with Premier
MpSSOUNI, after which I will ^ve ^ou a definite reply. I have tr^smitted this message to

Re my #410°.

On the 30th, PRUNAS' told ANDO' the following:

1. The Italian Government has completed all arrangements to wire its Ambassador in
Shanghai and have him proceed to Nanking tomorrow, the 1st,

2. Instnictioos isMJfe already been wired to Italian diplomatic representatives in the various
countries urging tliem t» recommend the other signatories to the Three-Power Pact to give

recognition.

3. Several days ago the Spanish Government inquu«d of the Italian Government whift

attitude it was to take, and so the Italian Government recommended that the Spanish GoverS-
ment grant recognition. It is, therefore, expected that Spain will also recognize Nanking.
This message has been transmitted to Berlin.

'Kot ayaikhle.

Trans. 6-28-41

FROM: Rome (Horiili)
TO: Tokyo

June 30, 1941
#414,

Traisa. 7-12-41

A-514

THE "MAGIC BACKGROUND OF PEAKL HARBOR

FROM: Rome July 1, 1941

TO: Tokyo #mi.

Re my #417".

Croatia announced through, th» Ifcalispl goVierBBttfeftt that it was recognizing the N&aMjif
regime as of today, July 1st.

"Not available. '

Trans. 7-2-41

No. 990

FROM: Hsinking ' July 4, 1941

TO: Tokyo #414.

No objiii^ to Manchukuo and Croatia mutually i*c©ghiziBg each OtM^. Suggest HSuWttf
the arrang^cats through the lylinister in Manchukuo,

° Not available.

Trans. 7-10-41

No. 991

FROM: Rome July 1.1941

TO: Tokyo #4^

On the Ist, PURUUNASU' informed Ando* that the Chungking government has notified the
Italian government that it will sever diplomatic relations in the event Italy recognizes the
Nanking government. Both Italian Ambassador in Chungking and Chinese Ambassador in
Rome are expected to return to their respective countries. Germanj^ is also i^jiected td do liker

Trunas.

^Secretary in the Japanese Embassy, Home,

Trans. 7-2-41

A-515

No. 992

m<m: ToM July 4, 1941

Nanking # 255.

Message to Berlin #612.

Strictly Secret. To be handled in government code.
Re your # 478°. M.M.M.* Intelligence Report.

The gist of the wire which the Chief of the Foreign Section of the Chungking Government sent
to the Chinese EtnbassieRiia Germany and Italy on July 3rd is as follows:

"Since both Germany and Italy have recognized the clandestine government, we have
decided to break off relations with both countries. Consequently, leading all the members of
your staffs, evacuate immediately. ]Mip^af"^«aijmis instruction ^pi;^ Its
been instructed to do.

Also, please have the Consul -Gen era! in Austria do likewise."

"Not available,

' Jt ia though* tJotat this deal* with military intelligence.

Trans. 7-11-41

No. 9«:i

FROM: Rome July 4, 1941

On the 4th, PRUNAS" confidentially told ANDH*^ the following; 'The ltal!sii government

has deiinitoly Itroktn off relations with the Chungking Government, effective this date, and
has told the local Chinese Embassy as much. We are of a mind to evacuate Acting Ambassador
ALCESANDRINI first of all and then the remainder of the EmbaifisiSf t^kli fisftS'lI

'DitectM General of TtaiwoceswiB Bureau^ Italian Foreign Office.

No. 994

FROM: Nanking July 2, 1941

V&: Net No number.

Message to Tokyo #44^";

Re your #2S5'.

On the 2nd, Commercial Attach^ NAKAMURA, together with the Army and Navy Attaches,
called on WANG and congratulated him upon his Government's being recognized by Germany,
Itaiy and other countries. WANG, in a very h&ppy: mood, stated that it was due to Japan's

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

assistance that the People's Govetnment has become what it is today and requested that we
cmvey tp the Imperiitl Government his heari^^ gratitude.

'Not available^

(In 2 parts — complete.)

Received i'rom Vichy as # 336, 1 July,

Re your # 252°.

On i July, I called on Darlan and'S^id tlldt it was evident from what former Foreign Minister
Banden said t& &iib iimi AtsAmma,dm Sswadfi, tsst :Se#i«aiB«arj i^ait f^mde' mtt' li^^^^liliiiM
the matter of recognizing the Nanking government. I added that since the establishment of
this government, it has become more and more infJuential with the passage of time. It has
made such strides that teday it stands on ft very sound foundation. On 1 Jtily, both Germany
and Italy recognized this government, and thetg. ^ Ia4le^ti^«i6 that 8#yiSal othets of the
European countries will shortly follow suit.

It is the hope and desire of Japan, I continued^ France, too, take this opportunity to
give her recognition of the Njiidailf .g«»vi^iHnent.

To this Darlan replied:

1. France, (being bound by the terms of the German- Fifench peace treaty is not in the

same position as others of the European countries. She does f^<jt itecessarily have to act in
precisely the same manner as other members of the Axis powers.

2. ShticAd' ^e peace teeaty be revised and another treaty of a better type take its place, attd
if, in conjunction with this, France were to be given a chance to cooperate in the new situation
in Europe, France could make basic changes in her foreign policy. Under such circumstances,
France could view her relations under an entirely different light and would make radical
changes. However, matters have not progressed to such a point as yet.

3. France possesses French Indo-China, which has a common border with Chiang Kai-shek's
domain. As far as I (Darlan) know, Wang's influence does not extend to the southwestern part
as yet. Should France, under these circumstances go ahead and recognize the Wang regimfej

th^e. may be disastrous results. The Chiang faction would, probably, start disputes ,

^^Wfei 'would be very much against Mtm^^ ei Wmm^ mnd she is doing everything in her
power to prevent occurrence.

4. For these reasons, in spite of the fact that ftance is exceedingly anxious to voluntarily
recognize the Wang regime as an esprei^idn of friendship towards Japan, she cannot afford^l^-
give rise to unfortunate developments as a result of it. However, if the Soviet Union's aid to
Chiang vanishes because of the German-Soviet war resulting in materially weakiening Chiai^
Kai-shek; or if (Jerman-French cooperation moves forward another step, and thus wipes away
all uncertainties for the future for the people of France, or until such a time that France can
keep in solid J9tej) with Germany and Japan, it is France's intention to maintain the status quo.

No. 995

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Nanking

July 5, 1941
#253.

I, therefore, replied that I was perfectly aware of the fact that France was in a different posi-
tion from any of the other European countries in so far as her position in the Far East was con-
cerned. Moreover, 1 said, our requesting France to recognize the Wang regime at this time
should not be taken to mean that we expected France to do everything that the Axis powers did.
However, it is a fact that practically all of France's interests in China are controlled by the
Wang government and for this reason it would seem to be to the interest of France to establish
healthy relations with that government, I said. I requested that he keep the above fact in
mind when giving this matter his further consideration.

In any event, 1 said in conclusion, we would no doubt find other opportunities in the future to
further discuss this matter.

There are indications that even the President is placing considerable importance in this
matter. However, it is apparent that France feels considerable concern over the possibility of
Chiang Kai-shek extending the conflict to French Indo-China, I, myself, being of the opinion
that it would not be particularly to our interest to involve French Indo- China too deeply at the
present time, deemed it wise to drop this matter for the time being. I do not think it advisable

Translator%'i^(m: Last tln«e
twislation.

Trana. 7-9-41

No. 996

FROM: Tokyo July 4, 1941

TO: #1426.

(Circular)

(Message to Vichy # 256) .
-Eeytrar #336".

The people's government is most eager to get France's recognition and so please again press
titfe^ttef strongly on the goveomment^

'Not available.

Tpani5/?-S-41

No. 997

FROM: Vichy July 5, 1941

TO: Tokyo #344.

Re your 4 256°.

I am of the opinion that it would be well to point out in issuing our demands for military
1*868 the fact that French Indo-Chia^ |l wIShotit defenses at the present time and could ve^

A-618

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

easily be subjected to manipulations by a third country. Aa I reported in ray message # 336*,
Darlan, himself, stated on the occasion of my talks with him concerning Vichy's recognition
of Wang's government, that the above anxiety exists with regard to French Indo- China,

Should we conduct a^otiations with the V'ichy govenifiti^ fegarding recognition of the
Wang government, prior to making our demands for bases, we may be faced with the possi-
bility of having to say that there were no dangers to French Indo-China flrom third countries.
It is heedless to say that that would be vary unfavorable to us. (For the moment, I am not
taking into consideration that the Vichy government will encourage us in our demands for
bases.) It is quite possible, moreover, that as a result of our demands for bases. Franco- Japa-
nese diplomaMa^ l'ellit&»is be broken off. It would be betteir* under sai^^bNiSteiafiiHtsifrit would
be to nur disadvantage if the Wang government has recognized the Vichy government.

It was with these considerations in mind that I reported as I did at the end of my message
#336*,

From your message #256°, it is not clear whether you understood the above circumstances
or not, I bring out these points again because 1 thought that possibly you read only that part of
my message which c<mcem64 tiMf ISa£i^m vi/in&lS0^i6iS^ isfw^ t^tsmo^. Will you please
kansmit yowr instmcticais.

i ;

°See n, 996: "The People's Govomamt is inqat anxjflUB to get franct'a teeegtAtitfUi and bo please again pfeaa the

matter strongly on the Government,"

'See 11, yyf): ,Jap Amb. at Vichy disirusse.s with Admiral Darlan the question of Freiu li rt t oi:iiltiftn of the Nanking
government. Because of France's peculiar position under Axis control, and tor fear of repercussions from Chungkiog,
Darlan !fy)tmVsu^&s tiie time feelpy KmI^W^ con^ae to maiatato

No. 998

FROM: Berlin June 27, 1941

TO: Tokyo #?9l.

Re my # 783.

According to your Circular # 1318 you desire to have the recognition of all Axis countries. In
regard to France, it seems that France is seeking Germany's favor at this time. However, in
order to insure freedom of action for ouraelves in the future, I think it would be best at this time
not to ask for France's recognition.

Trans, 6-30-41

No. 999

FRO M : Tokyo July 1 4, 1941

TO; Nanking #295.

Message from Vichy as # 368.

Re your ff 256".

On the 14th, I went to Vice^Premier DARLAN and told him that the Japanese Govern,-

ment is now pa:^iBV&i0^^lif^m0^ M^^ the mw 3«^i^Mimmt to I^liSUEt^^

A-519

In connection with the anxiety which France seems to have doncerning French Indo-China, I
begged him to reconsider the contents of your message and he promised: "As that is a big
question for France, too, I will study it."
Relayed to B^lto; - ' • - '

Trans. 7-19-41

No. 1000

FROM: Tokyo July 31, 1941'.

TO: Vichy #336.

%your #168(?). „ . ^ ^.

In view of the establishment of joint defense measures by Japan and Freix^;il,do- China it is
desired that France go a step farther and recognize the Nanking government. I^ease wire the
pp^Mlft tt^ftd of affsiifS. itofeeSMiere it is reported that Chungking is sending GIDOMEr" as
ambassador to France and that he left for his post July l^th, ^o'mg via the United States, Inas-
much as this has an important bearing on the recognition problem please ascertain France's
attitude on this and wire. Please relay to Germany.

*WMI Tao-ming, He is graduate of tlst^rlxsity of Park, was mamber tȣ Chinese Reconstruction Committee sad has

txam^ 8-14-41

No. 1001

FROM: Tokyo July 8, 1941

TO: Berlin #616.

Re your #837 (?)'.

Please suggest to the German government that Denmark and Finland recognize the Nanking
government. Also when you mention this please suggest that we desire to have them recognize
Manchuria at the same time. {Regarding the recognition of Manchuria, it would be well if you
would get in touch with the Manchurian Minister there. I think the proper procedure would be
to have the Minivers ctf the^ two countries resident in Berlin or else have the Ministers of
these two countries resi«l®at ia Japm get in touch with the Manchurian Minister resident in
Japan.)

'Not available.

Trans. 7-9-41

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEABL HARBOR

{^©M: Berlin

My 12, 1941

TO: Tokyo . ^

Re your #615*.

I called on WEISZAECKER* on the 11th, and ^'five him the message contained in your tele-
gram. With regard to the question of Manchukuoan recognition, he said that it would be neces-
sary to seture REBBENTROP's sanction but that the purport of your message had been noted.
The principal points of this tel^wa and caption telegram have been transmitted to Finland
and Sweden.

"See n, 1001 in which Tokyi) requests Berlin tu suggest to the German Government that Denmark and Finland
tecogniie the Nanking and Manchurian Govern m ems.
'Chief of Political Section, German Foreign Office.

question in accordance with the desire of the Japanese Government and thai they would have
their Ministers in Finland and Denmark transmit the request to tihe governments of the respec-
tive countries. (Incidentally, I might say that ttfie m*ttef is agtifeaWe lo Bureau Chiefs in
Switzerland and Denmark.) The Foreign Office also asked if it would not be well if Japan also
coat^BCted the Ministers of these countries and through them submitted the request to Finland
atai' fi^Aark, I replied that we would do so. Furthermttpe, in regffld to the form in which
recognition is to be given, the WANG regime, following a customary practice, has agreed to
inform in writing its representatives in Berlin and Maachukuo. Please informed that I intend
to arrange for contacts with Helsinki and Stockholm (sic) , '

•'Seen. 1002. in whidi W^S^i®EKEIl (Chief of the Political Sectioii of the Get man Foreign Office) tella mMA

Trans. 7-23-41

Trans. 7-15-41

No. 1003

A-521

No. 1004

FROM: Tokyo JuJy23, 1941

(Circular) '
(Abstract)

• ■ i^ns. 7-25-41

No. 1005

FROM: Helsinki (Sakaya) July 20, 1941

TO: Tokyo #200.

On the 19th, the newspapers contained favorable comments concerning the President of
Finland taking the necessary steps for the formal recognition of Manchukuo.

Trans. 7-28-41

No. 1006

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) July 26, 1941

TO: Berlin #697.

The Premier of Manchukuo has requested me to convey to the Ambassador and (SAKA ?)
his thanks for their efforts in securing the recognition of Manchukuo by Finland.

Trans. 8-2-41

No. 1007

FROM: Tokyo July 4, 1941

TO: Bangkok #371.

Re # 812" addressed to me from our Ambassador in Germany.

Because of THAILAND'S position in regard to the war in Europe, we cannot very well force
the matter of recognition upon her; but in consideration of the fact that the request is an earnest
one, will you take a suitable opportunity to transmit it to Premier PIBUL and get his views on
the matter?

"Not available.

TiaJM. 7-7-41

A-622

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. im'

FROM: Tgkyo July 29, 1941

TO: Bangkok

(Abstract)

Thailand will recognize Manchiiko on 1 Aii^ust 1941. (Several jjuestions on procedure.)

Trans. 7^0-41

No. 1009

FROM: Toli^o(Matsuok&)
TO: Btriui

(Circular)

(Message to Nmking # 230) .
Strictly Secret,
Re my #229".

As you know, Chungking has been announcing that in case Germany recognizes the new
People's Government, China would recall CHIN KAI* from that country. I think that in the
event of German reoognition of Nanking, we would have to assist in taking over the Chungking
diplomats stationed in ft* aiuntries which have given recognition (as for CHIN KAI, we have
a plan of approaching him through the Manchukuoan Minister in Berlin) and also in the treat-
ment to be given by the countries concerned to those officials who refuse to bow to the Nanking
Regime. Will you please find out (as far as possible to ^E^'#tail) the opinion of the People's
Government authoirities regarding this matter?

June 28, 1941
#1357.

"Not available.

'Chinese Ambassador in Beilin.

Trans. 7-9-41

No. 1010

FROM: Nanking June 30, 1941

TO: China Net #160.

(Circular) •» • -

(Parti of 2).

Re your # 230".

On the 29th, I called on WANG and found that the Chinese Ambassador to Berlin, CHIN
KAI: Charge d' Affaires, SHU I; and JO ZUI RIN were all in the employ of WANG when he was
iforeign Minister, and some persons with whom he has had close contact. However, he said he
}^ ]M ti£i ItMMNs&i^ ^tmea iloe^ Ms Maape^ m^/t&s^ tod«y lift i& not in a position to

A-523

I

know what these men are thinking, there is no way but to depend on Germany, Italy, afld Japan
to win them over.

Of course, there is no objection to having them remain in their present positions if they
should change over to the peace faction. As for CHIN KAI, 1 understand that he has been in

Moscow, Beirlin, and Msms^hxikut! beeause the smtdfr m Ite

when he was connected with the bank of China. One way would be.i^ xequest the Minister' fi»
his assistance, but if CHIN KAI refuses to accept the offer, we wouTdi iai^ to appoint someone
who is now in Europe to take the post, since there is no way of sendii^ a man firom China today
when we need to have an ambassador appointed as soon as possible.

Fortunately, in this connection, we have HI HEI KG who is now representing China at the
Internatifmai LftlKsr Office in Geneva and who was Detmrtii^ltiid '^tli^ & the days when
CHIN KO HAKU was Minister of Commwce, He hm been fitoBi ^feetotiEae inforniing us
that he wishes to return to Nanking.

"Seen, 1009.

*8lf«irt9!|^Metichtiiuo«ft Minister.

(Circular).

Message to Tokyo # 428.
(Part 2 of 2)",

Judging on the basis of his past record, it would be all right for him to become an Ambassador.
Since I am quite sure that he would accept, it might be well to have the Japanese Consul in
Greneva approach him with a view of getting him to take up his duties in Berlin. If CHIN KAI'
also accepts, then we would have him become Ambassador to Rome (as for secretaries, we could
select them from students now studying in Germany). Furthermore, in case CHIN KAI joins
&e peace camp, since the members of his family are living in Shanghai, there is no reason to
be eoBfi©fned over their safety. WANG said also that since this man is well known to him and is
pro-German, if both Japan and Germany decide to win him over, he no doubt would listen to
reason.

You will see from the aforementioned opinions of WANG's that what he says is within the
scope of those matters constituting the exact replies to the questions which you have asked in
your telegram. In any case, it would seem that we need to mediate in all matters.

I understand that WANG had discussed this question with HIDAKA'' toward the end of last
year and so will you please get in touch with BIDAKA who is now in Tokyo.

'For^artl (if2see 11, 1010.
'Chinese Arnlifi^sador in Btrlin,
'Japanese Minister to Nanking.

Trans. 1^-41

m, mil

FROM: Nanking
TO: Peking:

June 30, 1941
#160.

Trans, 7-9-41

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEAHL HARBOR

Nanking My% 1941

W- Tokyo #.«S.

(Abstract)

He my #464°.

Suitable diplomats to represent Nanking government are very scarce. Tf no successors e$Ui be
found to take the place of Chungking diplomats, we must tolerate them tor the time being.

■Not available.

Trans. 7-14-41

No. 1013

FROM; Berlin July 4, 1941

TO: TWtyo #M3^.

On the 3rd, Ambassador STAHMER, who had gone to Italy for a change of air, returned and

I went to see him for a little talk, I said: "In German consulates and other diplomatic estab-
lishments throughout China there are many stubborn pro-Chinese officials who have been there
all too many yeti^. have recognized the WANG regime now and this situation does not
coincide with what is to be expected. 1 want you to discharge all these superannuated officials
and replace them with new blood which is more imbued with the spirit of Nazional Social-
ismus.*' STAMMER replied "I go the limit in agreeing with the feeling you express. I shall sufe^
mit this matter to Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and endeavor to remedy this situation as
soon as possible," Will you please wire me back immediately the names of the German otfi-
cials in the consulates and other diplomatic establishments in China wMch are not in harmony

"Ttms. 7-17-41

PROM: Berlin June ^10, 1941

TO: Tokyo {?) .r814.

1. After Germany gives recognition to the People's Government, WANG ascertained from
CHIN KAT whether he would sever his connections with CHIANG KAI SHEK and s^ve the
People's Govf^rnmcnt. If he pledges loyalty to the new government, we expect to employ him.
However, in that case, as 1 have already pointed out in my #805*, it is important that he should
not be allowed to serve in Germany.

Furthermore, we should examine the character of every member of his office and eliminate
any who are in tti^ least anti-Japanese and appoint those to diplomatic offices who possess the
correct idedlii^i Wt would like to employ only those who will pledge loyalty to the new govern-
ment.

2, I would like to have WANG arrange to entrust to me all the matters connected with taking
over the Chinese Embassy in Berlin, its management, etc.; it is my intention not to take any

A-525

conspicuous part in this matter but to have the German Government attend to it, at least
outwardly. This message has been transmitted to Rumania and Italy. Will you please transmit
it to Nanking?

'Cbinese Ambassador in Berlin,
*Ncit available.

Trans. 7-8-41

No, 1015

•H^: Rome .Jttty I, tUl

TO: Tokyo #419.

Re Berlin- Nanking (?) * 814°.

If CHIN KAI (Chen Chieh) is to be made use of, this is the only place he can be assigned to
at this time. But in view of his past connections with the Chungking government, even though
he is inclined to be pro-Japanese, he should be sent to Nanking first to show his willingness to
serve the Nanking government and also to familiarize himself ysji^ tim ^tidt ^tii4 «rf ^
new order in East Asia. ' ' " " '-

Please relay to Nanking, Belayed to Berlin.

•Not available, prQbably refers to # 814 irom Berlin to Tokyo. U., 1014.

TVaos-t-^r^

No. 1016

FROM: Berlin July 5, iSsH"

TO: Tokyo #854.

Action Nanking as # 1,

(Abstract)

Re Nanking-Tokyo #428°.

Osima does not consider Ambassador Chen Chieh as a suitable person to represent Wang's
government, although he may be useful in his government. Suggests that someone in China,
whose loyalty to Wang is unimpeachable, be appointed.

Note: Chen Chieh was Chungking's Ambassador until the Axis recognized Nanking on 1 July.

'Regarding pians for replacing the present Chinese Ambassador at Berlin. RI HEI HO, now
Bepresenting China at the International Labor Office in Geneva is suggested. See n, 1011.

A-526

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 1017

FROM: Berlin July 10, 1941

TO: Tokyo #883.

Message to Berne ? as #32.

Chinese Ambassador CHIN KAI and his staff and their families, in all about 50 persons, left
Potsdam Station via Basle for Beme at 9:30 P.M. on the 10th. Since it will be necessary for them
to remain in Switzerland for a while arranging for their return to China, pl#||^>]tel|^yMl
them and wire me from time to time with regard to their movements.

Relayed to Tokyo and Rome. Relay firom Tokyo to Nanking.

' ■ ■ -. . , I Trans. 7-15-41

\o. 1018

FROM: Tokyo July 11, 1941

TO: Nanking #279.

Rome to Berlin as # 2i#t 9 July.
Re your #50'.

Ale»«ii#3rine advises that he believes it mmH fe& kadvisable to attempt to have the (present
Chinese Ambassador ?) in Italy represent the Wang regime a« 1^ {an ftx@im Chiftng s^ix^
and consequently a vigorous Japan-hater.

"Not available.

Trans. 7-16-41

No. 1019

FROM: Tokyo July 14, 1941

TOt * ' M$3j^mg . •• #286.

(Abstract)

Received from B«riM«» #i^SSj- 13 July. " v -i

In compliance with President Wang's request, we have been trying to contact Ambassador Chen

Chieh (Chin Kai) to accept the Wang regime, but he is reported to be in Lisbon now. However,
as there are not boats available he will probably return to Berlin, at which time we will renew
our effort to see him.

TtsnA. 7-16-41

A-527

No, 1020

FROM: Tokyo
TO; Nanking

July 24, 1941
#314.

(Message from Madrid to Berlin # 18, July 19)
Re my # 17°.

On the 19th a number of Chinese arrived here and put up at a certain hotel. 1 sent FUJII* to
inquire if CttEN^^^^' was among them and to ask him if he would be good enough to grant
me an interview. Well, none less than CHP'N himself came down into the hall and said to
FUJII: "Yes, he is a bosom friend of mine, but in view of present Japanese-Chinese relations,
I feel that fcflf'ttS to tSMc tcf ethsf wcndiS ^ ilMtli^ of tis iinyiMiig fet fumk^ particularly in view
of the fact that we are such close friends. There is so much military action now that this might
sanse misunderstandings. No, it wpuld be impractical for me to talk with him at any other
3^ce ea&er." Well, I think the ^}$ ^asm& m tilfewS^ Um la^te I® when his

troop breaks up at Hongkong. I have sent this to the Min:feter.

°Not available,

'A telegraphic Secretwi^F in Spain.

Strictly Secret. Urgent.

Since WANG went to Japan, the Nanking Government, with a strong feeling of emotional
expectancy, hopes that its own position will be fortified and that our policy of making it firmer
and securer will materialize without the loss of a day. The Nanking Government is, therefore,
time and again pleading for the return of Ambassador HONDA, For one thing, our treatment
of WANG has made quite an impression on Chungking. Now if, as the press reports. Ambas-
sador HONDA resigns, something will not only be lost iM.' |}.l^fefegj feiiit SiSa lte, CflOANG'a
capital. The unsalutary effect would be exceedingly grave.

This, too, is a point not to lose sight of: We suspect that in Chungking there are some — what
the Chinese call suave but ineffectual (Enman Mukekka) officials who look with envy on
WANG who is riding high and handsome now. We might win them over soon, but if Ambas-
sador HONDA does not return, their interest will probably cool. Our field officials here, who
have been so eager, would fall into despair. I feel sure that all our schemes concerning China
would collapse. Yes indeed. The Ambassador must hold his post, and as the first step on our
policy of consohdating our gains, he must at once turn his steps to the road back to Nanking.

{In touch with Nanking tmthis-)'.

Relayed to Nanking.

W&SU: Shanghai
TO; Tokyo

July 20, 1041
#1308.

Trsoiu 7-23-41

A-628

TIJE "M4G1C" BACKGROUND Qf JfEAJ^ HARBOR

No. 1022

FROMf-glateipii • MiM'^

TO: Net #604.
(Circular)

Action Tokyo as #1^.
Action Nankit^ ^$i$t-
{Abstract}.
Re my #979*

The Japanese government, inst«aii of |Saifl£mg jiovernment, should be apllB&aehdd flf®
by the tiermans who contemplate buildiogfacbaiesm the vicinity of Shanghai,

° Not available.

Trans. 7-25-41

No. 1023

FROM: Peking July 19, 1941

TO: Shat#i^ita4*lfiei)i^ #31$, ■ <

(Circular).
(AbsEt^iet)

North China Political Council is to handle negotiations' under the guidatt«^ # :
advisers with those countri^ which havetfies^gaissf d tiie W«nf ifowatmnent.

'Germany is cuir^l;^ nepitiatuigabitisd trade agreement with Japan, China {Naakb^, «nd Manchukuo.

Trans. 7-25-41

No. 1024

FROM: Peking July 22, 1941

TO: Tokyo #466.

Re my #460'.

On the 2l8t, I called on both the German and Italian commercial attaches in this city and
told them that in many ways it would be best to contact us in regard to tl^ matters whicbtlK^
intend to discuss with the HOPEN Administrative Commission. I expect the negotiations
between the two commercial attaches and the Administrative Commission will be largely a
matter of form, and really important matters, I believe, wUl not betaken up with the Cpmmji*
sion but with Nanking. However, 1 asked th^ to be sure tek.il|^. mattes It-^.^fiPiMaea©

A-529

Ibstbassy in case these matters have been taken up with the Commission and are of ao iittpQIt-
mt nature. I have transmitted this message fej N4NSAI saad SHANGHAI.

'See II, 1023 in which Peking advises North China Political Council is to handle nc^tiations under guidance of
Japanese advisow with thi»e countries which have tecognked the Wang govMBment,

Trans. 7-28-41

No. 1025

FROM: Nanking J»ly !22. 1&4X

TO; China Net #191.

(Circular).

Mmage to Tokyo # 500.

Re your # 460" addressed to the Minlstir from Peking.

1. Since then HIDAKA' conferred with WANG and advised him to arrange matters with
Germany and Italy after the question of Nanking's relations with these countries has been
thoroughly discussed. The German Charge d' Affaires, FISCHER, also remittit^ to HIDAKA
that he would like to be in touch with the Japanese ^iib(^ti@ft while negotiating with the
People's Government.

2^ It is alse #ir 4e^ that «w i^Pmnmmt keep in close t<iciil9E'iiif|itlMh'1i9« €^ and
Itahan Govermaetits in considering the relations between Germany and Italy on the one hand
and Nanking on the other. I would like to have all matters pertaining to this question trans-
ll^tto^to this ofhce. (For example, we would like to h^ i|iic#4 ^lli i^ giving the

conversation held with WAIKAA'and^IIBU'' inB^sMn.)

■n, 1023.

^Japanese Minister to Nanking.

'Probably WEIZSAICKER, Chief of Political Sf!CtwD.t German Fore^n OIBce.
^Kana spelling.

Trans. 7-24-41

No. 1626

FROM: Tokyo

TO; iShanghai, Peking aftd Canton
(Circular).

(Mess^ to Nanking # 299.)

It was decided at a meeting of the directors of the Far Eastern Reconstruction Bureau on the
12th, that the balance of the customs revenue in Canton which has existed since the establish-
ment of the new central government should be transferred to the People's Government from

the Shanghai branch of the Bank after the deduction of (1) the deficit created prior to

ihe estobllsbment ci tb© new regime ((sgj^sTqaEtmately §4,^ yuan) , and C2) the ahsre of ©tpsnsea

July 18, 1941
#1647.

arising from exemptions, miscellaneous expenses, foreign loans, and indemidti^. This deci-
sion is expected to be approt»«4' at ti« g«i«f«l iaeetin^ of the Par Eastern Bureau to be held
in the near future. Furthermore, an agreement was arrived at at this director's meeting that
in case the revenue due to the People's Government is so insufhcient as to cause a deficit in the
funds necessary for the execution of such policies, as the anti-Communist policy, which are
equally important to Japan, consideration should be given to adopting necessary steps such as
liquidation of the funds accumulated as a share of the (Canton ?) Foreign Loan Collateral
Fund in Shaaghfii, Dtetaile will be sent you by mail.
Relayed to Csntm.

Trans, 7-22-41

FROM: Tokyo July 22,

TO: Shanghai #722,

The Far Eastern Reconstruction Bureau has. a4&«^»d. 8. «quest to the office concerned that
they mmU Wm ijo MVe *Sife^fSn*ativ^ «rf the KAGlCtf tMmi stake M the confer-
ence to be held in your city by the Concession Policy Commission. If you htivc no special objec-
tions, will you arrange to comply with their request? it is expected that the army authorities
will notify theit agimmmMh these represeBti8*iv^ e^^i fftfiSeipiti.

•Kanaspellliif,

No. 1028

'frfftia. 7-25-41

FROM: Tokyo July 23, 1941

TO; Hiking #30-(?},

From Amba^sdor Honda:

Commercial Attach^ Nakamura has al»mtiEhe plans for a reft^^SMzation of the Nation-
alist Government. He also is of the same opinion and, therefore, we would like to see this
brought about. However, in view of the view held that this would be done by the rallying of all
parties and all factions, as well as those of no party or faction, it seems that it would be neces-
sary to have the full understanding of the SO forces (that is of the army through the SO forces)
for any reform now and we would need to emphasize that one object of such reorganization
would be to bring about a closer and more positive concert of action with Japan. It will be well

for him to confer with and if it is necessary to have such reformation take plage before

Wai^s and there are prospects of its being done, please talk it over with -i'-^ lilong the

Trans- l-WhU

No. 1029

FROM: Nanking
TO: Tokyo

July 24, 1941
#515.

Re your #308".

From HIKADA to Ambassador HONDA.

When I called on WANG to ^scuss the matter in my # 514", I suitably communicated to him

the purport of your caption telegram. WANG expressed his hearty approval of the matter and
said, "I intend to deal with the matter as you have suggested. The reorganization of the govern-
ment will probably take place about August 10 when I shall have returned from Canton. I will
at that time get in touch with you." I un#MgtWtd ^tot i»/i» C«*t||etiaf t%.te^ in
regard to this matter through SHO — — .

Message to Tokyo # 483.
Re your #460".

Duftof &f itot <tf July we wfll gtt thfdugh the formalities of instalBi^ WANG a§ Chief of the
newly teeogB^s^ Gid^exnoient . It has already been decided that he wUl tour Kwantung during
the first ten days of August and, since plans have definitely been laid, we wish to have him
make this trip sometime during the month, although it is impossible right now to set the exact
date of his departure. j

Relayed to Hsinking.

'Not available.

Trans. 7-28-41

No. 1030

FROM: Nanking
TO: Hsinking

July 16, 1941
#20.

'Not available.

Trans. 7-18-41

A-§32

^^te^itoa) OP PEAEL w^mm

No. 1031

FROM; Tokyo July 11, 1941

TO: Hsinking #393.

Action K«iikfotls»

Re your # 460".

No objections to Wang Ching-wei'a proposed Manchurian trip. Time to be during this month.
It is desired that the round trip be made by a^*(?|teice. This has been discussed with the i(@M^
taiy and naval authorities.

'ie., Nanking's, Wang Ching-wei desiies tomake a trip to Manchuria during titai Jatterpart^ Jwly.

Trans. 7-16-41

No. 1032

FROM: Hsinking July 18, 1941

TO: Nanking '#S.

(Message to Tokyo # 467.)

Re your # 483' addressed to you from Nanking.

Sineie it is-y^rfetention to ^l^ tiaidSl® in August, aiia''^tec»tt%iBi#^^Wt«r^k iii^
in this matter, I would Hke to have you make arrangements so that this matter may be post-
poned indefinitely.

I consulted with the Manchukuoan g^fWttJiwBnt and have transmitted this message to
Nanking.

"See n, 1030 in which it is stal ed l.hat WANG will be fonnany installed as Chief of the newly recognized govem-
ment and will tour Kwantung during the first ten days of Augupt*

Trans. 7-23-41

No. 1033

FROM: Canton
TO: Tpkyq

August 2, 1941
#290.

(Message to Shanghai and Peking as Circular # 148.)

WANG arrived safely by air at 3:00 o'clock and was met at the airport by the military i&i^'
mander and by the highest ranking Japanese and Chinese military and governmental officials
along with the German and Italian Consuls General, Along the route from the airport large
numbers of Chinese and Jap^e#^ lIMii #t«'#^)^^id ^li^^^lHm and si^ door a flif
h(^M In his honcnr.

Tomorrow, the 3rd, he will be welcomed in the Foreign Concession (representatives from this
office and the military will be present). On the 4th he will attend a session of the Far Eastern
Newspaper Conference and that evening will eatertain Japanese military and private bigwigs.
On the 5th the Japanese willlii t)im ftatertaia ^& at 8:00 p.m. on the 6th he will broad-
cast. He is expected to leave on ^'l^liiii. ,

Relayed to P?kiog>

No. 1034

FROM: Canton July 30, 1941

TO: Tokyo No number,

1 have been requested by tli4-ti«»mmittee charged with the preparations for the meeting of the
Far Eastern new.spaper correspondents to request that congratulatory messages be sent by
PREMIEIi KONO YE and the Foreign Minister in view ol the /act th^t WANG is to be present
SKrafor sra^ reasons.

It is requested that the wire from the PREMIER reach me not later than August 2. I have
consulted UPA, an official of the publicity bureau, r^srding this fltiat^er.

No. 1035

FROM: Tokyo June 14, 1941

TO: Batavia No number.

Negotiations # 144 (Separate Telegram)

5, However, needless to say, the Imperial Government will insist on its just proposals. Fur-
thermore, the disruption of the negotiations «€B' have no effect on the usujtl jeli^tmE piwailiftg
between Japan and the Dutch East Indies.

4, With the intensification of economic warfare, circumstances surrounding the Dutch East
Indies made it impossible to successfully cai^y'HgMB.fl&e M€f&taattoK^ reply submitted an
the 16th by the Dutch East Indies authorities was not only very unsatisfactory but also ac-
companied by an insistent proposal on their part that they could alter at their own will the
amount of those materials which we regard as importaiil SBtd indispensable. In view of tbe fa6t
that in the past, on various occasions the Dutch Government, as well as the Dutch East Indies
Government, had made definite promises or statements regarding this question, we concluded
that it is no use arriving at an international agreement on the basis of the recent reply sent to
u&. This explains the jr«8Bcja^ ow^^oad^Knoiiig^^^^ and wi^5l#i»#iBg ow repre-

sentatives.

-. Relative to this question, the iSrtdii East todtes Government loudly claims that its policy
has for its object the progress of the inhabitants of the islands and their prosperity, hut it is
clear that our proposals have nothing in them that would interfere with such objectives. It
need not be said that rather by firmly establishing economic cooperation with Japan and W
thus contributing to peace and order iui^ fm last, m^ikl»>^teh Mstst IndiW Govenwaoia;,
make any progress toward these ends.

A-534

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

2. The Imperiftjl, -'|l©jrernment, realizing the unity of purpose with the Dutch East Indies
Government, h^a lbe@ti negotiating with that government on economic questions since Septem-
ber of last year and has made every effort to bring about a successful conclusion. These nego-
tiations covered not only the question of securing necessary materials and of carrying on trade,
but also such questions as establishing the right of Japanese subjects to enter the islands; to
engage in business; to invest in and establish enterprises; to engage in ocean transportation,

in aviation; and . In regard to these possibilities, especially in regard to aviation and

exploitation of oil fields, Japan as a third-power nation has been cooperating generously with
the Dutch East Indies. Consequently, the demands of the Imperial Goveinm&it were all very
reasonable and, therefore, of such nature that they could be easily satisfied if these two govem-
ments had been willing to encourage economic cooperation.

-. In November, year before last, our Government proposed to the Dutch Government that
negotiations be begun between Japan and the Dutch Elast Indies, and the Dutch government
agreed to this in principle. Later, the Imperial Government got in touch with the Dutch Gev^
emment on repeated occasions with a view to commencing actual negotiations. However, with
the spread of the European war to Holland in May last year, the Dutch East Indies suffered its
effects, and negotiations between Japan and the Dutch East Indies also were badly affected as
the result of the mobilization of the economic resources of the Dutch East Indies for the prosecu-
tion of the war. For the Japanese government,, which is pushing toward the objective of estab-
lishing a new order in the Far East and toward the establishment of solid economic relations by
means of bringing about close cooperation between the Far Eastern peoples, the spread of the
European war to the South Sea region was a trend to which it could not be indifferent. It is, of
course, evident that in her effort to make herself a well-armed nation, Japan has to depend
increasingly upon the natural resources of the Dutch East Indies. She felt the necessity of secur-
ing for herself the indispensable resources and by establishing a cooperative relation between her
and the Dutch East Indies, to bring about stability in the Far East. Therefore, the Japanese
government demanded of the Dutch Government that negotiations be opened at once with the
vit'w to firmly establishing such a condition. At the same time, she demanded that the Duti!%'
authorities guarantee Japan a supply of those important materials which Japan hopes to get from
the islands. In reply to these demands, the Dutch Government promised that, regardless of how
international relations may change as a result of her involvement in the European war,
economic relations between the Dutch East Indies and Japan would be continued as usual in a
satisfactory manner. She furthermore revealed her honest intention of putting into practice
enthusiastically the program of cooperation, stating that to do so would coincide with the destiny
of the Dutch East |t)<Up%#ad woyld contribute to the ei^tablishoMsnt of peace and stability in the
Far East.

Note: It is customary in the preparation of a long message like this, the contents of which may
b0 disseminated outside diplomatic circles or which are known to other govern ments, for the
Japanese to transpose the paragraphs of the text. It is believed that such was dom ttiia
message and that the paragraph numbers are simply reversed.

Trans. 6-20-41

A-535

I

No. 1036

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) May 21, 1941

TO: Batavia (Daihyo) # 120.

According to reliable information the Dutch have decided to leject our fizuil proposal entirely
and to demand the return of our representatives.

Trans. 5-27-41

No. 1037

PROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Batavia (Daihyo)

(Complete translation, previously abstracted)

Regarding my # 120*.

According to latest intelligence, FUANM0KU (Van Mook), had decided to impose a general
embargo on rubber expof^^ Jcq^lUCi^lAilf^^ the Netherlands Bast Indies home govern-
ment to this effect.

It is claimed that Britain had suggested to the Netherlands government that the Netherlands

Indies keep in step with the British Malaya in imposing a general embargo on rubber and tin
exports to Japan, and it now appears that the Netherlands Indies has decided to act upon that
su^estion.

Hofstraaten is said to have explained the details of our final demands to the British, but out
of deference to yourself and our other (trade) representatives he is withholding the publication
of the embargo procedure until our representatives withdraw from the Netherlands Indies.

" "According to reliable information, the Dutch have decided to reject our final proposal entirely and to demand
the return of 6ur reftfesentatives."

Trans. 5-28-41

No. mfi

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Batavia (Daihyo)

(Abstract)

Netherlands East Indies decides to stop all exports of rubber and tin to Japan.
Japanese tra4exc|K^ntativ«Si«ii»e#f&i»$t^«« Indies.

Trams. 5-27-41

May 21, 1941
#122.

May 21, 1941
#122.

A-536

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 1039

FROM: Tokyo (Matsaoka)
TO: Batavia (Daibyo) (?)

May 22, 1941
No number.

Negotiations # 123.
Strictly Secret.

On the 22nd, the Vice Minister summoned PA" and told him that insipiU e^ ihe fact that
Japan has been taking a conciliatory attitude, the Dutch East Indies authorities hftve been of
late stiffening their attitudt) and that we could not help hut suppose that the Dutch East Indies
authorities are bemg influenced by the United States and Great Britain, especial^ in attempt-
ing to tie up the questiO«''iaf '#^'**^f*tattfiai-^#nibher and tin with the expectation of these
materials from French Itido-China and the Malayan states, and in raising one objection after
another even in regard to the thirteen items concerning which an understanding had been
arrived at some time ago. Under the cirtmmatancea, Japan would have to recall her reptes^a*-
tative, YOSHIZAWA. He added the statement that Japan "May be compelled to take further
measures which we have to take." PA replied that the position which the Dutch East Indies
authorities are taking with regard to rubber and tin is to be explained by the fact that the^
materials are being shipped to Germany through Japan. Although, the Vice Minister re-
frained from stating that none of the materials are being shipped to Germany, he explained
that most of them were being used in arms production which has recently been expanded. He
replied further that if the Dutch authorities are going to hastily conclude despite this fact that
amounts exceeding that of pre-war days are being shipped to Germany, and thus continue to
assume an intolerable attitude, we must say that l%a€&ei«''ii*^1i%4$fefe
reconsider fundamentally the attitude we have been taking.

In xeply to this PA, stating that he believed it would be possible to settle tiife Witter if Japan
wouia'«B*^t'^ figures 8tri^t>i^'*'^ftfe^ items, begged that Japan

do so. After stating that he would transmit the request to the Minister, the Vict Minister said
that although on several occasions Japan had sowed the Dutch authorities in Batavia the
figinres, she had not succeeded in convincing them; however, I hclieve that it may be well to
show them the figures. 1 understand that the Vice Minister told PA that he had been ordered
to discuss just this much and no more today. This statement caused PA to be somewhat put
out and to request that further consideratleh he given to the question.

Netjierlands Minister to To^yo.

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) Pi^liplt

tm Batavia (Biy^^i) tiSit

iAbsmct)

Re your #349".

All accounts of foreign fif3^/^#apan must be clearly indicated in order to facilitate count-
eraction by the Japanese -g&ifi&^mmt in case Japanese credits abroad are frozen. This is s
general requirement and & »Q£ ii^|si6#;^eefli i^^a^#^^

"Not available.

1^0. t041

FROM: Riyoji, Batavia
TO: Tokyo

Secret within the Department.

Re your #231".

1. In the meantime, 1 have conferred with Chief HOOGSTRATEN of the Cottjittercial Sec-
tion and took that opportunity to try and get him to accept what yoti suggested, HOOGSTRA-
TEN said that to have Netherlands Companies in Japan make entries in the Japanese Lan-
guage was truly a formidable request which could not readily be acceded to. He said, "Here
in the Islands the several foreign companies simply make statements of their accounts in the*
English or Malay language. If, on the other hand, we require them to make daily financial
statements in Netherlandish, 1 can tell you one thing, you Japanese would certainly be up
against it. No, I cannot see your point.^'

I said, "Well, you might say that to have i,hem draw up. dai^ atatements in the Japanese
language would be exceedingly troublesome, but they have to make notations in Japanese
anyway, so I cannot see where it would be so difficult for them to make their main statements
out in Japanese. Still, let us leave this argument for a later date. Let us have the Netherlands
Companies confer with the Japanese Officials and have them all thrash the question out.
What do you think of that?*'

HOOGSTRATEN replied, "In that case, let us set a time limit, and with the assistance of
the Foreign Office in Tokyo have the Netherlands Commercial Official, the banks, and repre-
•i^tatives of the companies get together with the Japanese Officials and discuss the matter.
When the reHults tire sent, and after you and I talk it over again, the Netherlands govermnent
will decide on ita attitude. Will you arrange to have this conference take place immediately?"

2. I have with a number of representatives of our companies here and they argue as
follows:

Since the Japanese banks and commercial concerns have to make their entries in English,
the inconvenience is practically negligible; but if they were constrained to do so in Netherland-
iiih, the large companies and banks, and all our concerns and business houses — even our
liSsential Department of Finance, would inctir great losses beyond any doubt. Furthermore,
mm the point of view of numbCTS, we would suffer more than they because there are only some
fourteen Netherlands Companies in Japan. Consequently, in spite of what you say in your
caption message, please explain this to the officials and arrange to hold the conference sug-
gested by HOOGSTRATEN. Try to work out some scheme that will overcome the inconven-
iences which the Netherlands Companies complain of, and please do nothing which would
mme the Netherlands Officials to make our companies in the Islands make statements of
IC^igiiisetg laM^tib^ifiteEtil^ would be the best policy. Please wise me track.

Ycnir caption message and this memge have be&n wired in abstract form to Soerabaja.

■' Maisu(ik;i dirt'irts that all accounts of foreign firms in Japan must he ^eoflj^ It^diltfttAii' 'OV^iiB'liftti&^iitate
counteTacting by Japanese Government in cMe Japanese credits abroad are frozeia,

Trans. 6-5-41

June 2, 1941

THE "M.4GIC" BACKGROmiip OF PEARL HARBOfi

No. 1042

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Batavia (Daihyo)

# 132 (negotiations)

(Strictly secret)

We recently learned that the British and Vetherlands commercial attaches in this country
were making surveys of our rubber needs. On the 30th, the chief of the Trade Bureau asked that
the Netherlands commercial attache call on him.

He was confidentially adviwed of the figures, prepared with the cooperation of the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry, showing our consumption of raw rubber, shipments to Manchukuo
and China, and of the probable amount of our imports, A copy of these figures is being cabled
to you as supplementary cable # 133°.

For the purpose of partially making up the deficiency of the supply, we wish to purchase
10,000 from Malaya and 10,200 from the Netherlands East Indies. There is apparently no other
way then to get along without the 26,874 shortage, by economizing on our needs. It is our desire,
therefore, that we import a total of 30,000 from the N.E.I. However, this does not mean that we
intend to revise the request Of 20,CI0& madt% OW (leiegate ¥o8izawa, the Netherlands commer-
cial attache was told.

The commercial attache replied that the matter would be taken up with the Minister, and
Batavia won!d feidWsea lif «ii^»ubsequently.

"Not available.

Trans. 6-4^41

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Batavia (Daihyo)

Negotiations # 128.

According to reliable reports up to the 23rd, the Netherlanders had decided to give a reply of
refusal. The Governor- General advised the Assembly (?). According to a very special report of
today, the Netiterlanders after that are reconsidering not breaking off {tLB^U^em}.

Trans. 5-31-41

May 31, 1941
Ko number.

May 28, 1941
No number.

A-539

No. 1044

FROM: Batavia(Daihyo)
TO: Tokyo

May 29, 1941
Np number.

#213 (negotiations)

Re your (negotiations) #126°.

When I presented the second proposal of my negotiations messsig^ # 201^ I presented it as «
separate item.

'Not translflted; Dated 27 May.

'N.E.I, officials will study a second propoBal offer by the Japs in their negotiations and after careful couaUtoation
of their needs, give an answer. Their answer wUl include the separate request for rubber and tin.

(Circular)

1. We request that you consider in as friendly a manner as possible the applications for per-
mits made by Jap^e^e employees for entry into the country insofar as the law permits, and

#a*fiatrfe«sfty6» gtwttiiipti*f,«0©{^^ year.

2. In order that Japanese engaged in Japanese industries, as well as Netherlands Industrie^
may penetrate into inconvenient and out-of-the-way places (with the exception of Java-MadorA|['
'#&reque8t ^at you permit a certain fixed number of Japanese*' Actors to practice.

3. We request that permits be granted for the expansion or the establishment of independent
as well as joint enterprises, insofar as it is not necessary to make reservations and as long as it
is not contrEiry to national defense or disadvantageous to the inhabitants.

4. We further ask that petroleum rights be granted in some areas^

5. We demand that a promise be given for the establishment of direct air communication
ligtwei^ Japan ami the Neth^landa Indies at some aj^propriate opportunity in ^i&m^':06Mi
that improvements he njad^ in th& cimmuiucations between the Nethedands bid^a,
Bangkok and gaig^.

ft ^ "ftat'^ t>r<iffli6e l«s gIveM Ifr "tt^ eflfert -^t at mm^ appropiate-€ftte fe tte&

future permission will be granted for the construction, under Japanese supervision, of an up-
to-date cable line between Japan and the Netherlands Indies. Furthermore, we request co-
■^tWfBtioii with regard to the injpxwement of the now existing wireless communication ^atem
between Japan and the Netherlands Indies.

7. Sliould the necessity arise for the use of Japanese products by Japanese industries, pro-
viding tliere are no special objections, we request that permits be granted for tlie opening of
iCOastal ports. Furthermore, should it be necessary for Japanese currently operating in coastal
navigation to increase the number of their ships or their tonnage, so long as there are not partic-

Trans. 6-3^-41

No. 104S

f<BOM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)
TO: Washmgton

June 12, 1941
#1241.

A-540

im "MAGIC" eACitcfiOUNO of peawu harbor

8. We would like to have you consider, should it be necessary as a result of the expansion of
Japanese enterprises or the increase of Japanese- Netherlands Indies trade, pearmitting navi-
gation into heretofore unopened ports in order to facilitate the unloadix^ Qt^i^i^^^QQAB, pro-
viding there are no particular objections presented in maritime law.

9. With regard to the imports quota of Japanese goods, particularly such items as are neces-
sary to the peoples of the Netherlands East Indies, consisting principally of textiles and miscel-
laneous goods, we request that a quota be established equivalent to approximately 80 % of the
Netherlands East Indies products imported into this country.

10. With regard to the export of Netherlands East Indies products to Japan, we request that
definite permission be given for tiie minimum demands of various essential goods necessary to
us in the following amounts:

Rubber — 20,000 tons per ye^
Tin — 3,000 tons per year
Bauxite— 400,000 tam
Copra— 25,000 tons
Pahn oil— 12,000 tons

etc., etc. Furthermore, in return for this we havtt iffiBseto!Eedo|i*iai^^<» icfr the items ^gd-hitek We
are especially anxious to ^uy,

Trans. 6-13^1

Mo. 1046

FROM: Batavia (Daihyo)
TO : Tokyo ( Gaimudaijin)

Foreign Office secret.

The Domei story of the 31st was reported, in general, along the lines contained in my mes-
sage #217'.

As you are well aware, we are in the final stages of the negotiations. The Netherlands Indies'
e^iinter-proposal is now being carefully studied by the council, and therefore, this is the most
i^tical moment ctf the entire proceedings.

It is exceedingly unfortunate that at such a time as this, there should be so many Japanese
press comments attacking the Netherlands East Indies with their naturally unfavorable reac-
tion upon the Government and people of the Netherlands East Indies.

Should further attacks be made upon these people, by our pr^, we Peaj that We Will not be
able to obtain the concessions we are looking for from them.

IVaniilator 's note: Following sentence badly garbled, ean only guess at gist.

Will you please, therefore, consider ways and means of preventing the newspapers from car-
rying such stories.

Hofstraaten told Isizawa that both the government and the people of the Netherlands East
Indies found the statement issued by Chiel of Section Ishii and other recent Japanese news-
paper stories concerning the Netherlands East Indies exceedingly dietastefuL He further

Treimlator's note: Imt sentence, above, badty garbled.

June 1, 1941
#216.

A-541

1^83^.6-3-41

FROM : Tokyo { J apanese Foreign Minister) June 2, 1^1

TO: Riyoji, Batavia #293,.

Secret.

I have assessed 35,000 yen for your expenditure funds for this fiscal year (money for the policy
toward Chinese residents will be handled separately), and I am wiring you the first installment
of 17,600 yen, together with 676 yen, an advance for MIURA; the sum total being 18,176 yen.

Now, as for the subsidy for tiie Japanese language newspaper East Indies Nippo (Sinarusur-
atan), the pros and cons mentioned in my wire to Manila #132° should be considered, and as
ISspfimds poT the managewiifi* ^ the native papers, consider the plans each tiMe and wait for

Trans. 6-5-41

No. 1048

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa)
W: Tokyo

■^ Sfonr Circular Message # 1248\

The regular European language periodicals which you send ua, insofar as possible, we have
distributed through the branch offices of the South Sea Association. Of these, articles and
pictures of cultural value are rather widely bought and read on this island. Though occasionally
pictorial weekly magazines of two types are reprinted, it is not clear where else publication is
being made of them. They are rather prone to give a wide berth to printed material such as
we distribute, and there are many who even go so far as to contribute letters to newspapers
saying, in effect, "It would be wise to reject printed propaganda material which smacks of
Nazi-ism." Not only are we here in this office finding it extremely difficult to use such material,
but in recent tiroes there are even indications that because of an extremely strict censor sys-
tem which is in operation here, this material is being seized while en route to us. We have dis-
carded the principle of large scale distributions such as we maintained in the past and tend
now to change our policy to one of concentration in a given local area. Please, therefore, discard
all material which smells of propaganda, and after you have carefully selected material of
call^i^^ic^ llifase send it to us.

'Notavaibisle.

IVans. 6-27-41

jHBe22,1941

mm.

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. im

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Batavia (Riyoji)

Re your #605°.

In regard to the subsidy for East India Daily and the Chinese SUR^TAN we are negotiating
tor Taiwan'' to supply tiiis* A decision has not been reached yet, but we wish, to airange a definite

'Mimy tagSXet lKtlt^>ffi^8»dSIM#'«ffieyt,^;^^Sg^.>ji|^ "8t>Uih.3f«S CtdV«n««" ere located in Taiwan.

Trang. 7-25-41

No. 1050

FROM: Batavia (Daihyo)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

{In 4 parts — complete.)

Pream ble

From memoranda presented by the Japanese Delegation, May 14th, and 22nd, the Nether-
lands Delegation has noticed with satisfaction that Japanese proposals have been modified
in several instances after thorough discussion of the various points at issue in course of nego-
tiations. They value these modifications as result of endeavors of Japanese Delegation to adapt
Japanese proposals as originally formulated to emergencies of present abnormal circumstances
and meet to a certain extent objections raised by the Netherlands Delegation on account of
incompatibility of a number of these proposals with the principles of economic policy in the
Netherlands Indies. Nevertheless, the Netherlands Delegation cannot but express regret that
the views of the Japanese government are still materially at variance with these principles. In
fact, the Japanese memorandum of 14th May states that the Japanese government still firmly
holds views expressed in preamble of memorandum of 16th January. As these vitws wtre based
on a supposed inadequacy in development of natural resources of the Netherlands Indies and
an assumed interdependence between this country and the Japanese Empire, it is clear that
their practical application would tend to create special positions for Japne^ interests in the
Netherlands Indies. It seems, therefore, appropriate to point once more to the fundamental
economic policy of the Netherlands government in regard to this archipelago as set forth in
Netherlands memorandum of February 3rd, a poli^'H^llwh involves the fiirtherance of welfare,
progress, and emancipation of its population, nondiscrimination towards friendly foreign
powers, and avoidance of field activity. This country *has reached a stage of economic growth
in which, with assistance of mother country, it may be deemed capable in main of adequately
developing its own economic life and resources. This process is in harmony with aspirations of
population and care should be taken not lo hamper its course by too liberal admittance of
foreign interests. The density of population in Java and other parts of archipalaga as well as
density of population in the mother country emphasize still more the need to open up eco-
nomic resources and reserve labour market of this country as much as possiblfs for benefit of

July 17, 1941

June 7, 1941
#233.

lift, .the Netherlands Indies are subject to same rules and entitled same facilities as national
..enter^mes oi similar nature provided that interest of Netherlands subjects in country of ori^n
idrifedS* etitefprises are treated in same s0it Apart from these considerations of general and
economic policy the relations between Netherlands Indies and other countries must for dur-
ation of war be atfected by subjection of trade and other economic activities to certain unavoid-
able restrictions in order to prevent direct or indhrect advantage, to safeguard defense of Neth-
erlands Indies and to promote war effort of kingdom and its allies. These restrictions are by
their nature of temporary character. Notwithstanding the differences in general conception
vMch appears to separate the two governments, the Netherlands Delegation (is convinced)
not only of reasonableness of position taken by Netherlands government in regard to specific
questions raised in recent Japanese memoranda but also of practical possibihties open to
ifapaaeae interests on various points. 'i^*'t®0i» Ite views of the Netherlands government in
i(espedt to each of these questions are set f«rt3i%fef#'lf^to*.

1. The entry of Japanese nationals.

A purpose of the foreign labor ordinance is to reserve employment in the Netherlands Indies
as far as possible of inhabitants of country. Consequently, labor permits can only be granted
to foreigners if their labor is deemed necessary and no Netherlands subjects are available for
the specific position. Furthermore, it is understood that employer concerned shall as far as
possible provide adequate practical training for Netherlands subjects to fill future vacancies.
The need of foreign employment is always estimated in liberal way, which policy will be con-
tinued. The Netherlands governments aim at an expeditious handling of applications for
labor permits as far as feasible in connection with the necessity to obtain advice from differ-
ent authorities concerned and, in some cases, of local investigation. Because of vital inter^
involved, the Netherlands government does not see thier way to give assurances that in a num-
ber of cases labor permits would be granted to foreigners without taking into account basic
principles of the ordinance. Therefore, unconditional guarantee of admission of Japanese nfc
tionals up to full quota as asked in Japanese memorandum, which moreover would constitute
an inadmissible discrimination against other foreign countries, cannot be given. In this con-
nection, the question as to whether the granting of certain labor permits should or should not
be included in aforementioned quota does not seem to need further discussion. The Nether-
lands government is willing to give favorable consideration to a change in existing regulations
in order to permit strictly limited number of Japanese doctors to enter Netherlands Indies for
medical practice solely amongst Japanese residents in those places where the number of Japa-
nese residents would justify such course. An extension of their medical practice lo all employ-
ees servants working for Japanese interests is not apjttopriate as majority oi those employees
and servants consists of people of nDn'Ja|>^ese origin.

n. Enterprise and business.

EstabUahment of enterprises of foreigners in th^ir own account or in joint account with Neth-
erlands nationals is permitted provided such enterprises in opinion of authorities concerned
will constitute fitting contributidn to economic development of country within scope of general
economic policy referred to in preamble..

A. Foregoing a^^lHi^ails for participation by foreigners in mining entSttsoiAetS in Neth^'
lands Indies. The answer to requests made by the Japanese Delegation with reference to par-
ticipation by Japanese interests in exploration and exploitation of mineral oil products in
Netherlands Indies will he found in first annex of this memorandum.

B. As extension of fisheries and fishing industries should be reserved mainly for native popu-
lation the Netherlands government does not find itself in a position to grant permits or facilities

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

for fishing to foreigners. Whether under special circumstances there might be possibility <3£
granting such facilities to certain foreign applications will have to be considered separately iH
such case, judging every request on its own merits. For obvious reasons of national defence,
the Netherlands government will for time being, not be able to grant such facilities.

C. What has been said heretofore about participation of foreigners in enterprises in the
Netherlands Indies also stands for "commercial and other businesses" as well for "warehouse
business and others" meant in the Japanese memorandum. It is necessary to reserve these
branches of at'tivity to large extent for Netherlands subjects on account of the fact that espe-
cially in smaller communities and other enterprises like shops, small warehouses, and small
factories opportunities can be found for commercial and industrial education of rural tndie^
which is one of the main problems of econotuie poli^^ fw Netb^lan^ gfivetnm^nt.

m. Traffic and traffic communications.

A. The Netherlands government will be pleased to cooperate with the Japanese government
for the improvement of connection between Japanese and Netherlaniis ai*lines to Bangkok,
Saigon, and possibly other places. They are, however of the opinion that future development
of air transport within the archipelago and with foreign countries depends on uncertain iactors
that under present circumstances they could not commit themselves on this subject,

B. Taking into account present development of wireless connections, there is, as far as the
Netherlands government can see, no motive for duplication of telegraphic communication
between Japan and the Netherlands Indies by expensive submarine cables. In case improve-
ment of radio communications between Malabar and Japan prove necessary the Netherlands
government will be pleased to give cooperation required. There is no indication that in addition
to this radio communication provisioi!i& need b© made for utilization of submarine cabl€ l>e-
tween Yaz and Menado which, moreover, is in such bad state of repair that |ipiE its use exl^lSifil
and costly renovations and improvements would be required.

C. Coastal navigation in the NeiJierlands Indies has in principle been prohibited fcf aMjp»
under foreign fla^ in order to promote and protect national shipping. Exceptions to this rule
made in certain cases — including certain ships under the Japanese flag — should be regarded
as maximum concession granted to shipping interests which akeady existed when present
shipping laws came into force. The Netherlands government are ready however to continue
granting such facilities to concessionaires in coastal shipping under foreign flag as needed for
maintenance of their enterprises within present limits of type, number and tonnage of ships.

D. The foregoing also applies to permission for Qhi|% under foreigB fiag to all dosed pc^.

IV. Trade and commerce.

As prosperity of the Netherlands Indies depends to a large extent On trade with many comj.
tries, it is of vital importance that the Netherlands government retain as far as possible their
freedom of action with regard to adjustment of imports to exigencies of export situation. Be-
- sides, it is necessary for duration of war to exercise strict control on imports in order to avoid
waste of foreign currency and on exports in order to prevent that exports from Netherlan^
Indies should contribute in any way to provide enemy with materials of strategic value. The
Japanese government will undoubtedly understand that the present struggle for national ex-
istence admits no other course. Again, from these con^dli&l{bns, quickly changing inter-
national situation renders it inadvisable to enter into formal and binding agreements con-
cerning importation or exportation of definite quantities of commodities for any extended
period of time. On the other hand, it is in accordance mth the policy of the Netherlartds'^lV^''
ment to refrain from abrupt changes as lasting circumstances and vital interests of the country
permit. The Japanese government may rest assured that this policy will be adhered to in
lespeet mutually impoct^t ^4ide between the Netherlands Indies and Japafi,

A~64B

(A) In regard to Japanese interest in Netherlands-Indian import trade, an agreement was
reached after fullest consideration and embodied in the so-called Hofstraaten-Ishizawa and Van"
Mook-Kotani agreements. The Netherlands government sees no necessity to modify these
agreements which are still in force. Under present unsettled ciicmnstanoes, it seems impos-
sible to enter into any commitment concerning quantities of certain commodities which will
be imported from any particular country even during next twelve months. The Netherlands
government is however prepared — if such is wished for by the Japanese government in interest
of regulation of production in Japan — to state quantities of goods for which, during next six
months, permits wiU be issued for importation from countries at choice, on which permits,
importation from Japan will be possible as Icmg as prices and terms of delivery can meet com-
petition from other countries. These quatn^ies will have to be determined according to actual
needs of Netherlands Indies.

(B) The Netherlands government remains of the opinion that position of Japanese importers
in the Netherlands Indies has been satisfactorily settled on basis of above mentioned two
agreements and that they could not, without causing undue harm to other interest concerned,
enlarge this share; necessities of war render it impossible for the Netherlands government to
enter into any obligation to grant permits unconditionally for exportation of various commodi-
ties for as long period as next twelve months. Any statement of policy in this respect even for
much shorter space of time must be subject to proviso that it cannot be binding whenever in
judgment of the Netherlands government, full execution would be o£ direct or indirect advant-
age to enemy, or harmful to interest of kingdom and its allies.

However, the Netherlands government appreciates dit&culty for Japanese government to
adjust their internal economic policies on basis of complete uncertainty with regard to imports
from Netherlands Indies, the Netherlands government have no objection to state under express
proviso mentioned heretofore, their intentions with regard to restrictions of export for year 1941
aa determined by their view on present situation. Such statement is drafted in second appen-
dix of memorandum. It need not be expressly mentioned in this connection that although the
Netherlands government must indicate their right to be sole judges of exigencies of war witk
regards to exports, ord inary channels of intercourse remain open for consideration of facts and
complaints in regard to import duties, export taxes, surtaxes, and official prices. Same treat-
ment will be given to goods imported from and exported to Japan as to commodities imported
from and exported to all other cotmtriee in ac^rdantfewith prineiiile of Don-digcruakati^n.

V. Termination of agreement.

If present exchange of views would lead to drawing up of an agreement, the terminating
clause could then be considered simultaneously with wwding of document,

VI. Netherlandig proposal.

The Netherlands Delegation propose that following be adopted by the Japanese govern^
ment— as their contribution to furthering of economic relations.

Note 1. This is the message the Japanese Special Envoy in Batavia repor|ed took his staff
ten hours to encipher on 7 June. The Netherlands East Indies sent identical test in plain English
t4j§|Bf§55eding daf jfe^ifil^j^^f^ds Legatipn, Tokyo. SecH, IC^, 1069.

A-546

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 1051

(^SEJM: Batavia (Daihyo)
TO: Tojtyo (Gaimudaijia)

(In 4 parts — complete)

L As shortage of sugar is known to exist in Japanese Empire and adjacent region, Japanese
government undertake to provide for import during remaining months of 1941, of Java sugar at
ixte of 150,000 tons year.

2. Amount of ebony to be imported into Japan from Netherlands Indies sliall, for same
period, be brought to level of 2,000 tons year, which quantity yet only represents about 50 % of
normal importe.

3. Japan government will provide for importation, during remaminf months of 1941, of
coffee from Netherlands Indies at rate of 31,000 (?) tons year.

4. Japanese government will grant to Nethwiattds nationals and cempswieB necessary Wb^
^ty for undisturbed exercise of their trade, in similar W£^s as such liberty is granted to tl^ps^
nese nationals and companies in Netherlands Indies.

Netherlands government, considering Mangkalihat Extension, have no object to granting to
B.O.M. concesstima 5i|^i^%,wi^.£sm^^^ of that company ^ IVbmdry

17, 1941.

Applications of same i&ie ^ exploration in Banggaibiock and northeast New Guinea will be
held over for consideration at'&turtltiine when activities of B.O.M. shall be sufficiently develop-
ed to justify further ext€nsio3*ii^^. concessions. — — granting concessions in PRESE areas to
possible later appU6£^'1lfi^a»»IaiMl^- ^^mje&tmt itrM' carefully examine applications Bl&d
by B.O.M.

ANNEX M

Gonceming exportation to Japan from Netherlands Indies of various commodities and guaii'-
tities, specified in Table 111, annexed to memorandum of Japan delegation of May 1 4th, fol-
lowiiag can be stated. (To avoid possible misunderstanding it is expressly observed, that ibllow-
ing statement in no wise eae^7M©dteapSl1ieMlMS .-»~«-- BHd gtt mentioned
in Table ni.)

Under present circumstances and unless full execution of measures to be m^tfoned below
would, in their, judgment be of direct or indirect advantage to enemy or harmful to interest of
kingdom and its allies, it is intention of Netherlands government for year 1941.

A. To maintain or institute quota for exportation of following commodities, mentioned in
Table HI, to Japanese Empire during year 1941 in «ttcfe»iii(S^-Jitotfe4otal *juantities in m€i^^
tons to be exported during thait^ac. ^eitcb) article:

10 Rubber— 13,000

17/18. Tin and tin ore (in tin<i^tiat>-^i!X)8
20. Nickel ore— 150,000
22. Castor seed— 6,000
24. Cinchona bark— 600

B, To institute monthly quota for exportation of following commodities, mentioned in Table
in, to Japanese Empire for remaining months of 1941 to amounts specified in metric tons op-
petite each article:

4 DAMARANDCOPAL— 125

(Kapok fiber (including kapok fibre in the seed) — 100.
K«pokaeedand #^tmed— €00.

June?, 1941

A-547

8. Copra (including the equivalent in cocoanut oil)— 1,650.

10. Rattan— 100.

11. Palm oil— 1,000.

14. Tanning material— l!^.
19. Bauxite— 20,000.
21. Manganese ore — 500.
25. Quinine (net weight)— 5,
28. Jute (refined)- 125.
C. To refrain from instituting quota for exportation to British government of commodities,
mentioned in Table HI, are not included in lists sub A and B, with following reservations.

Export quota at present for scrap iron is to be regarded as measm*e to prevent wholesale thefts
of iron as consequence of liigh price obtained in case of unlimited export. Otherwise, there is no
objection to export to Japan available scrap iron, as far as it is not needed for home consump-
tion or for allies of Netherlands,
Under last mentioned proviso there is also no objection to exportation to Japan of available

iB3Eportation of mineral oil and oiling products to Japan ~ matter of negotiation

^ Jupiftpi^e government importers and oil-producing companies. Present situation of oil-
flSi^es does not, in opinion of Netherlands government allow increase of production. Same
BjtpIteB to export of pitch cokes.

in case in Table HI, Japanese government plan to import — — - from Netherlands Indies, no
definite opinion can as yet be given.

Same applies to sisal fibre, where quantity applied for is nearly twenty^five times normal
amount.

Available date regarding exploitation of molybdenum ore, chrome-iron ore, wolfram ore and
mica ("high quality") seem to contradict probability of exports of any importance.

Trans. 6-14-41

No. 1052

FROM: Batavia (Japanese Consul) June 7, 1941

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #230.

To the Chief of the Fuel Bureau, from Ito.

Concessions granted in the Netherlands Indies government's reply are about the best we can

A-548

THE "UAGIG" BACKGROUND OF HABBOR

No. 1053 '

FROM: Batavia (Daihyo) June?, 1941

(Part 2 of 2)".
\ (Abstract)

Oil negotiations have practically broken down, and the Netherlands East Indies authorities
have not granted request for prospecting rights in Dutch New Guinea. The Dutch also do not
agree to Japanese demands regarding rubber and bauxite. • *

•For Part 18#e 1062, n.

Trans. 6-21-41

No. 10S4

FROM: Batavia (Daihjiol ' ; June 10, 1941

TO: Tokyo ' , - No number.

Negotiation # 299.

Strictly Secret.

Re my # 222° and #227".

On the evening of the 10th, beginning at 5 P.M., 1 conferred until 2 o'clock in the morning
with VAN MOOK*, and Assistant ISIZAWA' sat with me. I sought explanations on the various
doubtful points in their reply and discovered that the real intentions of the Netherlands' offi-
cials are considerably more elastic than the written answer itself. Details follow.

'Not available.

'Director of Economic Affairs, N.E.I.
"Japanese Consul in Batavia.

Trans. 6-12-41

NO.105S

FROM: Tokyo June 12, 1941

TO: Washingtoai , No number.

Cir. #1240.

Re my # 88° addressed to Washington.

Since then we carried on reported negotiations, but it became clear that it is impossible to
get the Dutch East Indies government to accept our original proposal as it stands. Therefore,
J^l($>'£^wth by compromising against our wishes on most of the points, we submitted a final
pxopoaal incofpOTatan^ tie demands of the Dutch East Indies authoritiea (the main points are

as given in the separate telegram, Circular #1241*'), But on the sixth oi this mouth tjisy le-
jected, in fact, practically all of the propositions contained, even this proposal.

In other words, as regard to such question as: Entrance to the country; operating business;
transportation; and professional practice by physician, they proposed (1) that physiei^s be
allowed to conduct their profession oniy for Japanese patients in certain specified areas; (2)
that rights be granted for the exploitation of some of the oil fields demanded by Japan, but as
regards the other oil fields, they would consider the matter after ascertaining the achievements
in the fields for which rights have been granted. On points other than these, they have budged
hardly an inch.

Relative to the question of trade, (1) they proposed that they would consider granting import
quotas covering a period of six months on the basis of demands in the Dutch East Indies and
provided that the export terms for Japanese products are reasonable (however, this does not
mean that they have agreed to our demands as these stand, but that they would notify us of
the amount which they have decided on merely in consideration of their own interests in order
to give us some idea of our export prospect); (2) relative to their exports, they have reduced
the amounts which we included in our final proposal for our importation of the various products
from the Dutch East Indies, Especially this is true in the case of rubber in that despite the fact
that they had definitely promised in June last year to supply us with 20,000 tons a year, they
bii.'90'f6^hil(!fid'j^ amount to 15,000 tons; also iA^lbd^ease of bauxite, they have cut the amount
to 20,000 tons a month in total disregard of the agreement effected between the dealers in the two
countries for supplying Japan as much as 400,000 tons a year. They said that they might further
zedttee' the amount or even refuse exportation at any time when they regard that their supply is
being used against the interests of Holland and her allies or for the benefit of their enemies. They
also claim that the reduction had been effected in order to prevent reexportation to Germany.
Tbey added, furthermore, a very vague and unreasonable reservation to the effect that the sole
ispposition in this matter is the Dutch Government, and thus they avoided giving us any definite
pledge. As to the quota period, it extends from one to six months, depending on the article and
they claim that in this znaftter ds» irSserve tim right to reduce the amount at any time and to
any extent that seems advisable to them alone, (Especially as regards rubber and tin, they
pointed out that actually 10,000 tons of rubber had recently been shipped from French
Indo-Ghina in a Japanese sitip asid hflid been fmii^itiifid tfi Ci^^many by way of Japan, an^tHm'^
take the attitude that in the future they would keep in step with the British blockade of Germany
and adjust the amount according to shipments from French Indo-China and Thailand to Japan
and that they might possibly deduct from tfe# afowttentioned 10,000 tons at even cancel the full
^ount. Their attitude relative to tin was the same. Granted that the aforementioned 15,000 tons
of rubber and 3,000 tons of tin are exported to Japan this year, inasmuch as 9,900 tons of rubber
and 2,300 tons of i^li^ve already been imported by Japan, this means that we co^d ito
mc^than the balance, namely, 5,100 tons of rubber, and 700 tons of tin.)

The foDowing is the direction for transmitting this and the separate telegram: Soviet RUS*
sia*-Hease transmit together with the separate telegram from Soviet Russia to Germal^ and
Italy; and also, together with the separate telegram, from Washington tO' London, and transmit
the message in a suitable form from Washington to New York as well.

"Not available.

Trans. 6-13-4^

A-550

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 1056

FROM: Batavia (Japanese t3iai^)
TO:

Re your Circular # 1060'.

There is no difficulty regarding transportation. However recently the Consul in Soerabaja
returned a safe to Japan and the officials made a compulsory examination, even opening the
door and looking inside, and so there is very Httie prospect of getting ^B^^^jag through without
inspection. From this standpoint of the s^euri^' iSf- ti^Wfc'i^UBWP^:^
amination are we to be prepared to expect.

Meitfie wire instructioos.

'KbtaViiLlabb.
No. 1057

FROM; Batavia (Isizawa) June 22^ 1941

TO: Tokyo #531.

I have, up to the present, from time to time submitted for your consideration my humble
views on the diplomatic courier system. In the light of recent actual exampleis, 1 would again
invite the reconsideration of our department on the following points.

1. Officially chosen couriers ought to be members of our department. To have any others
act in this capacity naturally contravenes the very nature of this system. Things being as they
are throughout the world at present, the censoring of telegrams and letters is a common prac-
tice and quite inescapable. Now when documents are regarded as of such great secrecy as to
require their being sent by this system to which we are gradually attaching more and more
importance, it certainly behooves us to send them by members ol' our own department who
have a full understanding of their responsibility. At the same time direct verbal contact can
be kept up between our department and its agents abroad through these men, quite aside from
the business involved in the documents they carry. Now if we let men who are not members
of our department engiSge in this work, not only would we be deprived of such conveniences,
but also, we wotila ft&Vfe to rely upon people who lack educfiftfoh, TsftiJ inay tfe uiicdtitii, and who
have too slight a knowledge of languages. It is very dangerous to send people like this who are
obviously not members of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Needless to say, some of them
are intelUgent enough to have a great distaste for carrying secret documents. To rely on ship
captains as couriers is a terrible mistake. Who knows how they will store the documents? They
have no contact with the high officials cqftCKfn^, aad in many cases enemies are on their ships.
This is a very bad practice. Already tft« fi^s^ik'«#k^lab are b^inning to entrain suspicions
concerning Japanese couriers, and if thhi|s.fft Wl^^ s^3&: th«y may dejarivs us of the p!rivi«-
lege of courier mail. 1 am quite sure of this.

2. Now if it is impossible to send forth a member of the Foreign Departft^|% Si^itf<dF M
have you please arrange to have our offices in the field, at least once a moni^,|i^9|tiS member
af their staff to the Home Office so tbftt i4ire<Bt Verbal compimaication can be caitied on. I
would also point out that offices whiiit' jha(f#^^ I^^^OM^ auch excellent
means as air routes ifm^ ssve bcth^t Jili lli^PS?^ % M^'tte retyuig
tin telegrams,

Trans. 6-25-41

June?, 1941
#479.

A-551

No, 1058

FROM: Tokyo
TQ;. Batavia

JiUy28, 1941

Re matter given in the last part of your # 531'.

Please hand over hoih messages to the military attache in your city.

Please be informed that hereaiter my telegram which has for its caption word one consisting
of either A or M as its second and fifth lettas, and of other letters, in a message for the military
aiti^^pliNiild&^himdl^ as auchu

°Sef II, 1057 in which Batavia suj^jjests lhat ofhtial couriers be members of the Foreign Department and that COM'
munications with the Home Office be carried on verbally as much as possible.

Secret outside the department.
He my # 277' and your # 443'.

We are dispatching Mr. ZOKU NOMOTO as a courier to carry with him secret documents
and the cipher machine for your office and Singapore. (He is carrying one machine in each of
two suitcases in his possession.) Therefore, please arrange to meet him and to expedite his
getting through customs.

Furthermore, this official is leaving Kobe on the 16th of this month on board the NICHIRAN
MARU and should arrive in Batavia August (2nd ? 3rd). As there is need for his leaving directly
for Singapore, please make arrangements for reservations on a mail boat plying between Batavia
and Singapore which will sail about August 10. After you have made reservations for him,
please wire the date of departure and arrival in Batavia and Singapore, respectively, to the
Singapore office as well as to this office.

* #443 is the reply to Foreign Office queries relative to the posaibility of passage of official baggage through custom*
D^bout examinatiian, to nt^iich Batavia replies thB,t it is pooible, provided a«ab ate attached.

Trans. 7-11-41

No. 1059

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Batavia

July 10, 1941

#371.

"Not available.

Trans. 7-15-41

A-552

THE "MAGIC" BACKGBQUNP OF PEAEL HARBOR

No. lOSO

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda)
TO: Soerabdja

August 4, 1941
#98.

Re your me^ge # 5".

Please immediately bum codes which you have in your possession. (Please refer to my circular
of last year # 2549".) Wire a detailed listing of all documenta destroyed. (Strictly secret.) Your
caption message is mail letter #5.

*S«e H, 1060A in which Tokyo sends out a ciiculai giving instructions covering the destruction of oteolete codes anS

#260 (Circular)

Received from Tokyo as Circular # 2547.

Of the following codes or insturctions therefor, if you are holding any in your safes, please
destroy them by burning immediately:"

Upon their destruction, submit a certificate to that effect to this office. Be sure to submit a
list of all the systems being held as of the end of the year.

The various foreign countries are redoubling their efforts to intercept each other's coded
messages of late. At the same time, tbj^.,4if^toieg..We fliaWnS spy systems and

other means to get to the codes.

For these reasons, there is a great need for taking every precautionary measure to protect
our codes and other secrets. In each of your offices, the chief of the office himself must assume
this responsibility and see to it that there are no slip ups.

No doubt these words of advice are sfuperflutatt, tefe te 'ne^ of llfee times I wish to let them set
as reminders.

Please give this message the same routing and distribution as you do the urgent intelligence
reports.

Trans. lQ-23-41

No. 1060A

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii)
TO: Santiago (Koshi)

26 November, 1940
No number.

A-553

No. 1061

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) August 4, 1941

Begaiding your # 716*.

^cause of shortage hands in both domestic and foreign services, I thmk there is no way

but for you to wire the ~ in the usual manner. We expect tO Send you, in the near fat^re,
something which will take the place of the code.

'Not available.

Trans. 8-8-41

No. um'z

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Batffv^lij^'
Re my #114".

The Dutch ite^QeiB» interests, as indicated in Message #281", part 2, finally a^eed upon
F.O.B. shipments, fommissions, invoices, and cotton for munitions.

Also, the prompt participation in the agreement of the guilds may be expected as direct
negotiations have been started with the leaders of the Japan-South Seas General Merchandise
Export Guild. Agreement with the Dutch interests was reached on commission fees effective
from the 5th of this month, in order to insure the guild's participation, it was stipulated that
their branches in Japan should hereafter not be affected by eissessments levied by the Finance
Ministry, but that Dutch firms (five having adhei%d to the agreement) will, under ordera of the
Commercial Attache be subject to them.

This will inevitably result in much dissati^action on the peirt of the branch offices in Japan
of Dutch firms.

Other export guilds will probably decide to join in the agreement under the conditions men-
tioned above.

Please inform the Social I^voy upon teceipt of this message.

Trans, 6-10-41

No. 1063

FROM; Batavia (Japanese Consul)
TO: Tokyo

Re your #321".

When I explained the details to HOOGSTRATEN, he said: "tt isn't that the Netherlands
companies are taking malicious measures, but should the Japanese Government as a com-
pletely national poUcy institute definite tax levies, then on the whole they would have no ob-
jections. In spite of the fact that in the past, the Japanese Government has frequently said that

June 7, 1941
#297.

June 24, 1941
#540.

A-S54

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEABI. iJARBOfi

it would in a friendly manner lend its good offices in the settlement of the question of Nether-
lands Indies companies entering the guilds, the guild authorities have actually thwarted their
admission into the guilds. Their constant policy has always been exceedingly unsatisfactory.
Nevertheless, I have received reports that the guilds have recently changed their attitude to
one more impartial and friendly. However, this I believe to be the result of the assistance
rendered by the Japanese Government and for this assistance I am grateful." I replied: "I
expect that in the near future I shall receive an authentic report that a satisfactory settlement

"Not available.

Trans. 6-26-41

No. 1064

FROM: Batavia (Riyoji)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

(Abstract)

Re your # 293".

The local branches of Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Nomura, Iwai, and Kasho have been making free
competitive "offers" for June loadings of rubber. Since this is very unfortunate, please take
SUTEPPU (step8itoc^p?e«*jW8mtuat^

° Not available.

Trans. 6-21-41

No. 1065

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Batavia (Riyoji)

' '^e^aestmessf^e.)

There are now in the Dutch East Indies, three members of Sumitomo": SHIOBARA, lOKA
and YASUDA, who have gone with the purpose of establishing a joint stock company (in re-
spect to ?) the rubber plantations "Boruhowo"' and "Suranzi."* They have permits to stay
there for one month and application has been made to extend their stay for another month.
The aforementioned permit (is good to) I he last part of July, but, as they will not be able to
complete their object of going to the Indies by that time, it will be necessary for them to stay
another month (that is, until August 14th). Please endeavor to secure this. Reply concerning
the results of your efforts.

June 9, 1941
#487.

June 12, 1941
#308.

A-555

PROM: Batavia (Daihyo)
TO: Tokyo

Negotiations #236.

To be kept within the Depfuctment.

Strictly Secret.

The Dutch authorities notified me that, according to a news dispatch, the Japanese Govern-
ment is expecting to pubUsh the contents of the instruction telegram in Tokyo along with other
governmental commiilaiti^tions, at the same time that the instruction telegram arrives in
Batavia; and since it was understood that the publication of the contents of the negotiatioHK is
to be done after a parley of all the representatives of both sides, they think the publication
we«iid be a mistake. And so in order to caution me, they called my attention to this. As the
instruction telegram has, as yet, not arrived, I am not enlightened as to the Government's
honorable disposition; and so, if perchance we are to come to a rupture without tipping off the
various Dutch authorities in advance, not only would the publication of the contents of the
negotiations on our own run counter to the understanding, but also it would be detrimental to
our future. If you include the contents of the negotiations in your publication, 1 would like to
have you wait at least until I have consulted with the Dutch authorities, and sent you a wire.

The hour when this message left the hands of the telegraphic clerk was 11:40 a.m. Please let
me know at once by return wire the hour ol its arrival in Tokyo.

Trans. 6-17-41

No, 1067

FROM: Tokyo

Re yeuE Negotiatioo* #3^^..

The text of our publication is as you mentioned in your wire. You virtually did not involve
yourself in the details of the negotiations, being contented merely by stating indirectly the
reason why we felt it necessary to rupture these negotiations and a bare statement of the fact
of the withdrawal of tl^ f^piesentatives. That would have beett Mt^&ctory had a compromise
in the negotiations been reached, but inasmuch as negotiations were severed we cannot see how
the way we publish is any of their business. (The details of the publication or the fact that we
present them to the Netherlands Indies from the point of view of propaganda, we believe to be
an unwise policy.) Notwithstanding that, last November when a Gompromiae was reached in
negotiations relating to the purchase of petroleum, in spite of the fact that our representatives
were opposed to it, the Netherlands East Indies officials had the petroleum industries issue a
joint communique advising everyone of the quantities involved. We have had examples of
Netherlands Indies' lack of faith in advising the United States of this matter. Therefore, as far
as the Netherlands Indies are concerned, when you advise them of the breakizig off of negoti-
ations, tell them as much and refuse all their requests. Now, if by any chance you have SX^
opinions of which you wish to remind me, please do so by return wire.

Furthermore, it is clearly a fact, according to authoritative intelligences, that the Nether-
Ismda ijidieB, authorities duriiisj| tJw. eeu^Sf iof sigotiations, whenev^ ^y found thBsmielves in

June 14, 1941

June 14, 1941

A-556

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

a comer, would on each occasion communicate with the United States and Great Britain, ia-
forming them of the details and results. Not only that, but they wired the Netherlands Ministry
in Tokyo in plain text the contents of our proposals on May 14th, as well as their reply of June
6th, and vmdoubtedly the Netherlands Government in London would, as a matter of course,

wire their envoys abroad similarly. That attitude and such measures 1 would

like to have you point out to them at the same time you tell them the foregoing.

'See 11,1066.

Trans. 6-18-41

No. 1068

FROM; Batavia (Japanese Consul)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

(Secret outside Department.)

To Chief of Communication Department:

I had my (negotiations) message #223° transposed into the KANADA system (?), but on
account of the complicated procedure involved, it required over ten hours to finish the ta^,
even with the entire staff working on it.

In view of the above, would there be any objection to using the MATU' system hereafter
(using meaningless words at the be^nning and the end of the me^ge) when transposing
similar foreign-text messages?

"See II, 1050, 1051.
'Red Machine.

Trans. 6-10-41

No. 1069

FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister)
TO: B8ta^il^«^i)

Regarding your # 482:'

From the Director of the Communications Division*.

We appreciate the difhculties confronting you in transmitting messages occasioned by the
shc^age of help in your office. Therefore, from now on, this kind of message' may be sent to this
G|glttl|'<^Meig;i<^£K^ 0ccasioa, mpl«in Imguagi.

'Batavia complains that it took his entire staff ten hours to encode the text of the NEI note. (It took eight hours
to decode.) Requests perm issi on to use the mschine for future items of this kind.
' Of the Foreign Ministry.

Trans. 6-26-41

June 7, 1941
#482.

June 9, 1941
#302.

No. 1«7«

June 18, 1941
No number.

NegdHattais # 231
§ti?ictly secret.

i£a several senses. Sir, your latest instructions are oi the gravest importance and^ as thMtB-
are two or three points which are not at all to my taste, I would tike to endeavor to modify your
views. Would you please, Sir, be good enough to wire me back immediately some instructions
along the followinfjiiieii:

1. When we come fo request the reconsideration of the Governor-Genera!, if we use the phrase,
"If and when we publish our hnal proposal, the Cabinet will be in a terrible position in the face
of the violence of public opinion," the Netherlandeis will say, ''WbH^ wiio was dealii^ with the
Cabinet anyway? We are dealing with the Japanese Government." No tb6t would have no
meaning whatever to the Netherlands ofhcials. Not only that, but it migj^t give tbem the im-
ftession that we he^ no coated imv&f «h»>;^#^^ a^t'li^'ttpvi^lSaME^^^t^ you
see that this would the digni^ of Imperial Japan? I do not wish to use my phrase like
that.

2. Concerning the maintenance of normal trade and economic relations between Japan and

Netherlands India, reference is made to commercial and trade relations in the last sentence of
the tirst part and in the last paragraph of the second part of the Netherlands reply. Now, Sir,
let me tell you one thing frankly: We have 7,000 Japanese here in the Netherlands Indies whom
we do not wish to .see confounded, and I intend to endeavor to my utmost to have the contimiv
ance (d such normal relations included in a joint communique. 1 want you to know that.

3. To say that we are going to have Consul General ISIZAWA continue the negotiations
would be to express an obstinate and hard-headed attitude after the rupture of negotiations.
Furthermore, it would impart the impression that we are saps. Where would all our imperial
'peatige be then? I think it bett^ t& i^eifftifl from making any statement like that and wait
until things quiet down after the rupture. Then when the various questions arise under happier
and more natural circumstances we may be able to resume the talks. I do not wish to make this
statement.

4. You say the "uchikiri" of negotiations in OXie place and the "ketsuretsu" <if negotiatinn.s in
another. Now, Sir, 1 would appreciate it if you would tell me wherein lies the ditlerence in
Wmf^g of those two words. They both mean "ruptoM" in English. If you can distinguish be-
tween the two in the English language, I would appreciate it. To me the statement, "to an-
nounce the 'uchikiri' of negotiations" means precisely "to announce the 'ketsuretsu' of nego-
tiations." Fttl*^iie»iiinre, from the te^t for publicaMeu givBti in your Negotiations # 146* anybody
OH the face of the earth would understand that negotiations are ruptured. Please clarify the
Government's attitude on this point for me if you please, Sir, and be sure to wire me the Eng-

5. I do not need to remind you any further that the question of petroleum is but one question
in the total negotiations, so we absolutely cannot segregate it and continue to negotiate con-
maslS»e it. As a matter principle and as a matter of sentiment, no matter how much I mi^t
try such a thing as that, it is obvious that the Nethralands facials would laugh at me. Will
you please, Sir, keep these things well in mind?

"MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HAEBOE

No. 1071

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 16, 1941

TO: Batavia (Daihyo) # 150.

Re your negotiations # 237°.

1. The matter contained in paragraph 1 of the said telegram ^tende^ to convince them
how earnestly we had been endeavoring to ftrrive at a coinpr6fiifBS"lS^ Hisfe'^'^fit *s very difficult
for ua to do, as well as taking the risk involved; and so will you suitably explain this to them,
bearing in mind that we are not appealing to them for fear of the fact that, in case the Dutch East
Indies authorities reject our final proposal, our Cabinet woulcH)*? ffl'aded in an embai?>as8ing
position.

2. As regards para^aph 2 of the gpae teieg^aWr will you please make the arrangement you
have suggested.

3. As to paragraphs 3 and 4, these are intended to show that while it is tn^^lSlft we decided
to discontinue the negotiations and to recall qn^ i^ipresentatives so that we need not accept their
reply as the basis for an agreement, it is alifi #iQe^tifit the Japanese government wishes to avoid
giving the world the impression that the discontinuation of the negotiations would result in
immediate disruption of normal relations with the Dutch East Indies and create a situation in
which we would be obliged to take up arms against the Islands. These paragraphs also explam
how, by discontinuing the negotiations and recalling our representatives, our GdveminMt
endeavored to prevent the rise of circumstances which might infuriate omt people.

Furthermore, the words, "To have CoikuI General ISIZAWA continue the talks, etc.", show
our intention of having him tell them in a casual way that he is to discuss with them from time

to time matters which were on the agenda whenever such discussion becomes necessary

and to do so on the assumption that normal economic relations with the Dutch East Indies can
be maintained.

(Remainder of messj^ garbled.)

:Sw. a„M&ift ia?«sr VC^aKAWA (iwdlfiestkai of certain points in Tokyo'a latest iastruc^^

No. 1072

FROM: Tokyo (Matauok*). June 18, 1941

The contents of the Dutch reply are extremely unsatisfactory; so much so, in fact, as to be
Utiacceptable to us. However, even though we rupture the negotiations, we do not especially
want to provoke the Dutch authorities, particularly as it is of relative non- importance to us now.
Since the obtainment of the Dutch East Indies goods is not free at this time, and the export of
Japanese goods to the Indies amounts to practically nothmg, likewise the import of supplies
also, I think that we W^tain the type of goods that the Dutch consider unimportant and the
araounts that they are willing to give \is through twdioary buaiiiess 4eals, evea though there is

A-m

no pact. Therefore, we have decided to rupture the negotiations at this time; but because we
wanted to make a political gesture as a warning to Lhem, we had Representative YOSHIZAWA
urge the Governor General once more to reflect seriously, but the Governor General answered it
was too late to do any m«a» tte^dous reflecting, and so we have decided to break up tiie negotto'
tions. Representative YOSHIZAWA, his staff, and complete entourage will b^'MlfcitiWiito-

The addresses of this wire are as according to my caption message.

According to my caption wire, transmitit or send in code.

°See IIj lQd5 in which the Dutch East todies GQvernment again rejected the Japanese pmposals.

No. 1073 -

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 18, 1941

TO: Batavia (Daihyo)

Strictly secret.

From the Chief of the Fuel Bureau to ITO".

1. In view of the peculiarities of the petroleum question, I would like to have you continue
your stay as a representative of the petroleum industry even after the Imperial Japanese dele-
gates return home,

2. The international situation being extremely delicate, for the present at least we would like
to have you make such necessary contacts with the view of bringing about perfect solutions
with regard t© the filling <rf already contracted for purchases of oil and matters dealing with the
development of oil fields agreed upon in various conversations, as well as to keep you informed
of what we might expect along many various questions. For the time being, at least, we will
d6lji@;».!ii^yiilii: #^. di^^ like to have'^v^^g^ a favorable opgeamt'
laty.

'Miteii agent in Batavia; also semi-official of Fcodgn Office.

Tpans. 6-21-41

FROM: June 21, 1041

(Abstract)

The Consul General is instructed to protest immediately to the Dutch East Indian authorities
against the unreasonable concentration in British hands of control of oil production and trans-
portation, and to urge the adoption of a mote reasonable position.

- ♦ ' • Trans. 7-1-41

A-560

mm mmmmxm &^ mmL harbor

No. 1075

FROM; Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Batavia (Daihyo)

June 21, 1941
#156.

Bearding your #245' and #246\

From Chief of the Fuel Bureau to Ito and Hatanaka;

1. The main reason for retaining the fuel representation is the maintenance of contact with
the Netherlands Indies authorities for the purpose of keeping opened the channel fcff future
aegc^tiations on the question of oil rights, should the course of events change.

-3. f%te solution of various proUtes eeuiieeled with the ^p^^^ilf dMrelopment of air-
line service and that of oil, already contracted for, which may require instructions, should be
given a secondary importance.

3. We appreciate Mr. Ito's past efforts a»el<we m^^m^f hiitMMgf&t t^ m^hh^
fore, please return as soon as his successor reaches there to take over his duties.

4, Please ascertain the matter in question of natural resources, in accordance with my mes-

'See 1016— Hatanaka feels that since the breakdown of the general negotiations, tbe lociil I«aiieh oflEice <ii Miteui
can handle the problem of acquisition of raw materials, and it will be OK for FTO to go home .

^Sie E, 1077— rro feek that the Dutch are just on the point of accepting their separate proposal, and &e vrtutts to
see it lckm^bi^»9etBit^^

(Abstract)

From Hatanaka to the Chief of the Fuel Section.

Hatanaka feels that in view of the breakdown of the general negotialtos^ itJie separate prob-
lem of the acquj5itioaf «f 'SKtr ^ft«^i#Bls can be handled li^^^ Iw^'liBMB^ <3f IMtotti and that it
will be O.K. for Ito toretUTD to TcAyo and let Hatanaka cioty dn alone.

No. 1076

FROM: Batavia (Daihyo)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

June 19, 1941

#245.

Trans. S-21-41

No. 1077

FROM: Batavia (Daihyo) June 19, 1941

TO: Tokyo #m.

From Ito to the Chief of the Fuel Section,
alone.

Ito feels that the Dutch are just on the point of accepting their separate proposal and he wants

Trans. 6-21-41

No. m»

FROM: Baltt^aie%fl'>

TO: Tokyo

Negotiations # 2o 1 .

To the Chief of the Fuel Bureau from ITO.

•Just as I told you in my separate wire # 242°, everything relating to the petroleum question
has been taken care of. As far as the Netherlands East Indies Government is concerned, too,
there is no point to my staying Imem^ longer. ConsequentJ^f* f am returning home on the
Nissho Maru. Please acknowledge.

'Not availabte.

Trans, fr-27-41

No. 1079

FROM; Bfltavia (Daihyo)
TO: Tokyo

Negotiations #253.

To the Chief of the Fuel Bureau from ITO.
Please refer to your special message # 156' dated the 2l8t.

Having reached a settlem^t on the resources question under discussion, the Plenipoten-
tiary made representations to the Governor General, outlining the reasons for insisting upon
this humhle servant's remaining behind. These reasons, however, were dissolved. Furthermore,
with regard to the petroleum question, the attitude of the Netherlands East Indies Go%'ernment
is as 1 have told you in my successive reports, and as was pointed out to me by VON MOOK*
in his communication of reply. They cannot accede to any of our objections. Recently, when I

June 22, 1941
No numb^.

June 24, 1941
No number.

A-562

Tm "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEABfc HARBOR

conversed with Mr, VON MOCK, he told me that by virtue of the negotiations having been,
ruptured, those who represented the Netherlands Indies during the course of the negotiations-
have abeady been divested of their authorities as such. "Therefore, questions of this kind", he
said, "come under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Mines. Henceforth, as a matter of course,
all negotiations will have to be disposed of through discussion with the competent bureau
chiefs and the industrialists. The Bureau of Mines hasn't the authority to handle such im-
portant questions as you have been bringing up having to do with political matters. Regardless
of whatever point of view you might take with regard to your future acquisition of rights and
interests, negotiations on such questions is impossible." The Netherlands East Indies Govern-
ment, too, will have no dealings with us. Therefore, there is not a single reason for this humble
servant or any other perscm to remain here.

With regard to what you said in your wire, I talked the matter over with the Plenipotentiary,
too, and we were completely in accord. On today's date he has dispatched a separate message
to the Foreign Minister. Please be advised that I am leaving, in accordance with my wire of
yesterday. I regret that I have not been able in my reports to date to make you sufficiently
cognizant of the situation here. Immediately after I return home, I shall give a full explanation.

'Director of EcQnomi£ Main.

Trans. 6^26-41

No. 1080

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 12, WAl

TO: Batavia #375.

(Strictly Secret.)

Re your #54 (7 2 'i').

From the Secretary of the Fuel Bureau to SAITO."

No matter how much I ask the government to which you are accredited to let you remain
there, I do not bd^evfe' tlttft tfeey wouM allow you to remain any length oftiiae. Therefore, please
return on a steamer at the end of this month. Concerning the permanent establishment of
some sort of fuel office agency, I am now in close touch with the Foreign Office. For your infor-
mation.

'fuel Negotiate in Batavis:,

No. 1081

FROM: Batavia July 30, 19*1'

TO: Tokyo #705.

On the 30th 1 called on the Chief of the Trade Bureau, "SU", and asked for a confirmation of
our oil agreement. He assured me that the government of the Netherlands East Indies has ftO

A-^

intention of abrogating that agre^lojiiliL^lid^j^iit^

pany would refuse to sell, either. ^

I, therefore, advised him that 1 was in receipt of ;^3^epOirt that the company is acting indeci-
sively with regarft,.t0.te«dij^ the i)U lBi> 3»fiii^'^pna>eni has ateetui^ J^^ fl^^ .
that? I asked. _ ...

He replied that probably the company was discussing the dispoj^Hofiif;! provision that
called for payment In j^Efe^rs. "MO" (Van Mook) aod l«g^^l«|l^8iii:S^ii^
confer on that point tomorrow, the Slst, he added.

I then said that I hoped "MO" (Van Mook) would do everything in his power to make possible
the fulfillment of our agreaatW^i.-.

"SU" said that that was a most reasonable hope on my part but that "MO" ( Van Mook)
would first have to hear what the company officials have to say before making any decision.

Trans. 8-4-41

No. 1082

IROM; Tokyo Junp25>l941
TO: Batavia #1^1.

(Abstract)

Re your # 245° and # 246*. From the Chief of the Fuel Section t&It& And Hatanaka.

Consent to Ito and Hatanaka's return thanking them for their difficult negotiations, Iwata to
carry out former policy to be assisted by Saito in place of Hatanaka. Your message of the 22nd
could not be deciphered*

"See H, 1076— Hatanaka feels that since the breakdown of the general n^otiations, the local branch of Mitsui can
handle the problem of acquisiti<Hi cf raw materials, and it will be OK fair Ito to go home,

'See II, 1077— Ito feels that tb»l>itti^ tffiEti«i^<(ift''the point of acceptii^ their separate propotal, and he wants to
see it through before returning.

Trans. 7-2-^41

No. im

FROM: Batavia (Daihyo) June 24, 1941

'^f. Koimaiber.

In summing up the purport of the message received from the Chief of the Fuel Bureau, I
most respectfully suppose that in support of the fact that the petroleum resources question,
by virtue of VON MOOK's* reply to ITO', has come to naught, he would like to see, as soon as
the international situation has taken a favorable turn, the realization of his long cherished
hopes based upon the original wishes of the Imperial Government for an ever broadening ac*
quisition of natural resources over and above our original plans. It is clear that for the present,
at least, n fiivorable turn in the international situation (if by "A favorable changing in the

A-564

international situation" he should mean an invasion of Grreat Britain) cannot be antici{Mi^.
Notmthstanding, all this, he instructed ITO and HATANAKA* to remain here. It is utterly
senseless. As for myself, I see no point in arguing it. Not only that, but VON MOOK first of all,
and then all Netherlands Indies authorities, by virtue of VON MOOK's reply, consider the
resoure^ question at an end. Though these two men be instructed to remain here, it is but a
matter of course that they will have absolutely no dealings with them (with regard, too, to their
successors, the same thing will be true). Therefore, though the Chief of the Fuel Bureau has
issued instructions in his wire, I am in accord with the desire of thes9 fn^4^ who wish to return
to Japan on the £i|a8l|QMaru. Fleaae bear this in mind.

'Seen, 1075.

'Director of Economic Affairs, N.E.I.
"Representative in BaUvia, accom^aQ3niq$;H|^^a^',
'Chief representative in Batavia.

Trans, 6-26-41

No. 1084

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa)
TO: Tokyo

Re your # 298°, 199'' to me, and your # 138' to the Special Envoy:

An agreement on tin, manganese and POKI (?) has been reached in the negotiations, but
Dutch opposition became more evident and they denied the existence of such an ^e^^Q^mt^
We ^^Id endeavor to negotiate ,a^9i¥^.if the Dutch uncompioinising attitude changes.

"Mitsu'^f^ha^ »y^km6mei:'^k^mo&^m'6i tin. During the first sfxttei^^ii^^^latdMi^gSSftoasslia
new N .E.I, says they cannot export the remaining 700 tons. Contact the authorities and wire result.

'Difficulties in obtaining piomiaed exports of manganese from the D.E.L (Request message from Mitsui main office).

Trans. 7-3-41

No. 1085

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

Regarding your #138°.

From Sekikawa to NlCHIRANSHOZl (Jap-Netherlands Commercial ?):

1 . In regard to the matter of reduction of shipping amounts, BIRITON has advised us that
instructions have been issued by the Finance Ministry that from 1 June on, 1^ Bi^:'f^ ^
placed at 20,000 tons per month.

As a matter of fact, this has really been in effect since March, because of the of all

loading of

June 21, 1941
#524.

June 21, 1941
#525.

2. To this I immediately lodged a strong protest, indicating that we absolutely could not
recognize it. However, the above measures are an attempt to apply a war-time embaj^o set, and
it is bound to put a curb upon those concerned in the contracts, with regard to contractB ah«ady
made and all other deals.

3. This matter is tied up with the policy of utmost national defense, and this, together with
the question of supplying commodities to third powers, is being manipulated by the top managers
in New Yw*, and it is exceedingly difEcult to ferret out the actual facts here.

Trans. 6-27-41

5fiOM; Batavia (bizawa)
TO: Tokyo (Oaimwdaijifl)

Jftefardingyour #3^^

Since negotiations with Netherlands Indies are in such a delicate stage, orders to purchase

sugar, and other things to the head office of Mitsui and Mitsubishi (It might fee w#ll

to send all telegrams secretly to me for the time beii)^)-

This has been sent to Soerabaja, also.

*^t@!ia>^cl]ase of 10,0*)0 ttms of sugar, caoeels previaus wder fer 12,000 ttms, ist* ,
No, 1087

FROM: Rome (Hor&iri)
TO: Tokyo

(Intelligence Report, secondary importance.)

According to an intelligence from a Vatican source, it siemt (tott the Apostolic delegate to
Batavia sent the following resume to the Vatican:

At first the attitude of the United States toward the Japanese-Netherlands hidies commer-
cial negotiations was not clear. The Netherlands Indies people were helpless and in no position
to refuse Japan's demands apm t^aa. Then the l^it*^ States brought pressure to bear upon
the Netherlands Indies, scheming to obtain an excellent bargaining position whereby they
could force Japan into a position of neutrality through appeasement if and when the United
States should go to war with the Axis. At this stage, it appeared probable that the Japanese^
Netherlands Indies negotiations would work out to a solution. But, this scheme of the United
States went awry; the United States changed its policy and brought pressure to bear against
the Netherlands Indies just as against China; and, along with Gteat Britain, brought these
countries into a cooperative encirclement, ready to defy Japan. Now, the United States is
maintaining a defensive line, including the Philippine Islands, China, the Netherlands Indies,
md also Thai, all of which have relinquished any hope trf Jap5» fWtSitiing neutxal. Thus,

June 21, 1941

Mm.

June 22, IMl

A-m

THE mmw mmmmmm mMMMmm

holding Japan against the wall, the United States is danghng before her as a lure the material
aid necessary for her revitalization, so striving to achieve her objectives. The Netherlands
Indies, however, are skeptical of this scheme of tl^ 0jlMts|tSt#ef
as certain as death, invade their territory.

Trans. 6-24-41

No. 1088

FROM: Tokyo Jtllyl7,1941
TO: Batfivia - ~ #39-(?}.

There are reports to the effect that America, with the assistance of Qteat Britain, will soon
effect a treaty, with the N.E.L flif fi$iMt^ -i^pi^fl^Stlip, '^Gf^^ Am^ica k

building an air base at DOBU"

"Probably DOBU in Papua, New Guinea*

Trans. 7-25-41

No. 1089

FROM: Batavia July 26, 1941

TO; Tokyo #689.

Re my #687. - -

1. Although the attitude of the Dutch East Indies Government is not clear, the people at
large think that if the United States should change to an aggressive policy and carry out a gen-
eral embargo, Japan would not hesitate to extend her southward march to include Singapore
and the Dutch East Indies most fear now, namely the spread of war into the Pacific, would
become a reality. NattUfally, they arc in a constant state of uneasiness.

2. On the 26th, I had the members of this oflSce tour the city of Batavia. They found that on
the whole the city presented an aspect no different from the usual one. The Governor-General
moved to his mountain villa in Haitenzorugu on the 26th. The War and Navy Dcf)art merits as
well as other governmental agencies worked only diuing the forenoon. The soldiers in the bar-
racks in the city were enjoying their weekend leave by goiiif du^ *itfi^^r families, and there
was no sign of any special vigilance. Of course, the Vigilantes were conspicuous in the city,
since it is from today, the 26th, for three days that the blackout which is to cover an area cen-
tering on Batavia and Baitenzorugu and which had been planned since several months ago,
was to go into effect. I understand, furthermorej that the time for this blackout has not been
announced to those concerned and that it is to be carried out on the supposition that there will
be an unexpected airraid.

No. 1090

June24, 1941
#539,

{Part 1 of 2)
Strictly Bectet

1. When I conferred with HOOGSTRATEN'' on the 23rd, I said: "We are now in receipt of
official telegram le^flfdiqji the Ruaso- German conflict. Now that connections between Germany
and Soviet Russi^l %^^n severed, it may well be said that the anxiety over reexportation
to Germany, a matter which the Dutch East Indies authorities have repeatedly brought up
during the negotiations, has been eliminated. Naturally, for this reason, supplies will be
shipped to Japan hereafter in the amount which Japan desires. What do you think of tfhis?"
HOOGSTRATEN replied: "We cannot at once agree to freely export materials to Japan since
we must wait and s^^ what tJw geiieral situation following the outbreak of the Russb-G^rtban
war is going to betflfi'sfece We Artnot know how the attitude on the part of Japan is gliyln|; t&'
change."

2. Then, 1 sounded out his opinion regarding the possible development of the l^^ss^'OfiHSAlt
conflict. HOOGSTRATEN's reply was: "Personally, I think it is e vm gooa- thfet tfeat ttils
conflict broke out. Because of this conflict, Germany will not be able to concentrate her eff'orts
against England and besides, since the Russian Army is bigger and stronger than it was years
ago, Germany will not be able to bring it to itsMik so easily. Ba '^e mesMtae, United States
aid to Great Britain will be spurred on and British fighting power will continuously increase, M
Germany, under these circumstances, should dissipate her strength and become exhausted,
Soviet Russia will probably hit back and regain her strength. There is no doubt that the down-
fall of HITLER will be hastened." 1 stated: "The German Army is superior to the Russian Army.
This goes without saying and since, for reason of its morale as well as its historic tradition, it
has absolute confidence in winning the war, the possibility of the Germans achieving victory is
great. Granted that Soviet Russia wins the war, Europe will come under the control of STALIN
instead of HITLER. This does not make much difference to Holland one way or the other, does
it?" HOOCS*rRATEN replied: "I believe this Russo-German conflict will be a drawn out
affair and both sides will become exhausted. Suppose that Soviet Russia won the war; she
has — — with Germany and has no great ambition in bo far as Western Europe is concerned
and so if HITLER falls, I believe we could easily restore HoUand In cooperation with Great
&itmtt."

3. HOOGSTRATEN continued by asking me: "We consider Japan's attitude to be of utmost
importance. Now, what is Japan's attitude?" I replied: "Of course, I cannot say anything
definite until our Government decides on the matter, but in view of the fact that a neutrality
treaty has been concluded between Japan and Soviet Russia and, also, in view of the fact tJaat
it is stipulated in the fifth clause of the Tri-Partite Treaty that the relations between the respec-
tive treaty powers and Soviet Russia shall be in no wise affected by the Alliance, I believe that
the change which hm takeji place in ^h& Russo-German relatione wUl have no immediate effect
on Japan."

4. Now, the impression 1 received from this conversation is that, while the Dutch authorities
maybe freed from the anxiety of Dutch East Indies materials being reexported to Germany,
she might, depending on developments, begin to ship materials to Soviet Russia on a large
scale in hopes of Russia winning over Germany and she might in that case make this necessity

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

a pretext for not increasing her exports to Japan. Furthermore, should Japan show any gesture
in the way of aiding Germany in a concrete manner, I am afiraid the Dutch authorities would
take a much less compromising and much more anti- Japanese attitude; therefore, I think it
would be well to always bear in mind in footing TOf fWliii^ tH regards the Russo-G^rman affair
what influence such a policy nii^ht have on the Dutch East Indies and, after a policy has been
formulated, to control and adjust a thorough manner publication of information by the intel-
ligence section ae well as newspaper editorials.

Furthermore, in order that I may turn the attitude of the Dutch East Indies as favorably as
possible toward us, I would like to be given for my exclusive use information not only concern-
ing every decision our Government makes in so far as such decisions should necessarily be
made known to me, but also concemmg the developments which fi^low sa^ d<&ev&\am.

1, There are many here who have misgivings as to whether or not Japan should use the
present Ihisso-German war as an occasion to attack Russia. I thought it might be well to know
what the attitude of the Netberlartds East Indies toward Japan would he in case of such an
eventuality and so I sounded out some of those with whom I am in fiont*lCt. Summarizing my
findings the situation seems to he about as follows:

A. Neither the establishment of the Anglo-Buasian alliance nor the outfigBSlfe. jrf a BtlSfiO-
Japanese war would have any immediate effect on Japanese- N,E.l. relations,

B, For example, even though Italy has formed an alliance with Germany and is attacking
the British army this has no direct bearing on the N.E.I, and therefore, the N.E.I, has not
attacked Italy and Italians resident in the N.E.i. are still permitted to carry on business.

C, IS by any chance a w£ur should break out between Japan and Russia as Icmg as Japan did
not commit any hostile acts toward the N.E.I, there should be no fundamental change in the
N.E.L attitude toward Japan. However, in that event Japan would be attacking the Soviet,
which in turn is fighting an enemy of the N,E.I., Germany, and so it would he inevitable that
the N.E.I, would have to further regulate the supply of ci^|llii^ti|i^ tM^g^l^.

D. In case Japan attacks the N .E,I. directly .

2v Om countri^ — — towafiJ England and Am^WfT^*'^^ (garbled mt) .

T^ans, 6-26-41

No. 1091

FROM; Batavia (feigawaj
TO: Tokyo

July 15, 1941
# 632.

Trans. 8-1-41

A-569

No. 1092 .

FROM: Batavia June 2B, 1941

TO: Tokyo {4[aai^l>ef.

Negotiations # 257.

lte:;y«^A^g««^ttliOQs #15*. ' '

I have received your very kind message, and my compatriots, one and all are, in truth thank-
ful beyond words. It is truly beyond us to express how, try as we did with our poor strength, we
were unable to bring about a successful conclusion to the negotiations. As a result of the publi-
cation of the joint communique, I feel sure that here in the Islands there is evidence of a change
for the better in the atmosphere toward Japan, and it is a matter for which our country should
be happy that our Japanese nationals who reside here are too perturbed. We beseech you to
accept otir mf^.he8rtfelt cMigj^t^a^^ i

'Not available.

TVans. 7-1-41

WnAm

WStOMt BtiUm^kM^vra} June 28, 1941

TO: Tokyo #5S6.

'FromHASEGAWAlS').

Wish to retufn to Japan the latter part (rf July upon clom of Japan^-Dutch Society. Request
instructions.

Trans. 7-23-41

No. 1094

FROM: Batavia (J£^ Consul) ' July 15, 1941

TO: Tokyo #637.

(Abstract)

The Mitubishi home office has instructed the local branch office to evacuate the families of
its members. Is this based on the independent decision of the Mitubishi Co., or does it have
imythigg to do with the pending policy of our government which makes such a move necessary?

Trans. 7-16-41

A-570

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. loss

FROM: Ba*aivi«''jJlapiitnege Comiji)
TO: Tokyo

{Request cable,)

To Chief of General Affairs of the Mitubisi Company from Tanaka:

With regard to the matter of evacuating the members of the staffs families, I have b0c^
following the examples set by other business 6rms, and persuading them to return home.

However, as I reported previously, general conditions continue to be calm, and if anytlii&ii^
are taking a turn for the better. For this reason, there are no families which desire to return hoMe
at the present ^asm.

In my humble opinion, 1 do not believe that there is any need for anxiety as to the sa£i^)@f
those Japanese residing here, as long as Japan does not decide to adopt strong measures.

It is my belief that to convey such matter as was contained in your cable, in plain language
text, is to unnecessarily excite the government of the Netherlands East Indies. This has an
exceedingly bad eflect upon the general situation which was gradually developing into a nor-
mal one, and at the same time, it violently interferes with the progress of our pioduction plkOK.

Was that plain language message sent with the approval of our government and as a gesture
of threat against the Netherlands East Indies, in retaliation for the recent export limitations
imposed on us by that government? If it was merely a gesture, it had very little effect on this
country. On the other hand, if Japan is actually planning some strong action, I would imagine
that a message in plain language would give Japanese intentions away to the Netherlands
East Indies.

Please advise me of the actual fact as well as whether or not this geSilBy^saf tiireat ^i^p^
used as an excuse to get the families out of here. I shall await your reply.

Trans, 7-16-41

July 15, 1941

No. um

FROM: Batavia June 27, 1941

TO: Tokyo #553.

(1) On the 27th, after the departtife of Minister Yoshizawa and party, HofslBfilSten espreased
the following desires to me in regard to Colonels Maeda and Oga, and Lt. Cel. labii. As he has
repeatedly told me confidentially, the Army has not been pleased over these army officers
being here, and in ^4e#iSf'tMfa^ thftt in fcJs mnveJMfioia witfe Mfti an the 27th, Yoshizam
told the Governor General that the remaining members of the party would leave on the next
ship (and this is a fact), he would like to have the above meniipned three individuals take
passage on the Asama Mara that is scheduled to leave 3 July. ~'

(2) I told him that the N.E.I, government had been advised about a week the said
three will be leaving on the Kitano Maru 15 July, and that at that time no objedS^ to this has
been expressed, and I asked for the reasons for the sudden (change?). Hofstraaten then ex-
plained that the coming of military members in the party should have been refused at the very
outset of negotiations, but that for the sake of not giving affront to the Japanese government,
special consent had been pvMi, However, judging from their conduct wne^ tfefin it lUft'lS^^ilife

evHliSait' i^t they Itavf motB ei^zo«eed in the ins^ietion of alipcti^^ the N.E I'. thfks

A-571

in the business pertaining to the negotiations. As a result, serious criticism has been coming
to the government from the military authorities in all sectioi^ of the country, and this has led
to the demand by the government *

Trans. 7-1-41

FROM: Tokyo July 3, 1941

TO: Batavia (Riyoji) #365,

Re your #560".

The N.E.I, government answered that according to instructions they had received it would
be impossible to grant permission but the reasons were not stated clearly. Is this a refusal to
permit EGUCHI' to return or is it the policy of the N.E.I. government in the future not to
recognize Japanese military and naval langUijp #adent officera? Please take thk point Mp
with the proper authorities and wire the result.

■Not available.

'Lieutenant Commander, I.J.N. (?)

Trans. 7-14-41

No. 1098

FROM: Batavia (Consul) July 9, 1941

TO: Tokyo #S96.

{A bstract)

Re your # 368".

Netherlands Indies objects to having (Vice Consul) Takenaka return to N.E.I, because of his
previous connection with the radical elements among the natives. Please consider api)ointing

•Not available.

No. im

^OM:
TO:

Batavia
Tokyo

July 18, 1941
#645.

According to spy report, in addition to the recently completed air field at BUTTENZORG',
two military air fields are being constructed at TAKGERAN' and RANGKASBITOENG'. The
«ipplementary lm^mMM^ 0MiW^^Wy> M

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

an air field of a much greater scale than the above is, I understand, being built. The details will
be sent % pail.

"South of B»t«fig,

'West of Serang.
'Western tip of Java.

Trans.

m^tm

FROM: Batavia July 18, 1941

TO: Tokyo #648.

According to spy information, there are two United States Naval ofliceH stationed in a certain
section of Soerabaja and Java (one arrive about two months ago and the other more recently).
There are also British and Australian army officers (the British officer arrived from Singapore)
who are stationed respectively in Bandon and Batavia. I understand that these officers are
giving military training. 1 suppose that at various points in the island there are many officers
in addition to the above who are serving as either instructors or liaison officers,,

■**ri&8.?-23-41

No. 1101

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) July 23, 1941

TO: Tokyo #667.

According to intelligences (Chinese report) the British commander-in-chief of the Far East
forces, Brooke-Popham, and U.S. Naval aviation officer, Normer, are in this area at present.
It is further reported that one ofhcer each from the Australian Army and Navy came to Soef-
abaja several days ago and will remain here as instructors in military affairs.

No. U02

FROM: Soerabaja (KohriJ July 18, 1941

TO: Tokyo #296.

{Request telegram ) .

Please transmit the following to the Provisions Company.

We would like to be entrusted by you with the purchase of Java rice on the followiciig

terms: Quantity, up to 2,00& tcms; ship to be supplied by you; price and time of shipment,
time you wish in July or August, 9.10 yen; and August or September 9.20 yen; local consump-
tion is active; market for futures is inactive; July and September, inclusive, 9.35 yen; October
to December, indusive 9.95 yen. Because of a general rise in the price in purchasing price,
there m littte pcfMp^t^'Of « decUnev M mxmgetamts axe made qukklj, it might h% possible ^

arrange the business according to the aforementioned terms. However, if time is lost, rice in
stock will be, without doubt, consumed locally. Will you, therefore make arrangements at

matt.

No. 1X03

FROM: Batavia^
TO: Tokyo

(Separate Message.)

Re Part 3 of my #6l4'.

The following are examples of how the Dutt:h East Indian Government has subjected uadS'
cancellations or postponements on export license agreements which had been consummated.

(1) Palm Oil: Because io January of this year the quantity to be exported to Japan was
limited to 1,000 tons annually, all of the 1,150 tons which were contracted for by "TOZAN-
NOJI" were unavoidably cancelled. Of the 1,140 tons which remained to be shipped to MITSUI
during January to May, we were finally able after various parleys to obtain permission to ship
190 tons up to the end of February. After that everything was atoned, but rfit^nl^^.fsstait^
in my message *f 603*, we were able to get 500 tons more. '

(2) Kapok: In June of this year, the exportable quaBti*? fSWI *««tiri«*ed ti^ -500 tons per
month; that is, 3500 tons for the period June to December, ^«^lli?fe ik8.«*^Sl#

about 1, 100 tons to various companies had to be cancelled.

(3) Tannin: From Mangroves, etc. In spite c£ the fact that export licenses for about 2,000
tons had been agreed upon for June, half of this quantity was not allowed to be shipped.

(4) Scrap Iron: In March the Dutch East Indies Government suddenly limited the export^
able quantity to Jap^utO i^^OO ton* per month, arsd in spite of the fact that busim^a transa^
tions had already been entered into, all quantities exceeding the above had to he cancelled.

(5) Rubber: In February rubber shipments were restricted to 1,650 tons per month, and all
in excess of that amount have been held up.

(6) Kopra: Because of sudden restrictions placed upon this by the- Dutch East Indian govern-
ment, Japanese tirms in the Celebes have been forced tphold on the spot about 13,000 tons which

i 8p$^%tU«t ^m^Mek^m^^^m^fssntmcts^ for.

"Notiivaitehl*,

\o. 1 104

FROM: Tokyo July 17, 1941

IMi *Wm^' #390 (?K

(Secret.)

Regarding the conditions attached to the Netherlands government's final reply which re-
dueea the xnbb«i;«^!nf^ j^. Ji^E^ $9

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

tion is contrary to the agreement entered into last year at Tokyo between the Foreign Minister
and Ambassador Pabst, and that as the above agreement, was based on the preliminary talks
between DO. ROSU and myself, this matter more or less concerns us both and for this reason,
reconsideration is in order to restore the amount to the original 20,000 tons. Whereupon "DO"
agreed to take up this matter with "PA" at once. Subsequently, "DO" informed ANKHA that
he had received a reply from "PA" stating that our claim was justified and that he will try to
make necessfU^ adjustment.

(2) On the same occasion, in answer to "DO's" question, ANRHA explained that as a result
of direct German- Vichy negotiations, the 10,000 tons of rubber, out of 25,000 tons purchased,
which had been shipped to Kobe, has been designated designated as the pfOp^y of the Germaft
government, and aH.hough it should already be on its way to Germany, its present whereabouts
is not known. Also, that the remaining 15,000 tons which is supposed to go to Japan is held up
in JVench liii*»43ima on the ground that there is no rubber on band which can be spared, and
that the negotiations for the 35,000 tons to be bought from Thailand ("DO" is said to ht(90
information regarding these negotiations) have not yet resulted in any definite agreement.

Trans. 7-19-41

No. 1105

FROM: Tokyo July 18, 1941

Reymjf #6l4*,part3.

The contracted articles are to be exported as eoon as possible. Although ships were reserved
until the 5th of this month, permits were issued for sailings before the 20th from Japan proper.
The NICHB^AN MARU and the CHIRUBUTO are the ships assigned to the Netherlands East

Ttam. 7-23-41

No. im

FROM: Batavit|W6S«iW# J^uly % 1941

TO: Tokyo #686.

In regard to permitting the use of only English and Japanese in telephone conversations to
the Dutch East Indies, the Dutch East Indies Government says that if we prohibit the use of
Dutch in such intematJonal telephone calls, they may also prohibit the use of Japanese. As
there are many Japanese resident In the Dutch East Indies, such a restriction would be very
inconvenient. I think, therefore, that when the new system is inaugurated on August 1st, it
would be advisable also to recognize the use of Dutch,

A-575

No. 1 107

FROM: Tokyo July 31, 1941 "

TO: Batavia #473.

(Strictly confidential.)

Regarding your message # 686°.

As a matter of practice we have been permitting the use of the £>atc& language. Moreover,
tCft'JI^!^ been making snangements to announce a revision in the order within a few days.

Jta ispite of these facts we were advised on th& 29tli, that the Netherlands Bast Indies is paco-
hibiting the use of the Japanese language.

The Ministry of Comm«B8to*K«ns now advises tJ»'ai«(ilf?f^iB|f^fif^Wtiations fern ^mv^moit^
of this order proves to be unsuccessful, it is ready to completely suspend telephonic eomiauni-^
cations between Japan and the Netherlands East Indies.

We shall not announce any revis^. |pi t^»i <wder uptH yott have eolOpleted your negotiatiflsis*
Ple^B, th^efc»«, advise us of the regulte of the negotiationfl as soon as they are available.

Trwft. 8-7-41

No. 1108

FROM: Batavia July 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo # 687.

Secret outside the Department.

1. Every time the Netherlands Indies officials have mentioned the matter I have taken the
opportunity to endeavor to sound out their views concerning the attitude which the Island
Government is taking on the French Indo-China question. On the 25th when I conferred with
the Secretary of Economics, VAN MOOK, he made no reference to this subject, but on the
26th when I conferred with Chief UTUHEREN of the Immigration Office, the latter said: "The
Qccupation by Japan of southern French Indo-China has further damaged Japanese relations
with England and the United States, and if war breaks out between Japan and England, the
Netherlands will have to fight side by side with England. I am very anxious because of this
turn of events." As a personal surmise, I stated: "Well, you know how the [ 'niiod States and
the Chinese were hindering Japan from procuring French Indo-Chinese goods, li was doubtless
in order to stop this that Japan carried on negotiations with Vichy." U. asked: "If that is so, why
were you so anxious to get military bases?" I replied: "You know how England and the United
States have been increasing their assistance to China and you know what happened in Syria.
If we had let French Indo-China alone, England would have brought her economically and
militarily under British influence and would not have been long about it. That must be why
Japan took this action." U, shook his head, saying: "No, you must be wrong. I cannot think
that of England and the United States. I am very much grieved." I hastened to reassure hiitt.
by saying: "Well, in any case, we are not likely immediately to see the outbreak of war be-
tween Japan and England. I don't think this will have any direct effect upon the Netherlands
Indies. All we Japanese want is to see an increasing am% ligi%#{||!l twft 'igaB^i^S^* 0i
merely looked chagrined and confused* .

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

2. On the 24th Chief RrTTOMAN" of the Jntelligfince Section told a group of Japanese news
reporters that in his personal opinion Great Beitain would not start a war with Japan over this
isftu©.

ly taciturn.

4. Chief HOOGSTRATEN is now away on vacation but while we were negotiating I once
heard him strongly declare: "Occupation of north French Indo-China by Japanese forces would
not constitute a direct threat to Netherlands India, but if Japanese troops were to proceed to
the southern part, they would indeed be a threat to these islands and we could not overloolt it."

6. 1 have kept my eyes fixed upon the Governor's mansion and on the evening of the 25th the
yard was a parking ground for many, many automobiles belonging to high officials.

6. I wanted to congratulate the new member of the Council of the Indies, VAN DER PURASU",
so on the mommg of the 26th I called him up to ask when I might visit him, and he replied: "You
do not know how very busy I am. I would appreciate it if we could postpone this interviewiitetil'
the 29th."

7. bi short, it seems that the Netherlands Indies Government is deeply and maturely con-
sidering its new ^at we h*w W l^ia is all fo* the
moment.

Relayed to Ausftftttil, , -"^i Sdigk^fc liCinila.

°Kana spelling.
No. 1109

FROM; Batavia (Isizawa) July 12, 1941

TO: Tokyo #612,

When I saw HOOGSTRATEN, Commerce Bureau Chief, as mentioned in separate message
#613°, he stressed that the Netherland indies Government consider this a very important
question. He hopefully requested in a pressing manner, that Japan soon hand over the mining
machinery to the Netherlanders. 1 answered that I knew nothing about this, but I would inquire
into the conditions and confer with him again. Please make a, survey of the supply and then
reply, giving ttoi ism m vMeh I aiSi ft» auswKf <

Belayed feet' ■ ■ ■

'l^otavMlalbfe.

Trans. 7-24-41

A-577

NO.UI0

Shanghai July 22, 1941

TO: Tokyo #131S.

Re my #1219°.

1. The unloading of the cargo in question was postponed for some time after my previous
report but was finally completed in three days beginning on the 14th. Investigation by special-
ists revealed that, as reported by the Netherlands authorities, the cargo consists of textile
machinery. It was found also that this machinery was ordered through the Arnold Company
by the Junh^ Textile Works in Sainan, but, because it was not shipped in time, the contract
was cancelled; that this company had kept the machinery in the warehouse belonging to the
Bank of China, and that subsequently the Netherlands Government had purclmsed it. Thus,
illl suspicion as to its being the property of the Chungking regime was cleared.

' 2. A formal protest has been filed by the Consulates of both Britain and the Netherlands. In
ftdSitibn to this, the Java- China Trading Company has addressed a request directly to the
gendarmerie for immediate settlement Q±'^4f.9W^i|gj*.jSojpMjueo%^ g3iJjd»rB9«rie made
the following proposal to the company:

(1) Since an attempt was made to export the machinery in question, in spite of the fact that
no permit had been issued for the purpose and the fact that the Army authorities had given
warning on four different occasions, if judged on the basis of military regulations, it should
logically be confiscated. However, the authorities are considering its release as a special favor
and would like, in return, to have the Netherlands firms cooperate with the Japanese hereafter
in the purchase of materials by the Japanese government. If the Netherlanders agree to offering
such cooperation, the Japanese authorities will offer special faclM#s ftttije time ttm remainiiog
part of the cargo in question will be exported.

(2) Also, the Netherlands authorities should promise that the machinery in question will
not be transferred to the Chungking authorities after its release.

The Netherlgnds authorities accepted these terms. Now we are discussing the details of the
question. It is tfm intention to release this machinery immediately upon our having com-
pleted our consideration. I would like to have this matter transmitted at your dlBcretion.

'Not available.

No.IlU

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa)
TO: Tokyo

lie your #386*.

(1) I gave reply to the official in charge at the Finance Ministry, as per your reference mes-
sa^, and on the 21st on the occasion of my visiting MO" on other business, MO laid great
emphasis on the fact that they desire a speedy settlement of this matter. I then explained to
him, on the ^ams of Shanghai's #1229' to Tokyo, how the vessei Canton had made difficult
*=^¥*^^SfflB^M^^f^^e«lfl^ta^y by acting eontfatj*'** the orders of the water police, and also how the
reasonal^^ffiife of our contention in view of the fact that the CHUGOKIJ Bank is a bank be-
longing ^tife^ to the Chungking side. However, as MO insisted that the machine in question

July 23, 1941
#668.

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEAKL HARBOR

was the possession of the Netherlands East tttdies, and would not see our point, I told Mm that

this is really a matter that should be handled throuf^h Minister Pabst in Toliyo.

(2) 11" this, with other incidents involving the Dutch that have arisen in China is found to be
entirely the fatilt of the Dutch, there might be no necessity of showing leniency, but if such is
not the case, 1 think it would be highly desirable to try to reach a settlement quickly that
would be reasonable to both sides, if the Dutch are not convinced as to the reasonableness of
our method erf handling this matter, we must remember that there are countless matters
P^^ining to the supply of important N.E.I, products to Japan, and in connection with the busi-
nesses and enterprises of 7,000 Japanese residents, regarding which we are dependent upon
the good will of the N.E.I. Government, If we should provolw the Dutch into taking retaliatory
measures against these interests, it would be a most unwise course, involving extensive losses.

Please give careful thought to all these points and undertake to reach a speedy settlement
of the matter in question.

'VanMook,
'Not availabl**

Trans. 7-29-41

No. 1112

''mmm July25,1941
TO: Tokyo *m.

To Shanghai mM0^' Be my # 612".

On the 25th Director "MO" (Van Mook) said that he had had a telegram from the Dutch
Authorities in Shanghai to the eifect that the spirming* machinery had been released and he
said that he wisired to express his tTianka to the authorities there and to the Japanese govern-
ment for their fair i^atm^t.

° Jap Minister Isizawa wires Tokyo that Commerce Chief Hoogstraaten has requested, in a preS^feg iaajiner, that

die mining mmhmery be handed over to the K.E.I. Government, Reqius^ils instruttions. SeeH, llOS,
*A one letter garble would make this "mining" machinery referred to in reierence.

Trans. 7-29-41

No. 1113

FROM: Batavia July 28, 1941

Re my #696".

1. Let us compare the steps taken by Batavia with those taken by WashijSgfem and Londonj
{ 1 ) Batavia has not abrogated their commercial pacts-

(2) She has not detained our ships,

(3) The Government has neither by statement nor implication directly censtired us.

(4) They show an inclination to interpret this general export quota system in such a way as
to let us procure the goods we have already contracted for and appear ready to show lenienQr in
ia3&1iac0^Lt)^iMf$tr us with goods.

A-579

So we can see that they are a little more lax than are England and the United States. And
yet, essentially beyond any doubt they are one link in the Anglo-American-Netherlands chain
oi economic encirclement. The only thing is that they hesitate to deliberately insult us. They
do not consider it wise to invite a military attack by Japan upon their islands, All"S^ are
doing is hiding behind this export quota system to keep out of danger.

2. On the 28th in a conversation 1 had with VAN MOOK he said: "K the Japanese do not
0^li^i^#|jE$fflaelves in a manner suitable to us in the future, we will surely exercise a com-
ftotd economic blockade. We will surely join up with England and there is a possibility th&t we
n&Ky'^ so far as to conclude with the United States and England a military alliance."

°Not available.

Trans. 7-30^1

No. 1U4

FROM: Batavift July 31, 1941

TO; T<35»9 #713^

During the evening of the 30th, Hofstraafc6Bffl6f^liti*l fir^ his vaimtion and requested that I
call on him, I caUed at his official residence atod ^iaeassed matters with him for a period of over
twohoms; .

I mi rf^e e|}iai<fe 'te^'tfte stffejiSfcts disetiSSBrf^fl^iJe of the sjfe&iart'iinportance. It is a matter
of extreme urgency, I believe, for us to draw up a fundamental policy with regard tn out rela-
tion with the Netherlands East Indies and this talk I had with Hofstraaten should have con-
siderable bearing upon it.

As I reported during the Japanese -Netherlands trade negotiations when I had occasion t<i
discuss matters with Hofstraaten, I found that directness and clarity were two of his outstand-
ing characteristics. I am convinced that his statements were uncolored espr^ions of the
policies of the government of the Netherlands East In(Hes. In at^ eivent, I am sure that POewiU
not be far wrong if be proceeds under that assumption. _ . . ^ ^ .

Bearing this in minct, vnil you please give your careful attitofefefi to'*liif^Sf«Sj'«(*ni(^i^ft&
of yesterday as they are set forth below:

Hofstraaten: The occupation of the southern part of French Ind(p-China by the Japanese

East Indies must assume that Japanese antagonism is increasing In iisleasSli^.
IsUdfiia; The recent occupa^tion of French Indo-Cfaina was effecl3;tejed' Ih^^lfie of conditions
the world, tn^ w!tfa ^IqE' upnaemti pf th^ ^mmmii^ isf JUi^im. It» purpose was
at of facilitating defense ^«SjglK cpsperation, and nothing more* It not intended to
have any bearing or significance on the Netherlands East Indies.

Hofstraaten: Although you say that there are no ulterior motives involving the Netherlands
East Indies, the fact remains that as long as Japan has army, navy and air bases in the southern
part of French Indo-China, the Netherlands must necessarily completely review her relations
with Japan.

hizawa: The Netherlands East Indies has been loudly boasting that all of her self-defense
arjangements have been completed. Moreover, accorduag to the press the ABCD" joint front
lij^|»3«&tvig^^feai;^^i^il^^ has bden clearly stated that because of

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

these facts there would be nothing to worry about even if Japanese forces did descMwl Upon
them? It doesn't seem as if there should be any cause for diatresa or anxiety.
Hofstraaten: (Makes no reply; maintains silence.)

hizawa: You say that the relations with Japan must be reviewed. What is implied by that?

Hofstraaten: During our trade negotiations, most importance was placed on the prevention
of reexportation of goods to Germany. Now, however, we are compelled to further curtail the
delivery of all military supplies such as petroleum which would have a tendency to strengthen
the military powers of Japan. This may mean that the trade between the Netherlands East
Indies and Japan will be reduced to one fifth of the past figures.

Isizawa: Such a step, of course, would be outrageous and unjust in the extreme. However, if
the Netherlands East Indies defmiteiy adopts such a policy, nothing can be done about it. In
such an event, Japan will, I suppose, have to find some other appropriate means of obtaining
f^$^)|^ntial materials to make up fort^#li^j|^|es&€iea.,
— oleeise relay accmdingly.

Tmm. 8-7-41

No. 1115

FROM: Batavia July 31, 1941

TO; Ttokyo

Re my #713".

CD According to the impressions I received in my conversation with HO ( Hofstraaten)
there is no longer any room for doubt that as long as we are in French Indo-China the Dutch will
consider Japan as an out-and-out enemy nation, and will strengthen their cooperation with
Britain and the United States in devising every possible means of hindering Japan's southward
advance. It therefore becomes absolutely necessary for the Imperial Government to be done with
indecision and to effect counter measures. One day's delay will make our position just that
much more disadvantageous. However, to give the Dutch cause for irritation, at once, after
entering French Indo-China and before our preparations there are completed would be an
unwise policy, and therefore 1 wish the "press campaign" in Japan which resembles a dog
barking at the moon could be entirely eliminated.

(2) I have been avoiding coming out into the open in any steps pertaining to the present
freezing orders, by having Imagawa of the Specie Bank carry on the negotiations with the ad-
ministrative bureau and the Java Bank. Both of these have taken the attitude that if some
definite plan can be worked out which will be satisfactory to both Japan and the Netherlands,
they would be glad to have the Japanese government use its influence for a settlement along
those lines, in the case of Dutch gold. Although the freezing order has been enfe«l*ii-thu8 far,
even the Dutch are being greatly inconvenienced by it; as a matter of fact, on the 31st the
president of the Java Bank complained to Imagawa about the difficulty Dutch firms in Japan

are in, and suggested a loan of 500,000 yen. (Imagawa has sent a cable regarding this).

1 therefore think that if we maintain a calm attitude, there will be some vray of meeting tlie
situation brought about by the freezing order.

(3) Hf^re*^, the present aituatitm in ^apaitefie-Dutch East Indies relations is as I stated in
my reference message, and it is evident that trade between the two countries will become more
and more restricted, while it will become impossible for a considerable proportion of the Japa-
nese residents to carry on busineas- Not onlf iEMt trot the Imperial GoveromeMt, hsmiw tS

A-581

the need of commodities, will naturally be driven into a situation where it will be compelled
to take decisive measures against the Netherlands East Indies.

(4) Because of the above mentioned situation, I would like to give guidance to our resident
subjects at once, along the following lines:

(a) Gather the heads of the Japanese Associations of the various areas, and advise them that
while in the past we have tried our best to pacify the Japanese residents in regard to evacuating,
and while at present it does not seem likely that there will be an outbreak of war at once, still
the possibilities are that it will become more and more difficult for Japanese residents to
engage in their pursuits, and therefore it would be well for each individual to give careful con-
sideration to the matter, and for those who have not the self confidence that they can weather
the gale even when the difficulties become more difficult, it would be wiser for them to dispose
of their places of business and leave now; while it might be wise for those who have a solid basis
for their enterprises and a certain amount oi' stick-to-it-ive-ness to remain and continue with
their businesses for the present and watch developments.

(b) If it becomes evident, regardless of our efforts from now on, that there can be no improve-
ment in Jap«^,^EKl, relations, but they twthiue to worsen, in order to avoid such a disgrace-
ful exhibition as an excited effort to evacuate when it has become too late, t would advise them
to take the initiative in withdrawing early. (Thus far I have been of the opinion that it was
necessary to have our Japanese residents stay till the very last, but judging from recent trends
in the government of the islands, I think that the moment a breaking-off of diplomatic relations
is decided upon, a wholesale arrest of resident Japanese will take place, and it would be very
disadvantageous for us to have our human i^sources in subjects who are acquainted with the
situation here and speak the Malayan languages held by the enemy. It would be better to have
such return to Japan early, keeping a list of their names and addresses, so that in case it should
become necessary to employ force with the Netherlands East Indies these individuals could be
utilized by the military.

(5) The resident Japanese even now are greatly disturbed over Japanese-Netherlands rela-
tions, and if the Japanese ships should stop making calls here, they would immediately be-
come excited, and I would find it impossible to take care of them*'l!}}jiSS|^^ J'iS<3[Ql{|'fiik^

the ships continue to make these calls at least for the present. - • - - » -.,4 •■• v . •-

(6) I am continually being asked for responsible opinion as to what course they should pur-
sue, by Japanese residents in the various areas. Thus far I have been encouraging them to
remain, but the trend among them now seems to be in the direction of speedy evacuation, I
think therefore that it would be wise to give them advice along the lines of a definite policy and
to begin from now on evacuating them as occasions permit,

(7) Please give these points your careful consideration and advise me on the general aspects
of them at least, within about one wieek.

°SeeU, 1114.

Trans. &-7-41

A-582

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEAHL HARBOR

No, 1116

FROM: Batavift
TO: Tokyo

July 31, mi
#714

(In 2 parts — complete.)

1 . On the occasion of my conversations with Hofstraaten on the 30th, I advised him that the
government ot Japan was in the process of reaching a decision with regard to articles already
contracted for by N.E.I, merchants from Japan. In the midst of these discusstom, the Nether-
lands Fjast Indies saw fit to freeze Japan funds. Und«f tibe drcumst^ces, thk was an aatoimd-
mg move on their part, I said.

Hofstraaten said that there was no question for th&^cpet^^ should he granted to goods which
not only had been contracted for but had also been paid for since that constituted the transfer
of title to the Netherlands East Indies side. He added that Japan had not acted justly when she
refused to issue a definite statement in spite i3f ^£S(^ iM:1lus lSr6l^ir|iad^^l^^^
asked for just such a thing time and time again.

Basically speaking, he continued, if Japan had accepted F.O.B. transactions as had been the
custom in the past, this problem probably woul4 not Eav^^ ^iolMai. ^ISebruary of this year,
Japan insisted that payment be for deliveries at warehouses and in cash. The Netherlands
East Indies agreed to these terms. In spite of this, the Japanese on July 7th suddenly pro-
hibited the exporting of goods for which payHStoifelifid even beraa made. This being the csase,
Japan should feel a two-fold responsibility.

At present, he continued the stock of goods held by Netherlands East Indies merchants in
Japan (paid for but as yet unshipped) amount to 12 million guilders (about 25 million fen)*
J£ this becomes a total loss, it is feared that it may be the final straw as far as those roerehaftte
are concerned,

Oai#ie «tti«r hffiii, dK^ti^ 'tliti' Btit(& marehantd'^^^ tt i^e time^ $1^

government of the Netherlands East Indies ordered the merchants to submit to the msOSekS^U^
delivery plan, in behah of promoting trade relations between the two countries.

Japan's funds were frozen, he continued, so thai they would he coUatetal in the unlikely
event that these merchants were forced to suffer a loss.

2. I, therefore, said that it was not the intention of Japan to prevent the shipment of goods
for which payments had abeady been made. However, since this was the first instance of
export embargo to any country in the whole wide world by Ja^^ .^036: Wlii» fCgp
definitely settle upon the ways and means of carrying it out.

Ftirthennore, I said, the 12 million guilders referred to by him, was money privately owned
by Ehitch merchants. The money that the government of the Netherlands East Indies froze was
that set up as exchange funds by the government of Japan. Therefore, there was absolutely no
justification in taking such a retaliatory measure. Moreover, when the Netherlands East Indies
government went one step further and proclaimed that all exports would be placed, on a permit
basis, one must assume that an economic war has been declared.

To this Hofstraaten replied that the matter was simply that involving the 12 million guilders.
Therefore, if Japan permitted the Dutch merchants to ship their goods from Japan, the gov-
ernment of the Netherlands East Indies would release ten and several odd millions of guilders
of Japanese funds it was frozen in the Netherlands East Indies, Moreover, the Japanese would
be permitted 1^ '}mf:9^^'-mA i^|(oo#»^(^ iiM Netherlands £!ast Indies and also to ship it

As a result of the Japanese occupation of the southern part of French Indo-China, the Neth-
N-lands ^st bidies Mt a direct tiiceat. £^m t^s ftai^^^iid;, it was deemed to be essential

out.

tfcat emergency measures be adopted. That was why the general license system was put into
^ect. A comparatively strict limitation on the exporting of petroleum and other war materials
"Vdll undoubtedly be obsefved in the future.

3. I said that the Chief of Bureau had assured me that the Netherlands East Indies

had no intention of abrogating the petroleum agreement. The two men, I said, would seem to
be in disagreement on this point, Hofstraaten replied that the petroleum agreement was a
purely civil contract and therefore the government doesn't have to do any abrogating or any-
thing else about it. Even if the agreement continued to be in existence, he said, it would, of
course, have to be subjected to the licensing system. Moreover, the government has no inten-
tion of granting permission to export the undelivered portion of the contract. As to what extent
of this amount would be licensed for exporting, no decision has as yet been reached.

Please relay in accotdance witli .

FROM: Batavia August 1,1941

t^? ^^^^ No number.

There is no doubt remaining now that the Netherlands East Indies will from now on tighten up
restrictions on exports of commodities to Japan, and therefore, we too as one means of counter-
ing this will find it necessary to scheme to prevent the export to the Netherlands Indies of rice,
salt-fish. etc. from Thai and French Indo-China. This will be quite a blow to the KethLTlunds
Indies, especially in the case of salt-fish, which has amounted to one million guilders worth a
y&ar, sent to N,E.I. by Thai and IVench Indo-China together. This is an absolutely essential
artit-le of food to the islanders, and the stopple of its supply will likely give rise to a serious
aocial problem.

In putting these measures into effect, it will of mutae be necessary to beiEr in mind the fact
that most of the export trade from these twO' countries to the Netherlanda East Indto gt^iiiy
way of Singapore, especially the salt-fish,

mmm give study to thi»#p«iil ^^^idel^advise as to results.

Trans. 8-S-41

No. 1118

^OM: Batavia (Isizawa)
tG^: Tokyo

August 2, 1941

Re your # 442'. .

HOOGSTRATTEN and I are already in the midst of negotiations. He would not readily make
concessions at first, but after further conference granted permission, tina once i>nj^* for the
shipment of rubber, tin, and ilmonite.

*N(»t available.

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HA8B0R

No. 1119

FROM:
TOi

August 4, 1941

fm

Jtegardingmy #715".

A. I know that you have the matter under careful study, but to tell the truth the unrest
among our Nationals here in the Netherlands Indies has me worried. I do not seem to be able
to do anything about it. Already 90 people have applied for passage on the Nichu-an Maru
soon to leave here. The Cheribon and the Makasser eacli have a full capacity of 75, but they
have already received 400 apphcations and the applications are still mounting. Representa-
tives of our people asked the South Seas Shipping Company to be sure to let them have the
Johooru Maru and the Nissho Maru to get away on, and the Company informed me confiden-
tially that if the taking on of cargoes can be dispensed with, each vessel can accommodate
1,000 persons.

B. Thing being at this pass, in accordance with what was said in the caption message, I
wish to inform all the chairmen of the Japanese societies in the Islands about the facts. Please
wire me back just as soon as you possibly can. In any case, on the 9th, I and having the chair-
men of these societies convene here, and if I have not fteQ^'J?*^'^ fes^ '^'(i^

jud^ent inmaWi^fittin^statements to them.

"See n, 1115 which described steps to be taken with regard to the Japanese Dutch East Indies freezing orders.

Re my meiSSage # 708*.

Immediately upon hearing rumors of freezing of Japanese funds by the government of the
Netherlands East Indies, those merchants who are sensitive to the upa and downs of the com-
mercial circles, as are the Chinese and Arab traders, were quick to realize that the Japanese
merchants would encounter difficulties in futiue importings and that Japanese merchants
were interested in cash transactions. These persons became active immediately. For the pur-
pose of getting possession of the stocks that Japanese merchants had on hand, starting with
cotton thread and textiles down to every other article, these merchants crowded around our
merchants' establishments. They brought with them mountains of guilder notes to consummate
these deals.

Due to this run, Japanese merchants who had a stock of goods which came in under the im-
port quota were swamped with buyers. Ap^mmUf single sales amounted to as much aa
twenty to thirty thousand guilders.

Because of these undisguised acts on the part of the Chinese and others, the government of
the Netherlands East Indies became acutely aware of the dangers of skyrocketing prices and
at the same time» have an ever present stock of goods. Therefore, on the 30th, an order was
issued pj^ob^bi^i^r il^i^J^^ fsibricat^d melals, and othex arti-

cles.

Trans. 8-9^1

No. 1120

FROM: Betavia

August 1, 1941

mm.

Through that means and also by furth^ restricting by law the fluctuation of costs, the govern-
ment hopes to curb the undercover transactions of the Chinese and other merchants. At the
same time it is evident that uneasiness over the fact that there shall be no more imports from
Japan in daily on the increase. It is also apparent that the government of the Netherlands East
Indies is finding itself in considerable trouble because of this situation.

In view of this situation, I urge that the Japanese make a determined stand and watch ail
opportunity to improve matters in the future.

It also should be noted that the order prohibiting Ibe toj^j^jEtfj^iTOods may eventually have
the same etfect as freezing the funds.

To the Chief of the Trade Bureau.

1. Since the trade negotiations. I have had occasion to discuss various subjects with spolies-
men for the Netherlands East Indies. The subjects included the matters pertaining to the ex-
potrt association; food for the Dutch residents in Japan; shipping out of Japan the goods con-
tracted and paid for by Dutch merchants in Japan, etc.

In every one of these instances I have been requested by the N.E.L merchants to use my good
td^^lMng about a settlement. From the^ facts, I have been und^ llitt IfeHpe^fi^ tlusft
^ey have been putting considerable rebance on the influence contained in ray recomraend-
ItMons. However, there has been something indecisive about the attitude of Japan and the
people affected had no inkling as to when their particular case Would be settled, if ever.

''I am of the opinion that that was responsible for the issuance of the "freezing" order and also
tea ths establishment of the central organ about which I made mention in my message # 734°.
It is my further belief that other previously contemplated steps will be put in effect in turn
from now on.

2. In view of this fact, I believe that we should abandon the policy of putting our sole reliance
in the power of arguments. Instead we should prepare ourselves so that we can retaliate with
acts, any acts directed against us. Paralleling this, we should continue our negotiations.

I, therefore, request that you dispatch your instructions to me, with all possible speed in the
future. If the subject involves several ministries and an immediate decision cannot be made,
will you please advise me of at least the general trend and atmosphere of the discussions. I
shall endeavor, under such circumstances, to inform you of the situation on the scene in the
hope that the information may be used to speed up the reaching of a decision.

"tJot available.

Trans. 8-8-41

No. 1121

FROM: Batavia
Tokyo

August 3, 1941
#732.

'Not available.

Tran^.&i#-#

A-586

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 1122

FROM: B«||y^1P^^ii$>#'
TO: Tt^

(Secret)

Re # 189" sent from the Yokohama Specie Bank branch in this city to its main office.

1. The impression f received from Secretary VAN MOOK and the Chief of the Bureau

relative to the attitude of the Netherlands East Indies Government was, on the whole, the
same as that described in IMAGAWA'S report. I, therefore, believe that we should at this time
procure materials and products from the Netherlands East Indies within the shortest period
possible by use of our funds and adopt the policy outlined in the latter part of the caption tele-
gram for the |)urpose of wiping out the balance of the frozen funds, {we should the enter-
prizes conducted by the Japanese residents in the islands )- The atti-
tude of the authorities here toward Japan has been growing worse every minute ever since our
occupation of French Ind^-China aad wtth the piogre^ of our plans concerning Thailand. ¥^
tbi$ xe^n, if I waste time by waiting for instructions on everything we do, a general embargo
might be imposed, and as a result we should be prevented from procuring the materials which
Ate at present procur^te. Tto WMld tofiftf W tfcft,<liaig«y®l^*fe^B^*SBf funds in the frozen
atate uidefinitely. I would, therefore, like to have you entrust to me and to IMAGAWA all
negotiations relative to this matter, on condition that these negotiations be based upon the
demands we are now making and that vfWJ&$>4m utmost in the work. I wflMM'-^^fiaw^tot lWiir
giving your answer by return wire.

2. Although the Chief of the Exchange Bureau seems to be rather optimistic about future
export of materkls (the last part of 3 in the caption message). Bureau Chief Ho seeias to he
opptwed to aotonly of rubber, tin, and ilmenite, bijfcalaoof palm oil and .

'Not-wvtal&hy.

Ttans. 8-8-41

No. 1123

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) August 4, 1941

TO: Tokyo #749.

The order for freezing recently issued by the Netherlands Government is intended to freeze
funds but not assets. However, since the order issued by us applies to both the funds and assets
of the Netherlanders it gives them an excuse for retaliating against us. There ia a great danger
of their freezing Japanese assets also on the basis of reciprocity. This would prove quite tin-
profitable to us; therefore, I believe the first ihing we should do for the present — setting aside
the question of our future attitude — is to release the guilder funds now being bl^>C^$d and to
apply them for payment of exports to Japan. ~ "

I would like to have you so arrange matters at once with a view to either officially informing
the Netherlands that pur order does not apjplj to assets, or to discuss this question with

the Netttfii^Ql^l^^i^f'li^t^

August 4, 1'Hl
#842,.

A-587

PROM: Batavia (Isizawa)
TO: Tokyo

August 4, 1941

#747.

1 . Today, the 4th, a Chief of Bureau of the Netherlands East Indies Government filed a
request for the transfer of five hundred thousand yen to the Factors" in Japan. Please be ad-
vised that YIMAKIWA has already wired the Yokohama Specie Bank of this matter in wise
# 19 (2 or 6) addressed to the Bank.

Now the freezing regulations were promulgated by both countries as being a comprehensive
measure and having no bearing on individual cases. In view of the fact that these guilds are
doing business in Japan, it would seem to me that they are blundering in not keeping a reserve
in Japanese yen. However, should we not permit the transfer of this sum of money they doubt-
less would take similar action against our banks in these Islands. Such a situation would be
most unfortunate in my opinion. For myself, I plan to carefully point out to the Netherlands
East Indies Government the error of such a course but what we should consider at this time is
the early conversion of our frozen funds into goods. Then we can export those goods.

After this has been done it seems to me quite apparent that we will have to take necessary
measures with regard to the Netherlands Indies. Therefore, I advise patience for a little while
and compliance to their wishes with regard to the transfer of the five hundred thousand yen in
question. This, I think, will be a good plan in precluding the taking of measures by the Nether-
lands Indies Government against the Japanese banks on these Islands.

2. Should YIMAKIWA'S method progress favorably, no problem will arise but should con-
fusion result, since it will be necessary for us to conserve our shipping space, I would tike to
have the entry of the Johol Maru into the harbors of these Islands and the sailing of the Nissho
Maru and later boats postponed.

Since 1 shall wire you again as soon as I have ascertained the attitude of the Netherlands
East Indies authorities, I would like to have you reach some decision subsequent to the receipt
of that message.

"Manager of guild brsnelieB.

Chinese residents in Thailand still maintain anti-Japanese attitude. They are encouraged
to take pro-American and pro-British attitudes. Premature to send representative from the

IVans. 8-^1

No. im

f ROM: Bangkok (Asada)
TO: Tokyo

May 23, 1941
#300.

{A bstract)

lAgpection.

A~588

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HAliBOH

No. 1126

FROM: Bangkok (AiAl»>'
TO: Tokyat

May 20, 1941
#239.

Re your # 266".

At the time I told BORIRAN how much we wanted, he replied that now the mining lots in
the neigh borhoold of Nakon Sawan* are in the hands of Swedish engineers who are engaged in
makitif test borings; and though no calculations of the underground quantities can be made,
everything is now being bandied by experts, and they will send us samples of the ore and a full
report. That is all for tiie time being. Moreover, BORIBAN intimated that there is the prospect
of JapaBsoonopefa^e^&iKi$NM«^Mwftieli^f^ - '

"Notavailabte.

Re paragraph 2 of your #302".

With Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Kohatu as a nucleus, have Mitsui and Mitsubishi take advan-
tage of their connections and purchase inactive rice refineries belonging to Chinese operators
and, by adding to them several of the dft^le;^ doing busing with KObatu, i&cm a guild. Then
secure a comprehensive export permit and assign work tO the respective members of this
guild. This is our plan. Aside from the reasons given in my previous message for the addition
to Chinese dealers, we have in mind giving them an opportunity to do business directly with
those Chinese within the occupied territories and to use this connection in oiu- work of recon-
ciling the Chinese. In regard to this, the two Attaches have made special requests. As to the
concrete s|e|$ ta be taken in forming the guild, it would be neceasary to secure the understand-
ing of theiraiatMcfe eompany. We wiU ct«isi<ler this matter after Secretary SHffiANO returns
from French Indo-China.

As for the situation in this country in connection with the principle of having one company
in each place, please get the details fixtm Secretary AM AD A and Forestry Expert SATO who

Trans. 5^22-41

No. 1127

FROM: Bangkok (Asada)
TO: Tokyo

June 6, 1941
#320.

l^tans. 6-9-41

A-589

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) ^t%,|S4J'»- .

TO: Bangkok (Koshi) #3^.

(Abstract)

We propose the establishment of a jointly managed Thai-Japanese company to mine tin.
Annual potential capacity 6,000 tons, capital about Y 6,000,000 necessary. Tin now shipped to
Penangis to be absorbed by this firm, and entire output to be sent to Japan. Measure to be
adopted to insure regular uninterrupted shipments to Japan. Ascertain the Thai government's
B©sition on this matter and reply promptly.

Trans. 6-12-41

No. 1 129

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 9, 1941

TO: Bangkok (Koshi) #317.

Those concerned are about agreed to the propc^al to use the 100,000 CHARU (Ticals?) to
purchase a two- months prospecting contract, and have all the tin ore mined during that time
sent here. However, Mitsui says that they cannot take definite action until they have a tele-
gram from the engineers there regarding this. When a decision is reached, payment is to be

J^eOO CHARU.

TVans. 6-21-41

No. 1130

FROM: Bangkok JuM 6, 1941

fP@i Tokyo- #317.

Very urgent.

Strictly secret.

With regard to tin mines in Takuapa' and Pakutaku, the local Mitsui organization is cur-
rently negotiating for their purchase. According to a technical report made by the Mitsui
organization, these mines are considered to be quite excellent in quality. Not only would it be
beneficial to the extent that it would give us guarantees for the three staple items tungsten,
tin, and rubber, for which we are now carrying on negotiations. Since it is felt that the estab-
lishment of new enterprises of this type would be particularly beneficial to us, I would like to
have you go to the trouble of negotiating with the Mitsui Home Office so that they will decide
to purchase an option for these mines, md aisa^ .unrangi 1!»itlt .t^fee ft^m^' Ut^gmim&mB^.'M
the necessary exchange permits.

A-590

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No, 1131

FROM: Tt^yo (Matauoka)
TO: Stoigk^.

June 6, 1941
#814.

(Part 2 of 2)".

(1) As for petroleum, we shall supply the amount to be consumed by Thailand after ascer-
taining tlie amount of consumption in that country and on condition that Thailand turnish us
the necessary tankers.

(2) Japan shall demand in the future the entire amount of Thaiese rubber and tin. Thailand
shall do her utmost in arranging to assure the supply, the amount of which has been notified by
Japan, and Japan IMHaiia xa s& Mt m assiatanee is necessary in order to
realize this program.

{a) Japan shall agree to British- Thailand petroleum negotiations on the following condiUons:

a. These negotiations shall be carried on as purely smal^#»^atl&

b. Regardless of whether the petroleum negotiations succeed or not, Thailand shall furnish
Japan with as much as possible of the 35,0O0' tons of tin ore a year. (The actual amount of tin
ore to be supplied Japan will be decided later.)

It is our intention at first to secure 40 of the entire production; namely, about 6,000 tons,
and to eventually secure the entire production. Will you, therefore, take every opportunity to
negotiate with the Thaiese authorities for this purpose and at the same time so instruct the
importers that they would purchase as great an amount as possible? As to the amount of pe-
troleum, we should supply for tte month of June, it will be decided with the British-Thaiese
negotiatiofts in mi^*

"Pari 1 of 2 not. available.
' Apparently error for 15,tHX).

Reyoor #208''<?),

I would like to send to your city by the next airplane. Secretary JURO SUZUKI of the Govern-
ment Planning Board and also YOSIO YOSIDA, official of the Fuel Bureau by having them
respectively act as Foreign Ofiice Secretary and General Aflfairs official. I want to have them
stay there for about one month and have them investigate the present consumption of petrole-
um, as well as have them assist in instructing from behind the scene as much as possible the
way of consuming petroleum. Will you please get in touch with the Thaiese Government and
request them to offer convenient t^^Htese officials may accomplish their mission? In view
of the matter which you have set forth in your # 208°, I would like to have your wire me at once
what sort of treatment the Thaiese Government would give an expert sent by us to that country.

Trans. 6-19-41

No. 1132

P^ROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Ban^iE

June 6, 1941
#315,

Trans. 6-11-41

A-591

Fuithermotjl, it is understood that it is necesssny t&t tiiem to come to a dedj^a ili' soOn as
possible.

Advisor — in this oiiice has ahready given his approval in this matter.

" On west coast oi' Malay peninsula, in Province of Surat, Thailand.

Trans. 6-9-41

No. 1 133

FROM: Bangkok June 6, 1941

TO: Tokyo #315.

Re my 308*.

DIREKKU' has confidentially told me that Great Britain has decided to furnish Thai
with 6,000 tons of petroleum. (Furthermore, according to anpther report she "Riai
with two shipments of 6,000 tons each.)

"Not available.
'Kana fiiwUmg,

m.im

FROM: Tokyo (Matgwkaif June 14, 1941

TO: Bangkok #330.

According to a report from a very reliahle source, the petroleum which is to be supplied to
Thailand from England, will, since business is suspended, be taken in by the Asia Petroleum
Company for the time being, and later on will be loaded for the second time. Hereafter, British
and American companies will work through intimati! UaisOll md cooperation. The Zuuanda-
ato petroleum is backed by the Uttfted States iQw^ioettt.

Furthermore, it would seem that the recently concluded secret pact {contents unknown to
us) between the Chief of the Ptop^pi^da Bureau and the Dutch East Indies officials is not
to be affected by this action.

No. 1135

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 16, 1941

TO: Bangkok #3S3,

§««il'Wtside the (^^im^weM, >

As stated in my #273°, it was decided that all matters having to do with our supplying
petroleum to Thailand should be under the jurisdiction solely of the Foreign Office. I under-
stand that despite the fact that we had clearly informed WANl'lTO* of this decision when he

A-592

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

was visiting Tokyo, the Thaiese government has aubmitted a request to <jur Navy for a supply
of 12,000 tons of crude oil. This is an act disregarding our wishes and, therefore, will you please
inform the Thaiese government that the Japanese government would not consider such
requests when not submitted to the Foreign OflB^,
We have discussed this matter with the Navy.

'Not available.

'Chief of the Trade Binasji,

Trans. 6-18-41

No. 1136

FROM: Tokyo June 13, 1941

TO: &t^b^

When you have a convenient opportunity, please tell Pibul that we desire to Ijaw; NAI,
WANITTO come to -lapan in connection with the ratifying of the arbitration agreement be-
tween Thailand and French Indo-China.

Trans. 6-16-41

No. 1137

FROM; Vichy June 6, 1941

for ' Tokyo #285.

Re your 206".

I have just received a note from the French FM-eign Office «tt^ IfeiSI as soon as

ROBIN'' returns to his post, proceedings will be begun immediately for ratification and that
these proceedings should be concluded by the middle of this month.

"Exchange of ratification of French Indo- China-Thailand peape treaty. (See Vol. 1).
'French Plenipotentiary to French Indo-China.

Trans. 6-7-41

No. 1138

FROM: Bangkok (Futami) June 13, 1941

TO: Tokyo {Gaimudaijin) #335.

Regarding your Circular # 1227°.

Thailand is very anxious to have the ratification take place as soon as possible; by the 27th

"Mediation treaty between Thailand and French Indo-China to be presented to Privy Council in Tokyo on the

Trans- &-21-41

No- 1139

FROM: Tokyo June 21, 1941

TO: Vichy #241,

Action Bangkok as # M7«
(Abstract.)

Regarding my Circular # 1227°:

The Thailand- French Indo- China treaty has been signed by all parties concerned. The
e^schange will take ptoe&M i

"Till^lagtefr&Stthe Thai-French Indo-China mediatioD treaty will be presented to the Privy Council in Tokyo on

■JVsns. 6-24-41

No. 1140

FROM: Bangkok (Futai^l July 11, 1941

TO: Tokyo #401.

Today the Italian Minister called md stated that recently he had had an interview with
Pibul at which time Pibul made the following dbas^^ l^afd^t Span's southern ex-
pansion; "Should not Jap«tt at time advance to the north? Has not the pressure on
south heen alleviate?"

Trans. 7-16-41

No. 1141

FROM: Bangkok June 23, 1941

"I©: fofeyo #350.

(Parti of 2).

Reporting for yotir information on the local situation, as fragments were picked up at th#
time of my call on Pibul when he returned to his post, and during my visit with WANITTO.

(1) It is expected that preparations for the ratification of the border agreement will be
ready in a few days as far as Thailand is concerned, but Pibul seems somewhat uneasy abdUt
ratification by the French. It would also seem that influential British, Americans and
Germans have been telling Pibul that there is danger that some situation will arise thai
will cause the French to withold ratification

When I met him the other day, Pibul told me there were some things he would like to
ascertain about our attitude toward French Indo-China. I told him that in the matter there
will be no change In the future in the policy of the Japanese government. I think what Pibul
fears the most is that our southward policy might weaken and that we niisht back down in our
jpressiu-e on French Indo-China, and especially in the dignified, independent attitude we

h«ve taken toward Britain; and that the British and Anaericatts will this, and the pro-

iarxtiBh-Ameri«an factions accordingly will become more j^ipesiilvst ijB Atir a^vitl^ maiij^

';Sm "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HAJlgOR

Pibul's own position within the country more difficult. I rather think that to some extent the
break- dowat. of negotiations with N.E.I. , and indications of the existence of a type of anti-
Japanese agitation in southern French Indo-China might provide si%texi$il for bettering to

some extent the conditions of the Thai government.

(2) In Matsumiya's" proposal regarding political and economic cooperation between
Japan and Thai, as well as the Mizuno-WANITTO understanding, it is urged that the
economic problems be submitted for consideration by the various firms engaged in the
Iguii^ii^emeonc^imed) wbdtethe ^ti^^^a^Hi tio bei» tibe gmp olWAHITTQ.

(Part 2 of 2i

In regard ixt the rubber item in the Mizuno-WANITTO undCTstanding, when I met Pibtil
the other day, he told me that the British had suggested that the amount of rubber to be fur-
nished Japan should be reduced to 25,000 tons a year, that he personally had no intention
of considering this, but he asked whether the Japanese government could be satisfied wi^
35,000 tons yearly. To this I replied that the more we could get the better, but that if tiie terms
of the agreement reached in Tokyo are carried out, of course, our government would be sat-
isfied. In regard to tin, WANTTTO called yesterday, the 21st, and said that the British
seemed to have no objection to our having up to 2,000 tons of tin ore, and asked how that
would be. I told him that he need no% eyen gsk^ 93., he.w^U kiiQwa that that would not be even
one half of the amount we need.

(3) In regard to the machinations of the British and American faction.^ in this place, as
WAN|TTQ has been bat^ cmly a ihort time and has been very busy, it seems that he has
been ttfeafele to find out ^'(^^e fficts yet, but' what has betet fiM&ito learn, has been re-
ported to me from time to time.

In regard to WANITTO's going to Tokyo this year and he, himself, has not been

able to decide whether it is necessary or whether this is , but he will study it further and

wishes to decide which to do later.

(4) When WANITTO called yesterday reference was made to the question of the establish-
ment of a tin refining plant, but I could see no indications of Thailand's having any reliable
or definite proposals. Only in regard to the matter of a Japanese-Thai joint management,
in the nature of the tin industry in this country, and considering the fact that the ore is secur-
ed from tin mines affiliated with British capital, he sfiid there was opposition id IH^ |^
of a joint managem^t organization.

Titans, 7-2-41

No. 1142

fBOM: Baufkok

June 23, 1941

Trsm. 7-13-41

A-S95

FROM: Bangkok June 20, 1941

TOi Tokyo #346.

Re the last part of my # 344".

1. I understand that the Thaiese Government is now organizing five groups^Two groups
for land surveying; one group for meteorological observation; and two groups for surveying
the Mekong and Mei Rivers.

2. I think that the Japanese Government should increase the number of Japanese joining
the groups and decide on our policy. If it seems necessaJ^ to consult previously with Thailand
«Sfi fttemch Inde"43teia', *e ritaiM 4@ m wWi a view t© deciding on tlife iMiaceiSiaife 1» be taken.

s.^ou please inform me in as detailed a manner as possible the number of Japanese mepi-
t-as well as our concrete plan, as 1 must have this information in order to negotiate

*Not available.

No, 1144

PROM: Bangkok July 2, 1941

TO: Tokyo #380.

To the Chief of the Commerce Bureau.

The Thaiese Government has granted permission to carry out the plan which WANITTO"
discussed during his visit in Tokyo; namely, that of establishing a printing office here under
joint management of the ASANO BUSSAN KAISHA' and the TOPPAN INSATSU KAISHA%
Both the Foreign Ofhce and WANITTO l^e'iaft^tl^ted that we as^t izt having technicians
sent here for the purpose.

"Chief of the Thailand Trade Bureau.

laige Japanese manuf actuxii^ and trading oonc^,
'Aiaxge Japanese printing company.

Trans. 7-11-41

No. 1145

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) June 18, 1941

TO: Bangkok #340,

With reference to the suggestion brought to us SARASASU last year that Japan
invest in the Bangkok Chronicle, the stockholders have now come forward with the suggestion
that this Thaiese language newspaper be placed under our control under the following plan:

A-596

THE fiAG^G^W^O QF PfiA^ HARaOB

1, The original investment of 8,000 bahts be supplemerrted % additional 3,000 by the
stockholders and a fcirther 4,400 bahts by SARASASU, the latter amount to be secretly put
up by us. Tb^|p|pat mmlA eoutittme m#Bi the nominal management of SARASASU and the

company.

2. Necessary supplies and eguipm^t-iEiBr tbe pubHgsil@a».!e{itfl(£l^lij#ljM9^<^
azines to be ordered from Japan.

Aa soon as the above agreement is entered into, Japan is to deposit to the account of
SARASASU in the Bangkok branch of the Yokahama Specie Bank. He will then turn the money
over to the company, sending a temporary receipt ^ ^Jftp^ jfe^ ^SW^lS^g^^ as

can be arranged, for a certificate of transfer.

Trans. 7-12^

No. 1146

FROM : Tokyo ( Foreign Minister)
TO: Bangkok

Re my #340°.

We have appropriated 4,400 Baht' from the secret intelligence funds and are sending it to
you fittr the purchase of the Bangkok Chronicle. PleaiKi handle this matter as stated in the
laat jpart of caption message and wire the result.

"AvaUable, See U, 1145.

Tmm. 7-10-41

No. 1147

FROM: Bangkok July 3, 1941

TO: Shanghai #028..

(Circular).

Action Tokyo as #381.

1. The editor of the Bangkok Ctaronicle, PIAPURIJIYA, is reported to be planning to make a
trip to Japan in the near fature. The said editor has been pro-British in the past and it is re-
ported that his purpose in going to Japan is to collect information in China and Japan and
that for this purpose he is being subsidized by the local British Minister to the extent of 5,000
bahts.

2. While, of course, it is impossible to swallow this report whole I think that this man's past
tendencies should be invested and that special precautions should be taken to keep him under
surveillance. This is for your informati(m<

This has been relayed to Shanghai, Naaking, and Canton.

I^ms. 7-10-41

July 2, 1941

tap

FROM: Bangkok July4, IMl

TO: Tokyo -

(Strictly Secret.)

Re your #340°.

I have not yet received your letter about the matter, so my procedure is not clear; however,
the Bangkok Chronicle has a very small circulation, and I do not believe it has much influence
among the THAIESE. Even if we buy this newspaper, it will still be more or less of a question
whether it will be effective as an organ of propaganda, and also it will be necessary to study
carefully means and methods for controlling the news which it carries and the supervision of its
editorial policy. If you decide on the above, please wire me the details of how the money -telH^
action is to be handled and point out the meoBures whi^^ii shQuld be taken.

"AvAilablii.SMjJ, 1145.

Ti^, 7-9741

No. 1149

FEOM: Tokyo June 17, 1941

'Tb; Bangkok #339.

(Secret outside Department.)

Please let me Isow, at once, the monthly purchases for this year of Thailand rubber by Ger-
man firms. ' «

Trans. 6-18-41

No. 1150

FROM: Tokyo June 17, 1941

TO: Bangkok #336.

(Abstract)

From Rubber Importing League to NIPPON JINDOGYOKAI.

British company is reported to have instructed its agents to buy up Thailand rubber for ex-
port to Malaya at a price higher than the existing market price at Singapore. In return for which
tifely will ship foodstuff and machinery to Bangkok. Please check up on the validity of this re-
port, and also take steps to assure supply of rubber to Japan and prevent its goii^ to Malaya.

Trsos. 6-21-41

A-598

No. 1151

reOM: Tokyo July 11, 1941

TO: Bangkok #390.

According to reports firom sour<^ in whidi we have a great confidence, negotiations are going
on between the U.S. and T^iailand for an agreement to exchange manufactured rubb^ goods
for raw rubber.

Trans. 7-11-41

No. 1152

FROM: Bangkok (Futami) June 30. 1941

1?0s #374.

According to the proposal dated November 21, 1940, and based on the principles set forth in

the Japan-Thaiese compensatory and settlement agreement, export to Thailand of Japanese
products amounts to 130,000,000 yen. How is the possible limit of Japanese exports to Thailand
estimated in the face of the changing situation, both domestic and foreign? I would appreciate
your wiring me details as well as the estimate of such exports. Futhermore, if our object is to
secure for ourselves, for example, 400,000 tons of rice (at 224 yen per unit, f.o.b.); 6,000 tons of
tin ore (at 48,000 yen per unit); 56,0(K) tons of rubber (at 2,450 yen per unit); and 6,000 tons of
tungsten ore (at 7fi,000 yen per unit); the total, according to the current price level, would be
the enormous sum of 208,000,000 yen. Then, there is salt to be imported. I believe it is necessary
to consider carefully how we are going to pay for all this.

Trans. 7-3-41

No. iisa

FROM: Bangkok ' MyHlMl

P>; . #403.

(Sea«t within the Depeurtmeat.)

Separate telepfHR.

Resume of the British-Thailand f^treement.

Petroleum Pri)diictfi

(1) (Great Britain guarantees to supply) :

Kerosene oil (?) Kilotons

Motor oil 2500 Kilotons
Diesel oil 5000 Kilotons
"Gas" oil 1000 Kilotons

Private aviation oil Normal consumption amount -

Military aviation oil Normal consumption amount
Crude oil 5000 Kik)tons
Rehned oil Usual required axnount

(2) All above at C.I.F. prices.

(3) Great Britain guarantees to supply the above (something about black oil— undecipher-
able).

(4) Great Britain tOifawEWtee transportation, Thai to furnish the "S.S. SAMUI" for that
purpose.

(5) Hitherto existing regulations regarding 0U ;&ito(WSeS&tl»jS!'4^lS%*^^^

and new control measures mutually adopted.

(6) Thaiknd includes in her stipulatieoiit ^Adivering rubhet to Britain that Britain fun^^

her with i^unnysacks.

(7) There will be no restrictions to commerce in fertilizers.

(8) The minimum quantity to be shipped to Britain, 18,000 tons. Up td mM^Wsm^ i^l^
tion may be supplied but in n<i event will a total of 48,000 tons be exceeded.

(9) The price will be at the Malay rate of per 100 kilos up to 135 "baato".

(10) Within two months after the expiration of this agreement, neither these risstrictions nor
any other (special agreements excepted) will remain in force.

(11) Thailand will send reports in the market price of rubber to Great Britain from time to
time. ' '

(12) It is underatood th^^l. is to be furnished in esdaga^ fear p&farCfl^utn
products.

( 13) The Thai government agrees not to use arsy of the above purchases for re-expcrt,

(14) They are comdfir jng.--~'?^|p!!^^teM^^ tmj^ fiwa Mslf^ C^ite puW^i at th«

pore price.

(15) This agreement effective for one year.

No. 1154

PEOM:
TO

Bangkok (Futami)

July 12, 1941

Be 0Qndition& in tills ootiA^ fi;£k»9iNi ^nouncement «f tMliw^^ations held is W^^^

(1) At the time the said conversations were brought about, there ^ulte a stir among
people with all kinds of celebrations and demonstrations, but this fixcit^^ among both gov-
ernment officials and the people has suddenly cooled off recently, and ever since the govern-
ment some time hadk made its statement about restoring to normal its relations with Great
Britain which had become (Translator's note: This sentence badly garbled) ^ if they should
now revive their traditional principle of equality and good will for all nations, the French Indo-

China problem would be utilized advance would suffer a setback, relations between Japan

and Thai in general would enter a period of reaction^ and conditions looMng toward the future
would be anything but reassuring.

i^)-. jfe connection, we might notice the attitude of the Thai Government as revealed in
tSBWiisat contacts. When WANITTO returned from Tokyo the very first question he was asked by
Pibul is said to have been — when is Japan going into Singapore? Before this, during negotiations
regarding rubber and tin BOLDPZN (?) had made the remark that "If Japan is going into
Singapore soon, the rubber and tin will all be furnished to Japan." When we asked what he
meant by that he explained that "If Japan puts up an unyielding front to Great Britain, all

However, aince then the matter of rubber and tin which at one time seemed to have reached
a settlement at 38,400 tons, and then later at about 35,000 tons, of late has now drepped to
30,000 tfsm — — (garbled out).

Trana. 7-31-41

No. 11.55

FROM: Bangkok immA),
TO: Tokyo

Reports

Previously Britain had requested the Thailand government to withdraw the currency that
it now had in Amerlii& promised its assistance with regard to Thailand getting supplies
from America, however, no definite conclusion has been reached as yet. At this time, Thailand
is making the following negotiations through its Minister in Central America and also through
the director of the Central America branch of the Thailand overseas company.

1. They have ordered one freighter of the 5000 ton class and several freighters (number not
clear) of the 2000 ton class and smaller. Payment of $500,000 to be made from funds Thailand
has on hand in America.

2. Payment for oil purchased from Britain to be made from the same source.

3. Delivery of the bombers ordered (which are now being held in the Philippines) or return
of the purchase price*

The above has been proposed to America which in turn has ffiade the following ]»qtiests but
apparently they have not yet been accepted.

1. The non-exclusion ^CSfetSsfianity.

2. That Thailand form no secret foreto towSe itgieemeiit with a third country.

3. The exchange of intelligence.

Particularly in regard to problems in the Orient, l^at HiaUand take pains to collect infor-
mation and turn this over to the Ame|i€«a iMinistsr.. {As for etainple, Thmland reports regard-
ing the recent conference in Tokyo.)

I'mmu 7-18-41

No. 1 1,%

FROM: Tokyo July 16, 1941

TO: Bangfei^ ^ #400.

Based upon the second article of the Tokyo-Bangkok Amity Treaty, it is about time we estab-
hshed a commission. You said that your # 198° of last year that the Thaiese expressed approval.
Ambassador MATSUMIYA and WANITTO' worked out a proposal for making more intimate
rel^tioSt tliMNlt^^ Japan and Thai, even going so far as suggesting the personnel of the Thaiese
Commission. But then things took a bad turn because Thai refused to reveal to us the con-
tents of her negotiations with England, the United States, and the Netherlands concemiag
petroleum and rubber, particularly with respect to joint ownership of the areas concerned. It
even looks like they might now resume these talks with Great Britain, If they do what you said
in your # 389°, there are srnre to be bad results; therefore, let us immediately have a Japanese*
Tlmiese commission organized. Negotiate personally witii Premier PIBUL and see if you cannot

July 15, 1941
#410.

A-601

work out a prospectus for joint Japanese-Thaiese rights and interests. Not only would this bring
about a closer rapprochement between our two countries, but will result in mutual benefits.
You know by exercising the power of such a commission as this we can get all our nejgotiatipns
through quickly. You will be our chief representative, assisted by the Military and Naval
Attache, together with two first-class secretaries (UCHIYAMA has finished his job and he, too,
can serve as a representative). Thus, we will have five negotiators. (In case of necessity, Ad-
■¥186^ ONO and other can sit with the Council of Specialists.) We want, if possible, to get
l^eraier PIBUL to be the main Thajese negotiator but, if he cannot, be sure to get some man
who is known to favor this sort of deal with Japan. Please ask PIBUL strongly to realize this
pi^po^iLl immediately and wu'e me back the results.

° Not available.

Trans. 7-21-41

No. 1157

FROM: Bangkok (Asada) May 16, 1941

TO: Tokyo " #275.

Recently near the border of Malay.-<to«[. *e ^ilSgora, there have been signs of considerable
unrest. Therefore, in order that prompt eomUJUnicatioiM may be received, please reply by
telegraph concerning the possibiiteiw.^ #*lMishittg radio communication in the Consulate
General in Singora.

Trans. 5-22-41

No. 1158

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Bangkok

Re your #275".

it is possible to establish a two-way radio communication with Canton as a relay point, but

it is necessary to have machines, aerial and equipment. At this time it is very diflScult to carry
this out secretly and it is the policy of this Consulate not to make the installation.

■Seen, 1157.

Trans. 5-22-41

May 20, 1941
#276.

No. 1159

ERQM: Tokyo
Tbi Bangkok

July 21, 1941
#415.

Re your # 396°.

To Technician Hashimoto from the Director of the Industrial Bureau, as follows:

Select a site 3 or 4 kilometers farther west than the aerials for the 100 kilowatt broadcasters

for the BIIMAN building: site and then negotiate with the Thailand communications bureau

and reply Immediately about the result.

Strictly Secret.
Re my #403'.

Negotiations were begun with Vichy on the 14th. Unanimity was reached on the 21st and on
the 22nd exchange of documents took place. Immediate negotiations were begun in Hanoi, and
on the ^rd a comprehensive agreement was signed. Thus the matter was settled. At noon on
on the 26th we will publish a statement concerning an agreement for the joint defense of French
Indo- China described in my separate #428°. We think, however, that prior to publishing this
statement the Thaiese {government ought to be apprised of the facts and circumstances. Will
you please read over well my caption message and then at 6:00 p.m., Thaiese time, go and tell
PIBUL'' confidentially the contents of our statement. Please wire me back what he says. We
feel that the publication of this event will have quite an effiect upon the pec^k of Thai. We feel
that thlH must be minimized as much as possible, so please t|1^'HBt^4<^-fei^^ hi$ people,
which we feel him quite capable of doing. Tell him this;

1. It goes without saying that this joint defense understanding is not aimed at Thai and that
the traditional friendship between Bangkok and Tokyo will not be affected one whit.

2. Japan is not changed in the sUghest in her eagerness to continue to cooperate in the eco-
nomic development of Thai.

3. The reason why we are^«iqg^ t^tlti 4td¥All# M is because Japimeise-
Thaiese relations are so intimate.

'Not available,

'Prime Minister of Thailand.

'Not available.

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Bangkok

#427.

IVans. 7-28-41

A-eos

PROM: Bangkok July 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo #449.

(Secret outside the office).

Re your message it All".

I immediately called on PIBUL and explained the matter to him in accordance with your
instructions, at the same time adding that I was telling him privately in accordance with in.-
stmctions from the Imperial Government because j^ #&l^li^teUy friendly relati^
Japan and Siam. PIBUL expressed his deep appreciation. He showed m me^mm. m^M. I^Stdlt
of the conversations but said that it was all right.

*i«|IIt44^:baw)ii«:HT9iiy^8j.veBB!aiigkokadvani%i^^ Indo-China.

Trans. 8-^8-41

No. 1162

FROM: Bi^n^gkols July 26, 1941

'tCJ: '^C%0' #450.

(Parti of 2)'.

As stated in my #422* relating to the British-Thaiese negotiations, the British are to supply
Thailand with 21,520 kilotons of petroleum products during the year in return for rubber, tin,
and other products. This means that ptg; df m«ids upon Thailand regarding oil, tin, etc., can-
not be carried out. " ^' ' "

The real object of these negotiatfbijfe^fe to obtain Thailand's needs for oil from Britain. If,
then, we insist on the accomplishment of our original demands, it will be impossible for the
negotiations to go through, with the probable result that Thailand will have to call on us for
all other requirements.

In accordance with the decision of our cabinet and the purport of memoranda issued by
Chief of the Commerce Office MIZUHO and of WANITTO, the situation will be handled as

■^fefl^^^^^J^hB^ding British-Thaiese negotiations to oil, lubber, and tin ore.
*Not available.

T^ans. 7'-31-4'l

No. 1 163

FROM: Bangkok (Futami) July 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo #450.

(Very Urgent).

(Part 2 of 2)'.

1. Negotiations between England and Thailand should be started as soon as possible. See to
it that Great Britakia|;£^l^^lS[I>^|>«S^ti» heaip iiek$ and oii dtuffl^ ^ta

A-604

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

2. We will have to be satisfied with the 30,000 kilotons of rubber which Thailand is reserving

for us and plan to make up the shortage by increasing the amount from French Tndo-China.

3. It is of first importance that Thailand guarantee us a minimum of 6,000 kiiotons of tin ore.
"4; "Since the British-Hiaiese negotiations apply for one year only, I want you to reserve the

right to demand Thailand's entire output of rubber and tin in the future. For the present, do
not do anything to discourage the British-Thaiese negotiations, and rather than make a contract
ft»'#^tipSilated amount of these products for ourselves, simply negotiate to secure whatever
qiiantity is necessary to fill oiar present requirments. However, it is quite possible that because
of the political attitude of the two countries toward our occupation of French Indo- China the
agrwaMasl between England and Thailand may not materialize. If this happens there ^ff lfe'
no necessity for our making the above above concession in our demands upon Thailand.

Whatever we do will depend upon actual events. For the present, please manage as above.
K you have any opinion on ttie matter, please let me have it.

Tians. 7-30-41

No. 1164

FROM: Tokyo (Corrected Translation.)
TO: Bangkok

Secret outside the Department.

Re your #450".

You may handle the matter as you suggest but, listen, we absolutely must have at least
35,000 tons of rubber and at least 6,000 tons of tin. i mean we must get 3,000 tons of rubber each
mcsnth and 500 tons of tin. Please make them accept this dema^.

"Saen. 1163.

FROM: Tokyd July 15» 1941

m Bangkt^ #396.

Re your #395',

In regard to the Mizuno-WANITTO understand^g, we have had formal negotiations with
Britain regarding oil, and America has promised 35,000 tons of rubber and as large an amount
of tin ore as it is possible to supply, hence in order to insure a supply of rubber and tin from
Thailand, in spite of the fact that we have no obligation to do so, it may be well to supply
Thailand with the 12,000 tons of oil which she needs at this time in view of the fact that we
urgently need supplies from her and also in view of the state of relations existing between
Mpm M 'ShgM^ now as stated in y&m telegram # 398'. However, in mimn tm supplying

July 28. 1941
#440.

this 12,000 tons of oil needed by Thailand, we will want definite assurances of a change of atti-
tude on her part and also an assurance of a supply of at least 35,000 tons of rubber a year and
6,000 tons of tin ore a year. From now on we will want to begin importing 3,000 tons of rubber a
month and 500 tons of tin ore a month. With this understanding that Thailand guaiantees
the above supply of commodities we will supply the oil.
It will take about two weeks to complete loading the oil.

'Mot available
1154,

Trans. 7-1S-41

No. U6S

mmii Teitsw 15365^). Juiy22, 1941

TO: Bai^ok #41i,
(Secret out^dte^B^iiBttBiMH^).
Re part 1 of your # 421".

You may negotiate on the basis of the line ymi indicated. However, according to infor-
mation from , if the coupon system is made more lenient and if the production is increased,

a total of 80,000 tons a year is possible. Therefore, we should demand 42,000 tons for the year
and hold to demanding 35,000 tons as the minimum. 70,000 tons would be all right for tin
ore. However, WANITTO' claims that 15,000 tons is the figure for tin concentrate produced in
Thailand and does not repr^Stet t%fe efciatf^ of ore. Our investigate ihows that 13,000 tons
is the quantity of ore and that the production of tin is about 25,000 to 26,000 a year. Since
there is a noticeable discrepancy in the figures, will you please check up on them and in our
final proposal demand 40 % of the total amount.

'Hot available.

Trans. 7-2$-41

1 1

No. 1167

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) July 36, 1941

TO: Bangkok # 434.

According to a press report, not long ago Thai concluded an economic pact with Prance.
Please inti|i^^;#^ inim«iU$li]^^l^dei^/t^,^t^ in^e^i^;^];^ true,
thereof.

Tram, 7-29-41

A-606

THJi "MAGIC" BACKGBOUND OF PEL^iRL HAB80R

No. 116g

FROM: Bangkok (Futami)
TO? Tokyo

July 29, 1941
#460.

Re your #434".

The agreement between Thailand and French tndo- China is an agreement (ratified at
Saigon July 19) regarding the circulation of money and the transfer of negotiable documents
as provided for in Article 9 of the peace treaty signed in Tokyo between ThaUaaid and French
Indo-China, It provides for the time and method of payment of the 600,000 piastres and abo
for passage through the new territories. (A copy of the French text will be sent by air mail).

"*'AG«i^i^ pre«i«epOTt, wrt long ispo Thai cpnoluded an economic p#0_.iv^.PrKn(», Pi«ase investigate this
mM0^t^Mi'^m htuM wh«itiier or aot it is tfue, ako the g^t, thtmi" BmMiiSm,

1. On the 25th, yesterday, the following notice was given by the Thaiese National Bank to
Fukuda, manager of the Yokohama Specie Bank here. Aa regards the plan of selling 260,000
pounds in t-t to be sent to London in order to raise a fund in baatu with which to purchase
Thaiese rice, if the British bank {The National Provincial Bank) should refuse to purchase
the same, and consequently its payment to the Thaiese National Bank becomes an impossibil-
ity, the latter bank would like to have a written pfromise to the effect that the Yokohama Specife
Bank will be responsible for the payment.^

2. Yesterday afternoon when Adiviscff QNO conferred with PURAJITTO", he asked the latter
about this matter. Tlie i»ply wSft tluat PORAJrTTO i^ Bi* fciiow *^?ttites

look into it at once.

3. As it looks now, this request was not prompted by an order issued by the British authorities;
it is an aspect of Thaiese diplomacy in coping with our occupation of French Indo-China.
It would also be very serious should Great Britain, foHoWH^ the exsmjiJjB of the United
States, decide to issue an order for freezing funds.

4. If you have anything that I should know with reference to the Freezing of Japan's funds,
please wire It to me. WiU you ali^G tyiua^^tt tto message immediately to the Finance Minis-
try.

^Advisor of the National Bank of Thailand,

No. 1169

FROM: Bangkok (Futami)
TO: Tokyo

July 26, 1&41

#448.

Trans, 8-5-41

A-60t

No. 1170

FROM: Tokyo (Toyqdn) . July 28, 1941

TO: Bangkok ' ' #439.

(To be kept secret outside the office. )

Refer to your message #448°.

1. In regard to the 200,000 pounds, we are waiting for a report from the Yokohama Specie
BMe, after which we will telegraph you.

2, As a result of the recent fund freezing by England and the United States, it is feared that we
will be unable to buy Siamese products by means of either pounds or dollars. However, as
Japan absolutely need& Bidmet^ UedWber, tin, etc., please negotiate with Siam to have lasx
accept as a provisional measure payment in free yen until the conclusion of the pending
agreement on methods of payment. Telegraph me the results of your negotiations as soon as
possible. ' • '

'Seen, im
No, 1171

EEOM: Bangkok July 29, 1941

TO: Tokyo #459.

Re paragraph 2 of your #43-(?).

In spite of the fact that our assets have been frozen in England and the United States is
there any grounds for negotiating the use of "free yen" in Thailand? If the use of "free yen"

Tram. 8-1-41

No. 1172

WmUi Tokyo (ToyOKfe?' ^ . July 30, 1041

TO: Bangkok #444.

Reference your #459°.

Because of the rapidly changing situation it is desired that you settle for Siamese goods
in gold yen. The value of the yen in gold has been estimated as Yen 4.80 per ounce. This
figure was arrived at by taking into consideration the following points: the present market value
of the batu*, the fact that gold is worth $35.00 pea ounce in the United States, and that
#i« t^ue of the yen in the Uttil^ Stages Is Si^Ae c^ts. I sMt «!ice Ims^

for pfayment in a later message.

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Please cany out the measures in paragraph "N" of my # 442" which referred to the payment

of school fees of students sent by the Bureau of fhe South Seas, and in paragraph **lEp ?tf
# 411' which made inquiry of the date of your return to Japan.

'See n, 1171, in which Bangkok requests Tokyo to wire immediately how there can go abouL anSn^g for "barter"
if the use of "free yen" is prohibited.
'Siamese monetary unit.
'Not available.

Tram. 8-^1

* U, S, GOVERNMENT PHWTIHa OFFICE ; IBIS O - 244-a21 Vol, n Ft,2

I -

A-609